MILITARY NEWS: THE PROTECTION OF TROOPS AGAINST WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, BY MAJOR-GENERAL OF TECHNICAL TROOPS, A. ISAYUK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10-00105R000403710001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 2, 1962
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Pro''ect.o: of Tr,o s _ ~aipons of t'ss Ilestruvtlor..
Wior-Genera: of Tech+:ical Troops, A. Isayuk
Nuclear and chemical weapons inflict casualties on personnel
and damage or. combat equipment and armament over areas covering tens
and hundreds of square kilometers. A surface burst of a Warhead
having a yield of 30 thousand tons, given a wind with an average speed
of 50 km an hour, can contaairiate an area of 90C or more square kilometers
with a radiation level of over 5 roentgens per he r, and 250 to 300
square kil peters with a radiation level of 100 roentgens per hour
and more.
Considering such an enormous casualty effect of the weapons of
=a- destruction, it is now essential to train troops to d. sperse
rapidly, to maneuver, to ure skilfully the protective characteristics
of the terrain, and to cross rapidly large areas contaminated by
radioactive and toxic substances.
Maneuver and dispersion are the integral conditions in the
combat activities of large unite and. units. It is impossible to
preserve the combat effectiveness of troops without them. *neuver
and dispersion waist be carried out no matter hoi,.r distant the troops
are from the every. Nevertheless, maneuver and dispersal ncust not
have an adverse effect on the carrying out of the mein task by the
troops.
In selecting the areas for the disposition and concentration of
troops, it is essential to take into consideration the features of
the terrain that give protection from the destructive factors of
atomic and chemical weapons. Ravines, hills. ditches. caves, quarries,
underground excavations, vegetation cover (wools, bushes), and
meteorological conditions all chaige the radius and areas of
destruction by the shock wave, limit the spread of light radiation,
reduce penetrating radiation, affect the spread and the volume of
the radioactive tall-out, and also reduce the effectiveness of char' -- ,
weapons and bacteriological agents. 50X1-HUM
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The effe'c' of all the destructive factors of a nuclear burst on
p?_rscr.nej is e:,rsid .- tl, reduced Veen they are dispersed in ravines,
on reverse slopea of heights, and in ditches. The effective casualty
radf .. of t :e Ea k wave is reduced by approximately to times under
these con .ti .. ?pick v: reduce the effective casualty radius
from lig.:t radiation, on the average, by 5 to 6 times, and that of
penetrating r'a.v,ation by 15 to 20 percent. By an accurate
consideration of all the positive features of broken tea rain and
meteorological condit!ons and by their skilful use, destruction in
persc nel and ccxaoet equipment is reduced, on the average, by about
ha f .
Unfortunately, not enough attention is paid to the accurate
consideration of the protective features of the terrain. The
evaluwtior and reconnaissance of terrain from this viewpoint is
seldcc done, and the necessary measures to strengthen cover and to improve its reagthen the existing
protective features are not undertaken.
In March 1960 in an army exercise in the Transesucasus Military
District (ZakVO), the forrard command point of the 7th Arty and later
its cossn3 point, were located on absolutely the existence in the exercise area of broken terrain and otherpitt
favorable con:: t io:.,c3 . Neglecting the protective features of The
terrain, the arm,- command point was bunched so clove together (on an
area of less the- one square kilometer) that for its destruction
several high explosive bombs, not to siaatiao nuclear warheads, would
be sufficient.
Dispersal and maneuver, the advisable fam tion of combat and
mere formations, the skilful use of the protective features of the
terrain, in our opinion., are the basic measures for protecting troops
from the weapons of mess destruction.
In this connection, the question arises of what significance
will the preparation of the terrain in an engineer respect have.
Certainly, the significance of engineer preparation of terrain under
modern conditions has increased even more. Even the simplest types
of engineer construction reduce by several time the destructive factors
of nuclear and chemical weapons. Trenches and eanunicetion trenches,
for examples protect troop personnel from the shock wave of a nuclear
warhead burst having a yield of 15 to 20 thousand tons at a distance
of up to 1 km from the center of the burst, and from a warbe*d Y- .
a yiel~ of 100 thousand tons at a distance of up to 1.8 km. 50X1-HUM
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The rad.ietici doses from a surface burst for personnel seated in
trend:-. sn3 co =-1cation trenches lz m deep are reduced 3 to 5 times
(au: w~ e ? lying down a to 3 times), and the radiation level is
rr:uced 15 to 20 times. Trenches and slit trenches covered over even
tt rl,> give c .ete protection from light radiation and from
droplet.- toxic substances (otravlyeyushcheye veshchestvo--0Y ), and
reduce the dose of penetrating radiation 50 times, while dugout shelters
vita a top cover of 100 cm reduce penetrating radiation 200 to 400 times.
The most reliable shelters are the various types with thick top
cover. Depending an their types and function such shelters give
complete protection from penetrating radiation, and at a distance of
400 m fromm the center of a nuclear burst give protection from- the
shock wave.
