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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
November 3, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 17, 2013
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December 31, 1943
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12_8 t b Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001000300 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES INTEROFFICE MEMO Colonel BUX10321 DATE. WWI Secretariat sulAKL Attached Report from John Davies, "Anglo-American Cooperation in East Asie A (If. c: - . - ,?" 31 Decemb4r 1943 4 1. Annexed is What we believe a highly important memorandum by John Davies on the position of the American forces in East Asia. It is of particular importance since we understand that John Davies has been appointed by General Stilwell as political advisor to Oil in New Delhi to integrate its policies with that of the Commanding General. 2. This memorandum was transmitted direct by pouch from Major Huteheson to Mr. Katz who received it about 2 weeks ago. The Secretariat saw a reference to it in a cable Mr. Katz sent to Colonel Heppner and asked that Mr. Katz send us a copy of the memorandum for the Director's information. Mi.. Utz reports that he had sent a copy to General Magruder with a suggestion that it be distributed throughout the agency, and that General Magruder had asked him to make distribution to Mr. Scribner and Dr. Langer. In addition, Mr. Shepardson has seen it. The Secretariat believes that distribution should also be made to the Planning Group, FETO, X-2, SO, and NO, but in view of General Magruder's request that distribution be strictly limited, and in view of Tekhl cable No. 182 of December 20, 1943, attached, se have thought it best to secure your approval before sending copies to these offices. Particularly with reference to distribution to the Planning Group you may with to consider Whither this might be in effect the circulation to the Mar, Navy and State Departments which Heppzter has recommensled should not be made with- out Davies' approval, We L.LAp.4 SAAAct C.4 ec,tua clAfvOLIVIEra wALo 3.41a4AA., .slg Ldt -c?ASV ( G?ILe k?-g, Veoe-A.A.44;1 ?. k ii I 3 ? 1.1/:.1.), SECRET 00221101EMNOWOMMOVEGMangheaneKSINIP41,04.1ZIS:., .1 A ' -!P 41.1fr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 3. We believe this matter illustrates the necessity for routing all official communications through the Theater Officers who as staff officers for the Director can see to it that there is immediately called to the Director's attention any matter coming in by pouch about which the Director should know. This routing is, of course, provided for in the pending order covering the functionas of the Theater Officers. ? ????.....-,..ce,pr???...- ateic-srat, ?ft.o. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 COOPeraSIOU Niit Asia 11..15'43 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 '41- ? af-i ? 7: 1?.??? ''????? Ws will be able te is ourselves a good deal of trouble and misunderstanding if at the outset or our parti. oipation in and contact with the South last Asia Comma ive slowly distinguish where American and British interests lise In as far as the British are fightint the Japanese sow and seeking to punish aggression, wo are united with theme But we are not to the sam exteat united with the liritisie in their attempt to regain their colonial aspire metlek* American foreign policy and publio sentiment him midergoss a revolt:timer* Mange yet unannounced in these distant parts. 'tore still Illadst at home highly vocc.1 and influentill pabUaimers and min in pablis life idle will be ready to brsostaar ofilWeerati_ ea with the British in Burma, lialaya? Lodoolnina and fiventrin;ani snatohing British, Froneh and Data colonial ehortmats out et the Japanese firs. The suestims ili be NOM, sew should Amerisen boys die to ropoomos ealemies for the British sad their French end Duteh - " - 0: ? t I , Is Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001 R000100030012-8 - u 1 eclassified and Appri For Releas........................._1111111111111111111111111111111.111.1e 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 ?????? 1.2.0 For us to distinguish in this tkoater the prestos lina its of our national interests is one of the nowt diffioult tasks oonfrenting us. no repossession of the British lbw Are in Asia is merged with the Isar against Japan, /tory and politioal strategy are so intorninglod that the diftinstion batmen ths lam is easily blurred. 