PROBLEMS OF AIR SUPPORT FOR TROOPS BY COLONEL V. I. DOBEDIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
VOYENNAYA MYSL' [MILITARY THOUGHT] No. 7, July 1986, pp. 31-40
Problems of Air Support for Troops
(From materials in the foreign press
by
Close air support for troops consists of combat actions in support of the
formations (or large units) of ground forces in an operation (or battle). It is
carried out by the forces of front (tactical) and army aviation in order to
destroy the enemy's conventional and nuclear weapons, his strongpoints, second
echelons and reserves, command and control posts, and other targets. Its main
principles were determined by synthesizing the experience of combat actions.
These include: close cooperation between aviation and ground forces at the
tactical level, timely performance of missions, continuity of support, and
strict coordination of air and ground attacks on the battlefield,
The forms and methods of implementing these principles in theory and
practice have their own specific features in the Soviet art of warfare and in
the armies of the NATO countries. These are examined in this article by taking
into account the experience of local wars and the methods for the combat
employment of the US Air Force in them. This experience must be approached
critically, but it cannot be ignored when working out key questions of the
operational art and tactics of the Soviet air forces.
Close cooperation between aviation and ground forces at the tactical level.
Close air support is distinguished not only by the power of fire strikes but
also by continous coordination of the efforts of air force units and subunits
with those of ground force units and large units. Foreign specialists believe
that the success of their joint operations depends to a considerable degree on
the unity of views of the officers taking part in the planning, preparation, and
conduct of the joint operations.*
* Truppenpraxis, No. 8-9, 1966, p. 600.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
?
The organization of cooperation between aviation and ground forces in a
combined-arms operation has followed a definite path of development. For
example, in the war in Vietnam the US Army command strove to have constantly
subordinated to it both air support as well as all other combat support weapons.
This was based on the goal of facilitating the organization of cooperation and
the arrangement of contacts between representatives of the Army and Air Force.
However, after testing the feasibility of a proposed table of organization and
equipment, only army aviation (helicopters and auxiliary aircraft) was directly
subordinated to the Army. All tactical combat aircraft, including ground-attack
aircraft, remained with the Air Force. When preparing for combat operations it
was stipulated that there would be allocated to an army corps commander (or army
commander) the resources in the form of aircraft sorties for the day or for the
period the operation would be conducted. The principle of joint command and
control, which had existed before the war, was thus maintained: the combined-
arms commander assigned a support mission (within the limits of the allocated
resources) through the aviation representative, who was responsible for
preparing the sortie and for its results. This method for the command and
control of aviation survived the test, despite friction at all levels of
cooperation, and especially at the tactical level. Difficulties in organizing
air support had the following causes.
First, the commanders of combined-arms units who had been granted authority
to call for aviation often assigned it targets whose destruction achieved only
momentary success and had little effect on the overall outcome of the battle.
Combat aircraft were employed in the role of long-range artillery, which made
the cost of an air strike much greater than its effectiveness. Aviation's
contribution to the overall goal proved insignificant.
Second, high-cost aviation resources were used up at excessively rapid
rates. Frequently a combined-arms commander had nothing to call on at the
decisive stage of a battle, since the scheduled support had already been
provided and there were no remaining reserves. The principle of economizing on
aviation resources in ratio to other weapons of destruction was poorly adhered
Third, for aviation the frequent shifts of combat missions (or strike
targets 7, which allegedly were dictated by "requirements" of the battle, were
unacceptable. After receiving an order indicating the target coordinates and
description, readjusting to an alternative target was usually undesirable and
sometimes impossible.
h Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
Fourth, the trend developed of dissipating aviation efforts against small-
size moving targets dispersed over a wide area instead of concentrating strikes
against important targets in order to isolate the battlefield. In this
connection the foreign press has noted that "the effectiveness of aircraft
operations in the near zone was lower than in the depth of deployment of enemy
troops. This was because attacks were dissipated on a multitude of small
camouflaged targets, while maneuver near-the forward edge of friendly troops was
constrained and required the mandatory use of air controllers."*
Fifth, the combined-arms commanders who levied missions on support squadrons
did not supply them with reconnaissance data on a real-time basis. The aviation
command was forced to conduct reconnaissance "on its own" and to deal with
guiding aircraft to assigned targets and with marking the targets.
