OSS - ASSESSMENT OF ALLIED BOMB DAMAGE TO GERMANY/ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF NIGHT BOMBING/SITUATION IN FRANCE/PEARL S. BUCK'S LETTER ON THE IMPACT OF U.S. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ON THE WAR AND THE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FOR THE JAPANESE/BUCK'S EAST-

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1942
• Content Type: MISC

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Unab-tan purific Irtete
October 28th., 1942.
CHATEAU FRONTENAC
QUEBEC
Dear Bill;
Thank you very much for your letter of October
.22nd. I am returning to the States next week
and may follow your suggestion to get in touch
with TradVW-Davidson. I knew him years ago
slightly and perhaps can get the information I
want through him.
,
,
If I could get a few minutes with you I would V-N
'L
.. came to Washington. I will telephone you when A
I get to New York to see if I can make an aproint-
, . 11
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ment. ,
Warm personal regards.
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W. Brooks*
II roettinact
quebes,
Canada*
............amorirorkir.MOMMOOMM10.011P.111?10
October 224 1942
Dear Joan
I hole pure letter, and of course I would be very pleased
it its@ wo,uld,, give we es refer*
In rellition to thik Ariy_iir'b'orps, I auggent you get in
touch with00a-Davisose? ii4e4t4nt Seoretary .of War for Air*
fthis Deceirtmeeit** Washington, D.C.
117 I hoar of anitlaing'fior4,0d; rwili let you know.
Sincertisyv
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JOSEPH W. BROOKS
220 EAST 42"P STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y.
MURRAY HILL 2 5000
October 19th, 19.2
I am trying to get a job ferrying aircraft
for the Government and may have to give the names of
several people as references. In the event I apply for
a commission in the Army Air Forces, I would like to
call on your good graces to give me a helping hand7.
In the event you have any close connections
with the Army Air Corps, I might ask you to use your influence
for an interview.
I have been flying in Canada for the past
eight months Tor the RCAF on a civilian basis, doing
cross-country work in twin-engine bombers.
I sometimes feel that, with my past experience
as a line officer, and with 15 years of flying, perhaps I
should be in operational work. I believe you know my back-
ground and qus:Lifications, and if you ha pen to see or hear
of anything really interesting in Washington. I would appreciate
a line from you. My address will he Chateau Frontenac, City
of Quebec, Canada.
With warm personal regards, I am,
Sincerely,
NiNgssua gMamm
?IL
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3 14.11t sr*
October 13, 1942
Bear Admiral Harold Traia
Savy Deir_rtment
Washi;_,,,on, D. C.
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Dear Admiral Train:
I think you should see the attached message which
came from our London office today. I understand tnat
Brown is an 041 representative at Istanbul. We have
had no dealings with him and, of course, know nothing
about he subject of the message. I have so notified
London.
Sincerely,
ffildiaraj, Donovan
Director
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October 13, 1942
Dear General Strong:
think you should see the attached message wnich
came from our London cffice.today. I understand that
Brown is an MI representative at Istanbul. We have
had no dealiv:s nith him and, of course, know nothing
about the subject of the message. I have so notified
London.
William J. Donovan
Director
;1st::
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-1.71 40
". .4". Prom The Desk Of:
Commander John Ford, U.S.N.R.
Field Photographic Branch
Office of Strategic Services
10 Nov 1942
.there is enclosed copy
of letter requesting
services of Mr. Guy Bolte
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numummoomm
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Prom:
To
(1..)?????????? ?????????...?? ????????????-?-
0 VIE
Lat..at
f- r e I 11,11-1 t
1 September 1942
The ltreotor of Strategic Servioes.
The Chief of Naval Personnel.
nal Of ficer-in-Chlirge, Office of Naval Officer
Procurement, New York, N. Y.
Subject: Boum, Cherie? Guy -- Applicant for ?omission
in Class D-V(3),
Referemoes (a) Nav-36-711.1 of 16 March 1942.
Nnolosure: (A) Copy of ireforintoe (a).
I. After thoroughly interviewing the subjeot-named man
a* to hit professional Tw1t:rim-111?0 and background, it is recommended
lthivit, he .bor 1191.4118i011144 in the runk,Of Lieutenant (junior grade),
tli'4.1(.14, to be assigned to*e. ,,Of.ficke, of -Naval .,Operations,
Depertmat, for ,.,Airther asaisMOkit with the Field, Ph6tokraphic
*melt of the Off toe of Strategia Services as photogrvphic officer
tu be * charge of 'a Gamma tatit wubjeet to immediate orders to any
4mstiMtLcn in eonneationW& pita/Or:jai report? of the !current
liOntlfct?
?
, Nieuwe of thil(urgeney of photographic missions currently
br:441:0?. :littioneeit for the ,444at 14-0.14of -Staff, it is requested that
Iionsediato action be taken in ifteirociessing of Jr. /Nolte' a commission-
:040"itbat- the requirmant thailhe attend the Officers' Training
Sehoget 1001inivetic (1)-beenuse of the "iiiiecialised duties to mhioh he
101402:* be Osikigiamit. and (2) beeause time is a vital factor in the
wmeOteee.;*f the photo& hie 'ventures being undertaken by this
CrOmattation?
ad.-0447ml!
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WILLIAM J. DONOVAN
Director
B. 111, ODININONAM
Captain, U.S.N.C.R.
ly direction
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ez.
Colonel 711lian J. Donovan
DATE: 1.07P '11,4-r 30,
I iattaching a copy of notes of a conversation
with Ur. Lawrence, who is in charge
of bomb ainagc asses$-
ment for the Ministry of' Economic -ar'are. I am also in-
papers recently pre2ared on this sub-
c1u'ii rig copies of two
.iect in the Ministry of Economic -:arfare.
-There are a number of other documents relatik to
this subject that I am having copied now,
3/09/17: and "1'icb I h11
CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
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Conversation with Lawrence MEV regarding
receat
Within the last few months Lawrence, Col. Vickers and varloas
others concerned with this problem have experienced a definite change in
their views regarding possibilities of bomb damage. There is now a very
strongly held opinion to the effect that bombing may be expected to pro-
duce decisive rather than subsidiary effects. About the heaviest tonnage
dropped on Germany within eny month is 13,000 - 14,000 tons, of which one
fourth is assumed to have landed in the target area. As a rough guess
Lawrence mentioned a figure four times this as necessary to produce the
results hoped for. This tonnage would on the basis of present possibili-
ties be mainly distributed over German urban areas within the radius
Londom-Hanover. This observation raises two questions:
(1) Is the vulnerable population in this area a sufficient percentage
of the total population to ensure that the repercussions would extend pretty
much throughout the German economy':
(2) What would be the process of social disintegration involved and
what sort of evidence of this disintegration would become obvious to In-
telligence Services?
Lawrence thought that the answer to the first question is
definitely yes. The area within practical bombing radius now contaits well
over 20 minion aistributed in occupations and in locations inseparably con-
nected with the basic network of the Germen economy. It would be impossible ,
he thinks for disintegration in this area not to extend to other areas. The
magnitude of the problem involved in providing relief, strengthening adminis-
tration, rebeilding damage, and so forth would constitute such a drain on
German resources as to make it impossible to carry on a major war effort.
With respect to the second question there are, of course, certain
roiigb3y measurable effects such as the death rate calculated on the basis
of British experience, damage to buildings readily obsereable by aerial re-
connaissance, absenteeism in factories and so forth. Of much greater im-
portanee however than these measurable effects would be the breakdown of
Geverment controls, administrative machinery, and in general all those
social habits which are necessary to the maintenance of an orderly society.
laey particular bombing of the weight now contemplated waaLd pre-
sumab4 produce haphazard and uncontrolled migration of the population away
fromthe bombed areas, wholesale looting, he failure of the relief system
to functima adequately and so forth. To a certain extent evidence of sach a
process e disintegration would become available in the form of Governmental
'decrests designed tn deal with the situation.
SECRET
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Lawrence is of e:e opinion t.:.at tc fee:1.4f( cf lef
,
to function adequately ',mull be one of ti:e not oerio 'ff' f ,');
He cited as an example the sf.tuation in CoveLtry Ter:
The day following the Coventr:, ra.if-t cavalcaf:e of re ler
vehicles of various sorts descended on ,:oventr:- ireviKn2: feee, c'eiteee-,
money and other things necessary to re-establish -loraee ax-: to lak, ee
early return to work possible. The result was that .:roduction la ti.e
Coventry area returned to normal within a renarkabL:, sloe: ;-paee of tele
and morale continued strong.
Plymouth on the other hand, "eeing a larger town rather fa_7
moved from other centres of population, had to wait lon3er for r.eip wLth
the result that the re-establishment of ordinary conditions cf life ad
ordinary attitades was greatly .9rolonzef..
In Germany the cases of Lubec' t and Karlsruhe are illamina:da?;.
The relief caravans reached Lubeck the day after the raid which was in
March 1942; in Karlsruhe on the other hand which has been recently raided,
it took three weeks for adequate relief measures to be applied. It is to
be expected that with the increasing rate of bombing adequate relief measIres
will be subject to continual greater delay. Medhurst eeports it took 6
weeks to provide adequate relief for Essen.
It was agreed that the limitations to the weig_t of bombin a'etaces
are principally spacial and weather limitations. It is Lawrence's view that,
the latter are more serious. Bombers can be dispatched from a field more
rapidly than they can be landed. The landing of bombers from a 1,000 bomber
raid presents a very difficult problem even under ideal weather conditions.
In a 2,000 bomber raid, if weather conditions turn bad, operational losses
on landing might reach very serious proportions.
Lawrence thinks that it is probable that daylight precision bomb-
tee over Germany would be very difficult if not impossible against German
anti-aircraft defences. If it is possible he thinks that the orimare- targe ba
should be aircraft plants. The greater the emphasis placed on bombing attazke
from England the highter the priority which should be attached to the Lierman
aircraft industries as a target. He thinks that the primary object of day-
light bombing over Germany will probably be the marking of the tare ed for
night attack. He gave as an example the recent raid on :alan. ''he laylight
bombers reached the target about five or six o'clock. During the ni3ht a
cloud covering existed which would ordinarily have precluded reachin: the
target, but fires started in the day time made the city area clearly visible.
1
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Lawrence's parting comment with rez:ard to the role of boiabl:4:? al$
to the effect that tacticca chaLlges in the use of aircraft are extrr:le:-.,
rapid. He emphasised it by saying that tYere have been :g.eat.lr tacticFa
changes in aircraft in the last three momhs than the tactical chi.J.6c, Ir
the use of ships over the last 200 years.
This observation, of course, cuts both was. Thc changes
may be expected to occur may quickly increase the efficiency oc' -jr atta(:k
or it may quickly improve defenctes against air attack.
Ledburst said at lunch that a first line strength of 4,000
bombers could easily average 60-70,000 tons of bombs droped In Ozermary
per month. he would expect such first line strength to be bi1J.t u2 btfcre
the Spring of 1944.
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? kOrUigrat
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF Thr NIGHT BOMBING OFFEN3
VAECH - SEPT. 1942
SUMMe.RY zi.ND CONCLUSIONS
SECRET
1. In this period Bomber Command has ia 85 major raids dropped 13,S.83 tons
of H.F. and 11,565 tons of incendiaries on 26 built-up areas containing a
populationeof approximately 8.8 million inhabitants and about 2.6 nillion
dwellings. The total population is about 83 millions and the total number
of daellings at the outbreak of war (17.8 millions) was admitted to be
about I'd- millions less than was required to house the population adequately.
2. The devastation of whole sections of built-up areas which results from
the tactical methods employed is estimated to have had the following economic
effectsk:-
I. DIRECT EFFECTS
(a) Destruction and damag2_10 dwell/ma.
891000 dwellings are thought to have been demolished and 166,000
damaged so seriously as to have become temporarily uninhabitable; these
together represent about 10% of the dwellings in the raided areas and of
the total number of dwellings in Germany. The number of persons displaced
by such damage is estimated at over 750,000 - about al-% of the .population
in the area affected and 1% of the total population. The number actually
evacuated for reasons of policy may be and probably is larger. Some cf the
displaced persons can probably be rehoused in a proportion of the 166,000
damaged houses when these have been rendered habitable. On the other hand
it is estimated that there are a further 127,000 damaged houses which, though
.habitable at present, may rapidly become uninhabitable through stress of
weather Aimless immediate repairs are carried out.
The above estimate takes no account of slightly damaged hodses the
mEmber of which may amount :be 1 million. Unless damage to windows, doprs,
partitions etc., can be rapidly made goad in such cases, t e stress of living
in bl';em during the winter and the consumption of fuel, light etc., will be
greatly increased.
The alternative acccmmodation which exists in barracks, labour camps
eta. is mostly unsuitably located for the housing of industrial workers and
is in. any case already largely occupied for military hospitals, housing of
P and foreign workers etc.
There is ample evidence in administrative measurer of -bre acuteness
of the housing, problem which has already been caused.
e-
:Theso,conolusions are frwariably based on partial information and are there-
tore* subject to-wide margims of. error. The assumptioils used are delateratelf
comservativoy and include tie assumption that only 25 of the bomb Load Las
ii. in Wilt-up areas.
gitIrrariaslog,1 ''4.2..rgAl4;;g4LiL.
, 1
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e
(b) Destruction and dameLe to factories --ekYT er
interruntion of public utilitv_services and coenicatioe.e.
-ith the methods of attack now empley.:-d such da i-;, tou?;h ii e, oe-
curs inciientally and is best regarded as a bens accrai.1, over aod a-eve
the nain dividend earned under I(a). It has beenp-,s,ire.'f toe!; tr,e "))1'13
shal', be maximized by the selection as targete "if buLit-up arPas
the Largest proportion of war oroduction and essential ineastrj.
In vie of the direction of the ma:ur 2r0)ortior of toe attac::, i a
probable t'nat steal 2roductian has suffered more severely tean ari ot..er
activity. un the basis of damage known to have been i..,flicted on eix steel
plants in the Ruhr and Saar, it is estimated -tat e enely hc.s sZfeoed
a grosLi loss of 1,250,000 tens of finishe Teel outl)et - ;r,
of t-le estimated output of finished iron and steel in Lierlan Europe
1942. The gross loss will be partiallj offset by the o?eni.ez u, o illc
steel capacity in Eastern 'erance, but yuire2: to tar dela' in sterti,q:io
and naleing available raw material, a net loss, ahich cannot at j.resent be
calculated, will undoubtedly renain.
