MILITARY THOUGHT: THE NATURE OF MODERN WARFARE, BY COLONEL-GENERAL A. BABADZHANYAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403130001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 18, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The rla ure of Modern Warfare
by Colonel-General A. Babadzhanyan
With greet interest and attention, we read the article of Major-
General Goryainov depicting the technical-mathematical bases of
future warfare, the article of colonel-General Gestilovich which,
on this technical basis, analyzes the new possible meth~foor~
conducting war, the articles of Generals Tclkonyuk and echoing in many respects the article of General ovich
, and
finally, the article by General of the Army
expresses serious criticism of the basic positions taken in the
articles of Comrades Gastilornrich, Tolkonyuk, and Baskskov.
We gust admit that upon first reading dothe ubtawasccreabted regarding
Gastilovich and Goryainav, some degree
the proper course along which our military science is developing and,
cowsequently, regarding the correctness of the principles on which
our armed forces are being built. ~~inion~ sham that in many
and study of the problem have, in our opinion., shown "laid
y
respects the authors mentioned are wrong: They have that
it on thick", so to speak. True, it must be admitted that such
"exaggerationpis useful. It will force our military specialists to
analyze the nature of modern warfare more profoundly and to draw
practical conclusions on a sound basis s well aco siderationndfor items
new conditions in military theory,
practical implementation.
The article by General of the Army MArochkiTA appears to us to
be such more realistic and to reveal in grea=er depth the possible
conditions and nuances of future warfare.
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in which he depicted ~he possible nature of
pee of the basic problems discussed is the foUoving: Does
Soviet military doctrine require crisis? General Gast~ilavichsinSoviet
aista that
military art undergoing a
this is so, while General XUrochkin answers in the negative. This
matter is complicated and fundamental.
We must agree with General IDurochkin that we have a military
doctrine which dwells on the mass use or nuclear weapons, including
those in the megaton class. This is attested to by the report of
*.g. 1arushchov to the January 1960 session of the Supreme Soviet,
inning and
be
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the development of modern warfare. However, the principles for the
use of the types of armed forces and arms of troops within the frame-
work created by this doctrine are not yet sufficiently elaborated.
The views of the authors of both articles, coincii,r this. They
claim that Soviet military-scientific thought, led by the new military
doctrine, has only begun to develop and to determine those laws and
principles which must be established as the basis for armed conflict
in its modern phase.
This is true for both the strategic and operational scales. It
is sufficient to imagine, for example, a front offensive operation in
which the front troop c nder has at his disposal two or three
megaton warheads. Cr., on the other hand, that there are such weapons
at the disposal of the coamsander of the enemy group opposing the front .
It can be stated with complete assurance that the front operation under
such conditions will assume forms other than those under conditions
when only kiloton warheads are available.
General Geatilovich's important and possibly basic mistake is due
to the fact that in defining future warfare, be approached it too
narrowly, without taking into account political and economic factors,
and without consideration for the existence of various theaters of
Rilitary operations, each with different conditions.
Proceeding from the premise that there would be a world war with
unrestricted use of nuclear weapons, the author arrived at the wrong
conclusion regarding the number of armed forces necessary to conduct
a war and the nature of the actions cC ground troops in offensive and
defensive operations of modern warfare.
With a view to analyzing acme of the positions expressed. in the
articles of Generale Osetilovich, Tolkonlrak, and Bsakakav, let us
dwell in more detail on individual questions of military art.
First of all, it oust be recognized that the yield of a tharaonuclesr
weapon is extraordinarily high. It is still difficult for cme to
grasp and evaluate it. The radiological factor at destruction is
particularly great. For exajqle, a 10 megaton bdmb is capable of
destroying industrial and municipal structures over an area of 1,300
square kms; this is sufficient to destroy any capital. lladioaetive
contamination resulting from such a burst will be such that under
average wind velocity (35 kam/br) all parsons in an area of about
5,000 square kme (a acme 170 x 30 loins) viii parish from radiation
sickness, and in an area of (about 10,000 snare kne (a same 250 r k0 k tm )50X1-HUM
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about 50 percent of the persons will perish and the rest will lose
combat (working) effectiveness for several months, and finally, all
those in an area up to 100,000 square kms (a zone 2,500 x 400 kms)
5ic~ will partially lose combat (working) effectiveness. This
means, for example, that an industrial area such as the Ruhr can
be knocked out of action for a long time by two-three 10-20 megaton
bombs as a result of the destruction of basic installations and of
the annihilation of the labor force.