The timeliness of mission execution. The experience of the war in Vietnam
showed a steady trend of reducing the reaction time of attack aircraft to
developments in the situation. Support subunits were required to be highly
mobile and to take off immediately on call from the forward edge, and flight
personnel had to be able to properly clarify and execute a mission received
either on the ground or in the air without any prior preparation. Combat
conditions demanded not only that aircraft crews find the designated target and
have the proper weapons aboard, but also that they deliver the strike at the
strictly prescribed time.
As the pace of battle increased strike delivery time was reduced and
approached the limits of the technical capabilities of the aircraft. From the
point of view of organization, everything possible was done. Solving the
problem of reducing reaction time proceeded organizationally by way of providing
direct call-up channels (from a ground forces battalion at the forward edge to a
ground-attack aircraft base), adopting higher degrees of aircraft alert,
preparing and using forward landing fields (or staging airfields), and
designating standard flight paths and procedures to the forward edge and back,
which flight personnel knew in advance. Combat instructions also provided for
the maximum degree of readiness to deliver an attack -- the airborne alert. In
practice, however, serious problems arose in connection with flight personnel
fatigue. The US command carried out tests of "endurance" in low-level flight.
It was discovered that a pilot's attention starts to dull and his reactions to
* Ibid., p. 601.
?
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
?
4
slow down after 30 minutes of flight on alert status. This was due to the, great
physical strain of low-altitude flight and the excessive nervous stress
connected with the fatiguing expectation of commitment to battle. Actual
reaction time diverged sharply from the planned time that the combined-arms
commanders were counting'on. After delivering a request for support they
usually expected the immediate appearance of aircraft above the forward edge,
since a delayed attack did little to help attain the battle's final goal. But
pilots could achieve rapid reaction only by being on continuous alert in the
zone, and the air force command began tb object to that.
Another approach to solving the problem of reducing reaction time and
increasing the flexibility and mobility of air support was the idea of
extensively using aircraft with vertical (or short) takeoff and landing [VSTOL).
Foreign aviation specialists believe that such aircraft are better in reaction
time, rate of operations, survivability, and flexibility of use. This led to
basing VSTOL aircraft closer to the front line (up to 50 km) and to setting up
direct communications with the combined-arms units that the aviation resources
were assigned to and with the direct air support center. Modelling demonstrated
that this reduced request reaction time up to 10-11 minutes. Forward basing
considerably reduces combat flight time and consequently fuel consumption as
well. The support mission rate could therefore be increased to 8-10 flights per
day. The small size of VSTOL landing strips (or landing field) makes it easier
to camouflage them and provide them with air defense support, which, in
combination with the capability of these aircraft to rapidly change flight
direction at any altitude for evasive and counter-missile actions, increases
their survivability. The combination of vertical takeoff and landing with
transonic flight speed provides a VTOL aircraft with the greatest turning rate
when attacking a ground target or in close air combat. It is therefore capable
of carrying and employing the entire system of air-to-surface and air-to-air
munitions used by present-day ground-attack aircraft.
VSTOL aircraft took part in combat operations for the first time in the
British Air Force during the Anglo-Argentine conflict and carried out a total of
2,376 combat sorties (including 282 at night). During these sorties they
dropped 42 1,000-lb bombs and 21 sub-projectile canisters, and they fired 2,700
shells and 14 air-to-air guided missiles. The majority of flights were made
from aircraft carriers under difficult weather conditions. After a beachhead
had been established on the island flights were made from a special takeoff and
landing strip 245 meters long with aluminum matting. Argentine air defense shot
r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8 wommm
 I 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
i
down four and damaged one British Sea Harrier VSTOL.* Experience in this armed
conflict confirmed the prospects for using VSTOL aircraft from carriers, but
added little to develop the concept of using them for air support in a combined-
arms battle.
