MILITARY THOUGHT: THE ROLE OF AVIATION IN MILITARY OPERATIONS AT SEA, BY REAR-ADMIRAL V. BOGOLEPOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403160001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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I Operations at Sea
Rear-Admiral V. Bogclepovl
The gigantic development of udseile weepers compe1c one to ask
the question: Will the missile in its triumphal advance, diminish the
role whi^ . renr,ed aircraft have played up to now in military operations
quite cat.egarically: Not only will it not
dic:ini:s::, bu? on the contrary, giving aviation more perfhcted
weapon, via? e?;_n increase this role in the foreseeable conditions
or war-?'--re. To dcmonstrate this is the aim of this article.l
Two duai, basic strategic r~issiors have always stood and still
stand before the navy: operations on see (ocean) cosication lines,
and operations in connection with the coast; in each case combat is
candaacted against ezxemy objectives and for protection of one's own
insta2laticvs .
Previously, which is very important, to these basic strategic
ak:asione was added, so to speak, an operatiocel mission - the battle
for supremacy at sea, which facilitated the acc liahaent of both
primary mias .une. As a practical matter, it also developed into a
strategic, and lt. many cases, even into the foreaoet of strategic
xissions, ineszuzch as its more or less su*;cessful execution (by.
destroying or blockading the eener., 's fleet) autcortical y led to
a suitable lcveL of accanplisheent of the bas c raise comas .
At the present Use, this battle for supremacy at sera he.
Chsagned its searing and character to a significant extent. First,
under eonditioe of the diveere:ity and the dispersion of naval power
(including hare, above all, ev . tiom ), it is shoat impossible to
neutralize or blockade the forces of the eemeW so as to cc ,lertely
curb his activl:.y; sub 'riues and aircraft, especially pilotless,
have broken the law of numbers", so that within k bits they
.an operate even where the eneay has superiority of fortes. Second,
for the acccapliahaent of saeeoe mission es such preliainary neutralising
or blockading of the ' a forces is act required. Third, modern
combat against the main forces of the ee r - aircraft carriers or
1 While 'd' ie present article deals with the question in an a peratlarrl-
strategic context and perspective, to the EO33ectioo of Articles
(S nik atatey) No. 4 of the "Oval GollOettoa oy
Journal for 1960, In the arti:l. t $ P. eVsoro,, Us *a" gty is 1s
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missile submarines - has as its grew;, primarily, not Indirect, but
direct: and mediate protection of :ne's cw instay:ationn from their
influence, and not only the nr3vai but, prI srily, land installations.
thdoubtedly, operations against enemy sea (ocean) ccwmLtnicsticn
lines and against shore installations in a number of cases already
can be exezuted not only by naval and air forces but also by land-
based (r ze ioye) missiles. To be precise, sea (ocean) c icati n
lines of themselves also Include, along with that at sea, share
installations such as ports, kydr tAch ical facilities, etc. But
while earlier, because of the limited capiabilltiej% of naval vetspons,
the basic objectives on sea (o::een) c zr4cation lines were vessels
at see, now such basic objectives are frequently becoming those on
shcse.
Therefore, the q:::estion Is whet is more "Profitable to
destroy all these obJe_tives with lard-be sad missiles or those from
intervening" (prca zhtochnfy) missile carriers - subrarine, surface.,
oor air? Even elementary calculations show that a uniform solution
to this questiorn in all cases is oeribls. tb er varied conditions
it is advantages to use varied f,:rrces ad weapons.
If ooe has in mind the p.-cabie enemy's stationary Sz'oxad
installatiors which are sei sreted fr,= us by water and whose precise
lacsi.; ,, :s w_e know, it weld seem in all cases Were adve*_+tmeo to
destroy th+m with land-based missiles, for this saves us WA only
frcn losses of missile carriers, but also from the uocensity for
creating these carriers.
Wirer, in a n mho of cases, depending on the distances, an
the nature of the antiaircraft and antimissile defense of the e ,
and on rtber elements of the sitLmti,ae, the use of "intervening
carriers my be fully warranted, pertly be use of the feasibility
of simplifying caostructiom and decreasing the sixes, weight, and
hence, the cost of the missiles, partly because of their ?,mt
accuracy of hit at lesser distances frees the target, Partly because
mobile "intervening" carriers are less vulner able to the aceesq's
missiles than fixed land-based launching t atal]atiaoe;, prti,
because these carriers say be nee ed anywy for pertat ing other
missions, and finally, as a result of the necessity for the *me"
to expend weapons in these cases to caebat the missiles and their
carriers.
It one takes as a unit the Wlitary-3r aoetic cost of destroying
in the initial period of a war not less than 15 to 20 ner.eaat ni an 50X1-HUM
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a separate place.
picture here is drastically clanged.
The level of develoPOent of aise!1e technology tbooretica2lY eves
now permits the destruction of any objective in any ar-M ny othe
bjocean by land-based cruise miissiles, and in certain cases even by
ballistic missiles. Arad, if one speaks of offshore (pribrashasya
vodnaya) tones saturated with technical shore I isillanee means, then
such a solution to the problaw, at least in relation to s=ufmce objectives,
as a practical matter is not only feasible, but in many cases even
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1 An An exposition of the asthodology of these calculations requires
as ves as his combat large units (soyedineniye) and vessels. The
installations the role of aviation under modern c tlome is rather
modest, although in same cases it is it is not veil. out . It is 0=0
advantageaas to use ,land-based and suamsrine missiles a6stnst such
installations.
