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Document Creation Date: 
November 3, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 25, 2013
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May 15, 1945
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? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4P ? 1., 'tk:, k irriVal,,in:ihe STO on W3 'November 1044 I was i?pit to''Slierviceet Brahoh as Motor Traneportauion ()Maori ,. Iion to tho operation of the Motor Pool in London) i J44414 charged with the responsillility of obtaining oPerating all OSS Buildings in the London area) At the m. or to arrival the 00S Headquarters oonsieted of threo (6) 1,dihge ' at SOO ) and 72 Grosvenor Street. At the peak of ilatione the following additional buildings were aoquirodt 44 Grosvenor Street 24 GromvAhor Streat , US Oromvenor Street 51 Grosvenor Street . 14 Mount Nw 68 Brook Street - 70 Brook Stroet 48 Portman Square 49 Portman Square 50 Portman Square 40 Mount Street 60 Mount Street dAtickhal builoi6ge war* oubsequently obtained for storage aiee -tht- tor holding areas for Schooled and Training Branch' - I remained in the above ?opacity until 17 July 1044 t=iias sent to ?ranee with three :(3) enlisted men as the , 004 Dita4hmant of the Forward Mohelon of 088 on the Flt'Went. My job WAS to looett and -sot up a suitable Hthe Q arriVal of additional Braueh personnel Prom t he UK? oh cA04,w44, loeated ,in ?. Peirsr Mer and eonsisted of ot4Wwhioh Was used es,an oftioe building and billet); e.uihO whick Wattled: the :Itombined ?Meer and Nftlisted mese' oh110$0, ro (In pi A? Is Billets ? The mi was ready 44ye thefitilft- of _personnel on 16 August 1044s ..'1*16'11x11'..*3V111':$4_oilt'orua i:sg:n and movItlitrite70 ''' ' lirtitfieL2kiontod.ths l'tilWAi*':',Itliseees Park and Galli ltso 'o:ftliGur:::7011:21:11d $14116,4 T141 HQ_ waptirts i to operateat ijOit.jjg' ' ' :, 401014, , While i p f m W Se Ambler Asated in the cipaeity of StorY? oos .1 1:_tOtiii4 to London) where I was lerilces,,Braneht 14,Tob * 00140n , 4 t,,i0 ,m,u responsibility to assist : 418 640-111ffiench) in the supervisitmOt ' 4010 !,A00tions of the braneh whi0,..careOIi ; 4 i , , , . illi** -tr""54;""er***Ik' ? ' '-'44;? V1 .11**4004*??401*?????0. . -,4?480-$.44,C . ' ft ?,...,, . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ' 4 ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 . '17 ? ? " ? ? 1es Ind. munArrAtitaXSTRATIIR BRANCH AND SUPPLY DIVISION, ADMININTRATIVI SIRVICAR, OSS, Washington, D. C., 17 May 1948 Reports Offiee, Secretariat, OBS. =WI Deputy Dirootor, Administrative Basic communication from Major Griffin forwarded as required by 03 NO. $3. For Chief, Military Adm. Branch and Supply DiYisiont Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 )(10.0 14 Ind. 4q441 =may AttillitSTRATin !MANOR AND sum! D/VISTON. ADMISIMTMATIVE - OVUM, OSS? Wiehington, D. 0., 17 *v. 1948 *ports OM**, Seoretariat, OSS, TRIM Deputy Direotor, Administrative Services Nolo communiostion from Major Oriffin forwarded es required by 00 No. 88. Yor Chief, Military Adm. Branoh and Supply Division' Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Ap roved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? ? ? ???? .44..1"ft ??? Post Mediterranean D-da, Activities* Not long after Mediterranean D-day 'ale commun oa ions Xinis", as expeeted, started to disintegrate. This was caused not only by the utter confusion in southern Franoe, but also due to the feet that the heads of the chains were following our instruotiond to act as tactical intelligence teams and to report by radio and courier to the Allied t;round forces in rrance. Te role played by Barce- lona automatically decreased in importance and our Job was prac- tically over. Early in September one of the Uonsuls returned from the frontier with the news that an Amerletu Lieutenant har? come down to the frontier post and, seeing an bmerionn Consul there, informed him that he WRS MOUt anxious to speak to me. This Lieutenant had been sent by Lenda to that region to contact mem- bers of the various