'Moon the British and we fight our Iry into Bursas we shall be not only prosoeuting this war against the 0011111011 snow but also recapturing a portion of Britain's brim Until we are able to distinguish juart how far wo should involve our. selves in the pleas and %Lotions or, our allies, we shall bo running the risk of finding sursolvss beeauso of a lswdeblo wool to got tkilsis done in a dangerously false position* ha .sorving to clarity this confusing situation, it iv be nosed first to it ourselves in this British position, Ontinating their position in Bast Asia as they se. it. The pettish et* essgront. id vd.th Vow major tasks in last Asia. Qs* reessoupatina at their ibittbirast Asian &pips. he stimisr is the defeat at Jepsui The Usrvorassmt realises that because of Pearl luta& said AsOkssin. the *sited fitats feels ssissittod to ORS distosst 41.41sons? Stitt& lioverannat has bons abliii to digsond Ayes tips Soviet 14ost to boor tbs brunt at agninet Geraaay,: as it ligf dopes* Apo* us to bear 1.10 bra* it law Ivor siiot 441ise Zokatki-4:Ek ?r"7-zw - t'? 7,Anzti_ ,r? n ? tt7i* rk' SZORZT Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 That being the ease, the British Gevernmest is not se impulsive as to piano the defeat of Japan no inespeo. sive projeet -- as the prinoipal test before it. The reacquisition and perhaps impansiaa of the Rom lire is an essential undertaking if Britain is to be fully restored to the position of a first (*lass power. There- fere reeoaquest of Ihspire is the paramount task in British oyes. The raising of the Union Jaek over Singapore is mere important to the British than any victory parade through Tokyo. This British *valuation is revealed by their renarb. ably dell:iterate tiao-table, their unwillingness to employ against the enemy remouroos which for same time have been at their eammend, their military 'motion, present and past, rationalised ixr the itvooation of Acts or God, and tWiltelet4s 1o:hi& they Irish to follow in assuidng the often.. sive. This imtworobstioa does not impute heroia qualities to the British Government; it does imply that it has lost none of its petal-eel asemes#, Netters would., at course, be very mush more clear suitor the British if they *mid confine themselves to the teak et taking book the apire and delegate to us the emterprime of defeating the meow outside of the precincts ??;--7):,:7';?4 ? ,14?13 0? I ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 ef Sritink Colodes* limadea sad New Delhi, limvorrert mist *OM into oessiderstios in their planaing thho oempliosAing testa that (1) the *lied States, in piersuit of vietory over Jogai, is and will operating 41174111 britisk Negro loses Into ether parts it r bald by the enemy* asit (I) tits kritisk levornment is ommdtted to *Aim racialist the low barna Singapore and bon Reag? fiesision with regard to the latter sill be deferred until the issue arises meths or years hemp. American preeesioein India and plans for joint tett= against .,1?,:?1 -.t- : t ? ? ?"" ? ' I - 4,4;.. ? --;?- - 0 f , -; - f : - : '' ; t 7.f?'-`,...,4 --?.?" -4, ' ? , - !..:C,-,i,-._ ,...44, ... ? ' ? ' , ', , -1 ..??=7",,r .,::' . ' --- ...,? ? 1 :-,:. " :1 ''';1?;t1Yr?-;* 7 ' ' '', ? ?1 .4.-',1:-'1 Pfi ? ' ''' -,. I .?ii.-.7' 5 - ' .I"' ?', ?i -.....' ' T 1 ' 1:11(ki (ii : .* , .z...- - ., ? / ,. '''")-1..-'''a : ,-. z * ? . .F. 1- ' ,- . ?'-..? -,5*:-..".`'.. '1 ? , * ?.' :?'. -, .4 ?,, *,',.. - ??-z- --: *,. - ..,,;.':' '? .p.: _. I,. ? The Sritish openly adatt that they ars embarrassed by our prosonoe in Una, 401 ow plans for going into 1141111101 411*- 14"1141# 2914 proaionala and tharetwo clIspleiy of ritesi military etre** in British eolormiom embarrasses b. 0 OM 0114 Neatita tante MA MO *IAA 14-14ria, British offiaels in India are freak to liOegodk to * very oommidorable extent ewe fades* petertigiiife ti British ars farther berrs by our attitude I IM4103An1A1 itueotiest. Obvious amerieiln Siii,001010 aifit4:044 Ositinteriou the Ileorickan r000rd of 14-.???????''? _ ? ? ?.? , ? , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001nnnmni9_st and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 stosedieg remain* sielstlyslyaiiii emus AsiaMils *mile the gratin belief is Ohba as& lolls *bet imp ere vairieeeing le British eeleriel eubitivuee sew affreeieties for ,iver present ensue ea the eakeellik"``'" luestives the Britisa ars, sevartheless, ttL1esstelir epprehaveive lest thews Now sass tagesuess imprimis outburst ea the icubjeet et liberty fir esisaisl peoples ehisk idght OM to Asistie ears(' Stol1*"17. Us Drab& sre mew ever the presesee ill is theater et lawless etva Weirs *Meares Obo. Itieways "be DMA* ere:. 