THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF FIELD COMMAND OF A FRONT, BY COLONEL K. PASHUK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402910001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 4, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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The t7rganizatio~ial : tructure
Field Co nd of a Front
bye
Colonel Y. Pashuk, Chief of the Q~.arational
Directorate of the Headquarters of a
Military District
The wary great changes which have been taking place
in the postwar period in the Tana and aethods of arced
conflict and, under the iaf lueac? o! these, is the
organizational structure o! troops have not, in tact,
affected coasand eleaeats (organ upravleaiya). The
organization o! iiwld cogmand o! an stay and of a
front has regained essentially the sue a~ it was in
the years of gorld Yar II. Cert~-ia additions sad
changes which have taken p2ac? in recent years have
brought nothing basically ne? to the organization of
field comaands.
The organizational structur? and equipaent o2
operational staffs (shtab) ?hlch exist at the present
tics haoe resulted in a certain contradiction with
awdern requiregents. They licit the combat capabilities
oS troops, and they are in tact a brake on the achieve-
~eat by the troops of high speeds in the conduct of
operations. This is evident i! only fro^ the following.
The presence o! nuclear-missile weapons is a front
psrn~ts the fulfillment of operational tasks, not to
mention tactical tasks, io a ~.tter of ainu*es. Yet
to collect and collate the !acts o2 the situation it
the headquarters o! the front tapes several hours,
and is even they an excessive strain on its officers.
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At the present time , combined-arms large units
(eoyedineniye} are at constant combat raadiaeea,
determined by the titnQ necessary far the assembly of
a large unit when the alert is received and for
it$ soeemeat out lrorn its permanent die position .
(dielokats iya3 points. Army headquarters (shtab)
however do not possess such a degree of readiness
sad, is general, are insufficiently adzpted to work
under field conditions, which, naturally, limits the
combat capabilities of army formations (obyedineniye) .
Theme ~aost irnpor tan V conditions !or ensuring firm
control 02 trc-ops ar8 high rncbility, the maneuverability
of headgtitarters (shtab} , anti their ef3ective anti-atomic
protection. But how can there be talk of anti-atomic
protection, of mobility, or of the maneuverability of
the headquarters {shtab} of a front and as army if they
are billetted in 4 tent camp on eaercis~e? This
situation is considered normal, for during critiques
~i ezercises one can hear observations and ob~sctions
only to the fact that there are very sang tents sad
that they are not in the right order.
A broad discussion of the questions of organization
sad equipping of the elements for the control of troops
tad o! the organization and equipping of control points
(pain]cty upravleaiya) is necessary. It seems to us that
?ithout the correct solution of these questions it is
impossible to achieve a significant increase of the
coabat readiness of troops.
Ia our article we deal witr several questions of
the organizational structure e* a f ie ld of a front .
Fist of all, we~avill att6mpt to define the basic
pr .nciples upon-which this structure must be based.
In our view, th+e organizational structure o1 a
Held command of a front must proceed from the release
of the commander of troops of a front, to the mazisus
eztsat, from the decision of questions which are sot
directly connected with tha cosbat activity of the troops.
'~- SECREZ
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The cc~r.~m~?~der crust hay a suii is i4.:y.t t i~ae for study and
Sor this choice oY the best methods of dRCiding the
basic c?,ureat and Suture (perspektivnyy) tasks o! the
operation.
Mfith the existing organization, this requirement
ie not met. In the front 3ie1d comra.and there are 18
indtpeadent directar~ates, staffs {shtab), sad depart-
~oente Cotdel) subordinated directly to the troop
commander. Under such an arganization, the troop
commander is comp~+lled to cut himse 1# oi! systematically
from the immediate directloa o! operations artance. It
decide amass a! questians o! secondary iazpo
is completely understandable that he is not. in a
powi'tion to listen to all those making reports and to
give then eahauetive and concrete instructions. Besides
this, with the existence o! such a quantity of
depart~-ents in the front ! ie ld command, the solution
of sny question by one of the departments requires its
coordination with numerous other departments, which leads
to a great waste of time and effort. In consequence,
the Yront field command works !or a considerable time
not !or the tro~US but !or itself , which des not help
the operational sit is iency o! ?Le direction in any may .
