THE USE OF ARTILLERY IN SUPPORT OF AN ARMY COUNTERATTACK, INFORMATION COLLECTION OF THE ARTILLERY NO. 49, 1959

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402890001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 28, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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.,~,. , ,SUM
COUNTRY ; USSR
''The Use of Artillery in Support of an Arn~y
Counterattack", Information Collection of
the Artillery No. T+9, 1959
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Preface
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TOP SECRET
The Collection is designed for generals and officers from
comrjander of artillery of a corps, commandi
artillery division (comrnandi n8 officer oP an
and higher. n8 officer of an engineer brigade)
Generals and officers of engineer brigades, staffs of
artillery corps, armies and military districts haw:,
to-know and the appropriate clearances are +ng a need-
study and use the present Collection. ~8O Permitted to
The following took part in vorki
Collection: General_ ng uP materials for the
General-Mayor of Artil~leor Af Artillery M, T. Glushkov and
of Military Science Colonels Ap.AY AYeinskiy' Docent-Candidates
Colonels V. P. Godrlevich, Yu A, ~ r~OY and I? Ye? Rak}~il,
Orlov, ~1. A . Pavlov ~OV, V ? A ? Kotelltin, A. A.
3hlsarubski Candidates of Military Science Colonels P. F.
Y and I. A. Sholokhov, Lieutenant-;olonel P. S. Ivanov,
Mayor y. I. Yes in, and Engineer-Captain A. N. Samorodov.
The artillery staff requests generals and officers to forward
their comments on the contents of the present Collection.
Editor-in-Chief
Colonel-General of Artillery
G? S. Kariofilli
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The Use of Artiller ir. Su rt of an
Counterattack
(Issue 49/1959)
Present-day fire, Which is basically composed of mass
(massirovanyy) atomic strikes, produces a direct effect on the
aims of a counterattack and the methods of its realization.
With the mass use of atomic Weapons before a counterattack,
the task may be not only the utter destruction of the penetrating
our~tr~,r,~p+~' but also it create the necessar,; conditions for
_ _ ., go over to the offensive.
IP in the_past the coition for a counterattack was the
creation of initial superiority in forces and resources in a
given direction, in present-day conditions this superiority can
be attained by mass atomic strikes 88ainst the main grouping oP
the enesly penetration. This excludes the necessity for complicated
regrouping of forces in the direction of a counterattack and permits
this to be executed from the march and sometimes from various
directions.
By inflicting considerable losses on the enemy grouping by
fire (primarily with atomic q.trikea) and by a sharp change in the
relative strength of forces and resources in our favor, it is
possible to carry out flank and frontal counterattacks, On ma,gy
occasions the carrying out of a frontal counterattack is more
advantageous, as it assures Pram the very beginning the coarplete
destruction of the main gr~,uping of the enemy.
In order to preserve our own troops from possible atomic
attack by the enemy and to ensure the Possibility of operations
under the conditions of the employment oP atomic weapons, counter-
attacks at night will be employed frequently.
in a count~,erla tackehaveflu~nced ~hC~at userofions of troops
its fire. artillery and
The necessary condition of success for a counterattack is to
obtain fire superiority over the ene~-, in the first place
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superiority in atomic weapons which would prever~ any mass atom;c
strikes against the troops of our counterattacking grouping. There-
fore one of the main tasks of artillery, in cooperation with air-
craft, is the destruc?ion of the enemy mans of atomic attack.
T:;e ac uis it ion c; `
9 fire superiority by the time of the counter-
a*.+.`:ck i~ obtaine3 by continaots combat with the weapons of atomic
.~t'_a,?t~ ~u:d artillery cf tt:e er~er._;r during the defensive operation,
i~~il;r~ t.,,th atC[Ti^ ar~3 ,:;,nverticna_ artillery shells. As a rule,
a_ . -~r.wl~~ disc;,vered merry means of atc*aic attack should be destroyed
i~;:c,rdiately before ttie counterattack. The allocation of atomic
st:eli5 Yur this parpose must Ue prcvidPd for, and also the fire
of tube artillery with amaunition with conventional charges east
be employed.