According to the estimates of American specialists, the use of
50 nuclear weapons against the principal cities of the USA would kill
off about one half of the total population and would destroy up to
60 percent of all industrial enterprises. According to this same
estimate, the USA has a total of 170 urban areas in which the principal
body of the population and industrial plants is concentrated.
Consequently, the use of 100-120 nuclear weapons over the territory
of the USA would knock out up to three fourths of the industry and a
significant portion of the population of the USA. Considering the
high degree of industrial cooperation in producing complicated military
equipment, one can say that such a blow would halt production of
armament and supplies for the army and its demise would be only a
matter of time.
But what would be the consequences of a similar blow against
our country?
The large territorial expanses, the great dispersion of population
ard industry, and the observance of proper camouflage and secrecy
measures will permit a significant reduction in the effect of a
similar massive thermonuclear attack against our installations.
However, this would only reduce the effect! Results of a strike
would be significant enough to require the most extreme human efforts
to restore order in the country and to ensure the capability of our
armed forces to deliver a counterblow and to seize the strategic
initiative.
Under modern conditions, aggressive circles possibly may not
risk a war, if only because they recognize the impossibility of
depriving the Soviet Union, as a result of one &.trike, of the capability
of delivering a devastating counterblow.
target
But this situation cannot be permanent. The power of the first
surprise attack in modern time is not determined by the supply of
warheads but on the availability of the means to deliver then to 50X1-HUM
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Acccarding to estimates, the USA at present bas thermonuclear
materials in sufficient quantity to build about 2,000 megaton warheads
The NATO countries' basic means for delivery of nuclear weapons on a
strategic scale is still aircraft. Our possession of highly effective
antiaircraft missile weapons does not allow them the necessary degree
of confidence in their capability to deliver nuclear weapons by this
means. The strategic missiles at their disposal clearly cannot
satisfy the requirements of a major war, and, in addition, their
quality is not high, since, according to assertions of the Americans
themselves, only 50 percent of the missiles launched reach their
target.
This is the situation tpday. what will the situation be at a
future time, when governments which do not now have sufficient numbers
of missiles will overcome their shortcomings in this type of armwaent?
In the future, the probable enemy will have a greater capability to
deliver s'irprise massive nuclear strikes in order to destroy a
significant portion of industrial targets, administrative political
centers, m asile-launching sites, strategic aviation airfields, and
other vital areas and installations. Such a powerful, practically
simultaneous initial strike can destroy the most important and crucial
installations of the country, disorganize national control, disrupt
? mobilization and deployment of armed forces, and severely reduce the
combat effectiveness of the army and the country as a whole.
This is so serious in its possible political and economic
consequences that every measure at be taken so that if the imperialists
try to start a war it will not begin by a sudden massed enemy nuclear
strike.
The peace-loving foreign policy of our Party and the Soviet
Government is known to all. It stems from the very nature of a
socialist state. We do not went war and our Party is conducting
constant work in the direction of preventing a new world oar, which
would demand huge numbers of victims and would destroy all that has
been created by human bands. However, if it beds evident that
aggressive forces have decided on war, and that the initiation of
military operations is only a question of a short time, and if we
fail to prevent the aggressor's attack by diplaratie mrana, then it
is necessary to wreck the enemy strike by all our available forces
and means. Under such conditions, the strategic concept of the 50X1-HUM
armed forces of our country must be based on the total annihilation
of all enemy capabilities to accomplish his aggressive @chews during
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the first days of the war.
The question may be asked: When will these new conditions come
about? From what year or what date at our armed forces be guided
by the nev concept? The number of missiles and launching sites grows
&redually, and occasionally in spurts. The precise determination of
the period of the transition of the quantity of these means to the
new category is difficult and unnecessary. What should be done now
and quickly is to prepare and organize our intelligence and the armed
forces in such a way that they will be in a constant state of readiness
to deliver such a blow against the aggressor.