Ia order to ensure stable and continuous control
o! troops, given the pr?~?nt means and methods o! combat,
the front field commend must be streamlined to the
saaciawa. The large and unwieldy aeadquarters (shtab) ,
with the compleaents wa nee at present, would be unequal
to the teaks o3 firm control of troops in the ?fret
serious test. Clumsy and ?mmobile, they previde a
s~stea ^! no pore than su~.~ariicial and stemiag control
of ~vapg, to say nothing of their vulnerability, and
of their consequent short tenure o! file. How can one
to Lc of the operational efficiency and mobility of the
lrcrnt !'eld command, if its composition, not counting
servicing personnel, considerably exceeds 1000 men? In
our view, the strength o! th? command o! a front should
be reduced by at least 3-4 times. However, this will
be possible only i! the magi~ua use is madam i~ the
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front ! ie Id com.~aud of the vex ions means vi automat ion .
111tDAout this, under present conditions, it is, in
general, difficult to achieve real operational
etYic iency in the work ;o! h?adquarters and to eliminate
multiplicity in the control oY troops.
In speaking of the means o! automation, we have
in view, Yirst of all, those means whose introduction
is already entirely possible at the present time;
ae lector co~unicat ions (selektornaya sFyaz) , portable
recaru~ng equipr~~snt, ta~.simile telegraphy, television
communications, speech secrecy apparatus, duplicating
apparatus, the simplest computing apparatus, etc.
Let us take one o! the duties o! the headquarters
o! a lront -the collection a~?d collation o! !acts
about a situation. How many channels do one and
the same net o! !acts pass through before they reach
the trooF commander o! the front, and how much effort
does the gathering o! these facts coat? The troop
commander o! the lront hears the reports of the army
i cos~manders (komandarm) or o! the coam~anding o!licsrs
o! large units by high-frequency , (YCh) telephone or
other communications weans. The chief o! stn!! o!
' the front hears the reports o! the respective chiels
o! staff! by telephone (normally also by QCh)or, sore
rarely, by radio. The operational department (otdel)
collects the !acts o! the situation through chiels
o! directions (nachalaik napravleniya) and their
resistants by telephone, radio, sad telegraph, with
the help of the communications olficers. Commanders
rnd olficers o! troop arms are engaged in the collection
O! the facts o~ the situation through their channels
o! communication. All these people receive the data
at various dines, in varying completeness, and with
varying authenticity; the obtaining of the complete
facts wastes too much time. It goes without saying
that such methods o! operation do not correspond to
present-day requirements. The !acts o! the situation
should prss from the troops to the lront headquarters
by the shortest possible route, and X11 work on 'collection
and collation o! these lasts should occupy a mininwn o!
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The org~nizatioaal structure of a ircnt field
commau~i shoald reflect the sgecixic nature of the
functions o8 thi~a control link (zveno) . As is known,,
tho iron't troop dander, the army cos~.ander, and
the corps cosmsade~r decide question~a which are
essentially di8fereat from one another.
The corps coaeaander is interested in the progress
of comtxat operations directly on the field of battle ;
he is concerned primarily with changes is the progress
of these operations. The army coma.aader is interested
ia. the w~.y~s in which combat operations are likely to
develop over sevexal daps. Ueiag the resources of
operational intelligenc? (razvedka), he follows the
covemeat of the eaesy's reserves and means for nuclear
attack and thus cosaes to understand the situation ^or?
deeply .
The Sroat troop cosander hsa available intelligence
resources which allow hi.s to tallow the situation in
the eatir? depth of a strategic direction or o! a
theater at silltary operations. His fundamental efforts
are directed to the solution o~i long-term questions which
will ensure the successful developssat of the whole
operation . Ia con~uactioa witb this , is the co~nand
of the tront, the questions of the use of nuclear-
^issile weapons and of rear support o! the operati.oa'
are decided in their full 8L'^:+!, desaading of the
stab and command of the front, as a whole, long-term
planning, foresight, and, consequently, woxk of a
completely different scope and content from that of
an army headquarters,
At the same time a front headquarters cannot
limit itself to a purely general knowledge of the
operational situation. It should ensure that the
front trcwp cosawader is constantly parovided with
facts about the entire current situation is the area
o! the front, because t e ront coas3ander has at his
disposal nuclear-~aissile resources which enable him
to influence vigorously the successful decision not
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only of operational but also cP t.:~:~ti~.,~~ ~~rc~L:le~r~.s at
any time,
The organizational structure of a trant field
command must reflect completely the decisive role
of nuclear-missile weapons in the achievement of
the aia of as operation. The front troop co~uaander
should have sn element w~,~.ch concerns itsel4 bath
with the solution o! questions of the use o! missile
troops in an operation and with the assurance of
dira~ct control or caa~mand of units and large units
at these troops.
