25 FEBRUARY NSC MEETING ON LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10M02313R000100760004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 24, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100760004-3
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
Notional Intelligence Officers
DDI #1558-82
24 February 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM National Intelligence Officer for Near East-South Asia
SUBJECT 25 February NSC Meeting on Libya
1. The following comments are germane to the National Security Council
position paper being circulated for the 24 February NSC meeting on Libya:
A. On page 6, paragraph 2, the comment is made in relation to a
unilateral boycott that: "We therefore do not expect this step to have a
profound or long-lasting effect on the Libyan economy, although Libya will
probably be forced to lower the price of its oil somewhat in order to attract
new customers." Although the amount of oil being talked about is relatively
small (only about 50,000 barrels per day), the current soft oil market would
in fact render it difficult rapidly to attract alternate customers, even with
a price reduction.
B. On page 5, last paragraph, the statement is made that "There is
interagency agreement, that -- following careful consultations with Congress,
our allies and affected countries, and an accompanying public affairs strategy
that focuses on the broad Libyan threat -- we should implement a US boycott of
Libyan oil, unless a review of these consultations leads to the conclusion
that we should not go ahead." As indicated in my previous memorandum on Task
Force meetings, this statement glosses over .a considerable amount of
reluctance to this step by various agencies -- most specifically Treasury,
Commerce, and some elements in DOD, NSC, and State NEA. It would be most
accurate to say they have been brought around to accepting the view that some
sanctions have already been mandated by previous NSC deliberations, and that
the proposed courses of action are the least damaging available.
2. I recommend utilizing the talking points at Tab B for any statement
you may wish to make. These have heen updated. I also suggest you may wish
to emphasize the following specific points:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100760004-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 : CIA-RDP10M02313R000100760004-3
A. The terrorist threat against high level United States officials
may have receded temporarily, but there is no evidence that it has been
terminated by Qadhafi as a matter of policy_
C. A number of reports, which are considered credible, indicate
Oadhafi intends to oppose any US incursion below the 32'30" line in the Bay of
Sidra with force. Plans for such an operation, presumably in June, must take
this likelihood into account.
D. It must be well understood that the economic measures
contemplated are overwhelmingly symbolic in impact only, and that this
judgment has been made in a coordinated intelligence community estimate.
3. Assuming the recommended economic measures are decided upon, there
will be requests to CIA for sanitized material for use with Congress, third
countries, and possibly publicly.
-
, e -
Charles E. Waterman
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100760004-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26 : CIA-RDP10M02313R000100760004-3
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - DDI Reg.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/26: CIA-RDP10M02313R000100760004-3