Known aajor damage to aircraft works ).s estimated tc 'ave reEe-ted in
the loss of production of 60 heavy bombers, 60 dive bombers, 40 fl_:htPrs,
and 85 other aircraft.
Owing to tne length of the production period, t.le full effects of
damage at shipyards and U-boat construction ta;;..e sole tioe to become
visible. In view of the loef vulnerabilitj of shipyards to aerie:. a,tack,
the effects will not prove to be large, but sone considerable de_ej naj
have occurred, as a result af mailor dauage to workseops, at for :lards
where approximately 35 U-boats have been under construction or fLttin,-; ?et.
The output of A.F.Arls, M.T. and diesel endines for all pur)oics at tLe
dumboldt-Deutz factories at Cologne is thought to have .)uffered 10:1:3,, re-
ductien over an indefinite period. Serious damage to ti.e edel ,veeks at
Russeisheim has interrupted. the production of inportant ql,antities of special
motor components required by other asse-n.bly factories ad for 7ehr:lacht
spare3.
The olAiret of 30 locomotives has been lost through demzeze to
works and substantial numbers have also been (estreyed Li railway yards.
The cumulative effects of bombin: on industrialxtevioy have bern well
illustrated by serious damage to important Leavy engineerin_: and m,Lc:.ine tool
facories at Dusseldorf and Duisburg whose services woul-1 undo.Abted2y be re-
quired to repair the damage to steelivorks already described.
II IARMECT EFFECTS
(a) img_gLysailig;t4ime and interruetion of traffic ovemrets due to
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woo,
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- 3 -
eral dislocatioal
No adequate technique at present exists fur a qaantitatLve assess_(nt cf
this factor but there is pA,ntiful evidence of loss of )rodIction
fatigue, loas of sleep, absenteeism, increased time spe:-.t 141 trave, and
civil defence work, interruption to communications a:id public utility ser-
vices etc.
It is probable that in heavily raided towns t:.ere has been a gfr,eral ',-
cline in output ranging from 10% to 30% and of juration up to 2 month3 af r
each heavy attack.
Goal mining has probably suffered more severely than any other ill,str7
both on account of the direction of a high pr000rtion of the attack a3ain3t
coal-producing areas and c, ag to the particular vulneraOility of 20al
to transport dislocation al,absenteeism. Daily output in theuhr-Saar-Aache.,
fields is reported to have fall:n by 18% and on the assumption that tc.e
average duration of the deeline was two months, the loss of output would be
4 millloa tons out of an total of 143 million tons for these districts
and 186 million tons for '4:hole of Germany.
After heavy attacks rail movements of coal from -ff. Germany to Italy nave
fallen by proportions varying from 20% to 40% over periods varying from 2 to
4 weeks.
(b) Allocation of manpower and materials to rehabilitatf.on measures.
Photographic reconnaissance has shown the reduced ability of the aut?.ori-
ties to maks good the growing scale of dama-;e, even to keypoints.
It is provisionally estimated that the labour requirements to deal with the
scale or housing damage assessed in I(a) may amount to the emploTaent, of 100,00C
men for an indefinite period, apart from the labour re,..iaired for internal
pairs, repair of factories, commilnications and public utility services, and
manufacAare of the materials needed.
The reserves of clothing, furniture, household goods etc., accumulate to
meet emergenciee have proved wholly insuffiAent and in many cases have them-
selves been destroyed. Additional requirements of clothing alone for re-
placements aver the past seven months are estimated at 6000/7000 tons (in ter-.s
.
of yarn) compared with a present annual output (inclading militarj reiuireaents)
at250,030/300,000 tons. ?ring to the reduction of the manufacture of con-
saapttoa goods in order to release manpower, stocks in the shops have 1)rove:i
insufficient even though sales in bombed areas have been restricted entirel:'
to authentic air-raid victf.ms. Other expedients such as auction 2aies of
looted goods, having also failed to meet the demand, the ,eichswirtschafts-
ministertun has now announced that the manufacture of essential consumption
goods bill be greatly increased. In ?resert circumstances this can only be
achieved at the expense of war production.
.1.2.
20.10.42
"1%0 le 411104011
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-..-GCNCLEG 1.:FT.OTS OF 301131.R OFFI;1;:C71. zr2 ?
1. In the seven montl.s under review Bomber Cloma?-1 earrir? o ".;
raids on 26 built-up areas ana dropped 131/83 tons of
incendiaries (see Annex for details).
2. The economic effects of the tactical meti-ods of bombint; now emploied, ?7nich
result in the devastation of whole lo,iilt-up areas, .ay be elass.fir:
Direct Effects (a) Destruction and damagf,e to dwellinz.
(b) Destruction and damage to factpries and colmcrea:
property and the interruption of )Ub1i til ty ser-
vices and communications.
IndirectEffects (a) Loss of working time in undamaged factories to
general dislocation of economic life.
(b) Expenditare of manpower and material in rehabilLtat_on
leaslres.
The attempts which follow at measurement of these factors, based oE they
ate on partial information or deduction from experience in Great Britain, are
necessarily subject to wide margins of error; the most conservative of the
various possible assumptions have howe-rer always been used.
2. DestrlIction and damage to dwellinga_and dis lacemcnt of population_
Table I estimates housing damage in Germany on the basis of experience in
England*; figures of damage in Great Britain for the whole iar period up to
July 31st, 1942 have, been added for purposes of comparison:-
(?SECE1
??,? aNNININIONIR Estimate
DemolisEed or fit only
for demolition
Seriously damaged and
uninhabitable
Damaged & requiring
immediate repair --
Slightly damaged ***/
* A paper is available showing tle method of calculation and assun)tion used.
The latter include the assumption tvat not more than 25,, of ti.e total bomb llad
during the period feLl in a built-up area.
TABU
of Dwellings Damaged and Persons Displaced
may_idAELaRIa_12.4?1_
P.K.(un tc 7/3144.1
No. of dwellings
No. of
No. of persons
London
89,400
268,250
67,07
166,000
498,200
)
))
)
127,750
)
359,06
)
)
2rovinces
71,421
)
)
51,458,242A-
)
)
1111?1111.1?????????? 4.'40
II 01 015Witio
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,
NOTES:- 0 some of these will probably be rendered i.abitaele again after
extensive repairs; in other eases the re-air work necessary will be so great
that the work has probably been postponed till tle end or the war.
** without immediate repair, such houses would become uninhabita'lle ender
stress of weather.
*** No estimate of this category in Germany is yet available but if tre
C.1 ;
ratio proves applicable the number might be as large as 1 million. The daaage
would vary from broken windows and blasted doors to fairly
damage.
***4f which 1,250,429 were uslidhtly damaged".
The estimated total of 255,000 dwellings demolished Trgri.ty un-
inhabitable compares with a total of about 26 million dwellings in the cities
attacked and about 17.8 miLlion dwellings in the whole Reich. The estimate
of 765,000 persons displaced compares with 8.8 million inhabitants in the
cities attacked and a total population of 83 millions (incliding 10 millions
in the Armed Forces and 5 million P/7 and foreigners) in the whole of Germany.
At the outbreak of war the housing shortage was much more acute in
Germany than in England and there was an immediate need for some li million
additional dwellings. Substantial spare accommodation of a sort existed in
the shape of military barracks, youth camps etc. but this, though sometimes
suitable for the housing of evacuated women and children, is for the most
part unfavorably situated to be of value in housing industrial workers. aucla
of this accommodation is moreover known to have been taken up for rilitary
hospiials and for P/7 and foreign workers whose arrival has largely offset
the temporary relief to tre housing situation afforded by the calling of men
to the colours.
That, in these circumstances, the modest damage already inflicted has
raised a big housing problem for the authorities is shown by the administra-
tive measures which have already been taken. These include:-
(a) Compulsory regLstration of empty premises.
(b) Reconversion of flats which have become offices and the billeting
of the evicted firms in barracks or hutments. (such corversions are
now state-subsidized).
(c) Compulsory division of large dwellings (also encoufaged by financial
assistance) and compulsory sub-letting of empty rows.
(d) Erection of "substitute dwellings" (State loans are available for
this).
'
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(e) Diversion of Youth :ostels for "war tae'ee".
:eviction of forein aorkrrs fron .ote_s,
aeid move-Kir: into hutmcnte.
06.111.11???
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141, .141001011110 ri4
eee' Lr -,-: e
Germans are very house-proud and do not take kieeily to 1)1 l'-ieLL;
householders are known to have been sent to concentrat:on rael,s 1-trr-at-
ment of persons billeted on them.
a. Destruction ard dereaee to factories and commerciel ,roeerty and Lntee.--,et.:.ee
of eublic utilities and communications.
72.ith the methods of attack now employed such damage re.rezrets e.J.enus
accruing over and above the mein dividend of shattered i.olses and di-aced
citizens, tholgh it has been ensured that the bonus shall be as 111%2
possible by the selection as targets of built-up areas containin, the lerL,Es
pr000rtion of war production and essential industr".
The overall effect on German production cannot Ix assessed without ..c-
cess to highly secret German official statistics and even then it wcaif! not
be easy to disentangle the effects of bombing from tie influence of extrenecee:
factors.
Owing to the big concentration of attack upon tie heavy ineestry area
of the Ruhr, it is probable that steea producticn has suffered more heavily-
than any other industry. On the basis of damage * known to have occarred to
five steel plants in the Iluhr and one in tle Saar, with a combieec' eapacety
million tons of pig iron and 7 million tons of steel per annum, it Ls estilated
that the enemy has lost an output of I-4- million tons in terms of fihislr,d steel
products from these works. This is cquivalent to 5 of the estimated o-eput of
finished iron and steel products of Germaii Europe in 1.42. The ret loss ail]
not be as large as tias since in order to offset damage in t e ruhr, idle stfel-
works have been restarted in Eastern France, bat tie gross loss cannot wholly
be made good by these means owing to the delay in startin-up and I 1t:e
organization of fuel and raw material cupplies. Moreover the above est:e-late
takes no account of loss of output in the steel industry generally, thrue,:e
blackout difficulties and daziping down during air-raid warnings. I. this con-
nection, it ie of interest that of the total loss of finished steel productioa
by enemy action in Great Britain in 1941 (18 works mere actually hit), 95; :is
attribestable to interrleption by warnings and onl: 5% to direct damage.
Eo other induetry is likely to have suffered as heavily as this in :-Iro:,)r-
tion to its tota: capacity but (apart from tie results of special operations
against French factories and the !;1.A.ii. works at augsburg) a number of im-
portant itdustrial plants have been severely damaged. Some outstandie.:
cidente are:-
gmEggI_Iadustrx. The combination of damage to assembly shops end col-)onerts
/9....,.ctol.:iitted to have resulted in t,e loss altce:ether months'
from aerial recaaaaissance and reliable intellicnce re,eorts, henceforth cze-
noted as MR. or (r).)
141.1.10~.111,1
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output 0 by the Heinkel factories at Rostock. At least an equal effect i:s
likely to have been produced by the more recent damage (P.R.) to t:.e Focke n.L.f
e..ssembly plants and its satellite factories*. TI-e leser Flugzeugbau, alaD at
Bremen, has been reported (I) as suffering a loss of about 167.; of its norvill
production ** over six months due to "bottlenecks", which may have been
created. in part by the bombing of component factories. This works has since
suffered heavy direct damage and will probably lose two months' output.
Owing to the length of the production period, the effect, of
damage to shipyards inflicted during this period upon the rate of completion of
U-boats woad hardly be visible as yet. In view of the low degree of vu:.-
nerability of shipyards to aerial attack, the results obtained must ir..eie_tab.Ly
be a great deal less in relation to the effort expended than in the ce.se
most other targets. Serious damage to workshops is however known to have besn
done in the yards at Kiel, (Germania. Werft twice), Emden, Flensburg an. to a
smeller extent at Wilhelmshaven.*** Some slowing up in. construction can con-
fidently be expected and the delays at Emden and Flensburg may prove substattied.
131,2? jtas_. Both direct damage (P.R.) and general dislocation (I)have
produced a substantial loss of output (assessed by one source as 10/15% "for
an inaefinite period") by the Eumbold.t-Deutz factories at Cologne (producing
itt..P.V? 8,-. LT., and diesel engines for all purposes).
Recent information (P.R. and. I) suggests the partial destruction of the
most important Opel factory at Russelsheim which, in addition to making army
cars, supplied specialized components to a number of other factories assembling
lorries and may have been one of the largest suppliers of spare parts to the
Wehrmacht.
1.0H...2.29,Arge
Damage to the main construction shop at one of the Henschel
factories (P.R.) is reported (I) to have caused the loss of production of 30
locomotives; this would be equivalent to 25% of the annual output of this con-
cern- (the largest locomotive builder in Germany) in. peace-time but 2-.:?obably
does rpt represent more than 10% of the prouamme to which it is now wcrking.
The total out for German Europe in 1942 may be 2000-25000 models.
M............"?????????????=1.?????Mads=m.4.11.1?1?1????11.1.1..00??????????111. ?????????.? 1.1?Pm?m?Me?
The output was estimated Van 1942) at:- He. 60 - 10 per month
He.L11 - 20 "
He .114. - 10 "
He .115 - 10 "
He .177 - 5 It
* Estimated output per month:- 20 x F.W. 190, 5 x F .W .200, 12 x 189,
x P.11, 58.
it* tee 'meted output; 30 x Ju. 87 per *month.
***
No of -U-boato under construction Fittinf out,
tf3r;.1,1eart-shaven 10
Emdett 5 2
Flensburg, 7
f.eIEiermilii. turn) 1 5
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Other Enoineving. The cumulative effects of heavy and eersistent air-raids
are well illustrated by the heavy damage ehich has been inflicted on im-
portant heavy engineering aed machine-tool factories in ausselderf neod
Duisburg. Among these are sone of the largest ilakers in Gereany * c) ztenl-
works equipment whose services would certainly be re-leeired in lakire; gooa t n e'aeage
to stealworks described earlier.
4. Loss of '7orking time and interruption of traffic move:qents the to fenerel
dislocation.
Although plentiful evidence of loss of production due to fatigue, loss of
sleep, absenteeism, increased time spent in treveL and civil defence work,
interruption to communications and public utility services etc. is available,
its expression in quantitative terms presents equal difficulties. ,
It has been reported (I) that at the time of the heaviest raids on the
Ruhr and Saar, daily coal cutput (which is particularly susceptible to transport
dislocation and absenteeism) fell by 18%. As tLe duration of the loss Y;as not
been reported the overall effect cannot be measured. On the assumption that
output suffered this degree of interruption over an average period of two
months the total loss of productionwould be 4 million tons out of a total
annual ou.:,Imtt of hard coal of 14 _lion tons in the districts concerned and
186 million tons in the whole of uermany.
