SAUDI ARABIA-UNITED STATES: COMPLEMENTARY FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10C00522R000100660001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 10, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

A/s-c.4 fi/ A-71IC
' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/10: CIA-RDP10C00522R000100660001-7
CONFIDENTIAL
8 September 1983
Saudi Arabia-United States: Complementary Foreign Policy Goals
Saudi Arabia and the United States share complementary
foreign policy goals in the Middle East and South Asia of
supporting moderate governments and seeking to combat the
influence of the Soviet Union and other unfriendly governments or
movements. Saudi policies have helped advance US as well as
their own interests in the region. Until very recently, the
Saudis were actively engaged for over a year in the negotiations
to remove foreign troops from Lebanon, and they have been
generally, albeit quietly, supportive of President Reagan's
overall Middle East.peace efforts. Generous Saudi financial aid
over the past decade has provided critical support for moderate,
pro-Western governments from Morocco to Pakistan. The Saudis
strongly prefer to carry out their diplomacy and provide aid
without publicity.
Lebanon: The highest levels of the Saudi government were
actively involved in the Lebanon negotiations until 7 September
1983, when Riyadh suspended--at least temporarily--mediation
efforts because of the sharp deterioration in Lebanon's political
and military situation.
-- During the Israeli invasion of Lebanon last summer the
Saudis assisted US efforts to negotiate the withdrawal of
PLO fighters from Beirut and provided essential support
for international arrangements to relocate them.
-- Following the conclusion of the Israeli-Lebanese
withdrawal agreement in May 1983, the Saudi government
publicly supported the right of the Lebanese government
to take the steps it considered necessary to obtain the
withdrawal of Israeli forces.
-- Until early September 1983, the Saudis had tried for over
a year to facilitate communication between the Syrians,
on the one hand, and the US and Lebanon, on the other.
-- Saudi Arabia has used its considerable moral influence to
encourage both Muslim Lebanese and other Arab states to
support the government of President Gemayel.
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NESA M 83 10215
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Peace Process: The Saudis have supported the President's peace
initiative within Arab circles.
-- Last spring they actively urged PLO leader Arafat to
allow Jordanian King Hussein to negotiate for the
Palestinians in expanded peace talks.
Financial Assistance: Saudi Arabia's principal means of
influence is generous financial ,aid. Third world regional
friends of the United States who have received such aid include
Jordan, Morocco, and North Yemen. Other major recipients are
Iraq and Syria.
In per capita terms, Saudi Arabia's foreign assistance
level far exceeds that of the United States and is among
the world's highest.
In absolute terms, Saudi Arabia has been the world's
second largest aid donor, after the United States, during
the past decade. During that time, Saudi foreign
assistance has averaged at least $3.5 billion annually
and occasionally has been significantly higher--for
example to Egypt after the 1973 war and to Iraq since its
war with Iran began in 1980.
Saudi Arabia's immense economic development effort since
the mid-1970s has indirectly provided crucial aid to
regional moderates and friends of the United States--such
as Pakistan, Egypt, South Korea, and the Philippines--in
the form of large worker remittances and construction
contracts.
The Saudis have made several large loans to the
International Monetary Fund, which have substantially
augmented the Fund's resources. They loaned $3.2 billion
in 1979, $8.6 billion more in May 1981, and have agreed
to consider lending an additional $4.3 billion in 1983.
Constraints on Saudi Cooperation with the US: The prime
constraint on closer Saudi cooperation with the United States in
regional political and military matters remains the unresolved
Arab-Israeli conflict. The Saudis differ with us on the best
means to manage the conflict and other chronic regional
problems.
-- The Saudis look to the United States as their ultimate
protector against the Soviet Union or other hostile
countries.
-- However, because the United States is seen as the closest
ally and strongest supporter of the Arabs' most dangerous
enemy, Israel, the Saudis find it politically impossible
to publicly cooperate with US military efforts to defend
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Persian Gulf oil supplies against possible Soviet
attack.
The Saudis--and other Arabs--see US support for Israel as
virtually unquestioning and limitless.
The Saudis repeatedly ask why the United States refuses
to use its economic and military aid as leverage to force
modifications in Israeli policy and to rein in what they
see as continuing Israeli expansionism.
The Saudis, in turn, provide considerable financial aid to Syria-
-a minimum of $529 million/year committed under the 1978 Baghdad
Pact Agreements. Theoretically this aid should give Riyadh
leverage to force Damascus to moderate its policies in the
region. The Saudis will not use this leverage because of:
Pan-Arab requirements to support front-line states
confronting Israel.
-- Fear of Syria's ability to create trouble for Saudi
Arabia at home and abroad.
-- Concern that a cutoff of aid would drive the Syrians
closer to Moscow.
The Syrians, moreover, repeatedly have shown that they will not
let Saudi aid dictate their policy toward Lebanon or Middle East
peace efforts in general.
The Saudis have found that their aid to independent
minded states like Syria is difficult to curtail once
committed, and often does not translate into influence
with the recepient--a situation Saudis point out as
analogous to the US relationship with Israel.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/09/10: CIA-RDP10C00522R000100660001-7
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CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Saudi Arabia: Helping US Policy
NESA M 83-10215
Distribution:
Orig - Vice President Bush
1 - PDB
1 - DCl/Executive Director
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
4 - CPAS/CMD/CB
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/PG
2 - NESA/PG/P
ORIG: DDI/NESA/PG/P
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