The possession of missiles, particularly intercontinental, as a
no for delivering nuclear weapons, permits the conduct of preparations
for an attack in utmost secrecy. Under these conditions, the work of
our intelligence organs will be very difficult. Possibly, rotor tion
about aggressor preparations for an attack will be received only at
the last minute before the beginning of an attack. This requires a
mew approach to the preparation and definition of the stage of readiness
of our own scans of attack.
S Aejp +sa the matter of the wumerical size of armed forces, and
specifically of the ground troops. We agree with the assertion of
General GastilCr ich that, in order to acec+sQslish specific strategic
and operational tasks in modern warfare, smaller numbers of forces
scl lion,
will be required than in past were. However, in making this
we must not forget that the number of strategic and operational
to be fulfilled in modern warfare will be incomparably greater
in the past.
In the event of a global war, today our armed forces will be
required to operate simultaneously in mart' theaters of military
operations, including the Arctic. Considering the wide use of Beans
of mass destruction, which will create beery demanda for replacements
in the active armies, and in a number of cases for their full re-
constitution, one can say that in modern war move massive armed forces
will be needed than those discussed by Comrade Gastilorich.
General Gastilovich considers that the role of ground troops in
modern warfare will be essentially that of "occupation". In order to
seize countries subjected to sassed strikes by megaton boobs, ground
troops seed only overcome soma of partial and total d"tru on.
Thuus, the author excludes the bringing up of large operational and,
what is metre. of strategic reserves. Ca the basis of this, one reaches
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the conclusion that in the Western TVD (Theater of Military Operations)
30-40 divisions would be required to accomplish the war's tasks. There
is no need to engage in polemics regarding the number of divisions
(30-40 or 50-64). One thing is clear, that a sufficient number of
troops must be available to wake possible the rapid replacement of
large units knocked out of action by nuclear weapon strikes. There
will be numerous such situations. It seems to us that General
Gastilovich's estimates are too optimistic.
Nor can we agree with the view of Generals Gestilovich and
Baskakov that, under modern conditions, the distinction between
defensive and offensive operations has been erased. We agree with
the authors that the conduct of offensive or defensive operations
will be conditioned by the number of nuclear weapons and their
delivery means which are allotted to a given front. Let us add to
this the fact that the conduct of one or another type of operation
will depend essentially on the relative quantities of nuclear weapons
and their delivery mans available to the front and to the emW
grouping opposing the front.
At the same time it is iaepoesible to agree that an offensive
which differs from a defensive one in the purpose of the action will
resemble it in the methods of tactical actions of large units
(Gastiiovich) or with the concept that the difference in conducting
offense and defense will be retained only in tactics (Baskakov).
Ws fully agree with the view of General Darochkin, who says
that mass employment of nuclear weapons does not erase the boundaries
between offensive operations and defensive operations, but gives them
a unique character requiring the development of new methods for
conducting offensive and defensive operations. Actually, what can
there be in common between an operation whose-goal is to crush ene-
resistance and to penetrate into the depth of his territory, and an
operation whose goal is to prevent enemy penetration and consequently
to hold specific terrain and establish conditions favorable for a
switch to a counter-go tensive? In air view, such an assertion could
have been made only in view of the denial by General Oastilgsicb that
a stable defense is necessary.
Stability is a basic quality of defame, operational included.
Without this quality, defense as such ceases to exist and becomes
meaningless. Lot us tmi iae, for a moment, the defame of an Important
economic or strategic area which does not hove stability and in which
stability is not required. Most probably, such a defense will not
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accomplish its defensive tasks and the installations defended can be
surrendered to the enemy without any particular feeling of responsibility.
Let us clarify this thought. To hold specific zones, positiors,
or centers, when the attacking enemy has a sufficient number of
nuclear weapons, is practically impossible. Therefore, one cannot
speak of "linear" stability. The offensive can be halted only by a
system of massed nuclear strikes, counterattacks, and counteratrikes.
This can be done, homer, only within a specific depth of the defense.