chains. Since the Consul had to return to Perpignan the following morning, I deioidod to eocompony him. found that this proved to be R wise move and many problems, too numerous and complicated to mention here, were ironed out to the benefit of the service and the United States Government as a whole. I later made several other trips to France, tnivinly to assist in the liquidation of the ohains and also in order to call upon personally many of our key-men and subag.mts I had formerly known only by code names. ? ??.? ?I1 Barcelona Office was also ?ailed upon, after Mediterranean D-day to transport five "bodies" to France, three of them to Paris. This was arranged satisfactorily and after much careful planning, and the record was established when "Artichoke" arrived in Paris three days after having left Barcelona. a Li uldation of Barcelona ?Moe* in December 1944 and upon the insistence of the Ambassador, 1 was foroed to liquidate all SI affairs in Barcelona. This in itself is a ticklish and difficult jot, involving long hours of conversation with *gents who are being discharged, liquidating accounts, houses, apart- ments, employees, etc. All discharged employees were treated handsomely and adequately remunerated so as to enable them to live until such time as they mi6ht ecure employment elsewhere. Those who still remained in jail at the time of my departure were 6tven a ()ash settlement, each on his individual merits, and 1 KM satisfied that all will agree that they have been fairly treeted. In dischar6ing several of my key-men who would be in a position to render services in the future, if we so desire, 1 eAplained oarefolly to them that it was conceivable thut we might desire the.Lr assistance at some time in the future and I made a careful record of their .names, addresses and oountersigns to be used in re-establishin6 contact and these records are in the Madrid office. All files were sent by pouch to Madrid and the more important of those have been forwarded to tfashington. The turniture, with the exception ef the safe which was turned over to X-2, was given into the custody of the Consulate under a State Department arrangement whereby the Department is to get all furniture, eta. left in the Conaulmtes by the various aovernment acenoles 1 T- ?, - --A A r.r.rn%/C?fi Fr Release 2013/09/25 . CIA- DP13 1R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4111110,111.11. ? 41?,.. II a -1410*. ? ,tteir Ule. WO *WO fortunate in not having had bho mOVO of any Of ovr moil questioned, but lied they been, we wove essured that they would at the fiedt MOMt important best, X.,y2p4atmwL1n_Dercelonai Uounter Ompluhage aotiviteo were carried onl on it rAtire14'771t1TV, lOng prior to the time when X-U sent a mah of their own theres Mien the man did arrive, he fcond in establiohed orgenleabloa to take over, together with epproximately 3,00) drOmdultidekod 004414 Rt hie dlopookIt With thio ideal setisup to Start from the reot wRo easy, The X-0 actiet in Barcelona have greatly expended einoe then and it has developed into A *Wit imporbent organisetion. In order to show positive accompliohmeubs he aotivibleo muot be cimiely Coordinated with thome of the Thule Mi681011 end it le hoped that this will eventually be eccomplished. X.11 heo taken over many ex401 agent* end **fp meeting pieces' 41th the oole exoeption or the oentaot with "Artiehokem, whom 1 continutd to oem peraunitily$ ell eteictly X-11 eatiet were taken over by tho, office. lb ws relt thet since hie totivitleo tionovmued 111 directly, move 8o X.42, it *es preferoble for me to tiontinue bhe rtlAblohehip until the time "Artiohoke 'orb Oplati, 1. dkiJ160or utiuet Attlee theMedib 4isuetiD-doy the contro, ex0VO grOrrhe Tiliectiona orrice over bite obaino oteadlly dieintegrabed KU this Punction Wee egenated by Zende's tekm in rranoes Zenda end he mem prooeeded, ea boob they could under the 01140Wilitith0,,O, to call on each individual member or tliidh chain, a000mpanied whenever possible by the head ol the voopcoblve chain, In order to get Pull names, kddrthiOd end it