The uninterrupted air support of ground forces combat operations day and
night and in any weather was well established as a principle of the combined-
arms battle already during World War II and was especially applied during the
war in South Vietnam. The combat activities of the patriots increased during
the hours of darkness and the rate of air support, on which the aggressor was
relying, fell sharply. In this connection the foreign press has noted: "Night
deprived the aircraft of all their advantages: it was impossible to determine
the location of friendly troops and that of the enemy, who was attacking unseen
and determinedly."** One feature of aircraft combat operations at night was
that the following measures were considerably complicated or ruled out: group
operations (because of violation of safety measures); certain types of attack
based on a specific range of target detection and tracking (2.5-5 km in
daytime); methods of employing weapons against targets not observed visually;
and methods of target acquisition and designation carried out by airborne
controllers. Nighttime, which was the faithful ally of the units of Vietnamese
patriots, filtered out all the methods of air support and left US aviation with
only those had been used in World War II. The illumination of terrain by aerial
flares or by searchlights installed in C-130 transports was considered the main
form of air support for a nighttime combined-arms battle. The ground forces
signalled their position with lamps and illuminated the terrain with bonfires.
That these methods were not very effective is shown by the fact that as a result
of concealed and sudden attacks the patriots succeeded in burning more than
1,000 US helicopters on the ground.
In the local wars in the Near East and during the conflict in the area of
the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands not more than two percent of the total number of
air support missions were carried out at nighttime.*** Foreign specialists
believe that the problem of nighttime air operations in support of ground forces
remains unresolved. Air support has not been able to satisfy one of its main
requirements -- that it be carried out without interruption. The troops
conducted combat operations around the clock, but this was not within the
* Astronautics and Aeronautics, No. 1, 1983, p. 18.
Aviation Week, August--19-6T,-p. 26.
***International Defense Review, No. 2, 1983, p. 135.
?
?
50X1-HUM 0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 50X1-HUM
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
capability of aviation, which slackened its efforts with the-onset of darkness.
Marked improvement in the effectiveness of air support in a combined-arms
battle called for the development of a specially designated aircraft, which was
an acute necessity for the aggressor's troops. The original version of the US
A-10 ground-attack aircraft was intended solely for daytime operations in a
-poorly equipped theater of military operations. The decision was later made to
adapt it for use in the West European theater of war, which required its
technical modification and the development of new operational methods. Great
success was expected from the use of lasers to seek targets beyond visual
observation range and guide air-to-ground weapons to them.
Three variants have been worked out and tested for attacks using laser
guidance: illumination of the target by an infantry spotter (or forward ground
post); use of a laser device combining target illumination and designation and
mounted in the ound-attack aircraft itself; and illumination of the target
from a support (or reconnaissance) aircraft. In practical trials of the
effectiveness of these alternatives as measured by the criteria of reliability,
simplicity of organization, and adaptability to support conditions, preference
was given to the "support aircraft/ground-attack aircraft" system. The results
of training exercises demonstrated that by interacting with external laser
illumination a pilot can detect a target and determine the heading to it up to a
range of about 24 km beyond the limits of nighttime visibility. To determine
this, a light reconnaissance aircraft sought out and illuminated a detected
target, while a receiver aboard an attack aircraft, by scanning the surface of
the earth in various search patterns, found the right laser reflection that
carried the appropriate coded signal and ensured that a weapon would home on the
target. However, the probability of finding an assigned target under complex
ground conditions was not very high.* The forward ground controller operating
in the area of the selective search defined the targets and the reference points
(control landmarks) and then communicated the data to the air force
representative over ground-based shortwave links, and the latter informed the
ground-attack aircraft crew in the air over ultrashort-wave links. The pilot
reported when he arrived at the control landmark and the ground controller
illuminated the target on command of the air force representative, after which
guided bombs were launched from the aircraft at a range of up to 7 km from the
target.**
* Aerospace International, No. 4, 1977, p. 24.