Following the heavy raids on the Ruhr & Rhineland in May and ,Tune, move-
ments of coal by various rail routes from Germany to Italy were observed (I)
to fall by proportions varying from 20% to 40% over periods varying from 2
weeks to 4 weeks.
No otLer industry is likely to have suffered as severely as this. But
all industeies in the most heavily raided towns such as Cologne, Darvieldorf,
Duisburg, Bremen, Karlsruhe, Lubeck, Rostock, Emden etc., are likely to have
suffered a decline in output ranging from 10% to 30% and of duration up to
two months after a heavy attack.
5. Allocation of manpower and materials to rehabilitation measuregj.
There is clear evidence in photographs that the rate at which damage has
been inflicted in tne past seven months has outstripped the repair allocation!:
made by the German authorlties. Whereas in the earlier stages of the bomber
offensive repairs were executed with'great speed, not only to war factories but al3o
to dwellings, work on the repair of even key-points is now seen to proceed more
slowly, and damaged premises of law priority may uften not be touched for weeks.
Estimates of the scale of labour and raw materials required to deal with
damage to hansing as assessed in Para. 3 are not yet complete but there is no
doubt that the resources at present available to meet it are entirely inade-
quate. Iu a good pre-war year the German building industry constructed about
220,000 dwellings. But by 1042 both A e buildii,d industry aid t:e
?No.11.?????lare IMmemmaimwerwwwwwweemworoworwormesimoomm.
* Such er% Demag of Duisburg and Schiess ? Defries of Dusseldorf.
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which supply it with raw materials,have been exained o i:ceo.;imeo
forces and munitions industries. Even in peace-tie a eeeair eroeramme
covering nearly 300,000 houses would be a femieable load on the ineestry, are',
the industry now, with reduced resources, has to cope also with tre eriox
requirements of damage to war industries anti commureicatioes. 7.3xecrieece in
Bath, Exeter, Norwich and York shows that each ton ef bombs droeeef in a
built-up area gives rise immediately to a demanci for tle Labeer of 1.;e20 een
to work on demolition, clearance, first-aid rcealre ad ev,et,ally eore ,r-
eanent repair work to houses alone, and that this '3e-re:Lad mae- eersise :er a
matter of months.
On this basis, and on the nost'conservative asee)tions of t're efPfseeve
percentage of bomb-loads, labour requirenents ie Gereeeiy for similar :ueo:e'e
over the past seven months are likely to have exceeded 1G0,000 -len. This
cakes no ellowance for the demands on maneower L7or the re:aer of fect,eeie
and communications, for interior repair to houses and for tle eanufaceare ee
the rae* materials needed.
Not the least important aspect of eidespread daaaee to 'tees Ls tie
loss of interior fittings, furniture, beddiae, and ot'er he-eseield zoods,
clothing both in damaged houses and in shops.* Much of this cannot, nefd not,
and will not be replaced. Some stores (utKatastroehenlaeern) had been ac-
cumulated in anticipation of vital needs but many of these consistef of re-
served stoas in shops and commercial warehouses and bave been destroyed alcne
with the rest of the town Moreover manufacture of such articles has been eo
severely contracted in order to provide manpower for ?tier purposes that new
output is insufficient even to meet normal wear and tear. It is noa clear
that the various expedients adopted** have been -mite inadequate to meet even
the most vital and immediate needs of air-raid victims, and ahigh Nazi official***
has now admitted that it has been necessary to arrange for greatly in,lreased
manufacture of consumption goods immediately. This can of course mile be achieved
by the diversion of labour and materials from other ectivities previoesly con-
sidered to be of greater importance.
/ow. 01.1.10101M.P ymMMmillpw.d.M4Y-MmO1m ???111???????????.????=.
* Preliminery investigation of British experience ind-Icates that clothine re-
quirements alone may amount (in terms of yarn) to 1 ton per ton of bombs dropped
in a built-up area. At a similar rate, German reopirements in the past seven
months may have been 6000/7000 tons as compared with a current annual output of
yarns for clothing purposes (civil and military) of 250,000 - 300,000 tons.
** e.g. auetion sales of second-hand goods obtained from the clothing collec-
4ons and by looting of the Jews and the Occupied Territories; also the ban on
purchases from shops in bombed areas except by authentic air-raid victims.
*4* Dr* Lanifried, Secretary of State in the Reichswirtschaftministerium in a
speech at Laxemburg as reported by D.N.B. October 12, 1942.
wog moosammaniter
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VOF .;I1112 UF
ECONMIC "TARFaL
StFallkY. AID C01,-CLiSiol3
Omar
1. The relative strength of the three teams into -:rich t.e ran aorking
population (including lerisoners af war and foreign werkers, i.e.. been or-
ganized for total war is now (October :-
I. Forces (incl. auxiliaries, 2olice
and civil defenco)
11. Munitions (supplying war material to I.)
III. Civil Industry (engaged in aaintenance of
national economy)
.-Lgriculture , Forestry
More :essential industriee
Less Lssential Industriee
e
p
2. The German authorities have admitted tat no further transfers from Class
III to Classes I or II can now be made. This implies t.1-at Class III ha: now
been reduced to the einimum consistent with thc -laintnance of the ere sent
ma- effort. This minimum is not static and at is stage of the war maf be
expected to increase.
3., The urban working popvlation %roughly .21roups II, IiIb and consti-
tute 48% of the total and are divided as to two-thirds between industries
engaged in ele5ntaining the national economy aed one-third in the munitions
iadustries.
4. Successful night bombing or cities increaees, in a cumulativc
proportion of the national resources which must be devoted to the
dustries if the national economy is to be secured at the minimm
level of efficiency for the maintenance of the war effort. In th
continued and increasing bombinz of their industrial cities, the
ministration is accordinr!ly faced with the droblem of decf_din: be
three following courses of action:-
(a)
-Ianncr, the
civil in-
necessary
C face of
German ad-
tween the
ro ;LIEE.jt,m allocation of resources to civil industr to fala
below the minimum needed to maintain the national economy. TIis
noula reduce the endurance of the whole war machine, accelerate
the lace at which it would'. otherwise run down, and court --efeat by
co-...apse of the homejfront.
ofts. tont -
...a:two** *as; eustait414 10C4.44:44a'X'4L7t44;"'44 " "4-"
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- 2 -
(b) To divert an increased proportion of the effort of: tre=7.reorces
and the munitions industries 1.o defensive measure in order to hol-2.
off the bombers. This could only be at t-re e:e)ense of a ree-iction
in the effort devoted to offensive warfare o-tside tee boundaries
of the Reich.
(c)
c11221141ty.baciifrom
the civil inclAtries.
-ny's ower
To divert manpowert Raterials and oroauctive
the Armed Forces and munitions industries to
This could only be at the expense of the ene. militarj
in general.
5. In practice no clear-cut choice of oae alternative at tee expense of tee
other two is probable. A fusion, or confusion, of all three is tee no3t
outcome, coupled with an increased drive to mobilize the nenpower and eno-
ductive resources of occupied and neutral Europe. 3ut the inpoaition epon
the enemy of the necessity of adopting any or all of these courses co-ed not
fail to hasten the end of the war.
18.10.42.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NIGHT BOMBING AS A IT.CAP'ON OF
ECONOMIC WARFAill,
1. The total war effort of the German nation is contributed by three distinct
teams* :-
(a) The Arme4,Forces wad their auxiliaries (police, civil defence, Todt
organization etc.)
(b) The Munitions Industriu, engaged in manufacturing war material for
(a).
(c) The Civil Industritga engaged in the maintenance of the national
economy as a whole.
The eresent relative siee of the three teams is best shoern by a break-
down of tlub allocation of the total working population in Germany (incThding
P/W and foreigners) (Table I.) For comparison this also gives the position
in May 1959 (before mobilization).
; There is fourth class of non-occupied persons (old people, womea and chi]dren,
which: while drawing gooda c.;Id services from the nationai pool for its maintenance,
coleallutes nothing to it with the important exception of the housework of
*uroccupded" married women.
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TABLE 1.
ALLOCATION OF WuRKIIZ POnLA2loN (.414 a
GLI4,
(incl.? r ard
May 19 uctobe: 1;42
,;..2
Millions Iiios
I. ARMED FOI.LES., 2.00 5.5 10.0) 24.3
(Incl. police, civil defence,
Todt organization, etc.)
????????
II.
MUNITIONS.
(Metals, Engineering, Chemicals)**
5.43
14.9 6.58
- ^
III.
CIVIL INDUSTRIES.
11???????????????????????
(a) Aariculture & Forest Ly
10.62
29.2
i1.62
2E4.0
damlnleft
????????????????,.????????11.
???????M
(b) More Essential Industries
Lining
Ar7ministration & Public
0.E.0
2.2
0.78
\
1.5
Utilities
2.29
6.3
2.38
5.7
Transport
1.69
4.6
1.65
4.0
Food, Drink & Tobacco
1.66
4.6
1.45
3.5
6.43
17.7
6.26
15.:
I??????????
(c) Less Essential Industries
Railding, clothing, profes-
sions, finance, commerce etc.
11.94
32.8
7.10
17.0
TOTAL OF III.
28.99
77.6
24.98
60.1
GR.:1.1D TOTAL
36.42
100.0
41.56
100.0
???????????
NOTES : * Including in October 1942, 2 million P/" and 3 million foreigners.
The inclusion of the %hole of these industries in Class :I results
in a slight over-estimate of this class since ,:art of their pro-
duction is still for civil pm.poses but there is no means of es-
timating its magnitude. However a pToportion of the persons in
Class III are engaged wholly in supplying the Armed Forces.
-
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S 11
Lf-4
2. The German authorities have admitted tiat the fur-tier e the
munitions industries (and bi inference the Armed Forces) d ly
e3"...""r7dttr(Tfe:;
or indirectly upon the recruitment of more foreign workers, (or t:e
contracting of of work in Occupied Territories and neutral eoustries)*. This
is a tacit admission that Class III has been reduced to the minimum consist,en,,
with the maintenace of the wee effort. That this is highly ?robable coul
be seen b:r a comparison of the proportions of the total working popuLation
in Classes III b and III c with the proportions of the total British wprking
population in similar classes. The .sesources available at this stage *A'
the war for the Armed Forces and munitions production are ti-erefore :3e fl to
consist of the sul?plue available after the very large minimum necess;Lr7 for
maintaining the national economy has been provied. This minimum is not
static. As economic exhaustion (particularly of capital euipment requirinE
replacement)** increases with the progress of the war, so the minimum al-
location of resources necessary for the maintenance of the national conomv
also tends to increase. That the allocation of manpower to Class III is
still nearly as large as at the beginning of the war is due in part Lc t:.e
effects of the blockade*** and in part to the reductior in the produetivity
of labour.**** Provided that tile growing leaks in tne blockade can se
plugged and that the recruitment of suitable foreign labor continues to be
as difficult as hitherto, the minimum allocation required for Class III caa
be expected, at this stage of the war, to increase.
3. Night bombing, in its present tactical application, operates by tie im-
partial devastation of whole built-up areas. The two principal results d
are:-
(a) loss of productive capacity by direct damage to factories ard com-
mercial property and the interruption of public utility services
and comm.% cations.
(b) loss of man hours and reduction in output in tile factories which re-
main undamaged owing to damage to housing and to the general dis-
location of the highly complicated services and amenities of urban
civilization, the development of which over the past fifty :jeers has
* There has been some evidence of an increase in such sub-contracting in re-
cent months and the pressure on France to secure additional skilled workers is
now n.noricus.
** of the recent greatly increased priority which Gcrmany has given to the manL-
facturer of locomotives, rolling stock and machine too s.
*** 07 compelling the locking-up of man,.)ower in efforts to ach:_eve ,;reater self-
safficieney, of which the addition of 1 million persons to t're numbir of %71.-
cUltural workers is the outstanding example.
due to the dilution of the labour force Jith women and foreign w)rkers
*.zzio
productivity is less than the workers they nave substit-Ited, eel to
plaim exharation.
0' ignoring human cavnalties abich aro the least siLmificant factor.
3041111004"'""*"- ""*".**^"""""r""""1"494109041411811SSI airotliatriittUgi 141.0441b;g1,1 ..="4,4,(44.)14 woP t.ist,ova;uvr,?:;?
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been res?onsibile (largely unnoticed) for TT_C:', Of. e Jr:Cr( j.Z;P :e
the productivity of labour.
At a certain stage, the effects become cantlatiye x;.c. n
-- for instance (b) may often result, in part from (
0).
Since the civil industries form by far tie lar rest section r.f t,e
national economy (see Table 1.) the law of averla:es eneeres ti a%
the loss cf output from both causes falls ;aost larzely u:on t' ea.-
As these industries have now been contracted to the ninieran neces-
sary for the maintenance of the national economy, the nee,21 eo -
locate additional manpower, material and ,r-oductive capacit:
their rehabilitation (and this inol-?.des the rel;air of eama(::(,:?
houses)** must now enjoy nearly as Iligh a 2riority as t.c needs of
the armed forces and munitions industries. At tLe same time ale
raids are operating to reduce the productivity of the rescyirces
already engaged in such activities which ;ives rise to e ferftee
demand fcr reinforcements. The combined effect is o Lncreasc,, in
a cunulative manner the .cronortion of the national resorces
must be devoted to the civil industries if the natio: a: econoa is
to be secured at the minimum necessary- level f efficic.lc for (.1e
maintenexLce of the war effort.
4. In such a situation, the German admihistration is face:: with the )rotlem
of deciding between the three following courses of action:-
(a)
To allzrzLthe allosa:Aon of resources to civil industr7 to fall bez.
low the minimum needed to maintain the national economy. This would
reduce the endurance of the whole war machine, accelerate the pace
at which it would otherwise run down and court defeat by the eel-
lapse of the home front.
(b) To divert an increa e roeortion of the effcrt of the Armed Fcrees
and the munition industries to defensive measures in order to hold
off the bombers t This could only be at the ex)ense of a reduction
in the Iffort devoted to offensive warfare outside tee boundaries
of the Reich.
(e)
To divert manT;ower materials and )rode.ctive caoacItv back from tl,e
ameljorces ami the munitions industries to the civil industries.
This could only be at the expense of his military power in zEntral.