The creation of engineer structures, however, and also the
preparation of the terrain with the modern state of means of
mechanization will require a lengthy period of time -nd a greet
expenditure of forces and means. The command post (HP), communication
centers, and medical points alone of a division will require more than
50 shelters, well equipped in an aatiatcmic and antichemical respect.
The combat equipment, the vehicles, and the needs of the rear services
of a division and regiments will require the digging of about 2,000
trenches, dugouts (uglubleni.ye) and pits for various purposes.
It is quite obvious that such a large number of structures can
Orly be created when troops remain in place for a lengthy period.
Under conditions of greet nobility, high maneuverability, and fluidity
of combat operations, this is impossible with the modern leans of
mechanization of engineer works and the insufficiency of light and
portable structures for the constructicc of engineer structures.
Often it will not even be necessary. Therefore, the protective
features of the terrain Eat be utilized to the full.
Of no less importance in the protection of troops from the
weapons of mass destruction is the elimination of the consequences
of an atomic and chemical attack b} the eneiy. Unfortunately.,
experience of exercises shows that such basic measures as the
restoration of combat effectiveness of the troops, rescue and
medical-evacuatioc work, medical processing of personnel,
decontamination of combat equipment and weapons, and dosimetric
checks are not only not worked out in practice but fr0que-~41?
not even solved organizatia~elly. 50X1-HUM
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In one of the tactical exercises, the co=ender of the 210th
Motor" zed Rifle Regiment of the 118th Wtorized Rifle Division ' -
directly in the area of a "nuclear burst" with high levels of 50X1-HUM
radiation, took acre than two hours to make an evaluation of the
situation created as a result of the "nuclear burst". The evaluation
of the radi.aticxi situation was made slowly. Control and communications
with subunits were lost and no practical steps to reestablish them
were taken. Emergency rescue work was not organized, and the medical
prro^essing of personnel was carried out after lengthy delay. The
regimental medical post (polkovoy mediteinskiy punkt was not
for this work and the division medical battalion ) prepared
batelon divizii ), having arrived after a long delay., delay., (v not not nit
tleybo
render any actual assistance to the able t
personnel who had become casualties.
The subunit commanders of this regiment who were in the zone of
destruction did not even try to take any measures to eliminate the
consequences of the'hucleer burst". The individual antichemical
protection equipment was not fully utilized by the personnel.
The commander and the chief of staff of the division, knowing
the situation in which the 210th Motorized Rifle Regiment did not exercise any decisive influence on the organitionoand itself,
rendering of assistance to the affected subunits of the regiment. The
supply of materiel (clothing, medicines, foodstuffs, and means of
communications) was not organized.
The commanders of large units, units, and subunits which find
themselves in an area of nuclOoer burst (in the zone of fallout from
& radioactive cloud, in an area contaminated by toxic substances)
must quickly evaluate the situation and make a decision as regards
protection of their troops. First of all, communications with the
subordte subunits it be established to find out what their
situation is and what their needs are, report the situation to the
senior comandesr (chief) and inform the neighboring units about this,
appoint new ccumandrrs in place of those who have become casualties,
and without waiting for assistance from above, start alisinating the
consequence, of the employment of the nuclear (chemical) weapon with
their awn forces and means.
In the first place, measures for the rescue of personnel are
carried out, extracting them from the debris and rubble of engineer
structures and the rendering of mate medical aid an the spot.
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First aid to the victims is rendered in the form of self-aid and
m-rtual aid, and also by the medical personnel allocated for rescue work.
Casualties are immediately evacuated to collecting and triage points.
For the evs-aation of personnel, medical units and subunits should
be used first of all. If this should prone to be insufficient., then
other units and subunits may be utilized. The collecting and triage
points should be located outside the area of radioactive coertasinatioci,
near sources of water, and in places having good approaches for vehicles
and people on loot. All personnel must be informed of tie location
of these points.
In the case of mass destruction of personnel, army and front
independent medical battalions are sent to the area of the atomic
burst. They are given a part of the more and treatment of complicated work of rescue
personnel. IlnitB ar subunits of chemical protection
are also sent to the area of the ataxic burst to establish special
processing points (punkt spetsialnoy obrabotki--Pu&,).
Combat equipment and veapons are salvaged from ruins, restored,
and evacuated by the combat effective personnel of the units and
subunits after the radiation situat{on has been clarified and the
radiation levels do not exceed the permissible irradiation doses.
To assist the troops in the evacue,;ion of equipment and weapons from
the areas of atonic bursts, it is a visable to allot subunits from
other units, and prianri y from repaL units.
zone Combat ft equipment,
spthe
destruction and are beU.y daffigediare left on were the in
ot
and evacuated (if this is found necessary) on special directions by
army and front forces and means.