10101101.11 for isserioan *Oil a4- 1.111 INT IOW **ire* betavver 1.11.7-;.'-- 1 ''''''',,'?'.;; - .":??.1,.!"1:-.12'f''::' I???? ??'? ?,..la 4?1" i Z.t. .. : t;?-?,14,:. . . . 6 . ? ' . '..'..-4.4 T. 1. .-f: i - - - 4, .- ., . ? : .. =,,r, , . ? ;I.4.-.... II;III.t. .3 ?I. It IL-f ??-.1. - - ; .,. r. . ---- L, "?? - . .'' 1. i . .,? 17. ? ? '-, i ?,'????? ?.-- . ? r .1 ??,? ,i.l.' , Pi? .,.. ? -??'...? ,',,. :., ..4s r??,- -r.., , i ..f ??..: ;11,1. ? :',' 't-E':?.;,; 'i.:7;'?.??? - - "141- ? ? -]; ? ? ? , ' ? ..t4; ?? , t.. ? ?!,1 r '1?? t.:?? ? 1:4:". ? ? ? ; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001ROOninnmnni9_p Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 oissasplisisod Only by ir 'faro= is the wake. at a 44paseie withdrawal sausoll by' on outflousking of Buraa? Tims British oussequaiday regard tau. insistent* on prompt ottonsine **tie* against DOOM as soarooly bettor than to no awl ham mood or 'ghat we =grudgingly give this, thaw flea that thoy =at %Int low to dioramas )41 Woos fres gelig into Dania other toss resorting to a blwat ritual* Clitises potentialities in the post.war world eau= tits pm's* *Mob Govszolioda sow ossisty.i It msve. stow* tbott if Oki= moirgioi:fron this war strong sait usi. k will (I) srn&fl as a rooms of nationalist artbuies Artie Ilivires (a) attempt* jars., jr.rksirs6 iso=4.14istio omassios of its mks snip Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 ???? ???- ? 4414 ' ? ? ...'"?"7",,I.???."?;.... #10 , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 31111111111111111.1 4111.71118 It is widest fres all of the foregoing, thou, that the littish arevecmment the Caverraest of Inas flail themselves in Sit sisditat' .d position with regard to their Anerie= guests in India. We embLrrass them by our very presence, for- the fact that it is necessary for us to be bare refloat& on British prestige. Our good reputation among Asiatics ant our attitude ?bawd the colonial question embarrass then. They are nervous lest me attev7b inde. pendeat adairdstratial in reeecupied British colon.. i.e. Oresoleaver to sake then jots us in a Bursa of.. fassive disturbs and irritates then. Finally, they find themselves is sipposition to our determination to mato China ? w 4- irst,ler pow* .. Yet they hue to beat Irith us. Itoorause they need our it ea44 aotterial sad Aar, lend-lese, they Cannot Wort te pat se eat at India, as they mould like to de. The 1401iitcasiskisfillarressape from their dilemma esssilst sans ter bet 41.44ruis (for they have. no alternative), easselidiate es *IV* theeeelves for *efficient* eooperatioa wed thins by deigastiag the fategrated partnership, bring likeldsit. lime !aft Omar raw iitoe La eii1r4Aligkel the teeth last Asia Oosmand,, 104t Otar.egt it ea* be aitrielgeola thit Chinese r '01140 acwillipr,*Villk that 3 rittel mot- British Buren* Ai U. Suprilio? Ilasmeaddir- in patriot et-lard ui=oeibiss* *11 at the qualifies oaleulated _ ;3.'5- 41 4 ."1(1-11:1#7 :jr3: " ,*?;. 7::tr,11?- , r' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001 R0001 00030017-R = f * ? 4..= r ? ?`?4"...r. ? ? ??? ??????t?-, -I: ...,_. , ? .44 ,*?-? - . - ? +1 ?---.r_' ...11,7 _ F I .1.; -, : ?,1 j. ' i . ,. Pt. t...?, . --- ...,? . ..-..i. ;-i- V.. I 1 -..! ..? ...;,.., _..1 _. _I r., , : " ,,,...... ::...?,?' -,-..... .....,.....!......- ......- ]. ? I' .11- - - . ? . , I. , . ?-? . t.i.,-; i..- -. ? - . :-:- li - -,-,, ?li' 1 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 to appeal post to Aserieeas fortbrightness, vigor Mg glamour, int, aloe* so shall stover bier *tut confidential writers Rio lordship standee f2111K Kr. Churchill &sips& to inhibit his natural vigor* unless *vents, porshinas, ocortilves to suggest that, Ifteallailitsi /tarsi Bountbatten's British subordinates and Governotont of India ?Metals os- phaniso their osire to integrate personnel as well as effort* not only in unitary .affairs but also in matters have fart.resiallag political implications. The remain is an appresiation of ths British post- ties. lin*, then* of the Asiorlean positiont Oar Idosiuk le (1) te-ilsorease the *what effective- ness et Wass* foram isr' the war against glipau end (2) to Want Japes. Xit as British plans 11E4 efforts ?attribute to as tee amis vos will and- 11.11at give that tial est *Alia* sr timk Imo Loose duty head to ?moo pertotte. Ltly to retard sr frustrate tie aosemplinhaost St etur sissies, ressumpirtion of-Dritaist "vire in Asia say bo 110.01toti4t sos4e at our "ill0114 balliMelln is not so 4t1;teu"Ihment in fast as it 717$ ofoilktit "go sully itsfAinitsr-adission to r I kimilossot issted, tan& t4orritcrios ? ItOirrtddik 141441,11 kW- 444,410414 likialinattot? Thereby .410490100117 IMP 141.4.10,41741NWL iii in attorpriso anted* 44.???