Another, no-less-in~portara condition is the destruction oP
t2ie enemy grouping's penetration in order to make a decisive
alteration in the relative strength of forces in our favor in the
direction of the counterattack.
This afic can to attained above all by a mass atomic strike of
all Weapons of the a:-:ny and else by s considerable part of the
weapons un3er commend of the front.
The experience gained in exercises shoos that a mass atomic
strike can secure the aims of a counterattack if it is not ?inited
to the framework of the widtY. and depth of the tasks of the counter-
atta~king troops, but also covers the reserves and atomic ~.eapons
of tt:e ene,ay, that is the entire stain grouping of his troops.
The scale of the massing of atomic weapons, the objectives
for dz~tructi.~n in s mass atomic strike and its extent in frontage
ti: ^ i?; jepti~ are jetel:zined depending on the tasks of the counter-
a?tacking troops, the availability of atorta c weapons, and the
groui,irig and a.ct.ions of the enegy troops.
A rrrass atorri ~ strike, represents, in present-day conditions,
+-ire gain content of the artillery preparation for a counterattack.
Com~ent.ional artillery fire is supplementary to the atomic st.,-tkA~
a,ia is used principally for the destruction of objectives and
targets that are not destroyed by atomic weapons.
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Looking at the question this way, the ca~y~g aut oP an
artillery pxP~tion o4Y appe~. different from what it has seemed
up to now.
In order to ensure the forward sovement and deployment of
troops for a counterattack, a mass atosic strike against newly
discovered mesas of atomic attack, as well sa
points and the reserves of the a against large control
the forward soveaent of troo ~' can ~ carried out even before
line of de to Pd from the areal they occupy to the
P yment. At the same time it L advisable to neutralize,
by fire of conventional artil,lerys r1I eneap- art111e2.y sad radio-
technical means of intelligence also the night vision devices of
the enesy it the counterattack is at night. _
With the soveaent of the troops to the line of
or with their appro~h towa,:,d it, it is advisable ~ bo~nt~
ob3ectivea of the lssediate assault with atasic and con~tio~nal
c~'8es ? ~e destruction of the enaq by another setbod is not
excluded.
Ttte duration sad makeup of artillery preparation for acounter-
attsck in each specific case will be d,ete~ed
partly by the nature of LZ3e t by the situation,
of the a mop ?~~ti~; by the co~osition
ne~- troop moping, the avdilabill.ty of atomic v~espona,
and the sethod of their eap2oysent.
ZL the codmterattaak is earrisd Doti !'~ the aarch sad the
tsslt of the artillery is to support the tt~arrard sov~e and
of troops, the artillery preparation cad be sore ~p1o~-oent
ith~th~e~~8 a ~+unterattaclc trop a positSon of dira~ctoontact
? Tlnally, if there is a shortage of atomic weapons
the artillery preperation for a counterattack can consist oP '
several pavertul eoncxntratioos of fire (ogney~yr ~tal.et~ ~
aramxnttlon wlth conventional and ehesical eha~s ~
It is ads-lasble to .
with Quiak?act hem with the use o! chemical munition
in6 toxic substances is the first coceentration of
fire carried out against enes~y artillery and s~rtar batteries,
radiotechnical equipsieat, aai cossmnd Data ~ order to increase
tthe ~61'ee of dasage. tk~der t~awrab~li~tsorological conditions,
resotely pieced artille~?y iea sad ob~ectivea on
smmuni~tipn of the troop operatioaa cs~i be dealt with by chemical
chat'?ed ~~ peraisteat tosie substances.
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The timing of the last concentration of fire should coincide
with the movement out of the troops to the line of de to
should be carried out mainly against the P ant' and
the assault and against ene :.nmediate objectives of
my artillery.
The artille y preparation for a counterattack, in all cases,
must be powerful and as short as possible in order
bigger element of surprise of troo to produce a
the shortening of the duration of the ~rti~es. At the same time
not be detrimental to the resolution of the ta'sksre~ation should
it is necessary to inflict such destruction on the ene all cases,
mss, and fire means that our troops can then overc~ at ih empower,
speed the resistance ~f the large units of the first echelon of
the enemy and carry their efforts into the depth of the enemy
disposition.