Let us proceed to an exzimintlCn of Methods of operation a?ainst
mobile ems (ocean) _objectives: the transportation weans of the eawwp
Thus one may conclude that in Ope titzaa a lnst !BM shore
enemy industrial area measuring 60 by 20 kiloaaetere by intercoutine'tal
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, then with regard to all the
conditions en rated, as well as the probable losses, the cost of
accocoplishing this mission by atonic subssarinea will be approximately
the same, by diesel submarines-twice as much, by cruise missiles from
land bases - three times as match, and by aircraft - several times
more expensive. The expenditures of the enema to counteract these
strikes will be: for operations egdinst missiles - 6 or 7 corresponding
units, against aircraft - about 15, and against submarines - 20 to 30
unite.1
Undoubtedly, these calculatio, in viev of their extraordinary
importance, must be verified repeatedly and be defined more precisely
for the most diverse covditic s, for,, depending on the situation, it
will be advantageous to use we or another method of delivering missiles
to the target.
If one speaks of "intervening" carriers, then it is very c3emr
that it win be more expedient to use aircraft in case of relative
weakness of the antiaircraft defense (PVC),arxt to use submarines in
case of relative weakness of the e: ' e antisubmarine defense (PLO).
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In which cases? In thcee vbpre the extent of the development
Of a theater facilitates the creetlot of the necessary system of
missile launchers and shore i.r ta2lations in general. If this does
not axls(, then it is evident( that it is sip1er to utilize, for these
targets, mobile forces and weepornss, pr'tnorily aircraft. This question
must also be solved on the basis of military-economic calculations
based or initial operational-tactical requtret ants.
The width of the coastal zone now consists of several hundred
kilometers and., in accordance with the daevelo ant of tecbo1, is
grown contiru l.ly. Extensive invest igastion Y, 2st define precisely
the order of this growth in the near future, but in any case one must
consider that in some offshore naval theaters lsnd-based missiles
alree;;j are becoming the beckb a of naval forces.
It my be asked: Why are land-based missiles regarded as a r*vsl
force, even if only p r iaicxeUy? For the same reasons that 'one
gnr cc shore is worth ten tuna on a vessel', as he. been correctly
asstaseed up to now, cider ing that we of the basic eleeaezats at
naval
forces is the so-called shore defer ee, izclu ing,above all, ertilbtry.
A naval direction is not necessarily connected only with vessels; it
s coetnscct with those forces and weapons by amass or which it is
awe advantageous to a; canTlIgh the existing aissiooa.
Concerning combat with subear meat, in this zone the solution
to the question depends on the set d, selected by us for detecting
those. If this mission is assigned to fixed assns (vblcb at present
can work only on the basis or h,vdr+oacoustfcs) buying good c .tcaticma
with the shore, than detected submarines could be destroy" from the
shore under cc itic na in which this will not disrupt the system of
detection. But if the search and location of subserines is dome by
sobile forces, then these, aoatureUy, will hove fibs asiss!ae of
destruction. As is known, the leading place aatceng the" forees
to aircraft, i.nclud :ag helicopters. 50X1-HUM
, the nature and de at ;Mpartasoa at one or a
nissiaa of aircraft in our offshoe some gjjca the s tus ion.
AU 11 U-W esic vmeapom against e surface forces rces in sofas cases
is land-based missiles, then in acrobat apart` tine a
prominent place, along with saeall vessels, as before ong to
aircraft, in particular healicopters.
It wt be added that if the operational range at shore missile
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weapons is supe.ricr to the range cf she te7h-nicnl mftn of surveillance
and target den1gnetion, then in th .z "exterosi" pert of the offshore
zone the significance of aviation ais1 grow still mare as a result
of the assignxaent to it of the mission of s7. eil.larce (reconmeissance ),
target designation, and, wten needed., g7. fiance.
We shall turn to an appraisal of possi.ble metbcds of operations
against mobile evens objectives to-steed outside the offsb.ore zone
just examined. If one speaap of e ~v sub runes, then, naturally,
detection and deatr!actlot of them r 'aside the offshore zone by some
type of fixed. or shoe r zs is imprsctlcatle, and my be ecc l.ished
only by surface and air farceas. If one speaks of surface ooeaxi
objectives, then elementary calculations show that the destruction
of them from the lam, although poss''r--e, d nds such cunberecebe
missiles and such a cra liceted system of target designation, and
guidance that in an overwtel i.ng me jority of cases it is much more
profitable to destroy them with missiles fram mile, specifically
"i.ntervening", carries:. Which carriers in this realm are meet
advantageous - subsarine, surface, or air?
As is known, we have set aside surface ocean forces as a result
of a nuanber of considerations. Therefore, the discussion my proceed
solely with submrin a or air forcer.
Qafortuaately, the requisite ccseyrehensive examination of this
question does nat yet exist. Preliminary caelctalstiona permit me to
assert that the wet ad "antan eta{ s carrier of vea onsatt at Saar is 1
aviation.
The experience of history coafi-em this concept. Thus, while
in the liras World War., aviation, es,^ecialiy at sea, only spread Its
with, in the Second World War, its mare was already fr=om oce- third
to ve