? In practice no clear-cut choice of one alternative at the ex-)ense
other two is ,)robable. A fusion, or confusion, of all three is !.ie ,lost
likelyoutoolle, coupled with an increased drive to mobilize te eeelie ,Fee Ind
productire resoarces of occupied and neutral ;'irope. 3ut tl-c irvoeiden
the enemy of the neceesitj of adoptilei; any or all of these C.:CAW:36a cou:.c: not
fail to aasten the end of the war.
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* but, ractice, disocaion of war inaustries
as targets, from among the towns tacticall: silitult for atttck
containing the hig%.est -srD')ortion of 14r in-lustries.
** in view of the effect of the acute housing sl,ortage
spent in travel etc., on -Cele oroductty
(PLEASE NOTE that the above two notes are incomplete? ? ; is beca:2sc the
original from which this is copied was a carbon copy, ol whic1-1tr ca.:bon
had slipped.)
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?...t IPA7,1f/Filif rfer'W-;".? r,t-t-,,i.;?ipprttgp r
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON. D. C.
al
. foci fig Li sleg-_,..-e;h3. TVS* Uri
November 28, 1942
Subject: Assignment of Officer
To: The Adjutant General
Washington, D. C4
1, It is requested that 1st Lieutenant
Edwin David Bonner, 0-461768, Signal Corps, now on
duty in the Military Personnel Department, Signal
Corps, Roam 3R-287, Pentagon Building, Arlington,
Virginia, be transferred to the Office of Strategic
Services, Roam 2039, Temporary Building "Q", Wash-
ington, D. C.
2. This officer possesses experience and
ebility Which are deemed essential in connection
with a secret training program being conducted by
this officer and his. contemplated duty is communi-
cations work: in the field.. The particular assign-
ment for which transfer of this officer is requested
has been approved b7 the Joint =tad States Chiefs
of Staff.
3. It is further requested that this
officer report for duty in Washington, D. C., not
later than December 6, 1942.
4. Th* assignment of this officer should
be *barged against the allotment of commissioned
personnel for the Office of Strategic Services
epproved by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff
in a memerandum to the Director of Strategic Ser-
vim's,. dated November 1, 1942.
KidCallallOgi.s1,11k0??????????????e ???? ...eft es ??????????
r ?
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ectar
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3,1 ..411)-3A-11%
"Vg,]T37:-1 -
;) e4--
201.-3enner. Alvin D.
(11.28-421PO4.
let Ind.
War Department, L.11.0., Washington, D. C., December 9,
Director, Office of Strategic Services, 'Washington, D.
WOM.gvvp.psom.4516
1942. To:
O.
lique?st is basic communieation is not favorably considered as
the services of 1st lit. Zdvin D. 3onner are urgently needed in the
Office of 04 Chia Signal Officer.
,
???
10100141,00!
e
1
'11Ter
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-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
0 1/ 5fPk%4 "MI
41WEgift .1?MitIMI
eR.Q)41) 4i 4I,
114:member 13, 1942
Silbject ALppointomnt in the taw of the United States,
Under this provision. of AR 506-10;, and Paragraph
.4110 imatiprendam from the Deputy ,chist of Staff to the Caustiarrig
'aionermilt 4isrvieee of Lapplr. Subject* *Procurement of Officorim
Per tbe list of the United States risam civil Life* dated Oat*.
bMr 3.14 1912, it La recommended that the following WIWI peral4011
/00 1001/433.tlif4 in the Arla of the United States to the'ems** and
rim the duty as indicated boas*:
a? Woodrum Wilson Borah
14 Graffiti for *Leh resommemidedt fazAd Lisutenant for
aityliith the Wise of Strategio Serviemie, brim&
,prop0.04 sppe: tarnt, is within the pr4curea6
" 441-(- .4sa in Paragraph, 2 or a
oint United States .Chtefe
t ji01:***..::::to:r of .Strategic Sorvitioatr
ftist?for the Office of Strategic
vonber 1,. 19414
of sortitairise obaraster of duty: The
ed is at a Segret nature in **tweet/on with
?
. spark b.1fl .4Stsken by this 01191114 ZatIvOXI
4"teilkj 4Williativo issued by the liroiz2t
Unistst.s CbL.ti oft Staff in a letter dtteit
Plev`\*ruar :11$4.10 ?The particular dull to which
tbie -applismini,411111*-assimed is in the Depart*
sent a ,Ileseareh and Analysts,in which department
bo has boo* ampleyed and 1441,41 as a civilians
Its is the beet **lifted Mali available for the
particular assignment for Ithichas appointsont
?AS ,ritila?0441?
1P04111 Ouilifications* This aPPli-
,
atisrisisir sPeCial ability of a technical
1
1
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?Bicket,,, , - 4 -- ?
VV.: ?
an4 protossional naturs qualitiiris his for duty as
aaosaissionlit of:1*er* I. ba$ raoolial spools.%
saaret itraia ag. abila au aiVI,orsa of this organisamb
Wolk. partioaerl$ rSttiog bias for ths position to
wash b* via ims asslips111? te * Linguist and a
troiriod raparab anlaystoS* is a gradoxts of tug
Uolmforsity of Cal, ifornia at Los Angola*. istisra bat
yoviariosi Aelitiog ilt.A.a sna PA.% &Voss* 'fba 404
proposal, WOW? be performs& Ibi bia as * sivilian#
11, AN41144kot is sn osployaa of this *Moo and Ea radio
tit Cittssatsraipt linital Stotts* 14 birth*
lispia* tVi.s organisation is nooassarto
to
tie 244% r Vaaossairodatit It is rssogsmandad that "Darsod.
tilf. 410_.(0S 20400)* bo soaiirati in this *****
I darsoli anao bias not litterforral inttb, Om
ssit la aalvelinS ovt bissa1O tatty.
rid 411 tail orgenitattort?
Or 4ioations Appliasest WOK ClAsiliiiitigHt
la Calla$ OA ll tkOt sOltiodulot for ,isluostionio
(Sao inalo 4$6) II
nod. it iv*glkiii0.00-011.4 tisat *PP1104u2t, 141 ciraer"
duty at lie*11:40trit Do C. iiitb. tba OMANI: cif
. ,
at 14 4410 nOloss for **tilt* sittty is attatibitl*
;40,01110d int tha app:tioant eansuOt *Ms
LA a, lti)lisat Woosaity*
=4.1,?
Malta' J. DOnellrial
Dir*OilOT
t.,-??????
te4f) ?
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fluat
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t Ni1:1 +e)
C-V
44;-"
September 18, 1942
lir. Hamilton Fish Armstrong
Foreign, Affairs
45 East Sixtr?fifth. Street
New York, New York
Thenk you for your letter of September 16 with the
enclosure of Dr. Brandt's s.emorandum.
I had the pleasure of meeting Dr. Brandt last winter
and 111411 much impressed by him. I am told that he is probably
the ablest expert on European food conditions in this country.
/
, The Elmnomics Division of thS office has frequently called
him in for consultation to tl*eir very great advantuge.
The /memorandum on bombing attacks against Germany
tail iles as penetrating and thoughtful. The conclusions,
u probably know? afe In_ fairly close conformity with
zes40 BritisZ find Marie* bombing practice in Europeo
ants- of-trierian econbigicep both here and: in ,England, have
the conclusioa the Vermin transportation system is
most vulnerable?,iiurt of the whole economy. The
cszt ries c tittilOon locomotives and trains in Germany
4 1t1$flOt, u well a t sistent attempt to bomb railway
IflCtii**, loading yards and to forth, bear this out.
The at serious limitation to Dr. Brandt's proposal,
se* it, is 'WO its successful operation would require
viyWITY d*70.1144t bombing. A large part of this bombing
io4bore to take place without fighter protection, with
SOY Dm* Largio*setile boxbing to date has only
? ',?,.!?;,
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been possible at night, and night bombing ifrecludes the
accuracy which is really necessary to 'attaz.lck successfully
the kind of objective which Dr. Grandt has in mind.
respite this objection Dr. Brmdt's raemorandllas
Sede143 to me to be of sufficient importance to deserve the
fxalest consideration.. 7, intend, therefore, to put it in
the heads of vpur representzttives in London, who are working
est targets for the Eighth Air Force.. I think from my talk
w_ith, our Air Force, there, that this memorandum would be
of greet interest to then. In fact certain of them are
teeu on dayligPt bombing.
I an very grateful to your for sending Dr. Brandt's
isemoramdma to 2e and also for calling my attention to his
fortbcoeing article in tile October number of 'Foreign Affair-s.'
Sincerely yolrmi,
Tinian 3. Donovan
Director
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? otr.
61
e ?I ?
The attached say serve as a basis for a reply to
Mr. Armstrong. I introduced Brandt to the Colonel last winter
and he probably remembers him.
am keeping the memorandum to have it copied, and
should like to send a copy to Chandler Morse in London. Morse
is heeding up a unit...Amervese working an targets for the
lighth Air lore..
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41
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW
HAMILTON FISH ANIMITRONO
sosT4M
September 16, 1942
Colonel Willian J. Donovan
Office of Strategic SerVices
25th and E Streets
Washington, D. C.
Dear Bills
AS LAST sixty.rirtm striver
NSW YORK
CAIL ADOPMeills ardltAFFAISII4 KILW 110*K
Karl Brandt, formerly head of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture at the University of Berlin and
now in the Food Research Institute in California, is
one of ay best German friends and one of those whose
opinion I value most. He has just sent me a copy
of a nemorandua.which he prepared for Milo Perkins
at B.E.X. He tells me that Perkins has not even ac-
knowledged its receipt and, as the subject seems
important, he suggested that I night like to pass
it along to one or two other persons in Washington
who might read it with profit. I hope you will find
it interesting.
Your so ever,
'"t'-'r
...)
1008. Brandt has an interesting article on German man
power in the October issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
published today. I think it probably is the
most careful analyeis which has been prepared
to date - apart, of course, from estimates wh.W2
, presumably are being made by the Army and the
Navy.
vase.. ? v-le ? ..11, ?
?,.
V-44.7r7;-.7.
ts,r,
iy
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14:9T.rkeoVt..t.wc-P4 t-
Recommenied New Method of Bombing Attacks Against Germany
Memorandum by
DT. Karl trandt
(Economist, Food Research Institute, Stanford University)
?
Analysts of Gemanyis power of economic resistance have frocpieutly
made the assumption that the German food supplies and the supplies of motor
fuel anklubricants are the weakest bastions in her fortress. According to
all Information available at present, it is exceedingly doubtful whether
there is Meth or any truth in such asertaaptions.
Om the *Chard, there is considerable evidence that Germany's
vereasonagy is los'Orulnerable and already has had to stand the greatest
strain: in its System of transportation, which consists essentially of rail-
road* for 4,kelme haul and tha bulk goods with waterways and bighwayv as
inferior svpplementAry 'resources. Railroads aro the chief means of kraus-
party*** more-so than in the *United States or Great Britain, because they
mOo coal as pia which is ab ant. Waterway* are inferior because of the
Imperial of frost., and the slowness of shipping. Highway transport is
suffering
from a.sOotretky of trunks, rubber, and fuel. The German rail-
roads with theix services today extend over a large part of tit, European
oometinemt. It is highly probable that disturbances or temporary paralysis
of aorta* parts of the hea-Vily burdened arterial system would yield a many
times greater loos of men, hears in industry and raw materials than tlat which
mamba laid idle by direst *ilea upon factories or other targets.
Duo to theAremendous industrial war boom great shifts have oc-
curred.lutlermeny in the.requir* J of food and fel of the big cities.
AiMOk larger proportion of the people are employed today in the main indus-
trial centers and have been taken away from the farms. Hence, larger freight
1101,iois ftr provisioning the urban population and supplies of household fuel
egoviosomtisa. The war at the distant, Russian front requires a constant flow
Cdrwirmaterials Wren from, the Reich, which in turn imposes a heavier bur-
daLsa th0 trackage 'rolling stock, and personnel. The statements of German
iroported in German newspapers and the comments of reliable foreign
Switserland, and Sweden indicate that during the fall
Odascaw-- at 1041 and still more so in the spring of 1942, the German railroads
*0016" 'sortable to ratin in time the exceedingly heavy assignments of service
akipmeits of bulk feed, industrial materials, end arms and ammunition to
heat. 11 the spring of 1042, it was seriously discussed in 'German news?
Visa the /Web itimietry of Food mould make an effort to shift a large
of the potato aOreage frost its present location into the immediate pros-
e the MOM eonsmaption centers, especially the Rhineleald and the
'*dr to avoid the lack of gplies for many weeks. Potato
tam Me* boarifer, mach better into the pattern of farming in !astern
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IMINIMINIMMNIMMINIMMIN=FIRMJNI
Germany than it does in the west, but it is obviously :impossible to is in.
addition to the congestion of other urgent shipments many million tons of
potatoes in the short period between the harvesting season in September and
October and the first killing frost, which frequently comes in the seeoral
part of October or earlier.
U.The &untested 111.1.14dIssEALL Blizzard
According to the experience of loading Germaa railroad officials,
as for instance, Dr. Ludwig Homberger (up to 1958 vice-president of the
GaTabil Reich Railroad Corporation; now professor at the American lIrd.versity,
'Washington, D. C.), the worst upheaval in the railroad service observed far.
over more than 20 years has been caused twice by blizzards, which fel/ over
large parte of Germany. - Heavy snows and the alternation of soft temperatures
and hardest frost blocked. the switches, caused derailments and endless delays,
and hampered the necessary food supplies for the cities for weeks. The greatest
efforts made were frustrated by the simultaneous effect of the weather uport
all the trackage in the respective areas.
*mit of the bashing that hail been applied to Germany by the RAF has,
according, to my knowledge, either tried to hit military targets in the indts-
trial areas or ports or fortifications directly or, in so far as the trans-
portation systam:was the object of bombing raids, the bombs were aimed at
freight yards, switches, bridges, or main terminals. Usually such attacks
were mode' in long intervals; frmuently targets were hit squarely; but accard-
Lug to all reports even. big holes in the railroad bridges overrthe Rhine have
been repaired in two days or less.,
It is suggeste1 that a new method ought to be tried; namely, a
method imitating the effects of a blizzard, namely simultaneous blanketing of
a whole area by bombing all the feeder lines of rails plus highways with a
steady repetition in such :intervals that complete repair is made inpossible
for several weeks.