**Flight, No. 3860, 19 3, p. 1149.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
The requirement for uninterrupted air support assumed not only a solution to
the problem of improving its effectiveness in night combat but also the
assurance of an all-weather capability, which is especially critical in the
foggy and rainy conditions of Western Europe. Western specialists are of
divided opinion on this point: some support the development of an all-weather
ground-attack aircraft, and others want to assign air support missions under
difficult weather conditions to existing all-weather fighter-bombers. One of
the variants for developing an all-weather ground-attack aircraft calls for
modifying the A-10 aircraft by equipping it with radar, a low-altitude TV camera
(for use with the Maverick guided missile, which has a TV guidance system), an
inertial navigation system, and infrared search equipment. The number of
weapons carried is unchanged but a second crew member is added -- an operator to
relieve the pilot of part of the burden of target search and control of the
aircraft and weapons. The weight of these would increase the already heavy
19-ton A-10 aircraft by another 1,315 kg.
It is assumed that the principal weapon used at night and in bad weather
would be the Maverick guided missile, which has a TV homing head and is guided
to a target by an aiming-navigation system with night vision that includes a
suspended TV system.
Foreign specialists therefore consider that to meet the requirement for
uninterrupted air support that is not dependent on time of day or weather
conditions they must have an all-weather, but consequently a costly aircraft.
It is obvious therefore that the "cost-effectiveness criterion" once more
becomes a factor, since above the battlefield the aircraft will be engaged in
battle by cheaper antiaircraft weapons, and the costs of a single attack by an
aircraft will exceed the value of the destroyed ground target.
Air and ground attacks on the battlefield have been strictly coordinated in
local wars by target allocation, establishing the sequence of attacks,
designating boundaries of responsibility, and observing safety measures to
prevent mutual destruction. This coordination was based on the principle that
aircraft would attack those targets which would be difficult or impossible to
destroy with ground troops' weapons. The implementation of this principle was
predetermined by the capability of tactical aviation to retarget aircraft after
they were in flight, and by the organization of reliable monitoring and
centralized command and control of all the forces used for support.
is
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
I
Analysis of joint combat operations conducted in local wars has shown that
the operations of ground forces and tactical aviation in the combat zone were
always demarcated according to times and boundaries. Ground and air attacks
were never simultaneous and were not concentrated in a single limited area. The
efforts of artillery, combat helicopters, and other aircraft during close
support were diversified as to range. In daytime the boundary of authorized
attack by tactical aircraft was close to the forward edge of friendly troops,
and in nighttime it was moved back. Sorties of helicopters and other aircraft
were echeloned by altitude, and their flight paths were assigned to them by a
joint air-traffic control center. Fire support by the forces of tactical
aviation, combat helicopters, and artillery was controlled by a schedule of fire
that was calculated and coordinated in detail. When providing emergency
support, tactical aviation was ensured of a free flight to the target along a
corridor within whose boundaries friendly helicopters and artillery did not
fire.
In the manual on the combat use of US tactical aviation it states that air
support is aimed at achieving three main goals: to reinforce the ground forces'
firepower, to render assistance in executing and developing a breakthrough, and
to reduce losses of friendly troops to a minimum. In local Kars a reduction in
firepower was most often observed in the area of operations of combat
helicopters, and they were therefore replaced by ground-attack aircraft and
fighter-bombers, whose attacks were coordinated with the weapons of the ground
forces. Coordination with artillery was sometimes organized solely by boundary
lines to which the aircraft flew at medium altitude and above the trajectories
of the shells, and past those lines they operated without restrictions.
Additionally, antiaircraft weapons that did not have the necessary
identification gear were strictly forbidden to fire. In actual practice
cooperation between fighters and field air defenses in the same zone proved to
be unfeasible.
As noted in the foreign press, the experience gained in local wars in
conducting joint combat operations has not shaken the assurance of combined-arms
commanders that aircraft must operate closer to the forward edge. Not the least
factor here is that troop morale was boosted when air strikes against the enemy
were observed from the ground. However, the command of the US Air Force has
attempted to withdraw all high-speed attack aircraft from the control of the
ground forces and use them deep in enemy territory, and to obtain independence
and great freedom of operation under the pretext of improving combat
effectiveness. In this regard aviation specialists have written: "Everybody
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Cop
recognizes that close support is a complex mission in which the fire of some
systems is augmented by the fire of others. When organizing fire coordination,
sources of difficulty are the variety and mobility of the targets, the
unpredictability of the scenarios, and the abundance of tactical alternatives.