short hiotory of the participation or the oub-atiepts in the aotivitiem of the ohmin. It iftd MIMI that meny of tiled@ eubmagento had done worik which warranted MUNI iAlikb. t WO expression of thanks Oh mi.!' pgrb and itaChitiory wee aet up to *clue to. them some American military decurationD In somo oalies the Vrench muthoritito hove mloo agreed that esetain men ut ours alio deserved Vroiloh decorations. The liquidetion of the chitin* end the awarding of decorations is beinr adequetely handled by Zenda's organitetion aud in December 1044, was prtsceeding et it kietiereotury rate Immediately after the Orman retreat ifi southern Prance the Areater Iiiajoriby of tfic mefsbtirs of our ohains owe out into the open end publioly boasted of their olandeetine activitiel during the UOMim OUOuoktioni in illiony oligeb It Wee neoeseary toe tend* and his mon to vouch tor the vereolby of these claims, due to the e*ot that moony or our theh were supposed, by their neighbere, to havelbeen mildly collaborationists. in Witki Ok404 our intervention woo neoeseary to !mauve the release fro* pH...on or these alleged 400llanorationiste. None oP the members of our chains were pkid a salary em such . we merely pro- videdhem with the nooessery expense* incurred in traveling and gathering intelligence. In caws where kgeftbe did nub hive other memo or income, we odd living expenses for them knd their rodaiiiem, ? nr-IrrwPc1 For Release CIA RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For,Release.2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 , PS lt took rive months end 38,000 penetop to linplloete the lohy Pt:glow betiooe. The die.thekeeesfl i 14 'IMO% I 110.11ti ;10 11M1011 the OIPOOmgt0d0ON end tried three times uhenooessfully. nowevork tI ey weee worth welting rOPI es loom' by the nee uf these bedgem by 011e 4400 in 1.'eotioeis The oviginol dies ono @WW1 or the hopeo sift now in Weehlhemn. 40 sent them to A161916) boothoe with tubs bedgee, to lue need by Algiers' e4e1te lh Fvonue. wol m1,140 tupplle4 the Irreht.h Intellionoe Jervioe with the roloe dumnmehto they requI;ied. OUP etook of fol me downhill*, rubber. etempfli etni are *log now In Oksbiutun OH rlio? No* thwt there existo in aoobinNtun o ;mutton rOP PepPOft duoing muoh turelp doonmente A.d le hoped Isheti ruliueo mIncluau In the field will be oporma theee triele end tribhletlohe end will Utt supplied from Weshinflbun with oil WI* neOoddOPy poPophohelle. Thle WI. , ItOweVelt. pootni n hOliite, Wit) IALyOdb Iii (Alp I I nisi bithoon blmo to send In tu doehington semplue or i4 U dounments he Witi #,OUP., bugethee with oomplete OetkIle 0J3 tb huw ohd where they ore to be used. While (-Mr PepPOdhOLION of identity popmes wee, by nu meeno perfeut, uue in in From, insimbed thet till Watt WOO itootd Of Ot 0001.0neht WON LA: 1'010 lks WO Well OhOU6h un pitae inopootiun Mk begin find perlodio ',tweet oheokel Thot OUP OtWoffithte WOPO pod enour,h fur tido porpmei proven by tho lout ()hot In Nifty itlebehOee they wee,' peeor4ted to PoIioe oithuritire rue ee.volidotl.)11 mid were nob aimoovoeods i io neAb to impoemible 40 reprudhoe ?PiTer UP oovabootid with * wotermoek tiniest; it in dune niatee ideol oonditiono with oli ntoemoory mottriele ond fsoilitlen et fiends Thim oenhut he omuumpliShad ulolidestluely, tilmb lii VeciOtt wheit hhe tleitikpu ue Vle!ty Puiiu? ilMov0Otlid o mon or heillhg 1111140 popeve bbeie ripot ohook tin bho towft whoeo the popoeo wore 'flood tin hove beeh imbued to MI If the home kile; number of seid identity aged weer' regloteved with the proper euth4Atimoy Ir they were hub) than the men Wee leob Add In stony u%metj inoh KO reported by thq AAAKIo. urrendeeo were ohot on thr opot in eollpoon ototiono to eery* +Ito Ieemon to ()there. In order to rorther peobeot one MOW we requeeted the *WHO whloh howgrnto in the Polio- Wines 60 eubmit 'Dote bokon tit rgthdom or ihoiviookkIN who h4o olemn rodords end WerO hOt wontod by the Polioe on tiny ORPON WhoveUeVer 414 Priglik/WaY uolleboree tionieto? The uhoine reeponded to the doll end we eventnelly hod quite o oulleOtIon or eeol nemeeg oddreeeeil deeoPiOlon) KO) lottly Of mon roo6ing from pinup.; to old, tikli end short, blond end hronettos Pert of tfoyoe ilito were lode ovolibble tin Aly,leem end hilbeo The SECRET ? wilk1?01?1_,' nIiifid nd Aooroved For Release 2013/09/25 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 I irat. 4trat," *AIM:4N r4.104,ereitgrXIVP :VW..