MILITARY THOUGHT: INTELLIGENCE - TO THE LEVEL OF MODERN DEMANDS, BY MAJOR-GENERAL YA. MALAKHOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000402950001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 18, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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COUNTRY : USSR
MILITARY THOUGH'T': "Inteligence - to the
Level of Modern Demands", by Major-General
Ya. Malakhov
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Intelligence - to the Level of Modern Demands
by
Major-General Ya. Yalakhov
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Lieutenant-General M. Iochetkov's article, "The
Elimination of the Lag in Operational and Tactical
Intelligence" touches on a series of problems,
the practical solution of which has important
significance in raising intelligence to the level of
modern demands.
while we entirely share the author's opinions on
the basic tenets of the article, we should like to
state some views on this problem.
Recently, both in the pages of the military press
and at the critiques of command-staff exercises and
troop exercises, there has been repeated talk about
raising the role of intelligence, about its exceptional
significance for the achievement of success in combat
and in operations, and about the lagging of intelligence
se.zns (sredstvo razvedki) behind the means of destruction.
Unfortunately, however, in practice, nothing is being
done to bring the potentialities of intelligence into
accordance with the demands which present themselves
and with the tasks which confront it.
In our opinion, this results from the fact that
there is no single intelligence organ (razvedyvatelnyy
organ) in the Soviet army to direct operational and
tactical intelligence in the military forces. 50X1-HUM
1. Special Collection of Articles of the Journal
`"Military Thought", Second Issue, 1980.
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In actual fact, the Chief Intelligence Directorate
(Glavnoye Razvedyvate lnoye Upravleniye - GRU) of the
General Staff has no such organ, and its guidance is
limited to agent and radiotechnical intelligence in
border districts and in groups of forces.
The intelligence department of the Main Staff
(G lavnyy Shtab) of the Ground Troops does not direct
operational intelligence in the districts on a daily
basis, but at operational-strategic command-staff
exercises and maneuvers the reconnaissance detachment
(razvedyvatelnyy otryad - RO) of the Main Staff of the
Ground Troops prepares the appropriate materials for
critiques and draws conclusions on its state.
This all results in the fact that the supervision
of the training of personnel and of the activity of
operational and tactical intelligence are carried out
at the center by several chiefs, and are in essence
uncoordinated by anyone. Thus, for instance, the
chiefs of intelligence of border districts receive
directives from several chiefs of directorates and
departments of the Chief Intelligence Directorate,
from the chief of intelligence of the Main Staff
of the Ground Troops, from the Chief Directorate of
Combat Training and sometimes also from the headquarters
of troops of the Antiaircraft Defense (Protivo -
9ozdushnaya Oborona - PVO) of the Country. Zach is
interested, not in the state of intelligence in the
district as a whole, but only in individual questions
which concern their department (vedomstvo). This
seems to be the only way in which one an explain a
situation in which the problematical questions of
intelligence are not resolved. Moreover, we still
Lave no manual of military intelligence, or technical
means for reconnaissance against nuclear/missile
weapons, or appropriate means of communication, while
the methods of intelligence employed by the troops
are extremely primitive and do not ensure the solution
of this complicated problem.
50X1-HUM
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The absence of a single organ for the supervision
of operational and tacticaliTeaclutioneofneventsi.aple
results in the fact that the combat reconnaissance
problems takes years. For example,
patrol vehicles (boyevo-razvedochnays Bozo a 1958 , but
aashiaa - BRDM) began to reach the troops in and 01958,
the problem of installing a machine gun
observation instruments in them has not been decided to
this day.
It is known that no new technical means of
intelligence will give good results if there are
not well-trained personnel to use them.
The Commander-in-Chief of Ground Troops, Marshal
of the Soviet Union V. I. Chuykov, at the critique
of the comma==-=t=f ?xerc ise "DON", explained:
no matter how perfect, will not
"Squipaeat in itself,
ensure ee radical oo nders aanddta of the staffs at all levels
intelligence. . of organizing intelligence
way
must learn the correct
practically and of directing it continuously".
meanwhile, intelligence officers ' who would know
intelligence equipment well and who would know how lligence in to organize and carry out tr4laed properlymi~ths
operations, are not being
military-educational institutions.