When aircraft are forced to operate on the battlefield, their combat
capabilities are considerably reduced.*
Thus, the apparently simple task of "being over the target at the designated
time and employing the proper weapons" became a problem in actual combat
operations. It has not been possible to make tactical aviation a participant in
combined-arms combat. Applying a "cost-effectiveness" criterion showed that the
results were inadequate and it was necessary to continue the search for new ways
of organizing joint operations.
Based on the study of the experience from local wars, as indicated in the US
press, the US Army and Air Force produced a memorandum which specified that the
Air Force will support operations by deep penetration into enemy territory and
the Army is responsible for conducting combat operations up to the depth of 70
km beyond the front line. This division of efforts will have an impact on the
elaboration of requirements for the weapons systems planned for deployment up to
the year 2000. The memorandum also defines a program of technical cooperation.
The Air Force and the Army have agreed: to examine the material base of support
in the light of the new requirements; to halt duplication in the production of
weapons systems; to concentrate the Army's efforts on short-range weapons
systems and those of the Air Force on systems based primarily on cruise missiles
and air-launched missiles; and to work out jointly the requirements for ground-
based electronic warfare materiel and the systems for aerial reconnaissance
conducted in the area of combat operations. All rotary wing aircraft are to
remain with the Army and fixed-wing aircraft with the Air Force. Clearly,
better accord was specified at the level of developing new equipment and weapons
and of defining the optimum ratio between them, but the fixing of the zones of
responsibility resulted in the shifting of the line of demarcation deep into
enemy territory.**
Considering that fighter-bombers in local wars have used their weapons
without Army authorization at the range of 80 km from the forward edge, this
means that aviation is permitted relative independence. However, A-10 ground-
* Flight, No. 3253, 1972, p. 78
**Air et Cosmos, No. 22, 1984, p. 22.
L
y Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
?
?
?
. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 -IF
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
attack aircraft are required to provide assistance to AH-64 Apache attack
helicopters, which will be operating over a greater radius during fire support
missions. Further work is therefore still required to develop the new type of
tactical and fire cooperation between Army and Air Force subunits in the air.
Troop exercises held several years ago with the participation of helicopters and
ground-attack planes demonstrated that combining them into a single group (to
attack a single group of targets) yields better results than employing them
separately.*
The foreign press has noted that whereas under conditions in Europe the
organization of close support has not been significantly changed, because of the
effect of specific weather conditions, the appearance of new weapons, and the
increasing threat from field air defenses there have been substantial
adjustments made in the tactics of ground-attack aircraft. For example, in the
basic variant for support (under normal weather conditions) the A-10 aircraft
were armed with a 30-mm cannon that has an effective range of 1,800 meters and
Maverick guided missiles that can destroy armored targets up to a range of 7,600
meters, but whose range was limited by the capability for the visual detection
of the targets. Given the lethality of the weapons, the following tactical
method was worked out for a pair of ground-attack aircraft. After the forward
control post guided them to the start-of-maneuver line, one aircraft flew at an
altitude of 3,700 meters and used its Maverick guided missiles against self-
propelled artillery mounts, while the other continued to fly at an extremely low
altitude and attacked tanks by approaching them to the effective range for its
cannon fire. On the second pass the roles were reversed. This method was based
on a preemptive attack by a guided weapon at long range to paralyze air defense
counteractions and ensure the penetration to the target of the attack aircraft.
It was noted that the attack itself, which used TV search and guidance, was
incompatible with low-altitude flight by a ground-attack aircraft. The pilot's
attention was concentrated chiefly on maintaining his height above the ground
and he could not divert his attention for very long to the TV screen in the
cockpit.**
After flight crews had developed their skills in carrying out the combined
method with the change of places, a satisfactory survival rate of ground-attack
aircraft was achieved in the zone of simulated antiaircraft fire (much depended
on reliable guidance, since the flight of the first aircraft to medium altitude
* Aviation Week, No. 1004, 1984, p. 55.
