LETTER OF RESPONSE TO SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP10M02313R000703980026-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: October 10, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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DCl/CT 80-0103/1
1 0 OCT 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SWJECT:
REFERENCE:
Deputy to the ma tor Collection Tasking
Letter of Response to Secretary of Commerce
Letter to DCI from Secretary of Commerce, dated
3 October 1980
1. Action Requested: Your signature on the attached letter of
response to Secretary Klutznick's request for your views on issues
raised in a recent OMB guidance letter relative to the develo ment of a
follow-on to the current LANDSAT civil satellite program.
2. Background: As you are aware, three Presidential Directives
;
(PD/NSC-37, PD/NSC-42, and PD/NSC-54) have been generated by the recent
review of national space policy. The basic objectives with reference to
the civil space programs were indicated in PD/NSC-37 as being "to increase
the body of scientific knowledge about the earth and the universe; to
develop and operate civil applications of space technology; to maintain
United States leadership in space science, applications, and technology;
and to further United States domestic and foreign policy objectives."
This Directive also provided for encouraging "domestic commercial
exploitation of space capabilities" under government authorization and
supervision. The two subsequent Directives provided further guidance,
essentially concerning the specifics of implementing these basic objectives.
Thus, PD/NSC-54 levied upon Commerce the responsibility for preparing
the transition plan from the current NASA LANDSAT experimental system to
an operational satellite remote sensing program for civil applications.
The transition plan was to cover, among other subjects, "system financing
including pricing policies for the users' sharing of costs."
3. The differing reactions between OMB and the federal user agencies
to the Presidential guidance surfaced during the evolution of the formal
Transition Plan, which was completed in June. On one hand, the OMB
thrust was to reduce program costs to the minimum, to push to the maximum
cost sharing by users, and to turn over ownership and operation of the
system to the private sector as soon as possible. Implementation of the
OMB budget policies would:
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SUBJECT: Letter of Response to Secretary of Commerce
a. mean limited capability systems that will result in loss of
U.S leadership in civil applications of space technology;
b. stretch out the recommended procurement plans, thereby
threatening continuity of data flow; and
c. create a managerial/budgetary nightmare as the operations
of the civil system became de endent upon uncertain contributions
from the various users.
4. The other user agencies (Commerce, Agriculture, Interior,
State) have emphasized:
a. implementing the basic policy objective of maintaining U.S.
technological leadership in civil space matters, and
b. developing a sound program that would provide useful services,
ther attracting a broad market of federal, private, and foreign
users.
5. The OMB-user agency differences appeared to be somewhat moderated
by devising language in the text of the Transition Plan that tried to
respond to both points of view. However, the 16 September 1980 OMB
letter indicates that the OMB position--which is supported by Dr. Frank
Press--continues to be dominated by the sole objective of minimizing the
near-term budgetary effect without consideration of the resulting impact
on the national policy objective of maintaining leadership in space.
The OMB approach is unrealistic since its pressures for reduced system
investments--and capabilities--and for higher product costs will be a
strong incentive for driving present users away, especially given the
uncertainties in data flow and the near-term prospect of aggressive
competition from France. Furthermore, the private sector does not
appear to be too enthusiastic about taking over system ownership at this
time, and an inadequate system will only serve to strengthen their
reservations. Even if they are willing, devising and approving the
enabling legislation will probably take a minimum of two years.
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SUBJECT: Letter of Response to Secretary of Commerce
7. Staff Position: The attached letter of response highlights
critical points about the Implementation of the national policy objective
to maintain U.S. leadership in space that have not been addressed in the
OMB comments and provides specific information about the aggressive
nature of the French competition. It should, therefore, be useful to
Secretary KTutrnick in his present plan to get the President's resolution
of these issues. The letter has been _coordinated with, and concurred in
by, RMS and NFAC (OGSR and OSWR).
8. Recommendation:
to Secretary Klutznick.
end that you sign the attached letter
Attachment:
Proposed Letter for Acting DCI Signature
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UNCLASSIFIED
The Director of Central Intelligence
washingtompaosim
DCl/CT 80-0103
The Honorable Philip M. Klutznick
Secretary of Commerce
Washington, D.C. 20230
Dear Phil,
IE.:scull.* Rtgistry
se7/4901
1 4 OCT 1981
Thank you for your letter to Admiral Turner. The following comments
are in response to your 3 October 1980 request for our views on the
current issues relative to developing a follow-on system to the LANDSAT
program.
I note that with reference to the civil satellite remote sensing
program the three recent Presidential Directives on National Space
Policy have consistently stressed the two major objectives of main-
taining U.S. leadership in space science, applications and technology,
and encouraging greater private sector involvement in the operation and
ownership of the satellite imaging system.
In contrast, the 16 September 1980 OMB letter has focused on the
aspect of minimizing the budgetary impact of the civil remote sensinp
program. In this period where the need for fiscal constraint is critical,
the various OMB comments warrant careful assessment. However, the basic
position of indicating-that the OMB "decision to provide increased
funding for this program will be dependent on thorough programmatic
justification and the-willingness of the users to share in the costs"
fails to give any weight to the major Presidential objective of main-
taining U.S. leadership in space technology. It also seems to ignore
the stipulation in Presidential Directive/NSC-42 that an "adequate
federal budget commitment will be made to meet the objectives" of the
national space policy. In our judgment, these omissions pose the serious
risk of undermining one of the cornerstones of national space policy.