-???"..~..44........R.4.44:641.,i16**AOratOVSSia .*? 11, -77 ?-1 . ;FIlt4:777. *, ,' '' i'T.:P?4 ?-% - ? (', . - ( 1:4-4., 4,,.'i. / a r.--7---f1'.-Y ..fu--.--.. -:. --4..i.....0., :v. .4.?" ' .. . - ' i ? 1 '''. 'iv::1??,,, ..5 u. :.. ? st 4?11,7:T;?':5,!:),.: i'SW'it...? ,.:-.,14-.. : . , Y741.? ? 1 '';'' ' ? L ?. -.1. 1-., .'??? ?,.e..f.pri,-4,...11.1. 1,-,.. .1, tfT'f77., . ...- 4".. A,. ??t- ,a, 7? -41! ? d,(A1Z.:::,...W.',,ff.,,i,... .fig._:)....tielit, 4irkati.e tv tl ,-, 4 ? ' ' ? . ...--Ar...,Lit. ,x- ,..., .4?,..,VA.; ..,.....?...-., ..4.:-.1-..a.a...,.:?. . (' '',_.....m,u ilir qrf 14" ' ' C'''''.." - ilfil' 3-'.#.14',.4* i:4':r1---,,A,..F,r,4 -.;', , , _ ,,. -e... ..-.. ??:,..;.; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 _ 1120211T 2, '-ir _ r? ,??.'?...?"?:- 1:11? ? . r -,. ' ..,... i- -...?? t ' ''.1."- ? ' , ? ...,). r .1,....... ...i.j. ..,.... .?,...., .'''. 7."'":-.; ? ?A .!-.1.1.- .-..,*. ' ------- ? -.., ? ..... 5 1_,?7'. ':',V4-...ei -,1 7...1.:-. I ...A.t!..::;-t1- ? -z? ,. - ? ,... '---- 1 4714' co. ? , ... -....--41....1.:?.. 1 -- . rl *. ? 1- ir-i-t- ' ? ?I: .,- ? ,,,-;? ; 01?. . 1:";4 ? ,.. ::. ,....', ? 1. : .t . , ? , i- i-, ? T. I . ? ! . . * ..1r -I j- ? .,...?.t.."11. . ? 1 ., ,. ' 4 .., A ?? . a 7 .1. -.? !... t- , ? 4 . . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 ? ?I the scope of our aission. And it is an lwaterpriso full ax potential misunderstanding and easplications for us. ladle highly sensitive to enbarrascaent by us, the British whibit a distressing lack of sympathy for the discomfiture to *doh vs are exposed boo/suss of our titS10., (station with then. If we *mad 'perste in aouthenst Asia independently of the British and en our cant terms, woo night expeot to be *welcomed by and have the sooperation of the native pop. viatica. But begrime are to erwate with. and (in the ease of the tenth But Asia Cosmand) under the British, the people of geotheast Asia will identify us with the re- isposition at British Colonial rule. This in turn means that we may *vest mash the so* resistance, hostility and asm.eeepsration from the native population which will greet the British. It sanuis that we shall suffer oasualties? sabotage, troakdamo of pply and administrative ebstruction whisk we mould net 111114111Witvir were we on our onci. Oar sellateral imvelvemeat in the Britioth imperial eaterpriee will attest ow relations net only with ooionial Adeistiess but also with the trio people. fat Asia. The Ohinmeelp sad Wier th** Thais, will fool as zany Chinese atien4 de that we have aliosed ourselves with the *WA asidiiteieraee-:ter?reimpese.inostera inn istAilkin. Seek a twain throughout Asia obviously r? ? 401"...??7!- L. ? ',Y.). ' I -.... ?!.. , , l' , m . ... -4; -3''.- -."-?-'- v 1.1..7_ yl. ?, -,4-..t. , -t - li.1'? ....."A . , ..? ---',.......--- ..? ki3".". 3 ' I ia?L .? . folk- ? ? -? ...A ':-"' ? ?? '", - , ...,,,..., , .. N , -, ...-. , ? ,... LI. ' .4 ' ? .- ? .., ._ .,-? _ .. I... ip ? ? - - . . i .t , ? ? ? ? 7 ? i? ? f ? ? 7 1.4 -N. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDF'13xonnnl PnnnI (-It-m)m., Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 - has asinsuis implications for the futuro. Our participation i*Brithints osapalta to recrooto its ibspire ID* wise pigmies us in a false position with rs.. gard to the imerioan public. It is obvious That more than say ether imortioan fore* IS are Vulnereble to critielma. oven if mitinflutted. as being idipos of British imperialism. It is *vides*, them, frter what has boon. said, thcet the Anclemilsperioark partnership not only mebarriusies the British1 bost also threatens to diseessfit and eamprosise us. ilswever, we are soareely more able thsa the Yiritiah to extricate ourselves from it. to sooemplish r atssic we have as mush need at the Mritish as they have of us. The partner. ship eannat be dissolved. bat thill dew net sigma that we should resign ~selves saremorsaily to being simpremisted. We are atill able to 40.10, istrieto* Oh Ogasitiorraidi ..i;14014 of oomtrol ever oar sourish) 70, tissoolgs, so as i retails 0111 as an irtaspeulsrit ilserieas assethpiss. *sisal warfare 1110oan attsagt te asur *diet to st Asia 4,21 acr son tams ? 