**Aviation Week, No. 25, 1977, p. 88.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
50X1-HUM
began right before the moment the pilot acquired the target). However,
augmenting the efforts of "enemy" field air defenses with fighters immediately
increased the level of losses of ground-attack aircraft. This made it necessary
to supplement tactics with methods of waging a defensive air battle.
Experiments demonstrated that the optimum variant is for a pair to maneuver at
extremely low altitude while covering each other with cannon fire.*
In order to work out the most effective methods for the air support of
ground troops under the conditions of the European theater of war, experimental
exercises were conducted with the employment of mixed groups of ground-attack
aircraft and army attack and reconnaissance helicopters. The mixed group set up
for this purpose consisted of four A-10 aircraft, five AH-1G attack helicopters,
and four AH-58 reconnaissance helicopters. The "enemy" was represented by 28
tanks, 8 armored vehicles, self-propelled antiaircraft guns, and low-altitude
mobile antiaircraft missile systems. The actions of enemy fighters were
simulated by an F-5 squadron. The missions of the reconnaissance helicopters
and the ground-attack fighters nearly coincided with their primary function, but
the attack helicopters had to engage the field air defenses.
The helicopter operations to suppress air defenses were generally based on
the element of surprise. The helicopters made a concealed approach to the
target by using the cover provided by treetops and after reaching the effective
range for launching Tow antitank guided missiles (3,000 meters) they carried out
the attack. The flight of ground-attack aircraft used the helicopter flight
route for maintaining the direction to the target and determined a target's
location by the burst of the missiles. The launch line for the Tow missiles was
used for selecting the moment for the first pair of ground-attack aircraft to
begin a sharp climb and for the subsequent firing of the Maverick guided
missiles. The second pair intensified the attack with cannon fire without first
flying to medium altitude. When strong air defense opposition was expected, one
of the pairs of ground-attack aircraft stayed in the zone and monitored the
attack of the helicopters. If the helicopters were hampered by antiaircraft
fire, the pair made a pass to suppress it.
The operating method determined for ground-attack aircraft was a series of
brief attacks with no more than 20 seconds in the zone of antiaircraft fire,
followed by immediate withdrawal to a fire-free space. The situation with
helicopters was more complicated, since their crews had to guide a missile until
* Interavia, 1981, No. 11, pp. 1143.
?
?
?
' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
the moment it reached the target, and their attacks lasted from 40-45 seconds
(which is a period wholly adequate for aimed fire by antiaircraft artillery). A
pair of ground-attack aircraft made their run to the target from converging axes
at an angle of 20-30 degrees. Analysis has shown that "the best method of
stopping tanks is to hit them from the rear and the flanks."
According to data in the foreign press, the effectiveness of air support
carried out by mixed groups of aircraft and helicopters was increased by a
factor of approximately three in comparison with the previous method. However,
this was achieved at the price of extreme stress on the physical capabilities of
flight personnel: when used separately ground-attack aircraft carried out four
or five sorties per day, but in a mixed group they did not make more than two
per day.*
Typically, the alignment of "heterogeneous" forces for a joint attack and
the coordination of their operations was feasible only with combined command and
control. The Army and Air Force representatives who jointly directed the groups
of helicopters and ground-attack aircraft, were stationed in a reconnaissance
helicopter fitted out as an airborne command post. All combat support weapons
were at their disposal. In the next stage of the experiments it is planned to
augment the efforts by ground-attack aircraft and combat helicopters with
artillery employing flat-trajectory fire.**
In evaluating the prospects for the development of methods for close air
support, the only problems that can be considered solved are those dealing with
delimiting the zones of responsibility of the Air Force and the Army and also
those of combining their efforts in the development of ground facilities for
electronic warfare and systems for aerial reconnaissance of the combat zone.
There can also be no doubt that this combat mission will retain its importance
and scope.
Along with this, foreign specialists consider that at present the number of
unsolved problems is considerably greater. For example, there has still been no
selection made of the principal air support weapon of the next generation. Even
now the ground-attack aircraft in the inventory of the NATO countries' air
forces do not completely meet the requirements for quick reaction, acceptable
survivability, all-weather capability, and precision of attack. However, the
* Aviation Week, No. 6, 1978, p. 217.