Besides this, since nuclear. w~rhends (boyepripas)
are at present delivered t~ the target not only by
missiles but also by aircrat t and by other means ,
and also in view of the tact that the radiation
situation will eaercise a considerable influence on
the progress of combat operations, the front field
command should include an element which is concerned
with the general and specific planning of the use 01
nuclear weapons, ?ith careful study of the radiation
situation in the area of the front and of its
iatLuence on the progress of the operation.
In the interests of stability of control of troops,
the organizational structure of the front bald command
should ensue its division into sevez~al echelons
(echelon), the r:Al iuuaptndence of each echelc;a in
the control o! troops, rear units, and establishments,
tad the ability of the second echelon it necessary to
take upon itself the control of the troops of the
front and to eaercise tiis control, even ii only for
s short time.
The front field command should be able to detach
a wall operational group o! otlicers with means of
e~ntrol, which could ensure control for the troop
comc~aader during his movement to an advanced or
auxiliary control point. This operational group
should be constantly welding itsel! together even
while perloraing its district (okrug) command functions,
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and state of friendly r
and should havt spec ialmlca~doie~o~unicati.onuip
meat and corresponding
It is clear to everyone that the existing
structu.~e o~ the front. Fise~ate~bovloandnneedslly
meet th? requirements Enu2n
considerable improvemenuced into thiatstructure?anges
which need to be intaod
the organization of a front
First of all,
headquarters as the ~ ueW organizationioFdthe~ad-
must be changed . Th
quarters should ensure ion collatioaioandirecording
problems as the collet rational afloat ion . In our
of all data oa the ops for this,
view, a special ?lemevt should be set uP This
which would be Free F 1 center Die the operational
tea be the operations ea quarters. Only this
directorate o e ron
_enter must ~ concerned -iustionlaadiwithntheirlat oa
of a 11 the !acts on the a it nder , to the
uninterrupted transmission to the cosma
ieF of statF o! 1;he front and alswohic~ ~~hwillnspeakted
~h about and
persons and establisl~director~-tes, departmsats ,
later. All remaining i out this Function and
services ar? treed troy carry ng titular questions.
concern theaselves with their ~' ui d with modern
The operational center s:ithdradio spe~h-Becrecy
means of coamuaieation, rah seta, receiving sad
apparatus , facsimile teleg P y souad_recordiag
transmitting sets (teleustanovka), In th? future
apparatus , and selector co~u~iCet~~iaes which would
it mLst have elecotc`sses as~~ ~
automate such p ition,
the collection sad storage of Facts on the pos
state , and actions of ?~m3- troop , and about the
bilities;
enemy's nuclear resource8 and their caps ition
the collection and storage of facts on the pos
t Dope.
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- th? systemization and collation of information on
the operational situation for reports to the coma~.and
and the higher staff;
- the processing of data oa the radiation situation,
the deter~inatioa of areas contaaainated by radiation,
and of the levels of radiation !or a given ti~oe .
The fact$ received by the operational center about
the position of the troops (friendly and ensny) should
be disseminated continuous ly by television Bets or
by t~s lephones with visual presentation (videote letoaaaya
svyaz) to the troop coe~ander, chief of staff, and
the deparlmsat of operational planning. Ii accessary,
the lront troop costrrander or the front chic! 02 stet!
can b+e at the operational center personally !or the
detailed solution o! the ^oet iaportant questions of
control of the troc'ps .
Aegtt lar inf orsat ion about t':s p`S it ioo of the
troops 1a the detail necessary for the solution of
questions by the eras of troopB lust be passed by a
special re la netwc rk for the rsiaaining directorates
(departaents~.
The operational center must have at its disposal
several shifts (sans) of trained officer-operators.
Sash shift should also include an officer of engineer
troops, one iron the chemical troops, one frog the
hydrometeorological service, sad representatives of
the W4 sad R'? control points . The shift ehauld be
headed by a responsible off icer-operator (chief of
the operational department) who can makd an ?valuatioa
of th? operational situation and pass it on at th?
proper- tine to the chief of staff ar to the com'ander
eo that a decision can be aad~. with three wording
shifts and one roserve (i:.r the for~-ard co~-and post-
pfCP, or auziliary control point-VPU there nay be ao
^ore than 25 officers oa the staff of the operational
seater.