*-31511.1 from 'hone* aorose the Pyrenees, The greater majority of thee* Van were loyal and patri4io Frenohmen who were anxious to do something tor the eau's. Some were purtioularly anxious to cot to Algiers to join the Army while others were perfectly willing to return to Fran** to do intelligenoe work. Through AdAj and other out-outs with $0044110 to the Frenoh Red Cross, where all plfugesta were regietereti and interviewed, we had access to the mere promiting From:thwart for our purpose. Ono. a MAR had been recruited and we had deoided to send him to Franoe to esteblish a chain, inveriably the first thing he needed were documents - identity papers, travel permits, ration books, etc. We could never hope to *end any men to FrtInoe without pylori which were good otough to kt least allow him to travel to his destination or to where he WAS known end could get others. It was therefore aiosissery ror Itc to provide them with files papers and AJAJ, who it an expert at such things, wca asoigned to the job. A contact it tho Frenoh Red Cross was most helpful in sending us samples of all the dooumente he could oolleot from refugees. These were turned over to AJAJ to have copied. AZAJ had established oontact with ISOMO printers, engravers and the like who were willing to do this work clendestinely. Their prices were outrageous but without false documents we could not start chains so we were forced to bow to the inevitable. I never realised how much work WAS involvod unti1 AJAJ woe arrested and I inOerited this afterouo job. The duplication of * document involved three entirely separate steps. t would give the original to a "out-out", who in turn gave it to an "artist" who would draw en enlarged sample of the document. This drawing would be returned to me for checking as to spelling, commas, periods, etc., and if Tproved would be returned to the eut-outR, who then delivered the drawing to the MAR who :made thelustal engraving. This man would send back the engraving and a sample, and it he hid not made A mistake in the spelling, oto,,it would be sent to the printers, whose job it was to duplicate the piper and deliver tho final duplioctes. This three-40y process, involving checking three time. usually took between two and three weeks. Uncle these men were Nether careless and we were so emoting, I invtriably had to return a manli work at some stage of the precool" becomes he had misspelled a word, left Out a 00011A1 etc. This was exasperating to tv the least but oould not be remedied. The artist, engravers And printers were very nanrNaLant about whether they did the work or not and I couldn't complain too bitterly for fur of their refusing to do the work at all. Aubber stamps were also duplicated and hundreds were required* Duplioate *copies of all doouments, together with the necessary rubber stamps cad samples of how to 040 them were sent to both Allier* and Loadoni Not ono* did we ever reosive any from them in return, It wee a on.-way deal cm' should have been the other way around' k ? fd 2ndA ro ed For Release 2013/09/25 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? gT Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? 4 1 IQ, S 14'.. 14 1-r .? 4 .41, 4q4P ii '. ..i.r 1 I.kr.? .. ..?. rei'kh 4.- 4t.1p4 r" 33 rl.re - "14 3 cre "24 n-P 4'42 3:114,.. :444-74,,V v11 30 4 3 ' 18 ? 