"Armed Forces Journal, No. 5, 1978, p. 32.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
configuration of the aircraft that is to replace them has still not been
determined. The disparity in the European and American concepts is evident in
the A-10 (US) and the Alpha Jet and Hawk (FRG and UK) ground-attack aircraft.
The European version is a light high-speed aircraft (maximum speed is 930
km/hour) that is capable of "infiltrating" through unsuppressed air defenses
under conditions of a relatively equal balance of forces in the air. The US
version is a heavy but slower aircraft with more ordnance and is designed for
operations when tactical superiority in the air has been secured. Their views
are unanimous only in the determination of the "classical" sequence for the
performance of the main combat missions: first achieve air superiority, next
isolate the area of combat operations, and then provide close air support for
the troops.
In connection with the shift of the line of Air Force responsibility beyond
the 70-km line and with the development of the concept of the air-land operation
(or battle), which assigns the main role to reconnaissance-strike systems and
the use of conventional long-range precision weapons, many specialists are
inclined to abandon the ground-attack aircraft altogether. A container with
submunitions, launched from the ground on a given trajectory and homing on
ground targets, can completely replace piloted aircraft, especially when they
have the same combat radii.
Results of research have been published in the FRG showing that to destroy a
grouping consisting of 600 tanks, 500 armored personnel carriers, 50 artillery
batteries, 200 SAMs, and 300 motor vehicles requires about 5,500 aircraft
sorties to deliver 33,000 tons of free-fall bombs to the targets. This same
mission can be carried out by using submunitions with a total weight of 3,000
tons in 600 combat sorties.*
The new weapons have the advantage in many of the criteria (survivability,
accuracy, destructive power) with the exception of one -- cost-effectiveness.
But this criterion, as with the choice of an all-weather ground-attack aircraft,
may be the decisive one. For example, the US Army and Air Force have decided
not to request appropriations prior to 1990 for the Assault Breaker system, the
cost of which has increased exorbitantly.**
* Air Force Magazine, No. 9, 1982, p. 36.
**Aviation Week, No. 22, 1984, p. 23.
?
?
?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
 I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8
?
Thus, for the next few years air support of ground forces will be carried
out by piloted aircraft, but according to a somewhat altered plan. Specialists
consider that after the zones of responsibility are defined the best variant is
for the independence of ground forces in their own zone, that is, "supremacy" of
the helicopter above the battlefield, while tactical attack-aircraft support is
forced out beyond the line of demarcation. However, such depends here on
whether the new AH-6 Apache attack helicopter is capable of engaging tanks
without the cooperation of the A-10 ground-attack aircraft. When conducting
joint operations, this assistance is still considered essential.
The role and place of various piloted systems in performing support missions
are defined as follows. As an integral part of the ground forces, a helicopter
can provide intermittent and highly mobile fire support with a short reaction
time; a vertical-takeoff aircraft (based primarily on carriers) has the
requisite reaction time and sufficient fire power for amphibious landings; and a
ground-attack aircraft, which can be based on dirt airstrips, provides a
powerful concentration of fire and has a sufficient diversity of modular
ordnance to destroy all types of targets assigned to aviation.
Each airplane or helicopter is presently considered a component of a quite
complex and synchronously functioning support system. Requirements for future
aviation systems are therefore being worked out in several NATO countries with
consideration of the capabilities of other components of the system for the
acquisition and-processing of information on the air and ground situation, and
for guidance, target indication, and the marking of targets and the front line.
Today's pilot of a ground-attack aircraft does not operate autonomously in joint
operations. The performance of his mission depends on many factors that do not
directly involve the characteristics of his aircraft or weapons. A clear
example of this is the not yet implemented concept of "forward dispersed bases,"
even though there is a combat-ready VSTOL aircraft available. In this area
difficulties of logistical support have not yet been overcome.
The experience of local wars in which contemporary types of aircraft
equipment and weapons have been used has demonstrated that on the whole the
requirements for close support of ground troops exceed existing Air Force
capabilities. The search for ways of accomplishing this important combat task
is continuing.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP10-00105R000403380001-8