30Stisitheat sittsUiI British. 106 0411 hag* thereby to milligmbit seek 1404tility to as as win develop among colonial asod *von lila a larger degree of **op- en them might etheralse. b forthooming,. Thiessen be resseagiObeili say it ow psysitslogitrol *Wars prisms pro. *relyagibriiiiis. laim'aftrjr., .,?,"":??? ''11?:4?ki? '4 ''' ? . ; r . ?,.. l' ....,. i!F.-1;o., ' ???. ',....''. . ? Sr; P.I.. .1 ^..-5'...-- .?? ts'i IC:. Z. - ? I S7.i4-4: 1 i-. - - ? , _ ?:_4. .-11:1, 'i,,,i L,?`''.: A':-.'....., . -? ?:.--.. . . - . ? ; . .r..- -;:, 1.7 .. ---_,.. i' .7.. - ''P. .. r':e7.'?!... r ..g.i. 4.4 --.!??:-.7..,,, _3 . -.-1.....,r 11'.'..4...- )11:7::?:diE:''''.4'.. i.:11717.44.11.:'''..;1c...:. :,:.:41 . ...t ..: . 1:.... ... -? ? -.,..14: , ?,i. . ? - . 1,4.! 1.. . - ???-2,???.- - -.? ? -.=.74.4,. ? . . . " 1,-- : ? 1 .? -. . ? :?.,,-,..,, ?? ? . ? . - . r., ? 7 4 - . . . _ . """... ? '7' - ? T Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/1 7: CIA-RDP13X00001R0001 00030(11 2-R Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 can still guide our deortiny sowewhat, The British have al- ready made it clear that they have no intention Of permit. ting us to exercise independent oil administrative funnw. lima be true of other .colonial areas. They will, however, be glad to accept our civil administration officers in staff positions or possibly in the field, providing they are under aloes British ?antral. They will do this because, so long as we are associated, it is to their advEntage to place us in a position whore ksericals cannot formulate policy but where iv win 1,. ideutifiettlrith their policy end where can capitalise am our good reputation in Asia. tli-oan guide our destiny with regard to civil admin. istration only if wit temain completely aloof fres it. Participation in *ten administration in colonial Asia will plass as In a bass and oeurso, theAneri'ean and British Governments ars prepared itiplisseset is Asia Articles II and III t the Atlantic aiterteri Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP IN SOUTHERST ASIA Summary Southeast Asia is a political vacuum demanding aggressive leadership. The mad cannot be met by a return to pre-war colonial paternalism nor by action of the colonial powers individually. If a common and forward policy for the development of nationalism in this area cannot be agreed and acted upon by the United Nations, control must within a few rears pass to others readier to act. Characteristics: Southeast Asia, including Burma, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaya, and the Netherlands Indies, is an area rich in population, resources, and tradition. Its people are, however, fragmentated by differences of language, religion, and custom. Illiteracy is the rule rather than the exception. Few of the ethnic groups are by custom of military temperament and none have advanced modern military training or equipment. They are economically unsophisticated and have difficulty in competing either with large-scale technical industry or with the tougher, shrewder, tighter Chinese. They are untrained in the detailed operations of a modern national administration either as administrators or subjects. These shortcomings have facilitated the survival of colonialism in Southeast Asia. Until they are overcome, neither Southeast Asia nor its component parts can defend themselves or play an autonomous role in world politics. But these people are also intelligent and ambitious and will make trouble for any regime which does not promise them such a role. Outside Pressure: British, Dutch, and French rule have differed in various ways. The Dutch have been more efficient and honest than the French but. also more paternalistic and more intolerant of native political organization. The French have shown the greatest racial tolerance but - . two= gratin areAttietigiifw.