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The operational center cannot concern itself with
questions of planning an operation; for this a special
e le~sent is necessary - an operational planning department.
Aeceiviag systematic data a~ou~ a Curren pos on o
the troops from the operational center, the operational
p'laaaing d?part~aent analyzes and checks the fulfillment
02 tasks by the troops of the front , prepares suggest ions
for the command on the conduct of combat operations, and
passes on the necessary operational tasks to the troops.
In the future, the department of operati.~oaal planning
should also be equipped with as electronic computer,
which would lighten the performance of such tasks as:
- the production of estisatea related to determining
tlt~ relative balance o2 forces and the regrouping o!
troops;
- the determination of the requirements for combat
leans either !or a coaM1plete operation or !or part of
one and the distribution o! these leans to directions;
the distribution of nuclear means by targets, the
determination of the best alternatives Ior destroying
snemy targets ?ith the means available; and others.
?hea modern means o! control are available, the
ezecution o! the luactioae entrusted to the department
does oot call !or a large Hasher o! o!i'w er-operators.
The staff! oY the department can be within the limits
02 10-12 men.
The opera~ional center and the department of
operational pleasing should be united in a single,
element - the operational directorate, *hich ?ould
ensur' uni y n e wor o ese ~o bodies.
The intelligence directorate does sot lose its
sign canes, Tema ns a component part o! the
headqu8.rters of the front. But since a part of its
functions (the collection, collation, recording, and
storage oY data about the enesy which cones iron the
troops) is carried out by the o~eratioaal canter,
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the complement of tYie intelligence directorate may
be reduced and its structure changed. At the same
timQ it is necessary to bear in mind that data
about the energy reaches the front headquarters not
only from the troops but also lrora other sources
from the Chief Intelligence Directorate, Prom the
intelligence directorates of ne i~Zhbor ing fronts ,
Irom agent intelligence, from special diversionary-
reconnaiesance groups, froffi front radio and radio-
technical intelligence, etc. This data should be
checked, co*^pared, and evaluated by the intelligence
directorate before being passed on to the operational
center, gad for this it is expedient to have a special
element - a control point for operational intelligence.
This control point, like the operational center,
should work round the clock, and should therefore have
three duty shit is and one reserve shift. Bach operation-
al shift should include two operational intelligence
otiicers, concerned with the collation and analysis of
all intelligence data, one officer from agent intelligence,
one officer o! radiotechnical intelligence, one aerial-
reconnaissance off icar, and one special communications
officer .
To direct conbiued-arms recoansissaace and the
planning and control of all types of intelligence
activity is the intelligence directorate, besides the
contro3 point for operational intelligence, it is
necessary to have another department for planning and
control, with a staff of officers of .,onbined-arms and
operational intelligence, agent-intelligence officers,
and radiotechnical intelligence officers.
1-e see ao need for basic changes in the structure
of the other departments of a front headquarters
(replacement, communications, or topographical). How-
ever, the strength of each can be reduced considerably
in connection with the possibility of autosating and
mechanizing their work . The role of the cipher
departaent obviously will decrease with the introduction
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of apparatus for ensuring the secrecy of radio,
telephone, and telegraph conversations and,
consequently, its strength, too, can be reduced.
The questions of the control of artillery in a
front should be decided anew. The trend of develop-
ment of combat means eho~s that the role of artillery
in the solution of opera-cioaal tasks is decreasing.
Clearly, artillery will. perform only tactical tasks.
As a consequence, the aced for the presence in the
front field command of an element which would concern
itself specially with the operational use o! artillery
is disappearing. Questions of the combat use of
artillery can be settled successfully At thR tactical
Level (zveno) . Clearly these questions will be dec:.ded
in exceptional cases in the front command.
At the seas tine, the ever-iacreaBing role of
pissile troops in tt+a rgsolUt..on of operational tasks
requires the presence in the front field command of
s special element, which would concern itself with
their direct command, not only operational, but also
tactical control. furthermore, we believe that this
element must concern itself with the direct coamaand
of missile large units and units. Such an element can
be the control pci~t ~; tia6 missile troops of the front.
It show ve rec ra o, a ep one,, an a spray
coamunications with all missile large units and units
of the front, and also selector and visual telephonic
communication with the operational center and the
operational intelligence control point. .