9144. IA. e4VF rattittmatii "'V 41p7; 74. the egtots? Por the MAX end HUHU cheins I finklly made arrange- IMAMS for the "oc,mmunioetions oheine contot at the Spanish frun- tier to purcheoe all the neoeresury artiole' and mend them *arum" the frontier end then submitting the bill to me for paymmnt? This Wait a much more ektisfeotory wky of doing things end saved me a greet deal of time. A4 aleo suppliJd the AXAX oilman with two radio tranomitters, *Meth were inotalled in the vioinity or Utreeille. The forwerding of two complete redly trensmitters from liareOlona to Marseille olendeatinely is uo eimple mktter end was k long end drewt out pro. Oeset Fitt I had t cerpentor rake tour "trong wooden boxes for the mein pert" of ekoh set, One set of boxem wam okrefully wrapped in wrapping pkper end merked end detspatohed end the other set despetohed it we liters Despatching eight buxom meant geeing the AKAR herotions. agent eight times .. he in turn geeing the uourier eight times. The courier trensported them to olome to the frontier and they @roomed the frontier, ow by one, olandestitely and by night over the mountains? Onoe t,ley errived safely in Pranoe they were teken to Toulouse, where the night boxer were assembled and "Simon" end "Okotillo", his brother, peaked four boxes to a +suit- e... and left by trqin for Marseille? Upon krrival Kt Mariseille the Oestapo surrounded the station end tearohed everyone, clothing and luggege, but allowed "Simon" end "Oemtillo" to go through the, gate" unoheoked beoeume wo had provided them with Name Vichy Polioe papers and bedgee. lied they been caue;ht they woulu have, of UOUPO9p been shot on the spot, On One 00011410n, a, courier in Peanut Wille transporting some coffee, sugar end cigerettes for the HIIII ohain when the train wes eserohed by tho Ueotepo, but when tho Gestepo came to end mekruhed tha Iuggkge contkining theme eupplies, our man wee nut around to admit he owned the oontrebend, he lost the Supplies but eookped **rely. Peraohute_Proalos It is ih ed most unfolitunetr that we were horartlrlITInit-Vrgenising t ii proomn 1061; before we did. It wk" firit mentioned in ekrIy 10 end hkd we not onoountered so mem diffioultioe, both in Prknoe id in Algiers, we uould 'Ave tied 13 more effioient radio oommunioati no morvioe opepating out of From. than was eventuell 640001 sled. A greet deal of oredit for the work we did k000mplish ie'd6e to the tireless efforts of Morey, who *toted Oki personel lieimoh man between Algiers, Madrid4 London and Dercelonal bringing to eaoh crgenimetion the on-bhe-epot ploturs of the diffloultiem enoouhterod by the ?there, tve finelly got the progrem into working order and in spite or bed weether on Many 0* slot, managed to meke some pereohute drops, inoludiug radio operators with transmitting sets, to tho ARA, OAP end NUM) oheina? &id we been iOle to start thim progrem 6,nr we should loom had mouthern $11.404U00 lite/40.1y ?Ipiketeredsi with radio mats: 1 Pelee Identit Ptiermi This wke,without exoeption, the most tjw ooneuprjz job enoountered in lAroslone.? In 1943 end the eirly part of 1044 e Urge number of Frenohmen were 'moaning er".? ?f? ki? ? ? 441- ""40?10Arteci4444?40../4?Narre:441... SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? 411 ? It was also due to this careful planning and mutual confidence that enabled us to later tie in the WWI, Alla and OPOP chains with the LEAK chain, thus saving these chains from complete disintegration. In January 1944 the intelligence received from the old and the newly established chains started to increase both in quantity as well as quality and reached its peak in Xy 1944 when we received a total of twenty-eight pouches from the chains. During this mopth the Barcelona office also despatched thirty-one pouches to the chains, containing letters on current operations, instructions, etc. .2.212.2signsa It was found in our operations in France that what called wcaTZW,Tqligns' were indispensable and whenever possible an agent was provided with one. By the use of countersigns the only means possible of contacting an agent cut off from us was available. In one case, where we did not have a countersign, almost disastrous results occurred. BORO did not have a countersign with R-18 and when we wished to send "Simon' to contact R-18 in order foi_"Simon' to provide communications for R-18, BOBO thought that by writing R-18 a letter in his, WhO's, handwriting and mentioning several things