-gatiztiatosi 13.4A,fiQe - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 I'- have been least efficient. The British have made very considerable political concessions, yet have been racially most intolerant. All three have been alike, however, in failure to push with real energy the technical, economic, and political education of the people which is necessary if they are to achieve an autonomous status. This failure can easily be :fadged by comparison with what Japan has accomplished with her own people since 1870, what the United States has done in the Philippines or that the USSR has accomplished In Outer Mongolia. Instead of leading their peoples to statehood, the colonial regimes have dragged along far behind local nationalist leaders. Japans slogan "Asia for the Asiatics" permit:3 her a more progressive role. She is encouraging local nationalists wherever possible and within the limited means at her disposal is giving them access to political, economic, and technical experience. She has already declared the Independence of Burma and will declare that of the Philippines soon. She has increased the autonomy of the states in Malaya and promised a greater role to the political groups in Java formerly suppressed by the Dutch. This is strong medicine, even if Japanese control is but ill disguised. If, following reoccupation a few months hence, the United Nations revert to the pre-war colonial system, or if Thailand and 3urma are formed into a, British IcCormonwealth", as has recently been suggested, Japan may well retain, even in defeat, a political hold over nationalism in this area which, will be very dangerous in later years. The U.S.S.R. also, if it had an opportunity, would adopt a very positive policy here. They would cultivate the nationalists while ruthlessly encouraging education, religious reform, labor and political organization, technical training and all the other steps they believe Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 necessary before a country can become a full-fledgec member of the world order they envisage. China, for a .Cew decades at least, will lack the technical and peimJnistrative know-how to assume effective political and military leadership in this area. Under any international regime, however, it is safe to assume that her merchants would soon achieve an important economic position which would form the foundation for political control at a later date should the local populations in the meantime not achieve strength. The Need: Under such circumstances a return to the status quo ante is far from enough. The peoples of Southeast Asia will not remain our children. They must be trained to become our allies or they will learn to become our enemies. Both distance and the racial prejudices of our people will make it difficult for the United States, Britain, or the Netherlands to merge these peoples into our own political organization as Japan, China, or the U.S.S.R. might some day be able to do. They will eventually rebel if kept under our control without the full privileges of participation. Left alone in their present disunity, they will span fall under the influence of larger nei&dbors. The alternative is to organize them into a group, possibly including the Philippines, which would be strong enough to stand alone and to count on the generosity and extent of our political help to keep them in our orbit. Southeast Asia thus demands a leadership which will ally itself with nationalism, which will push energetically the equipping of these people for an autonomous role in world politics, and which will help them find such a, role. This leadership requires both greater interference Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13xnnnn1Pnrininnt-Innr... Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8 and greater generosity than have characterized colonialism -- greater interference with local ways and customs which are today handicaps and greater generosity in allowing the people of Southeast Asia to manage their min resources, industries, and administrbtions. If the United Nations do not provide such leadership, someone Conclusion: The United States might well initiate discussions of the future of Southeast Asia prior to campaigns in that area. A convincing statement of objectives now would be useful to P.W. and would facilitate reoccupation. Failure to secure agreement before occupa ion will, an the other hand, play into the hands of those who are planning on return to the status quo ante and sill make difficult, if not impossible, development of any sound foundation for long-term American (or British) political influence in this area. z A. A,4A, 4 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/17: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100030012-8