During the period of artillery pre
will be made of atomic air bursts. ~eParation the greatest use
is advisable both as a beans of inflicti~ehea these explosions
eaea~y tz'oops and also ensuring freedom of maneuveroforsour own cing
t='oops. The use of surface bursts oa the nearest enemy objectives
will be limited, owing to the high radioactive contamination of
the terrain, Bad moat in all cases be coordinated with troop
operatiras. pthe~ise, it is not impossible that on going over
to the offensive the troops will be obli
with a high _tevel of radiation and suffe~ ~stif ed los8es~~~
Atomic surface bursts, with a ste
ene~r, can be used to inflict ~ wind blowing toward the
particularly reserves movi foe ~ t~'gets in the depth,
weapons, large command ~ ~, troops, long-range atomic
on the flanks of the zonesof ~~oteher e:iemy ob?+,ectives located
P Aerations.
Artillery support of the trooDB duri
carr a ou n8 a counterattac?: is
Y art ery fire both with atomic ammunition as well
as eassunition with a conventional charge. Dur
mein task of the artillery will be the destzl:cti~ontofsnewlyod the
appearing and surviving means of atomic attack
brought forward, and other targets or ~ reserves being
preventing the advance of our troops. pockets of resistance,
During the course of the artille
attack, atomic ammunition can be rY support of a counter_
most important en used in the destruction of the
wen ~ ~' objectives such as, for example, atomic
~ ,reserves being brought forward,, especiaily- a='mored. etc.
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It is most characteristic in this period to deliver a single
(with one atc?mic missile) or a group (with several atomic missiles)
of atomic strikes in order to destroy the most important targets
sand ob~ectivea of the enemy. A large number of tasks of direct
fire support for the troops will. probably be decided by conventional
and light rocket artillery (legkays reaktivnaye artilleriye).
The methods of conducting the fire of contientional artillery
will depend first of all on the results of the artillery preparation.
If during the artillery preparation, the main grouping of the
enemy has suffered decisive damage from a mass atomic strike, the
main method of support would appear to be concentrated and massed
fire on request to neutralize the asst itaportaat eneaq ob3~ctives,
and also the fire of separate batteries sad guns.
If the enemy hoe not been sufficiently hurt, especially the
troops of his first ecbelon, the artillery support can at first be
implemented by successive concentrations of fire against the main
centers of enemy resistance, on the surPiving and newly spotted
artillery and mortar batteries, and other targets and objectives.
Crest importance ie assumed by the timely discovery sad destruction
of the antitsalc weapons of the enemy, including his tanks. This
is conditioned by the fact that the basis of the counterattacking
grouping of our troops will consist of tsa]c large units (units)
and on their succeaR will, in many Ways, depend the success in
carrying out the task sa a ale.
During the development of the offensive, the support of the
counterattacking troops is carried out by a concentrated and
massed fire of sll types of artillery against newly spotted
targets and ob~ectivea preventing the forward movement of the
tanks and motorized infantiy.
During this period, special attention should be paid to
securing the flanks of the counterattacking troops e-nd to degying
the enemy movement oP tanks, men, and fire means froaa the depth
and along the front in the direction of the counterattack. At
the same time it should be taken into account, that under
conditions of the mutual use of atomic Weapons, the solution of
this problem must not be limited to the area of troop operations
but must also include the !`larks. On the flanks, in the first
instance, enemy artillery means of atomic attack and reserves
should be destroyed.
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The most important ta3k oP the artillery is the consolidation
and support of the lines reached by the troops as a result of the
counterattack.
One of the main conditions for the effective use of artillery
fire in a counterattack is the continuous use of reconnaissance in
all its forms both before the front and on the flanks ~f the counter-
attacking troops. Reconnaissance of enemy atomic weapons, armored
troops, and artillery must be carried out particularly thoroughly.