The OMB letter acknowledges that moving on to the LANDSAT follow-on
system is "an area where we have little experience." Indeed, some of
the subsequent points it makes seem to be predicated upon assumptions
that are incomplete, inconsistent, or both. Thus, with reference to
NOAA Recommendation 1, OMB is insisting that before the concept of
attempting to maintain continuity of data in the 1980s can be accepted,
more detailed programmatic justification will be required by the users.
As a point of fact, this OMB requirement is being addressed almost
exclusively to the federal agency market. It ignores two key points--
that there are other users, both domestic and foreign, and the basic
fact that if a remote sensing system does not provide continuity of
data, users who have made or are about to make investments of manpower
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
and equipment will be forced either to curtail their investment or shift
to alternative sources of data. Lack of data continuity is a strong
counterforce to market expansion. Establishing continuity of data is a
foundation without which the United States cannot maintain leadership in
civil space applications.
OMB makes the implementation of NOAA Recommendation 2 to develop
specifications in 1981 for the goal of initiating a fully operational
system in 1989 conditional upon the willingness of U.S. users to invest.
OMB, therefore, indicates that a future, more advanced operational
system should be deferred beyond 1989. This position appears to be
predicated upon the assumption of a static condition whereby the making
of decisions concerning the civil remote sensing program can continue in
the future as in the past on the basis of unchallenged leadership and
with disregard of competitive foreign programs.
However, the remote sensing field will become far more dynamic in
the next few years as U.S. leadership is challenged by the ongoing
programs of France and Japan. Current information indicates that the
French SPOT program is comprehensive and aggressive. France has scheduled
the first SPOT satellite to be launched in November 1983, with operational
services to begin in January 1984. The satellite will carry two imaging
instruments capable of providing either a 20-meter or 10-meter capability--
as compared to 80 meters and 30 meters for the United States. The
spectral range will be similar to that of the LANDSAT MSS but will
extend only to 0.9 micrometers into the infrared spectrum--as compared
with the 1.1 on the MSS. However, the pointing aspect of the SPOT
system will afford a stereoscopic capability that will be especially
useful for topographic mapping and geological surveys. The French
government has announced the policy that, although the 20-meter imagery
will be distributed without restriction to all users who pay the appropriate
fees, the 10-meter imagery will be released only with the consent of the
countries that are imaged. The higher resolutions and the restrictions
on the dissemination will have a strong appeal to many countries.
This SPOT program has been under development for a number of years
and was approved in late 1977 by the French government which also provides
the funding. The stated objectives of the SPOT program are quite broad
and include more effective land use management of French territory,
facilitating involvement of French companies in the economic development
of the developing nations, and providing a technologically sound basis
for a subsequent military reconnaissance program. The SPOT system
processing objective is to supply some standard products within 48 hours
and fully processed products within one week. Various parts of the
UNCLASSIFIED
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UNCLASSIFIED
French government's scientific and technical organizations are apparently
being geared up to provide additional specialized imagery interpretation
and analytical services. The Japanese satellite program can also be
expected to be a strong competitor.
It may well be that not all of these plans will be effected during
the 1980s, but these foreign developments emphasize the point that the
U.S. civil remote sensing program will be subject to aggressive foreign
competition. If the development of its advanced capabilitiet should be
put into a holding pattern, maintaining U.S. technological leadership
will become increasingly difficult.
Therefore, there is a need to reaffirm the basic Presidential
objectives with reference to the conduct of the civil space programs as
they were unequivocally outlined in Presidential Directive/NSC-37--"to
increase the body of scientific knowledge about the earth and the
universe; to develop and operate civil applications of space technology;
to maintain United States leadership in space science, applications, and
technology; and to further United States domestic and foreign policy
objectives."
With reference to the OMB comment on NOAA Recommendation 3, it
should be noted that price levels which are too high will also drive
users to curtail their-purchase of U.S. satellite products or shift to
alternative sources. Again, nowhere does there appear to be OMB con-
sideration of the impact of foreign competition.
To summarize, I believe an inadequate or poorly implemented system
of capital investments poses the risk of developing an inefficient or
unreliable remote sensing system. This will serve only to further
stimulate foreign competition for the international market that previous
U.S. investments have basically created. It will also lead to erosion
of the current U.S. leadership in civil applications of remote sensing
technology fromrspace, maintenance of which is a basic objective spelled
out in the Presidential Directives. Since the Europeans and the Japanese
are already making major remote sensing advances, satisfying this objective
should be a major consideration. Furthermore, a marginal or substandard
U.S. system notable to compete with foreign competition also decreases
the likelihood of achieving private sector involvement in the future
operation of civil remote sensing activities--still another Presidential
objective. And, finally, such a system will even fail to meet domestic
users' needs for data continuity and reliability.
Sincerely,
is/ Yrank C. Carlucci
Frank C. Carlucci
Acting Director
UNCLASSIFIED
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JELKE I
SUBJECT: Letter of Response to Secretary of Commerce
DISTRIBUTION:
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