In each case the rear boundary of the defensive depth must be
determined cc the basis of specific .:onditices of the situating in
which the in factor is the relative strength in weapons of mass
destruction possessed by the attacker and the defender.
Defensive operations must, unquestionably, be stable. However,
mass use of nuclear weapons has its impact on this concept. If the
previous concept of "stability" included a specific, if one may use
the expression, "linearity" (the holding of a specific line) now,
under present conditions, stability must be referred to as being
established within the depth of a sector of the territory.
Loder these conditions, should defensive zones be established?
General Gastildrich says that they should not. We do not agree with
this. We know that the enemy will use gaps and open flanks during
his attack. Therefore, we/-can channel the enemy offense along directions
which are advantageous to us by establishing zones and centers in
specific areas. In addition, defensive structures serve as troop
protection against nuclear weapons. It is awe advantageous to build
defensive structures which serve a dual purpose (the protection of
personnel and equipment and increasing the stability of the 3efense)
rather than shelters at concentration areas with the sole function
of protection.
We also consider General Gestilovich's view regarding the use
of unclear weapons in defensive operations to be incoarrect. He
rejects both the necessity for ielivering rased nuclear strikes to
disrupt the enemy offensive and the desirsbiUty of conducting
caunterpreparationa.
She wide use of nuclear weapons changes the athod for conducting
defensive operations. Now,, it is of paramount importance that action
be taken to disrupt or to d 1 st ni gh the strength of eneq parsparai ons
for the offensive. Massed emplcyment of even a limited auaber of - 50X1-HUM
nuclear weapons can place the enemy in a situation where he may be
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it should be welcomed rather than feared.
forced to cancel his offensive. In this case, the greatest esl'e significance
will unquestionably be attached to counterpreperatiOnS
against the enemy's deployed nuclear means of attack and his troop
groupings.
In light of this, the proposal to limit ourselves to day by day
and immediate destruction of detected enemy nuclear attack weapons
and to individual (to the degree possible) tank strikes at
tvvaryingn
times against his most dangerous enemy
through, sounds strange, to say the least. Ewen more strange is the
fear that a sassed strike by nuclear weapons can lead to the growth
of a defense into an offensive. First of all, such a growth is unlikely,
considering the relative relationship of nuclear weapons, and secondly,
role s under
In conclusion, we would like to dwell on the
modern conditions. The development of tanks as
force from the time of the first world war until the now competition cconditioned
by the fact that the tank emerged victorious in
antitank weapons. Today the development and serial production of
antitank missile launchers which have a high effectiveness both with
respect to accuracy and destructive action, have created a new situation.
In single combat, a tank against an antitank missile launcher,
the tank will usually lose. This means that with a high enough.
concentration of antitank missile launchers on the field a- combat,
any tank attack can be disrupted and a large portion of the tanks and
their crews participating in the attack will be destroyed. But if we
consider further that the production of an antitank missile launcher
costs several tens of thousands of rubles and that a tank costs
several hundreds of thousandsof rubles, then it becomes clear that
the use of tanks in their modern concept in war,'are is unprofitable
both militarily and economically.
In our view, heavy tanks sust depart from the scene. They should
be replaced by medium and, particularly, light, combat vehicles armed
with an automatic multi-round missile launcher having a grazing range
of 3-5 kmme, equipped with anti-small arms fire, and splinterproot
armor, and capable of crossing water barriers.
The basis for this combat vehicle can be the amphibious tank,
PT 76. it must be kept in mind that, under modern con ittionss,troops
mast cover great distances on their own power both dwing
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fort as well as during the course of, combat and teat possibly it
would be more advantageous to create a combat vehicle with an
especially high cross-country capability wheel drive with three or
four axles.
The proposed combat vehicles, retaining the basic positive quality
-of tanks --- stability against the destructive factors of a nuclear
burst - would cost such less, would be easier to produce, and would
be more effective in their firing action.
Not considering that the views expressed in this article are the
only correct ones,we trust that a review of the large and basic
questions raised by this issue of the Collection will serve to
develop individual views corresponding to the tiaxi ae c . tions of
co=nducting an operation.
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