The higher intelligence courses forhintelligence
officers, the intelligence faculty of
i/n M.V. Frunze, the intelligence sections of the
Academy of Armored Troops and of the Air Fornes
Academy, as well as the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, have been disbanded. It seems that in the
existing higher military-educational institutions very
little attention is devoted to the training of o
in the intelligence field. There are, ther,
frequent cases of officers who return to the troops even after graduating at these
nvt withoutin the
elementary knowledge,
organization of intelligence.
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All of this has resulted in the fact that only a
limited number of intelligence officers with
specialized academy education remains with the troops.
The situation with regard to intelligence officer
personnel can be illustrated by the example of the
Belorussian Military 'tistrict . Of all the intelligence
officers in to district, starting with the intelligence
chief of a unit and higher, only 20 percent have
graduated from higher educational institutions. At
the sane time, in the last three years only one officer
has come from an Academy for intelligence duty with
the troops of the district. All of this makes it
necessary to select for engagement in intelligence
duties officers who have neither theoretical training
nor practical ability in this work, which in turn
affects the quality of the intelligence training of
the troops and the combat training of intelligence
subunits.
In our view, there is an urgent need for the
sericus reorganization of the training and advanced
training of the intelligence officers of all types
of armed forces and of all arms of troops.
In the training of intelligence officers, in our
opinion, attention should be given,f irst of all, to
the study of the technical means of intelligence and to
their potentialities, to modes and methods of organis-
ing and executing reconnaissance against nuclear/missile
weapons, and to knowledge of the organization,
armament, tactics, and operational art of the probable
enemy. Taking into account the fact that there are
almost no well-trained interpreters with the troops,
and that the military-educational institutions are
not training officers who know foreign languages, it
is advisable that the training of officers who are
proficient in foreign languages should be organized.
We share completely the opinion of the author
of the article on the revival of intelligence in the
arms of troops, but the solution of this problem
in the sequence of the headquarters of a front-army-
division must lie not through the channel of chie2s
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of intelligence of the appropriate commanders of arms
of troops, but in the inclusion of such specialists
in the intelligence aec t ions , departments, and
directorates of the combined-arms headquarters. We
consider this method more expedient, firstly, because
in the conditions of modern combat time (not in hours
but in seconds and minutes) acquires primary
significance, and this demands the shortening to the
minimum of the channels (instanteiya) along which
tasks for, and information from, intelligence organs
pass; secondly, because, in order to evaluate the
situation properly, all information must flow to a
single organ, which would collate, accumulate, and
analyze it and draw the appropriate conclusions
and thirdly, because, as Marshal of the Soviet
Umion V.I. Chuykov pointed out at the critique of
the exercise "DON; "Only the combined-arms headquarters
can plan intelligence a:, tivity purpor.-efully and can
utilize, for its execution, the various forces and
means, taking into account their capabilities and
the conditions of the situation".
It is most necessary to review and to strengthen
. technical equipment as a means of obtaining intelligence
data, as well as the organs concerned with their
processing. Let us take, for example, radioteehnical
intelligence units (O$NAZ). These are of low mobility
because of the bulk of the intelligence equipment
which they carry and, perhaps, are simply not suitable
for operations under field conditions.
As is known, the commanding officers of motorized-
rifle and tank divisions, and the commanders of combined-
arms and tank armies, have received and have at their
disposal long-range missile means of destruction, but
so far they posse&o .:..o.,lutely no forces or means capable
of carrying out intelligence to the possible depth of
fire-destruction o. targets.
We consider that each commanding officer (commander)
must have at his disposal the forces and means necessary
to assure continuous and vigorous conduct of intelligence,
at least to the depth of the range cf fire of the,means
available in the composition of a given unit, large unit,
or formation.
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