With this aim in view the army artillery headquarters must make
wide use of aerial and radar reconnaissance. _
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' During the implementation of the counterattack, our troops
m4Y be aub~ected to attacks by enenp- reserves moving up. Artillery,
therefore, moat be in constant readiness to destroy enengr reserves
in the areas of concentration and on the ~oarah, sa well as to repulse
the attacks of these reserves fry any direction. For this purpose
the comamander of army artillery ffiust switch the fire of missile
units, and when necessary move them.
In the conduct of a counterattack at night, besides the
functions already stated, at the time of artillez-y suppo~~ ~
artillEry organi~.es for the illumination o! the terrain and of
separate targets (objectives), the placing of light beacons, sad
combat with enemy night-vision equipment.
The illumination is usually carried out by separate batteries
(platoons) detached from the complement of the artillery groups.
At the same time, in order to conceal the direction of operations
of the main grouping of the troops, the illumination must be
carried out on a unified plan and as far. as possible on a wide
front .
The destruction of enemy night-vision equipment is carried
out by the fire of all artillery and in the first instance by the
fire of the escorting artillery operating in the battle lornation
of the troops.
The auccessfbl carrying out oP artillery masks in support of
a counterattack requires thorough planning of fts fire.
There are cansidersble shortcomings in carrying out this teak,
as experience shows. For example, the planaing~of art~eTy fire
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with atomic ansnunition sometimes is limited simply to
the allocation of ammunition in sccor3ance with selected variants
of troop operations.
? In present-day conditions, with the high dynamic of troop
operations, the planning and preparation of fire. and movement of
artillery in the interests of a counterattack must be carried out
immediately after the decision of the army commander on a defensive
operation.
It must be taken into account, that although in the past a
counterattack was delivered most frequently during the sFCOnd
twenty-four hours of a defensive operation, in present-day conditions,
with the rapid tempos of the enemy attack, the necessity for a
counterattack may arise even in the first day of a defensive
operation. Consequently, the preparation for a counterattack
during the course of the operation will be implemented, as a rule,
in a short time. Therefore, all necessary and possible measures
for the artillery preparation in support of a counterattack must
be carried out during the preparation period for the defensive
operatioan. ,
In accordance with the planned variants of carrying out the
counterattack and the projected expenditure of atomic ammunition
to be used in each of the directions, the ob~ectiv+es for atomic
strikes are selected, as well as the sectors of fire for
conventional artillery. In addition to that, in the absence up
to a given moment of intelligence inforsatioa about the enengr,
the selection of objectives (sectors of fire) care be carried out
on the basis of aaalysia of the tasks of the troops in the counter-
attack, possible actions and groupings of enemy troops, and the
nature of the terrain.
Subsequently, arising from the tasks of the artillery, the
~:.a :.f reconnaisssace of the enaa~y are determined, the movement
of artillery-is planned, and engineer preparation and topographic-
geodetic preparation of the combat formations are carried out.
ltaturally, at the ti~ae of carrying out the counterattack the
situation may turn out to be different from chat it was assumed
to be during the planning, and significant alterations to the
artillery fire plan will be required. It will be advisable to
introduce these additions according to the progress of the combat
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operations, and the commander of artillery and the array artillery
headquarters must always be fully aware of the situation and of
the decisions taken by the army commander, must know the availability
and degrre of readiness of atomic ammunition, the location and status
of artillery and missile units, as well as directly controling the
movement of the artillery.
In conditions of mutual employment of atomic Weapons by both
sides, the use of artillery to support the operations of the troops
carrying out a counterattack will have a different aspect.
A Wida artillery maneuver in the direction of the counterattack
is now accompanie3 by greater difficulties and losses than Was the
case in operations before the employment of atomic r+eapons, because
a maneuver can be detected fairly easily and be prevented by an
enemy possessing the necessary means of reconnaissance and weapons
of mass destruction. Besides this, to execute a maneuver~of
artillery from other directions and make preparations for its
firing requires considerable time, which may not be possible with
troop operations fromn the march. Therefore the concentration oP
artillery fire in the direction of the counterattack will be
carried out primarily by the use~of a wide maneuver of fire of
the artillery stationed in other directions. A maneuver of fire
can be carried out in as undoubtedly shorter period of time than
a maneuver of artillery and: contributes to a greater extent to
the achievement of surprise for the counterattack. In this case,
artillery losses from eneapr fire, and especially from atomic strikes,
scan be reduced greatly, in comparison with losses during the carrying
out of an art111ery maneuver in the direction of the counterattack.