III. The Timis.
Railroad systems in industrialized countries have a load curve for
freight ton-mileage which shows a high seasonal variation similar. to that of
the laCtoor load in agriculture. The peak load for urgent freight shippirg is
condensed into a period of from 8-10 woke in the fall, covering the mouths
at late August, September, October, and early November, and in spring covering
the period of late rebruary, March, April, and early Nay. The fall peak is
higher them the one in spring. This peak is the result of heavy shipments of
grasp nor boots, especially potatoes, fertiliser, and seed grain, and of
bmildist matarialt and household winter supplies. In this war, the fall peak
is 1144**tuated lor the heavy requirements of the army at the Russian front,
iihigaki **St be provided irl.th stockpiles for winter quarters and other materials,
the ehipmewit of Which 1,s jeopardised during the frost and snow season. At
the boo front shipment' of potatoes and fertilizer are the most urgent ones,
home* potatoes nowt to shipped before the heavy frost sets in. Fertilizer
it moModed also before freet and snow begin in order to get the fall-sown crops
is good condition into tbo winter season.
_
4
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IP
It is obvious that bombing attacks will have a such more telling
effect if they take place in peak-load periods - preferably in fall.
The fall season is particularly advantageous from another anis.
AU over Gernaay, as over the nocrthwestern part of the European, continent,
the period oalled in the United States 'Indian Summer' is normally favored
with the most ideal weather - bright ennushine, ctatulous clouds? starlit
nights, that hold especially &ring the latter part of Augtust or September
aod often the first two weeke of October. During that period, I know? from
my own observation while using the airlines in Germany, that at night the
mils are eisible to such an extent that the pilots of commercial airlines
use them for orientation at sight.
IT. Augairte.....L,CloitAititigs
It is suggested that for paralyzing communications a whole indus-
trial area (i.e., - the KESISelat Cologne, DUsseldorf district at 1..he Hanover
district) should be mapped out for continuous attack, stretching over a
pwriod of four to five successive weeks. Instead of flying into the center
of the district, the bonbirg planes should attack in dispersion and, if
possible, follow up all the mein railroad tracks leading to the area,, trunk
as well as branch lines, and parallel highways. The planes should fly at
treetop level and drop baths at short intervals on the tracks, is:Larder to
creek the rails and pry craters into the road bed at as many consecutive
spots as possible up to the main receiviag centers. It is assumed that
modern bombing technique permits the use of an appropriate type of delayed-
aotion bombs end their accurate placement on the right of way, so that real
demsge:can be done. If in addition, bridges, switch-control stations, loco-
motivsaheds and others installations can be damaged, the freezing of the
freight arteries would be complete.
od
,-;...;141AIMMG111.0.1.4111-?Mggseted
If it is possible to damage( the tracks of a dozen or more of the
, Jelin limo over long stretches with bombs dropped in a pearl-string pattern,
it will take srech.nore tine to do the necessary repair work. So far with
,single bomb hits on the tracks repair crews have been moving by emergency
-timiliet to the damaged spot. This:procedure would become inpossible if 20
of tracks were blocked by 50 or 40 different bomb craters.
The central bomber aseana.t upon the eilitary targets have resulted
Jinn concentration of anti-aircraft defences around the factories in the
heart of the industrial area. It is very doubtful whether much defense ar-
tillery or hear, machine guns are placed along the tracks. Shifting a
sew patter* Of attack may -each the defense forces by surprise. Until they
hen" heat readjusted, the min reeistance would consist of interceptor planes.
X an unable to judge the military feasibility of this type of attack.
Al an economist Iwand to point out that a temporary paralyzation of the rail-
road diemmadeations of an industrial area during the critical peak-load season
:41,7P:t
MN
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iroubi probably affect the enemy's output of war industries, the food supplies
of the urban population, and the morals, more serions4 than the direct
attack on factories or upon isolated opals in the railroad system. If it
can be prevented that the eastern potato suppliee for the winter reach the
Ruhr valley district in time before hard frost strikes, tine shortage win
be felt all winter long. U. the movements of coal from -CA. Ruhr to the cen-
tral and southern priovinces and to Italy axe upset in.r?.3 again the shortage
will be felt for many months.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
ONE THIRTY-F1VE EAST FORTY-SECOND STREET
NEW YORE, N.Y.
Colonel William J. Donovan,
Office of Strategic Services,
Washington,. D.C.
covering conditions in France which I have
just received from one of my French associates
and I am passing it on to you as i feel its
contents should be of interest to some of your
William IL Brewster.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
IMIMMIMM
1.,110,,,Kr.tagiSIPPAVffritr.t4P"M, - 4,4,44
si
NZIEGILANDUM
Oil THIS SITUATION 111 PRANCE
1LS 0:111,M111 30th, 1942
imorii.siummiLiiogiggsgiguiLimimerwa.
If the change in the situation in France during the first six
months of 1942 could be summard.Z*d, it should be described as a new step
towards economic debasemeutloilowing a specially severe winter and heavier
and heavier consequences of the war.
It can now be vett:tied that the 1941 crop, whiCh was expected
much more better, was in fact inferior by 25% of the 1939 crop as fax as
wheat la concerned, .15% for potatoes and about 30% for who.
If after suth a crop it was made possible not to stop the bread
distribution* it is, due to the exagerated sating of the' flour, and to a
small importation frem Algeria which saved a situation that appeared in
lUme as being alarming.
Sous campariSaas of ratoiing between francs and other countries
are gime. below : (normal weekly iming)
g
ifickirs (1)
Ica w
115
276 oper.
day
5 to 580
iik9ML,Vt,
frwcup to
*04h A942
`F ?
allt2m&
t400 ?Voil(J31 !..
'269 11:, (4)
280 (V5)
/322
- f
fUranOValbt
stperior to
Ifv6noli
rationing.
Swittzialind
5sa grs
194 *
135 *
frksAxp to
1.scent time
free up to
recent time
Iretuos, the common user is not entitled to integral
milk. Skil:tam/Dr is scarce.
Thee aorta at official rationing are those applied in cities
uarnased in thin ccuttry by consumption of farm products.
?
come,eivitissooDf this,lac)62:!supplies in the toms, an
000.000e4gctai1i girelne has been noticed.
tiggiesaitikito?ilig*.#101.iitiosook~rfogfamitsrfatil::, "1-,fassidwiiirop
-tt)
m 44
:ark'1yk p 119,4*. To this ration,
**lets 40441.1 for youths.
POWChsi&--
8110* April 5th : 400 gra.
Osk stho
40-11 Ovith 'to, pat 1101131014111 figure.
.4^
,
? ? ? .1 rl
,
V*-1; 3q*
dki4Ostat, ttlAuciWati.d$1/4.40.14Ataltigiftiltdiallif#1*0404014?400."444'4
,
(Y.
At i.c.. ; 1 , - - ? -, - -,..:-.i
!. r 14*.-'' ,LL-:???34 ' i t'...y. ,,,1: . _ 1
'1*.... =1,21I.L114,214.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
?
The result is to be 1?robably a small improvaineut of the 1942,
ervk. But tor the bult of the lahrge Treuch crop, the reduction of ;he
salt spaces due to lack of seeds" the decline in the nzaber and strvagrth
of Worlaaans-Ilips the lact c5fTritirtil1zera," the scarcity of transport cind
fuel, will conduct in 1942442, tOCturlb.er reduction of produets. The
prolyects of the food siroduction Aro= acrioulture remain dart if 'Ala DI
to laf.iit some time more.
?
It ?
AS it was previously reported,the index for
t-orc4?on. was in Sanuary reduced to 50*of the Sltne 19.. figure. It
hzam-Itnst improved since. But indexes are based on big concerns only.
Such big concerns have suffered from lack of coal reduction of
hydroelectric production d.ue to exceptional dryness, scarcity of raw
materiel end paralysis of .the transactions.
.Aside from the big concerns, the private home wort developed,
same being easier to supply with raw material end be nearer to the
customers. Trench industry is retlyning to what it ras IS 1860.
The remaining activity is not entirely used for the 'bellelit
of ?' -Y
'Self of it wail( that:is to say one aua.rter of the 19Zi
aAtivit.y" corresponds toTrench44rpose (rm'inly up-keeping, repairs end.
_. -.
iiioopereti40 teirkl. - ..
...:
1 e : f . 01. _
111,01M1 * the. s.bca.b. tar: is not taking into account the lowering
the Tgatestrial produotil*_ #:*:.;, to the technical Vegression? =sufficient
.0,044keping of the mach,inery anAt:the present" psychological, moral Bud food.
CO1011t1401.41this additioteklo0riug can be estimated Iron 20 to zvA.
. ek ampagition ts leduatttZ rea5d tixring the fa1l. and chiefly 'during
awe) *Later it no impoTtant fact occurs.
?
I 6
.
A
't
?,,
lr-ael end lubricating stocks have consteut14 rc:Iuced. 'airports
ete, practically ilia.
The following figures may give an idea of the cleartia. of trauspoll,
, 2401 et;ASF4tion in Trance :
4 i ., '
19S7 154'4
...........
.i....f.iir?
..0 0
, CtOns) 0%,0000,000 6 a ,o
20 ,00000
15,00q4, 20,000 \
, 11 P3(;406 60,000 I
ii 600 ;WO 111.1
: JO
Or, a . 01.5 v 2:5,000 Vooti LOD 1000
cal 450 1.300
Charco
(ritcoal-.00 ,000
(Coripre3sed gas 66,000,00 cubl.c mo1,01,-;
8,000 cars'
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
The number of cars on service should
Motor cars
427,000
Gazogene cars
;Authorized c-:rs
including gazogane
cars (1
Trucks and
ship motors
Electric cars
bt, c.mpared
(1) ?- reclaced every day or stopped from running.
Easamala wns further reduced during the first monthL of
1942. Yore MAM are being required to do the se work, ane: ,2..L.c the
demand for mAtt to work iu Germany increased. The tri' of F.rollt;
workers in Germany was 150,000 a reit months ago. It dropped to around
120,000 on account of returna thidn were not followed by re-deprcures.
Newspapers printed in the Occupied Zone state that prcaentli
thohnumbqr:of Frouth wqrtere: Ataermany is 170,000; the differerce is
teAlps)40e of, prisamsrs ofkays. Aorking on the spot. ,The Germans are
ask144* 550,000 more TmitkeirOPeople have no;#erithasiasm to enlist
-V0441#411.4 4,49i spite of th131gOrise that has been made to give tack in
atetidno, a certain number of *itsonersi of war, mostly peasants.
,f1?
A
1 ,
0
d
rta4 riZei
1913
1929
1939
1939
194C
1940
1940
1941
1942
1942
100
134
83
91
90
3?
64
72
54
59
,
Iplous reduction, during the last po
the 1.oi cit.trelgW,ears wixe. than af the
h4 &1ffii33 havet4et"200,000 freight
-
*P:*.yinl 010,0,thon; niit'iaking into ac
43-0itiing. very elvrly, and, a ne.7 requeut
?
nod, is undoubtedla
1Lok of goods to
cars at the time 6
count lazt freight V
for 4U,600 f1,16ht
rnnalncVt 1-2'*L"rrtiler"
-
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4.
V46-4, 5.44,t
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?
- 4
cars and 1,200 engines luis been racentli greseaLe.
more and more to a Railzcz.:. tr,,Lasport
00
Hereafter are ziven a few figure&
prices, '1r :;e11 as at the COSG of Ilviag :
(3asia iadex
Ehalalaszlzsa
1959
1340
1941
194k
.Augxst
DecelLber
.Tune
Tleckm:ne
Tune
December
'larch
May (estimatea)
The above figures are
arrive at a true statistical fi
:11.t.) consideration, -Alla sup
&aerially believed.
?
The activity-6i'
rise. Since Xanuarj 1942
to say au aavance of 204
and 14,100 (bee exb
4( ?
100
128
167.6'
161.8
172.9
196.0
198.9
200.3
Tre.Lc,) lb
100 i...uGu;? 1').3u)
Ret.;,11
109.9
i' .4
143.4
150.9
155.C10
C(,st of
-
4.4
liasz
lao.1
150.1
153.4
154.4
based on the officia 4.axe d prizes. :o
gure, the cff markeZ eLles should
transIctions are ncL SC, Lmportat IS it Is
1.e te
thb Stock.ExChangeh.s sh7L a new
Index vent up from 800 tt, .-sver 1,
), Mintait1t6 howcver bet
?
imporL-xnt
)00 %tpha.. 16
-eca 1,00C.
This rise is to speculation on infltItin, ,Jr et least
thtf'dezire of -inveeting-; by all means, .111 the availatle caz,b
b? an extensive printing of banknotes.
cr.
C.
* 0
12.`..ralgaLR412,411..92.*
Tax retrurzz Va-le ezoming In within a reusoAable rdthrk, .axpei4r
4re Loa oarapaled to 'tait their taxes, by advance qUarter iratalnents, ?7613,
1Dtrare re?iving their tax statemeqs. But the amounts thus
1V9Ak girftVlyitir thty 414en0f- 414 the4, te.pomel necess,..xy f(-2 the
-rOaS to draw ressourcebtrom othei- tteans, i.e.:
S.4%1 .44"?C 4';',4414:14,44r.4
c.c.s
".;
v
-.? ? a-cc. %,...!?*-4, ... 44.4' - 4'
?.... , I , ? ,,,,
' ? , ,:. ,? I
Atjy," ' ' .? '
7.,?:F 7. f, ' 4 , ....,,i: ' 7,v ,,., -.' ,.:.-4:,-..)f,-..t.#*; , .. 1 ,:. .
'''-? . 4 lit '.',/,,, ; ' ' ?`. 'i'M' ' ' l'' cV=. ' '''4 ' ''
j (.. 1'4 . ;:o't"....V.". ?rri..;--4,z--,''12--
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ON.
S
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",...4tIdazz?Platr.e."',Mnfv? :MVP r' v"""r!!`?
? l?
yaukleeeltres,
Trseseefer Bonds
Governiaent Bonds,
i/Banque de Vrancen'e ceelete.
The Bankmotes into circulaticn eere 1,70 billion:, et. t.he' erel
Deesal7mr 1.94T and ZOO billions at the end of 7eac 194:6, 1.e. ee
of 3C vAllions? The rythm of Increase hu e had an upware 43enleney eieee cne
To the contrary, the rythm Lf iacrease on the 'Jank deposits es
s2-wer. !be difference between the two i tplE Lied
er.eunt ef bank notes kept by private nold.ers, mainly in the ceuntry, Idlere
difficulties of transport and communioations with banks are great, the
increaee .of prices obliging the holder to keep t1Jir ze.eereee :acme,
this not teking into account the 1oo11en stock/figs" which ere over full
due to the fact that it is almost inpossible to invest money neither tn
estates or securities.