The personnel of the control point of missile
troops must ensure its unbroken work round the clock
and also the detachment, when necessary, o! a ~imall
but harmonious group of off icers for the control of
the missile troops during trips by the chief (nachalnik)
of the missile troops to the PKP or YPO with the
front troop coamander. Hence, the control point of the
aissile troops can consist of three duty and one reserve
operational shift. Sash shift would consist of two
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operators for the preparation of data and two
control officers. Thy work of each shift can be
headed either simultaneously or in turn by the chief
of missile troops , the chief of staff of the missile
troops , and by the deputy chief of staff of the
missile troops (he is the chief of the control point
and chief of the operational department) .
The operational department of the staff of the
miss a rooms as a _unc ors o panning the
u za ono the arias i le troops , of supporting
them, o! organizing reconnaissance, and of overseeing
their coabat activity . In view of this, besides the
chie! of the departa~en~, the operational department
needs a deputy chief of department (he is the chief
o! reconnaissance), three senior planning and control
officers, two senior intelligence officers, the chief
o! coaauaications, and his deputy.
It is clear that no one will doubt the need !or
? the presence in the front field coaomand of an element
which is concerned with questions of antiaircraft
defense. However, its organizational structure oust
also bs change3 somewhat. The development in the
capabi~ities o! antiaircraft aissiles and of radio-
technical troops and the use of nuclear weapons to
coabat aeons of air attack, call for still sore
centralization of the control of the forces and means
of P'PO at front level. The need is growing continuously
for their direct coamnand by the front PVO commander.
Hence, we cons er expedient to have a PVa control
point in the front field command, equipped~t~m ern
assns o! control, which performs all tasks, beginning
with the planning of air defense and ending with the
direct control o! PVO troops in battle. This point
aunt be coaaandad by the chief of PVO troops of the
front or by his deputy and should be set up on the
principle o? continuous operation by three shifts and
should have a reserve shift !or the control o! PYO
troops during tripe to the PHP or VPII.
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The controlling bodies of the engineer anc~
chemical troops musgt, in our view, remain in the
Croat field command. Their twaerical strength can
be reduced considerably since a part o! the functions
which previously belonged to these departments will
be perlormec~ by the operational center, and also because
o! the possibility of equipping these departments
with means of automation. However, there is no need
to have these departments in direct subordination to
the front troop commander, They decide questions of
support of the combat operations o4 the troops, and
their work should be ,ore closely linked with that
of the operational and intelligence directorates o!
the front headquarters. The operational center will
cc~acern itsel! with the collection, collation, and
recording of data on thc+ position, bringing up to
?treagth, and condition. of the engineer and cheaicsl
troops and of engineering sad cheaicsl equipment,
sad the front headquarters will also deal with the
preparation and delivery to the troops of orders
concerned with the combat use of engineer and chemical
troops, All this points to the expediency of including
engineer sad chemical departments in the make-up o! the
front headquarters.
It is expedient that the unification in a single
directorate of the elements dealing ?ith questions o!
autoaotive servicing and of tank armament which has
now taken place in the co~ssand of a district (okrug)
should also be retained is the front field command with
direct subordination to the troop commander.
It is expedient to cGnceatrate all questions of the
organization and structure o! the rear, and o! the
aaterial sad medical support of the combat operations
of the troops is one body -the directorate o! the
front rear services, headed y e pu y commas r o!
roops or a rear services. The organizational
structure and numerical composition of the directorate
of the resr services ahonld be examined with a view
to cutting them down considerably. The nucleus of
the directorate of the front rear services should be
tt~e rear-services operational center orgeaized is
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- planning supply and evacuation of all types, using
the various types of tran$port present in the front,
sraies, and Isrge units;
a canner similar to the operational center o! the
front headquarters. The rear operational center
cost decide all questions of collection, collation,
and recording of data on ,,the position and state of
rear units and establishments, supplies o! equipaent,
support to the troops, the structure of the operational
cad troop rear areas, and others.
It should be constantly ready to pass this data
to the chief of the rear services and also to the
operational center and to the chief 02 staff of the
front. The chief of the front rear services is the
person who reports to the front troop commander on
questions about the rear services. In the suture the
rear-services operational center should be equipped
with araas of autoaation, which would facilitate the
solution o! such questions as,~
- recording the availability and aoveaent of
aaterial-technical leans and the coapilatlon of
estiaates of the requirements of the troops for
these;
- recording medical losses, the degree o! Sullaess
of the medical establishments, the aoveaents of
wounded and sicY, and others.
?