The greatest poasibilitiee for maneuver of fire are poeseased
by the missile units, as well ~ long-range conventional artillery.
It can be considered that these Weapons will become the main ones
in the support of troops in a counterattack.
The movement of missile units atd long-range conventional
artillery during a defensive operation must conform strict~y- to
the planned variants and time periods of the counterattack, in
order that readiness to open fire is ensured even before the
beginning of the movement of troops, from the areas they oc~spy,
to the line of deployment.
In order to support a counterattack, the artillery of the ~
large units carrying out the co?.uiteratt~ack can also be brought in.
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The forward movement of this artiller, to firing positions in
front of the line of deployment must be carried out somewhat earlier
than the forward movement of the troops. This will allow it to be
used in carrying out tasks in the interest of supporting the move-
ment of the counterattacking grouping to the line of deployment,
its deployment in battle order, and going over to the assault.
The experience of exercises shows, that for the occupation
by the artillery of firing positions and fire preparations, on the
average up to 1.5 hours is needed, and sometimes more. Consequently,
in order that the artillery of the large units of the second echelons
and reserves carrying out the counterattack should be able to take
part in the artillery preparation, it must begin its forward move-
ment to its designated siting areas approximately 2 hours before
the columns of motorized infantry and tanks.
In order to reduce the period of preparation for opening fire
of the divisional artillery, it is essential that the topographical
preparation of the artillery and the planning of its firing tasks
for the period oP the artillery preparation and support of the
troops carrying out the counterattack should be completed in good
time during the course of the defensive operation. A.~ter a decision
is reached for a counterattack, possible changes is the fire plan
must be passed immediately to the divisional artillery commanders
and commanders of artillery groups, if possible, before the move-
ment of the artillery forward to the firing positions.
In carrying out s counterattack is w 3~rection not envisaged
in the plea, the topographical preparation for the artillery is
.accomplished by accelerated methods on maps or small-scale serial
photographs, as well as with the wide use of auto-mechanical means
of topographical tying in. The tasks are passed to the artillery
by all means of communicatior. available, primarily by radio or by
brief battle orders.
The forward movement of divisional artillery must be carried
out in q concealed manner, along routes prescribed for the forward
movement of combined-arms columns, but under favorable conditions
and along independent routes.
To reduce the time for forward moveme^t of artillery and to
reduce possible losses by enemy fire, its forward movement must
be carried out in approximately the same manner as for combined-
arms large units, i.e., from the areas of concentration to the
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line of deployment of the regiments into battalion columns, t OX1-H U M
artillery group$ move along regimental routes, then from this line
they must break up into columns of battalions (divizion) and move
with these columns along battalion (batalonn
firing positions assigned in Front of the line)Qf commitment, the
The timely foz~war-d movement of divisional
line of deployment is artillery to the
is available, ensuri possible if a sufficient number of routes
ng the movement along them of the artillery.
To ensure the simultaneous occupation by the artillery of
the firing positions and simultaneous readiness to 0
is advisable to form the artille Pen fire, it
battalions. whose fire I'Y columns in such a ve4Y that the
Hain line of resistancepshuuldnmov~ev~tbthe headstof thecoltumnshe
of the artillery groups. Besides this, with these aims in view
it is advisable that the Firing positions of battalions in the
Groups ~~ when possible of batteries in the battalions} st~uld
be echeloned in depth, selecting them in closest proximity to the
routes of sovemeIIt.
The movement of divisional artillery to the line of deployment
~~ the ~lirery of a counterattack frpn the
carried out in such a vqy-that the ant{4. march must be
units move u e~nk reserves of the large
P lmmedietely after the leading detachments.
the cover of these leading detachments and the ~ sad, under
~'tillery, the artille ~k-destroyer
~ ry belonging to the artillery groups moves
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