These considerable emoaate were used uatil recently for ouying
Xreasury ,Bonds. She amotent of i5rAle,2 Trea.stery Bolide 7.-aa about 2,Li)illins
at, the end of 1941. It is now abcut 30C billions. Banks have used them t.
breast a large pirt of their avatleble cash. They also have given .i1.1
faeilities to big firms whim aileoverfloodol with cash. Sueb. firma
14ve,st,the3r cash IlL Trealurr Bo at .sit months, e.t-one-eveter-and-seen at
two; Yee,Ps these cemp4nieS e$,T,'Only looking for temporary investilents,
and. a01(01,1 leety need immediate Itetuidity, bents have'madev efeey for them
difement.s4 .!4t-discount of "aonitif*j,! they have also bound themselves to tzke
bat** in ease of need, the bands ;at the iasufWg rate,,on very short notece:
24acult* Tha:danger can beAmtkein ca of cre44t restrein: there will be
AR04 F' nit Of bonds on the bee4 ahd on the Banque dV,Yrsiede. The Banque de e' -
Yrcace /las therefere deeided to Wire or less shut uirthe open aarket, the
g4ht tdAigcount securities et.los4 that. ninety days remaining as ia the
east. ',7;result Of hi'
j? bring about e serioixs. reductica
the sireasUry Bond subSe
t-
in order to reach sitoe-r.i.a:i-egczy of lenders, the Finenes
itei issVad a new toe_ of BOWLS called "Zone d'Iparp.p.e.", at four 'ears
maitteit:rp hearing an iniiiirest of :5%. These bonds did. not meet with favor,
a hie T yield being obtainable from other bonds.
seence-ed: lose tee% Government Bonds is impossible for the
tOlo Th Oovisrenwnt foreseeeTT;Xi77Ei7The end of the Jeer, the
isauedtb ,Ippoq, heeding; on 2v..tb 4.5 billione to buy back Treasury Bonds
or tmAogliAate 44*14.7 exicrOng bou4et. or reimburse part ft the evardraft
nth 'tir- UO &*epee. Will tido -0Verat3_b_t1.. be a succpes , nobo tr can tel
at tbo present but it eeems :reasonable..
dit
settzti:g. _
tietti044.
Irimacaa
44t
atpot to be
natat taut
ZnOittiti is' eAreso1!ra1: coivertittg to of its loans, eamely the
tiOtItait auclth 4 195kt in a Img terie loan at .3 1/44 par
*LtaUoreeratiOne total of which is not exceeding 20
efievOeeed lee 14=040. circles. However, the Minister for
rtirieirfai another conversion - more emporta.at -
(A 4 SIYI, -*A.a.Ung around 100 billiona. Thoae! conversions
it MOO* the Situation. It is to the monetary poce Lien
t2 b
, -
^ ?
Moe. ???44,k+.1%).?i?irwer?
_
,??????????? cco...???????2?????????????? .????????
mitv7,1r-Tri
r-F.,r,???.4.?,"r"-"Vr!er"r":"`
-
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\
ti Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
4 at
The .B.ank of
make up its Trausury._
avances to
increased from :
_6-
Pranat is mgatly called u,pon by the Government
t,f.)
?hos Si;, for payment of the Occupation indminaty,
144 billions end of 1941, to
171 billions in June 1942
(i.e aa incres:Se of 29 billions in five months), which added 4; o thc ad-
vances, without interest, are making a grind total of advances of 29ci
On the other hand, the current account opened by the Bank of
:France to the ReichIcreditkassen, in Which account are deposited every day
300 million francs representing the daily occupation indemnity, i. a. 9 billions
month14r1 ahors that its balance, whiah was of 64 1/2 billions end of 1941, has
be in la X me 1942. That is to say .that the Germans
hae, v drain- :heir account slaw the beginning of the year 10 tillions
whiCh were thrown into the circulations at the same time- as the Si billions
nonth.1$ , since six months) making a total of :
54 billions, plus
10 billions
whioili are absorbed by the a oalation.
.2
anknotesJito rICA eS bi ealation (increased from 270 to 3,00- billions, i.e.
ir4 not '-'neassiviiili a dupIi cit ion it totp,14 ty of these 64 oi. lions.
,
,
,;
&top' is still cheap at 1.75% at three:months and 3/6% at sight.
4-?
'474_11:
The demo4rIteica1 situation has not improved.
b ancli aeatn statistic up to rcb show the following trend:
- Thea birtha ars increasing,, but they are still below those of the
AM Period, and more mammas:in Non Occupied Zone that n Occupied one.
The, dSq_9114 4470?bempOrtant in Tanuary, less in February and
*etch* T4Or.nliahar is, on the whole, approximately 30,% higher than the
Immo before the war. It is higher in the Occupi4d Zone and especilly in
240,14t*.I#0,la the, Narl gecupisd Zone. Theparcentace of death of eld,Jrly
t0404EWAlly hith. ,L-
-
,
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0004:00110r1,100.1.111?410?011*.
44,044.?
A
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
.11';1?!*,-..:".441301.13,VAVAIMEt,:i VP* e?CmilliatiKtaztOrVa &PIM Irf'? rir?PrIVW,SAVr...M. ?Zr, 2":"Tigr17.?.,"",r4".", ?,,ae ? ? /X 'f 431.04,0e 37,30 it/Xi/Nei. ..A.L41/id1/4403 Ont/Fgle
..-37%tt 3 ?-? P
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC
/
SECRET(
eirritOg OF STRATEGIC SPVVICti.
INTEROFFICE MEMO
FROM: David Bruce
TO: Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT:
DATE: October 16, 1942
The following report was received from Lagos,
Nigeria, under date of September 25, 1942, which
our African desk grades as HZ, A-1":
"General Fitzgerald (USCO West African
theater) at Accra stated on September 20th
that he is making efforts to remove the OWI
men stationed in his territory on the West
Coast (at Brazzaville and Lagos.) This was
brought to a head recently when Fitzgerald
received a harsh razzberry from headquarters
in Washington because George Bookman, the OWI
man in Brazzaville, has sent a long cable in
clear to the effect that our troops had
landed in Leopoldville; giving details.
Fitzgerald said that he knows nothing about
these curious OWI men wandering about in his
territory, doing these things without his
authority which might easily place him in an
embarrassing or even dangerous position.
He flew dawn to Lagos and gave Bookman hell
but is far from satisfied with the situation."
1
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tT,??
A.4
?
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miammonemerm,cmorsubmarwmia
114(SMmmurfOrMWM
111011MWMWO.C.
1:-. ? I ' . ....17.11., A '.*: ... ) ^..
.II. ? 1.........0?????????.?46.0.???404.111d1h# .+ Wilha.1.615M14.10010ftftlij
/ILV S ' 6 0.111, / A i e leotor
k 114US le 4 0. I /4104
( &ant )/2444l""
DEPARTMENT OF STAE ta.5 /I dr I
,
WASHINGTON
In reply refer to January 25_. 1943
FA 102.91802/881
1141414
1444,41#
faI
r
The Secretary of State presents his compliments
to the Director of the Office of Strategic Services
and acknowledges the receipt of four letters of
December 7, 1942 concerning the assignments to London
of Messrs. Albert J. Sloane, Crane C. Brinton, Raymond
Rousseau and Robert Blum.
The Department of State is pleased to advise that
these aesignments have been approved and that appro-
priate ins4ructions have been issued to the American
Embassy at London. There is enclosed in this connection
a copy of the Department's telegram no. 182 of January 8,
1943 to the Embassy at London.
Enclosure:
To Embassy, London, no. 182,
January 8, 1943.
NTA,St.,,AT."
A
Col 41,7A4L.
deputefol)
it net)
OtuaTiot..
*Pa/LA/ /26
410?Ni NAN?. A.' A ???
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I.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
0
? a.... Ia./0Z/ uevol ? ?????? ?
?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FA
DivIsi?14 ...... ............................ ........ ?????????
BUREAU
ENCLOSURE
TO
LETTER DRAFTED ??????????????????.?????????????????????,-1.0?
Ce: ay. ADDRESSED TO
-e Director of the Office of
.......... ...... ? ..... Oa. ............ ................... ????
Strategic Services
? ..noge..6.
WW2
- ?
.4..0 F.
rt
frfe ;
1.1
9
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
?
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? -.e?
k-
-
,
^ -?,4 ?
'd* '
-
,P?=, .?-,
-
,
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
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????, ?,'?? ?
;
*r-c-ir., sSV
- 3 -
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
November 27, 1942
Lt. Colonel R. i Brooker
Toronto, Canada
Dear Ockaorml Brooker*
was delighted to receive your letter of
December le* As Iva say, practically a year has
gone by during which this organisetiom has had the
banefit at your advice and cooperation which, I *mare
you has been deeply appreciated.
I an convinced that our training propina,
due in large measure to your Inspiration and guidance,
has wad* rapid strides sand est confident that it will
ehOw Mott satisfactory results.
I *a glad to ktioatthat you share myenthua-
*0 that the program ea a whole meets with your
,?
v itis my hope that our association may con*
tinuOrot ;ably far its. a1r6ady proven worth but for
your in the problems of both war and peace which
lie OW.
,c*
WM Moat emor41411 season's greetings in which
*fur sten joins me,
Very sincerely Iroura.
Mites 4 Donovan
tdrestor
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
Till you please prepare a reply to the attached
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
December 18th, 1942.
It is now practically
a year since I first had the privilege of making
contact with your Organisation. During this year
we have had at this School members of your Staff
undergoing training with us. On behalf of my
Instructors and Myself I want to say what a wonder-
ful year it has been for us to have had this chance
of working together with your people. We have
learned a lot from them and have been fortunate in
making so many very good and lasting friendships.
do not think any better example could be shown
than during our joint Courses bore that American
and British people can work together, endure the
same hardships, make lasting friendships and face
the future with the same ideals.
For my part it has been
a great privilege to me to go a stage further and
to have been given the opportunity of helping in
the OrganisIng of your own Training Schools. As I
reported to you the other day these Schools are now
an what I feel is a first-class basis and I have
every confidence that with the present Staff of
Instructors and personnel in the Training Department
that in the course of another month or two, The shall
have a training setup which will compare favourably
with anything of its kind in the world. It has
taken a little time to organise because from the
first we have been very /Ichoosey? as to the Staff -
particularly of instructors - and have felt it better
to be under-staffed with the right people than up to
V
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
strength with a single dud included. I have
played a very small part in all this and the
present advanced stage of the Training is entirely
due to the keenness, hard work and team spirit
displayed by all the Members of the Training Staff.
In closing I should like
to wish you and all your Staff a Merry Christmas and
really big things in the New Year.
Colonel W. J. Donovan,
Temporary nte Building,
Constitution Avenue,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
U.S.A.
3/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
41,
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
United States of America
American Embassy
London
December 2, 1942
TO: George Bowden
FROU: George O. Pratt
From a leader of the Belgian illegal trade union movement
who was in Belgium from June 1490 to July 1942, and arrived
in London about November 1, I received information that the
bombing of transport facilities by American and British air
force units had not been as effective as it might be because
the targets selected were not the principal or most important
ones. For example, attempts would be made to bomb 4 single
train or to bomb switch yards or bridges. The bombing of a
single train, even though it might cause a wreck, was in-
effective because traffic might easily be re-routed. The bombing
of smtickyards was similarly ineffective because the number of
switching points throughoutlelgium made it comparatively easy
to re-route transport with-* minimum of interruption. As far
as the boibing of bridges was cancerned, the targets were diffi-
Cult to hit squarely and were thus put out of action, if at
all, only for a short time.
The suggestion was made that if the targets would consist
ethe locomotive round, houses, central repair shops and clas-
sification yards, there:mould be a much greater effect upon
the transport facilities in Belgium.
Pursuant to this suggestion, I have requested that my
informant prepare for me a brief summary of the location and
probable condition of these three types of places, and the
attached wport has been_ given to me in response to my request.
You 411,note that the report refers to three types of places,
first, the bridges rind- viaducts, which, as I-pointed out above,
art very difficult to destroy.- You will note also that he
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points out that these bridges are situated in congested areas,
and I suppose that one thing to be borne in mind in selecting
a target is to select one that would cause damage without
destroying the house's or lives of a number of people who live
immediately adjacent to the target. You will note, however, he
does name three bridges, the destruction of which vould block
traffice from and to Germany. These are situated near Liege and
Namur. My informant then lists fifteen places where round houses
are located which he considers the most important of the country,
and although as he says, the Germans do not make a practice
of leaving their locomotives in the round houses, he indicates
that in winter it is difficult not to bring them in for at
least a period every twenty-four hours, and that generally
speaking, the time between 1 A.M. and 3 A.M. will find the
greatest number of locomotives in these round houses.
Two central repair shops are named, the destruction of
which would have an obvious and serious effect upon transport
in Belgium.
BN also lists eleven places where the most important
classification yards are located, and in talking with me about
these classification yards he indicated that trains are made
up illssuch yards in the normal fashion, and that these yards
were not, in. July, protected to any great extent by anti-air
craft batteries.
While I suppose that both our air force and the British
air force command have excellent bombing target maps, and while
1 suppose that they made elaborate plans for bombing atacks, it
is my thought that this information coming as it does not only
from a completely trustworthy Belgian source, but from a per-
son who himself was on the Board of Directors of the Belgian
national railways, may have some weight in the determination
of the targets at which we should aim. As my informant put it,
it may be more sport to try to bomb a moving train, but the
amount of destruction to be accomplished would be much greater
if we would undertake to bomb the engines and their round houses,
and the freight cars lined up on parallel tracks in classifica-
tion yards.
Attaohment
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GEORGE O. PRATT
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
Personal and
Confidential
February 25, 1942
The Irish Minister, Mr. Brennan, came to see me
yesterday.
In the course of our conversation he referred to
rumors which had reached him that your office and O.F.F.
were preparing propaganda for use with the Irish people
if the American troops in Northern Ireland undertook
to Invade Eire. I had already told the Minister that
our troops were stationed in Northern Ireland in the
interest of our own security - which would be that of
Ireland - and not for purposes of aggression. I told
him I had heard no such rumors such as had come to him.
He than asked if I had any objection to his call-
ing upon you and talking with you. I said I had none
whatever and that I was sure you would be glad to see
him. I am, consequf ?4-, sending you these lines of
explanation so that ...... and when he asks to come to
see you, you may know what is in the background.
Believe me
Very incerely y so
\\*1 iskid
The HOndirable
Iilliam 3. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D. C.