The strength of the political directorate .of a
front, whose snbordinatioa s ou rema n as fore,
can be reduced because of the transler of the functions
of supply to the chie! of the lront rear services and
o! the functions of recording, appointing, and aoving
party-politicr l worker cadres to t5e chief of the
directorate of cadres of the front. The strength of
the directorate of cadres can also be reduced co~nsidsrably
because o ava a ty of coaputers which allow
the autosation of work on the registration of the cadres
by the officer coaplemeat.- ~
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Such, in our opinion, are the changes which it
is necessary to iatraduce into the organizational
structure o! the front lield command.
Proceeding Iron this structure, it is by now
already possible to deline in its general outlines
the composition o! the command post o! a front.
It, obviously, will consist o! two basic groups and
one reserve group.
The lirst~roup: the coanaander o! troops and
the cfi3ef o s a o! the lront, the operational
seater, the departaent of operational planning o! the _
operational directorate, the operational intelligence
control point, the department of planning and control
o! intelligence, sad the 8th department.
The second group: the headquarters o! the aissile
troops,~e con ro point of the PYO, the department
o! engineer troops, the cheaical depsrtaent, and the
signals departasnt .
The reserve group o! the command post includes -
ths reserve s~~oa the operational center, the
reserve shift frog the control point of aissile
troops, the reserve shift lroa the intelligence control
point, sad the reserve shift lroa the PVO control point.
The reserve group serves to man the PHp or VPQ.
It can serve as the nucleus !or a new lront field
comand, ii the coasand poet goes out o! action as
the result of a nuclear strike by the enemy.
In sons lesion, we shall dwell brielly on the
organization and movement of the control points.
The organization, disposition, snd aovement o!
the control points gust asst the requirements for
stable sad uninterrupted control o! the troops under
any sassy coercion. However, the present aater~
e o our opera ional headquarters does not allow
these requireaents to be net. The ezpsrience of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17: CIA-RDP10-001058000402910001-0
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17 :CIA-RDP10-001058000402910001-0
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esere isei shows t
le aaiatafaed hat eves it
oa a sutticieatihe control of troops
~r1od of preparation of an o y hi8h level in the
sesb y the ,~ ia~ the cpurie~i ~ ion, it very often
ceatroi Doer O?~ of the front he ?Deratioa. ~
t~ control tbea becoaee i~~ticieatl is lOtioa,
Pointe become helpless. y stibl? sad
1'hs relief of control
old aethods, by the din points is carried oat by
~rouPs to organise coatrolch torwird of operational
bsca~se, since the Points in a sew
. headquarterz. a,:.e ~ are oa o
the ?ove Place,
~'?Ops? Ce not ~ a Position to Peratioaal
~i t~Peed ~~uently, when as opelatioantrol the
dgvarters tall ~ ~ mat
second ~y? behind the troo eat
should ~odera ?Psratioas the hen
troo assure the c~a~r d4~'ters of a frost
Ps irrespective of whether l~ble control of the
? the ?ove. The control reao ~ statio
~tst e1?'s~'e reliable cow urces ?t a frost h~eay or on
pessary for the unicatio~ sad the coadt~~~
staff sad ?aterial~rY of officers oa the eve
ice, closi ~e should ensure the ra id and its
ni down, sad ~eoveasat of control P sstablish_
Ontort~ately, Points .
of rest for the otti~stions
bare sot yet been solved of t~ oorhis~ eoavenienCe and
~?~~ of radio Pelatioaal headquarters
? sal headtr~~ which~re beia the a=~riseatai
Peratio ~ devslo
officers to worbq~`ters at P~'eseat do Iced for
there can be no is thes with a sot allow
dnri talk of an ^ip? la consequence,
~ i short lutlt? y control oa the =ove or
Produetioa ao~l of a we hive sot one acceptable
heada~arters. stet! vehicle for operational
districts 4ttespts by the head
their sad anise to het Dot of t~~'ters of
own efforts sad reao is situation b7
waste of considerable s ~~ lead to the
other lines of the s,ilit~ and to the weaheai~ olonable
~'y sschine.
-17-
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 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17 :CIA-RDP10-001058000402910001-0
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In our opinion it is advisable to perform the.
task o! developing a stall vehicle in a centralized
way . The des ign bureau o! any automobile plant
could do this ?uccesslully ?ithin a iew months. The
eatablishnent o! nor~eal conditlone tar the work of
o!licers o! operational headquarters will raise the
quality and operational eiticiency of theirvrork and,
consequently, will iaprove the control of troops as
a whole .
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/17 :CIA-RDP10-001058000402910001-0