Clearance and restoration of routes for maneuver, and bringing
up of supplies and evacuation are carried out by the units and
subunits of all arms of troops with their own forces and means. The
most difficult tasks--the making of passages through the obstructions
and the repair of roads, bridges, and other tasks--are carried out by
engineer units and subunits reinforced with the necessary weans of
mechanization.
50X1-HUM
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Extinguishing fires in the areas of atomic bursts should be
undertaken only in exceptional cases where these areas are of tactical
or operational i portance, and then only when the high level of
radiation in these areas has fallen. Smell fires occurring at a
considerable distance from the ground zero of the atonic bursts should
be localized by the personnel of the subunits in the area or by
specially detailed subunits from units located Dear the area of the
fire.
In order not to expose troops, combat equipment, and armamut to
the danger of radioactive contamination and to maintain their combat
effectiveness, the radiation situation in an area of radioactive
contamination must be constantly known. To accelerate the
clarification of the radiation situation and the taking of a decision,
a simple method of calculation with tables (raschetno-graficheskiy
sposob) can be recommended to commanders and staffs.
The route of movement of a notarized rifle regiment crosses the
axis of the pe.n of a radioactively contaminated cloud at a distance
of 12 km from the center of a 40 thousand ten nuclear burst. The
length of the route along the path l ,, y 18.5 km. The speed of the
average wind is 30 km an hour. The l of radiation on the axis
of the path, 5 hours after the burst, equals Pmax ? 75 roentgens
per hour. The speed of movement of the column while on the path of
the cloud equals 25 kph. The movement is carried out on motor vehicles.
tnd,er these conditions, we find that the dose of irradiation received
by the personnel is:
II = Pmax x 18. 7 roentgens per hour
x25x2
and if the move is carried cutbuarmmored personnel carriers,.
It ^- 75x18.53.5 roentgens per hour.
4x25x4
A notarized rifle battalion moving in aotaW vehicles at 12 kph
must cross the path of a cloud from a surface atomic burst having a
yield of 30 thousand tons at a distance of 16 km from the cc----
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First of all, the level of radiation under the given conditions
is calvculated, and then the dose of irradiation. 50X1-HUM
e.+,..~vw.z:.c, rrv~ccwlCiil' T.mC T.extiDO( anomie Weapons and Operations o
Troops th der Conditions of its Tables for Evaluating
II 1.5 t ~- 1.5 E c = 6 r
t 2x22
O x \ ' a x 0 a 36 roentgens per hour
R xt l x
Good aids in carrying out met diverse calculations are The
Short Reference Book of Combat Characteristics of Atomic Weanns and
and doeimetric rules TL-1 and IL- .
Radioactive Conteathation of Terrain durt
In eliminating the consequences of the employaent of v+eepons
CC sass destruction the most aggressive and organizing role must belong
to the senior comsenders and staffs. They must immediately send their
representatives into or toward the areas of nuclear bursts for direct
? supervision of the work. Medical, chemical and engineer units and
subunits must be sent to the areas of nuclear bursts, and, if necessary,
subunits and units of other arms of troops . The composition of the
units and subunits so detailed will be determined by the specific
situation of each case and by the proposed scope of work.-
At p_ eeent, atte )ts are being lade vi*: hin the troops to create
temporary supernumerary teams for the elimination of the consequences
of a nuclear attack. In our opinion, improvised rescue groups and
teams do not fulfil their purpose either orrgenizatiocally or in fact.
By their coeelposition and technical equipment they are not able to
carry out the whole range of special tasks--evacuation of personnel
casualties, clearance of obstructions and of lines of supply,
reestablishment of communications and control., fire fighting, medical
processing of personnel, derontasination and degassing of combat
equipment and materiel, etc.
Furthermore, these groups and tears my themselves be put out of
action by nuclear bursts even before they are used. The very
creation of such tonnes will to sow extent weaken for a long Use the
unit or s'sb nit providing the personnel and the equipment.
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Owing to the combat aitueticn Frevailiro,
Zee ffiy be at such a distance from their troops ortrily created
difficult and also scxeetirses that it will be
arm. to ca impossible for them to reach the required
carry art the tasks of efl 1jsting the consequences of an
atomic attack.
50X1-HUM
We consider that the t effective aid to the
eing
the consequences of a nuclear attack can and must be~rendered by ~e elithos
Units and subunits which are in the vicinity of the area burst
but outside the sphere of its effects.
s
The ullaination of the consequences of the em
Vespons
ployment mass destruction consists first of all in of rendering Immediate aid
ad
to the casualties from toxic substances' ? in al observation
Or affectsd personaal; in discover =Is and have
been exposed to the effects of bacterial) a =Its
in c subunits emus
dainetric checkj and in organizing gents; in p ying
8 out
Of persoanel; the degassing a carrying out medical process ~
armament, E and decontamination of combat egsai ent~ B
water and lo'tting' equipmeztt, and terrain, and also of purifying
and bacteria ag nt8 foodstuffs from toxic and radioactive substances
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