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;76z.swirr--c?N-/-v77,71
41:-.4rNIMEt.fr14?.?!:'-.47,9P1.V_
0128-1
aN.114-nc
Subject:
Is February, 1942.
The Commandant, U. 4. Marine Corps.
Lieutenant Colonel William W. Buckleyt Marine Carpal
Retired, Navy Yard, Wnshington, D.C.
The Commandant.
Change of station.
1. You are hereby detached from your present stntion and
duties, and will report to The Chief of Naval Operations, Navy
Department, for duty as the relief of Colonel Joseph T. Smith,
Marine Corps.
T. HoLcomB
Copy to The Chief of Naval Operations,
Director of Naval Intelligence,
The Quartermasters
The Paymaster - 3s
14.001. Butaley - 10.
00/BUCEL19:', W.W. 1st Endorsement
20 February 1942
Washington, D.C.
Buckley, Marine Corps,
Washington, D.C.
1. Detached.
2. No public quarters were available nor were any
assigned you while on duty at this Yard.
Geo. Pettength
? 4?4
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0126,-1
AN-114-ac
-I'detached from your present station and duties,
Naval Operations, Navy Department, for duty as
ph T. Smith, Marine Corps.
/s/ T. HolcoMb
*Val Operations,
,fil40. Intelligence,
kiister,
bier - 3,
,Buckley - 104
lra "'W,ititr- "
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Conmandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
-Lieut. Colonel 161.-W.. -Buckley, Marine Corps,
Retired, Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
Detached.
2. No public quarters *re available nor were any assigned you
while on duty at this Yard.
GEO. PETT1MGILL
/5/ W. F. Loventhal
By direction
2nd 'Endorsement Navy Yard, Washington, D. C.
Rsceived at 300 p.m* 20 leebruary 1942.
/s/ WILLIAM W. BUCKLEY
LtCol., U.S.M.C.,Retsd.
Or MP INN ......... r
3rd Endorsement
Washington, D.C.
February 21, 1942.
1. Reported this date.
A/ G. G. MORRISON
By direction.
........0.494ep,?w4,,Ammoafe.c.peoss
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
Coordinator of Information
Coordinator of Information.
The Commandant, U.S. larine Corps.
Subject: Reported for duty.
1. Reported for duty February U, 194k, i331).
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0
EDWARD G. BURGHARD
NO UTIC Ilt22 725
WATISO t LUC. CALI ro MN IA
I just received a letter from the office of the Surgeon
stating that at the present time there is no known indication for
of an additio,a1 army hospital in this locality.
A, thomeand thanks for your prompt effort.
Sincerely,
1R000100030001-0
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????????=
WASHINGTON
I have your note of February 15, enclosing
copy of a letter you received from Mr. dward G. Burghard.
I will see that the offer of his home site for hospital
purposes is brought to the attention of the Surgeon
General.
Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Administration Building
Allahimgton, D. C.
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11111,?1411?11=1
February 15, 1942
William J1 DOT101.811
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,
n LW' iNe.,ci
144y--3 r
February 15, 1942
the Honore:a* John J. Malay
Assistant Secretary of liter
lashington, D. C.
Dear Teak:
Here is a letter frog a
ran lityntable fe110. I don't know
whetber you would 14-interested. or
110 t dip
Donovanaoy
'$r
tr.7
'NOWA
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t- ?
Sincerely
William J. Donmil
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gDWARDG.BURGHARD
PICIUTIC 3, SOX 7 Z S
WATSONVILLE. CALI ra SHIA
Febr. 8, 1942.
Dear Bill:
4.1.,,d4,,A AL ;
-64-11
0--aj?-? //0'4?
We have recently heard that both the Army and Navy
are considering establishing hospital bases out here, and that
sites suitable for this purpose are already being investigated.
Up to now we had not seriously thought of disposing
of our property here, but upr-1 11earing of the above, thought
what an ideal spot this plac rould be for hospital purposes.
You see, we have a little over 95 acres, situated right
on the Bay of Monterey, with woods and private beach. Our house
is large enough, and so laid out, that it could immediately be
used as an Administration building, and other buildings placed
around or near it. If necessary, it could even be used as a
temporary hospital, while any other building operations were
going on.
The property is on the main road leading to Camp
McQuaide **Achy by the way, is only a few miles away. A new
State Highway is only about 3/4 of a mile from us, and a spurr
line of the Southern Pacific Railroad runs right through one
end of the property. So you see, transportation facilities
are ideal.
From a health standpoint I doubt whether a better
place could be found. All our guests and friends visiting us
call it the Sanatorium, because of the recuperative climate.
We also have excellent water, with plenty of it.
We originally expected my mother to spend quite some
time with us, and as she would have numerous friends visit her,
besides other members of our family, we built a rather large house.
As usual, things did not work out as we expected, so that the
house is really too large for just the two of us. It would be
much better for us to have a smaller place, especially during
these times, when all our efforts must be put to winning themar.
I have made some inquiries as to whom to see, but find
that the only thing to do is to go right to headquarters. In the
case of the Army that would be General De Witt, but I do not know
who is in command of the Navy out here.
Not knowing General De Witt or the commanding officer
of the Navy, / was wondering whether you would care to send me
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rivarevigiggeMMErftimoseamt...._
4.55,115
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;555, 15.
LDWARD G. BURGHARO
ROUTE 3, BOX 725
WATSONVILLE, CALIFORNIA
letters of introduction to these officers, or to anyone else
in authority. YOu may know of other channels to contact, and
any suggestion or help you could give us certainly would be
appreciated. As I said before, we feel that this place would
be ideal for a hospital, or a place for convalescents; and would
therefore like to have the opportunity of offering it for sale
to the proper authorities. Perhaps you could look it over
yourself for Col. Knox. We certainly would like to see you.
Well, Bill, many thanks in advance for anything you
can do in this matter. Do give our best to Russ and Jo when
you see them.
With kindest regards from us both -- lots of good lucks
Sincerely,
? tktr....4,0.. 7. r. >4.
4
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1111111
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maaagmaaa.a.464:411.14aaa4a 44444- a
asaa,
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EICECUTIVE corn= OF TEM PRESIDENT
*ma rose IMERGIENCT IMUDIAMINT
WASED/OTOD. D. D.
'7)
LA,1-Zi
January 27, 1942
?
Mr. James Murphy
Assistant to the Coordinator
Office of Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Murphy:
The following information comes fran Mr. Hubert
Kletnpeter, friend of Frederick Brisson. Frederick Brisson
is the husband of Roealind Russell, the movie actress who
has been invited to attend the President's Birthday Ball
hero in Washington, and also the son of Carl Brisson, very
weU known in the United Kingdom and throughout the
Scandinavian countries as an actor.
Frederick Brisson has been in radio work for a
number cf years and manages the radio work of Herbert
Marshall, Leslie Howard, Cary Grant, and others. He 'worked
on a London newspaper and was correspondent for the
Hollywood Reporter. He also organized the U.S.O. program
in connection with the Hollywood Bowl.
Mr. Brisson speaks seven languages fluently and
is anxious to get connected with the Office of Coordinator
of Infbrmation ruling counter propaganda work.
Mr. Brisson was highly recommended by James D.
Secrest, who is in charge of our regional service.
Sincerely yours,
Henry M. Paynter
Chief, Economics Branch
,
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. Pagt14__ ""
.?,..r."41-1' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030001-0 S1".
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Memorandtus: To Colonel William Donovan
From Pearl S. Buck
It is already known that Japan is making much use
/miller propaganda in Asia of the prejudice of white people
against peoples of color. What is not so well known is the
effect which this propaganda is beginning to have. The
strength in Japan's propaganda is the unfortunate fact that
it is true that many white people do have 4 strong prejudice
against people of color, and that there have been many white
persons in China, Japan, Malaya, The Philippines, and India -
indeed, in every part where Japan is now using this propaganda,
who have been overbearing, arrogant and unjust in the treatment
of citizens of those countries. Propaganda strengthens such
memory. The Japanese propaganda says, "The white people will
hover give you equality because they have never granted equality
to any colored race. When you fight at the side of white men
you are fighting for their rule over you." Japan cites as
arguments:
a. England's continued unwillingness to grant
even dominion status to India.
b. England's colonial attitude toward all colored
subjects.
c. The discrimination which United States has al-
ways had toward colored Americans.
4. The fact that the U. S. nary will not allow
colored members except in menial positions,
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ssified and
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that no colored men are yet in the U. S.
airforce, and that in the army colored and
white are segregated.
Proofs of the effect of this propagandla are to be
di,iader..
found among our allies, especially among the younger people.
All are seriously troubled by What might be a victorious white
imperialism more difficult for them to overthrow in the long
run even than Japanese rule. One hears such remarks as this,
always spoken in confidential circles,
"We had better not allow the Japanese navy to be
destroyed - we may need it against the whites."
"Even though I hate the Japanese, yet if we had to
choose between being a dependency of the Japanese Or of the
Americans, we mould choose the Japanese because they have no
race prejudice to be a bar to the hope of future equality,"
"After all, what proof have the hliglish and Americans
given us of their real belief in democracy? They are not fight-
ing for democracy but for themselves. We must fight for our-
"Had we better not keep the strength of japan, which
is the only modern nation in Asia, to fight the white modern
*tions if? we mnst? If we destroy Japan, what will we do if the
- people do not give us the democracy we went?"
Such remarks., and there are many of them, dhow a dis-
people of Asia interpret as an endeavor to
?
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z
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cement union between England and the
United States alone.
The "Union Now" movement itself, Which ex-
cludes except in vague terms the democracy
of China from the proposed federation of
democracoa,
Goart.slalostignLAILIO-kralien4knOoinmr4,104rlitille-
Wisiimp4.441901 tendency in such important
officials as General Wavell to be colonial-
minded even toward such leaders as Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek. An example quoted was that
when Wavell in an interview expressed his thanks
to the allies for giving him his command, he
omitted mention of China though China has been
carrying on the main war against Japan for so
long in Asia.
It is felt that in Washington, Churchill showed
a lack of knowledge of affairs and persons among
our allies in Asia and that his interest was not
sufficient to help him to know or remember them
when told:
The end of Churchill's speech when he spoke of
England and the United States "walking side by
side in majesty" etc. 4his first public speech
in Washington, see closing lines) was taken as
confirmation of his "Atlantic-mindedness," by
people thinking from the viewpoint if Asia.
Are44
tendency of newspaper reporters and columnists
A
1m-1T
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?
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.4.
to lump the peoples of Asia together under
Ghe term *Yellow" or "Oriental." The
Chinese especially very strongly object to
this, and feel that as they never speak of
'white" or "Occidentals," but always of
nations, the peoples of Asia deserve also to
be spoken of as nations and not by color or
by "Orientals." A very sharp reference was
made to this by an important Chinese official
when he had just seen the Washington Times-
Herald use the terms "those Orientals" a few
days ago.
7. It must be taken into account allo that it is
inevitable that our severe losses in the Far
East have produced a conscious or unconscious
rise of surprised feeling among all those who
have suffered in some measure from white Imper-
ialism in the past. The prestige of the white
man in the Far East, until this time based
largely on the power of arms, has declined
temporarily at least out of proportion to the
truth. There is pride even among our allies
AAJ
that an Asian people imam been able so to deal
with a strong western power. Japan is quick to
turn this to racial account. She is saying, You
see we need not be afraid of the white man."
8. India remains a test case for democracy in Aria.
Much depends on the reply given by England
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through Churchill to the recent request
made by fifteen of the leaders of India)
all of whom were moderates in politics. Eng-
land has a bad record in the minds of Par
Eastern peoples, including China. Japan will
undoubtedly gain greatly if England continues
her present uncompromising attitude toward
India.
These are the chief facts which are at this moment
aiding Japan in her dangerously successful propaganda in Asia,
among all peoples.
What can we do to counteract this propaganda?
.:1
We must must act for ourselves first, mad remember
that we have a relation to Asia which is not
Rngland's. We face the Pacific as well as the
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the Far East and we must not now take It upon
ourselves by allying ourselves so completely
with England that to the people of Asia we seem
to be one. Any union which is exclusively white
and English-speaking will be an all-out aid to
Japan.
We aught immediately to assure the Chinese of
our determination to keep then with us on an
equal basis with England. If the President could
speak definitely on this point it would be most
valzsblo to us. If China could be wholly re-
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assured, then half the dal ger would be g one.
But words alone will not reassure. A Chinese
said the other day in a confidential con-
versation, "It is considered here that our war
with Japan is chronic and so we are sent no
help. Help is sent to places where war is con-
sidered acute. But five hundred planes, which
could have been sent to us at any time, but were
not, would have made it possible for us now to
have attacked the Japanese strongly on the flank."
Again: (quoted from a Chinese) "Vie begged that
American planes and warships might not be so
concentrated as they were in Hawaii and the
Philippines. It has been our experience that this
present war cannot be fought on the old methods
of concentration. Dispersion is the word. But
no heed was given, to us or to our experiences,
although we have been fighting the Axis longer
than anyone has. Now we think with acute regret
of those planes which were destroyed within a few
hours. We could have won the war with them."
Again: (quoted from a Chinese source) "We have
put the whole of Free China at tha disposal of
the All ior airfields. Dispersed airfields
make an inferior airforce able to stand off a
0
superior one.
Again: "China has a feeling of :.et-down. She
longed for the entry of America Anto the war
Ilik
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after all these years of struggle. In-
stead of having been given any relief) how-
ever 7 she is being asked to send soldiers
to Burma and Indo-China."
Again: "If China does not soon have help she
will collapse economically. It has became a
pressing problem to Chiang Kai-shek to know how
to feed and pay the Chinese army."
Again: "The great danger is that England and
the United States will fight this war as4Colonial
war. But it is not a colonial war. It is a
total war, and total war requires political and
spiritual values as well as military."
Again: "Why does not the United States realize
the great strength for the Allies that is in
the spirit of the Chinese people? Only the
Chinese are fighting a total war in Asia against
the Axis. The peo-ples of The Philippines, Malaya,
India, are all fighting on soil that is not their
own - they fight as colonists of an empire. But
China is fighting as America is, for its own
country. The real union ought to be between
non-imperialistic China and non-Imperialistic
America.
,LwGh.:hate,1A441./ Mi4 t"1/..)
What action can be taken and taken at once to
reassure China first and then the other allies
in Asia of our independence and our determination
to include them in democracy?
-
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a. There should be a continuing conference of
strateg7 in Washington - not London, for the
people of Asia strongly distrust England, but
are inclined to and want to trust the United
States. At this conference China ought to be
represented on completely equal terms with
England and the United States.
b. Decisions as to allocations of war supplies
Should be taken in joint consultation, and
care Should be taken that General Wavell does
not bring a colonial officer's mind to bear
upon the Chinese.
c. There is particularly in Washington much draw-
ing-room talk against China, end the Chinese
know it. People say, "After all, can you trust
the Chinese?" "What can the Chinese do?" "Why
don't the Chinese do something?" This is unjust
talk for the Chinese have been doing a great deal
for years, aid have had no help as yet, and it
hurts the Chinese.
d. The press Should be told that in speaking of
not use racial tern nor should any terns be
A
used which would seem to disparage our allies on
racial and geographical grounds. At present the
ignorance of newspapermen and columnists is such -
even off famous columnists like Walter Lippman -
that unwittingly they insult our allies in Asia.
Japanjji3ch indlude our allies ali3, they must
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f. Our generals and military men may be actually
as dangerous as they are helpful in winning
this war. Today war has to be won through the
mind as well as through armies and weapons,
The Japanese, like the Germans, are fighting
a total war - not merely measuring arms. But
many military men, American and English, seem
unable to grasp this fact It is natural to
them to think in the olit-fashloned terms of
weapon against weapons wary against army. There
ought to be 2.9221.212 liaison between Wave].]. and
Chiang Kai-shek - pplitical as well as military.
It is doubtful whether Wavell can do this, and
therefore he must be supplemented by others who
can help him. China is fighting with full
political consciousness but as yet we are not,
nor is England. Generals can not seem to under-
stand the new war. They think this war will be
fought and won by tanks and airplanes only.
Military men only know how to stand up to talks
and airplanes.
Next to China, the Netherlands East Indies are
fighting a total war. There are 400,000 Dutch..
men in the Indies who have no home now in
Europe. This is the greatest concentration of
white forces in Asia. There are only 80,000
Ehglishmen in India. Every use ought to be made
of the spiritual force of the Dutch who are
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really fighting for freedom. Free men can
fight ten times as well as colonials.
Australia, so far as I understand it, shows
the same potential strengths. This can be con-
firmed by a talk with Mr. Caerty, the
Australian minister.
Finally, the imperative first step, which
should be taken at once in order to reassure
China, our strongest ally, and to cut the
sinews of Japanese propaganda is two-fold -
(a) a clear statement made b.j. the President
that we are fully awar9(of the importance of
the Axis war in the Orieht and that there is
no danger of our giving it secondary attention.
(b) Immediate help sent to China, even if it
\ is only a comparatively small number of airplanes.
In closing this memorandum, I must respectfully cal
attention to the fallacy of believing that the Axis cal be de-
feated if Germany is alone defeated. Germany must be defeati.d,
but if Japan is allowed to get her fascist grasp upon Asia, upon
the resources and the peoples there, we Amerioans will find an
enemy stronger to fight than Germ9ever was, because Japan is
an entosymore deeply grounded in fascist thinking than Germanyis4i
and one far richer, if victorious, than Germany can be except in
her drionas?
I mast point out that long before Germany conceived
the idea of the Nezi regime, Japan had evolved it completely.
Stlay or historical rocords will show clearly the same scheme of
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government, based on force, on contempt of the masses, ot.
rejection of democracy, on aggressive warfare, on the use of
lies and trickery and propaganda as weapons. as early gs the
middle of the sixteenth century this regime began to emerge.
Korea alone saw it, for she saw herself as its first victim, as
indeed she was. The present world war, of which the first world
war was only a stage, may be directly traced to the period in
which Japan began her definite aggressive policy by seizing Korea.
Today's history only repeats that past event in broken treaties
and useless promises. It is interesting to discover the direct
relation between Germany and Japan in the development of
fascism in Europe. That the relation is direct no one can doubt,
and Japan was the primary source.
To ignore these facts, to believe that if Germany is
defeated we can easily defeat Japan is therefore ignnrance of
the most dangerous sort. A Japan victorious in Asia will be not
one whit less dangerous to us than a Germany victorious in Europe
is to England and to us. Nor would England perhaps be able to
give us much help if Japan wore to gain English strongholds in
Asia. We must not count upon the loyalty of India, or upon the
help of Rusta. The success of Russia in the present war has
only augmented the feeling of new power among the peoples of Asia.
There are thousands of Asiatics in the Russian army. India
particularly is being influenced by Russian successes. Russia
104 a special appeal for Asia today.
As for China ; I must call attention to her right to
be sailed a democraoyi, perhaps more truly a democracy than we
Ittgiand have over been. China has long practiced a real
I
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democracy, though on a plan different f rom the western plan,
and it is natural that great distrust is aroused all through
h or _
Asia when China solidly included with England and the United
et
States, where she believes she belongs, appeeerspeeatigiugd.fo.
Amte4?01ApufinarearILA.Ase-timaitalkittoolr.mrsimatudsaeialr. When China iimis not
put on terms of equality with England and the United States,
either actually or in planning, it is worth battleships and
bombers to Japan in furnishing proof of what she is telling the
peoples of Asia. Japan is trying to make this Irar a race i3.3ue
and we Americans ought to do everything we can to cut across
race. It would be to our interest to insist that China be given
an equality even if she did not altogether in all ways deserve
it in order that Japan be proved wrong. But anyone who knows
China will not allow that she is undeserving of equality. The
weir of defense whereby China has kept Japan from victory for
four and a halt, now nearly five years, will one day be written
down in history as a masterpiece of strategy in defensive war-
fare. Chines democracy is as real as our own, the basic
difference being in its form rather than in its effect. It
is a decentralized democracy whereas western democracy has al-
ways been centralized.
I submit therefore, not as my own opinion alone, but
and out of
as the consensus of opinion of many thoughtful persons in/Asia,
persons or various races and nationalities, that the great danger
to the UniLted States today is to become identified with England in
the minds of tam. peoples of Asia. We have a good record in Asia,
eemperatitely speaking. We are not feared there for past imperialisms.
Our Altars In Ala* auki be one of great influence mid friendly
,
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strength or it may be full of danger. Let us combine our
union with England only with an equal union with China,, let
us maintain our ow:a policies toward the nations of Aalas and
let us demonstrate to the peoples in Asia our determinstion
to maintain our independence while we fight with fun strength
for democracy for all.
?-?
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ofe0401.91*-44?0-1-a
Ve_Ts*.ta
:d
Miss Pearl S. Buck
40 last 49th Street
New York City
Dear is Buck:
he your letter about The .Mst
04 West Association. I believe that the
of this organization which you are
fowling is a aost ulieful one, and that the
a:- ?
piit1ined4n iolki3entorandum, is 10=4.
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004 fukithet tif* AcOjectt'll.,04wii1 be,
to recoil,* Wormaltiort about 3rour
Fobruar:r '3,, 3.942
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Sincerely,
'I William J. Donovan
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k. (Mowing has been. suggested by Ifr.
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k -en as a reply to the attachea letter:
*
'AI - b e 1 a. e v e that the purpose of the "East
_
aid. West Association" which you are found-
itg is a useful one, and that the plan 7thich
you have outlined in your memorandum is
soilud. I shall be glad to do that I can
.tolfurther this project and will be Tleased
,.tty reerire information about your work as
,
it; 'develops."
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MCI P. BAIT111, $rd
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*TeIegres
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Jw0ary 2v 1942
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^MP oksibt West cAssociAtiori
Devoted to mutual knowledge and understanding
of the life of the Oriental and the American peoples
4 ,
X
re.
PEAR/. S. RI:CR
FreAiost
CHARLES S. PHARIS
Tr/mower
Sorrzi of Directors
'MANCHESTER Booby
Loots BROMFIELD
PEARL S. BUCK
MRS. JAMES E. PUGHES
HENRY R. Luct
Iklm1c.4.7.Er MEAD
CLARK H. MINOR
JAMES Q. NEWTON
RICHARBI. WALSH
iiiisirory laird
(tit firma& ak)
AMMAN J. BARNOM
ROBERT M. FIELD
CitivErt LArnmottE
Lys Ytnuic
Gag= M. SrscLiiiie
My dear Colonel Donovan:
Forty Forty-ninth Street, New York City
Tanuary 26, 1942
The Board of Directors of the East and West Association want you to
be among the first to know of the founding of this organization, its
purpose, and what we hope to accomplish through ite activities.
The Bast and West Association, was plianned a long time ago by a small
group of persona who are familiar with Far Eastern $391ktiriee. We
felt that in our modern world it was increasingly neseSioiry to work
for real understanding between the peoples of the jwitit and its west.
f /VA
We feel that this is now crucial because of the "F.,. Not tonly future
peso* but victory itself depends upon underetandiatwtii?oVairoaprose
color and race and geogrephy, and aims straight at ?thelheafSt and
sands of people. -Stva
16C)44;t
Th* enclosed ssemorandum tells of the plans of the org,a4zation,.and
the channels we will use in developing its program =ore 'fully. We
shall not duplicate the work of any other organization. Cur purpose
is not relief; our interests are not nhumenitarian," but broadly
herrn. We shall do no research; we an not to collect new inowledge,
but to disseminate widely the knowledge we area home.
We shall appreciate your inquiries and suggestions and we would like
to said you from time to time further inform:IA-ion about our work as
it dirrelops.
p3B
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Sincerely yours.
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NEMORANDUM BY PEARL S. BUCK
East and West today are one. War has swept the peoples of the
world together and whether we are ready for this union or not, we have
been forced to it by necessity. The union will continue, whether we rant
it or not, mfter the war is over. Not the western peoples alone will
make this war, nor will western peoples alone make the peace after the
war. For the first time in human history the whole human race must
shape the world.
It is more essential today than ever, therefore, that the
peoples of the East and West understand each other in all possible ways.
We must know each other. Our faces, our ways of living, our feelings and
thoughts ummt be familiar and comprehensible to each other. But such
understanding can only be based upon knowledge and we have not that
knowledge. Our allies, the Chinese, are still strange to us, and we are
strange to them. Our present enemies, the Japanese, are still less known,
and still more strange to us, and we to them. We do not know our own
Oriental people, the Filipinos, nor the peoples of India or of Thailand,
or of the Netherlands East Indies, nor do they know us. We do not even
know very well New Zealand or Australia, those great western islands in
the eastern seas, nor even Russia, a continent whose people is more east-
ern than wustern. Nor do those know us any better. Outward circumstances
have compelled us now to closeness, but inwardly we are still separate
because of our ignorance of each other's peoples.
Thar? has been some interchange between East and West in the
upper ranges of culture, but in the spirit of the times ttis interchange
nmat now be between peoples and peoples. For such interchange, there-
fore, and for tho now understanding necessary today, the East and West
-
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Association, a non-profit corporation, has boon organized. Its purpose
is to help ordinary people on one side Cf the world to know and under-
stand ordinary people on the othor side, in terms which ordinery people
can grasp.
The East and West Association does not duplicate the work of
any ousting group. It seeks to use and spread more widely, through
varied moans comprehensible to the average person, tho results of the
studies and activities of other organizations as wall as of informed
individuals.
The immeeiate moans, planned so far, of disseminating this
human knowledge include:
I. Radio programs, nabional, local and ovorseas.
2. The sponsoring of motion pictures, documentary and
otherwiso.
3. An authentic illustratod monthly magazine.
4. Organizing in many placcs forums and discussion groups,
and supplying study programs to these and other groups.
5. Maintaining an information service and reference library
in New -fork.
6. Fostoring the translation of the wr4tings of East and
West into their several languages.
7. A monthly news-letter for mentors.
The Association will use any and all other possible mediums
of exchango between the pooplos of the eastern and thc western world.
January, 1942
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January -3, 1942
Dear Lir. Nelson,:
To enable the Coordinator' of Infornkition to ne?aseat 6ata
in visual fora to the President and to persons desimated by
his, approval was given by him to the construct:::la ?ind
eiip-
plug of a building which will be ,3rsted by this arganizetiln.
Actual consiruction of the buildinF is tc be =der ?Le
di tion of the Public Buildings Administration. Three of
th 's foreaost iadustrial designerg gr. R&mo Loewy,
1153, and Mr. "Walter :Corwin T; ne ague, have com-k
ed pratimirxery sketchem for tho structure, snd are ntrw
om interior arrangements and contents. The Office
t rinato is,to be responsible for the ?urehase and
idstallation of all equipment.,
We have now reached the 1pojit of ordering models for
the equiptent to be tnStalled. Certain ciporimental
lioesesory Wit** as some of thct eqapment is
" and conStrUct' speeifioally Tor the building,
it consists of m45! anima, el ?trios', ahotogrephic,
'items.
In ardor to aeeure delivery on neeessaTy supplies,
services, without delay, it is essential, es
int lOrojitlIsting as low in the "A" series
I would atm 'date your personal assistance in
.?
5
Sic eroly,
William J. Dow:van
oas fteoutive Direotor
ead Allooationa Board
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DRAFT
January 8, 1942
Dear Mr. Nelson:
To enable the Coordinator of Information to present
data in visual form to the President and persons designated
by him, approval was given by him to the construction and
equipping of a Wilding which will be operated by this or-
ganization.
Actual construction of the building is to be under the
direction of the Public Buildings Administration. Three of
the dountres foremost industrial designers, Mr. Raymond
Loewy, Mr. Benry Dreyfuss, and Mr. Walter Dorwin Teague,
have completed preliminary sketches for the structure, and
are now working on interior arrangements and contents. The
Office of the Coordinator is to be responsible fo-L. the pur-
chase and installation of all equipment.
We have now reached the point of ordering models for
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some of the equipment to be installed. Certain experi-
mental work is necessary in addition, as some of the
equipment is being designed and constructed specifically
for the building. This equipment consists of mechanical,
electrical, photographic, and related items.
In order to secure delivery on necessary supplies,
materials, and services, without delay, it is essential,
as you know, to have a project rating as low in the "g
series as possible. I would appreciate 31our personal
assistance in this matter.
61
Sincerely yours,
William J. Donovan
Mr. Donald M. Nelson
Executive Director
Supply, Priorities, and Allocat'on3Board
Washington, D. C.
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DEC 8 19411
fiye deer Cassel, Donevisit
I SIB attaching Ler yter information a copy of
sr letter at this date to the Administrator of ths
tielierel Work* Avow relative* to the Wilding tor
lasir pressettatiat astivitits.
Sineerely years,
iskjeast
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(Eign4d) HAROLD D. SMITH
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