known only to both of them, R-18 would recog- nise 'Simon* as bona fide and accept him into his home and confidence. Such was far from the case. When 'Simon' delivered the letter R-18 read it attentively and blandly announced that the letter was a mystery to him and that he had never heard of the alleged author of Same. "Simon' was almost desperate - he knew he had the right man but haw to convince R-18 that he camp from us and W*3 not in reality an agent of the Gestapo? No words of argament or persuasion -would change R-18'5 stand and it is fortunate that 'S.4,4on.1.1,-had a sub-agent of his awn in the Mee town. Be went to this sub-agent and explained his predicament and asked if the sub-agent knew R-18. By coincidence he did and he immediately went to R-18 and vouched for 'Simon", thus establishing contact between the AKAK and BOBO chains. P-18 later insisted he recognized BOBO's handwriting and presumed AURO had actually written it, but was not sure that it had not been written under duress and he, R-18, was not taking any chances. This case proves the absolute necessity of having a countersign with each and every agent in the field. In the event of being cut off from the 'home office' he own be con- cacted by roundabout means, but if he does not have a countersign it is very likely he will not even talk to the person approaching him on such delicate matters, much less if his life is at stake. Contact has been reestablished with the OPOP, Baal', BIBI, YY A and OVOR chains by the use of oountersigns and I an quite sure it would not have been. possible had not each one of thee0 people had a countersign known only to themselves and to the 'hamel office. to _EIEEP412.1,V21_2_h_ainas The greater majority of the 'communications chains' iiiFe capaoleorhariizg the traffic of supplies to the chains in France. For morale purposes we sent at frequent intervals supplies of cigar- ettes, soap, coffee, clothing, *hoes, etc. to the heads of the chains to be distributed as they be saw fit. There is no luestion but this was money yell spent and the heads of the chains with exception have fissured me that this service, as much as :anything, kept tub-agents enthusiaatic and wurking. This service of supplias was a problem in itself which involved a great deal of time taking work to buy, wrap and deliver the packagea to - 17 - ir- nr:s;Oitt igrtkIlAsittlfatzT: 1T.Mit,Riq we 8FORFT Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ,0;;;.es.?-on ;i1 3.'4rq? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 1 tit mail for some reason or 'another, the *agent weo assured a reply Would be forthcoming et a lator dete end this promise wad elwaym kept. 14 the ?aim of the AICAX obain partioularl,y thi4 was the rule and rarely did k oourior arrive with k paokao and k letter regarding operetions from "Simon" that he did not return the very next day with a reply to "Oimontes numerous queetione regerding the many problems oonfronting him And his organisation in Promos. The complete filer of lettere to and from "Simon" heve been forwerded to Wkshington knd are in the Registry tiles. Soon after / 'arrived in Beroelone I notioed thut the reports ooming in from the WHO ohein were by far superior in neatness, evoureoy end moro oomplete than those rooeived from tha other cheinis The reesun for this we thet WHO had had **porton** in this type of work and knew how to teleoh his eub-egents how to delood,work I hit upon the idea (for leok of I. better way - due to leek of time and mei:oriel) of photoeteting e series of what we called ideel reporting from the 3)110 ohain, outting out ell marks of identity es to iodation, +otos, and sending oemples of these so..ealled "ideal reporte" to tbe other chains al samples of how we wanted Intel:Ligon?. reported. The reaotion we' most impressive* &Ws of ohains asked for more *opies and we began reaping the good results in the next few monthe, denuury to moroh 14440 when the quelity of ell reporting improved k 049kt deals At about this time Undo started mending um Come printed inetruo- titans, amply illuotreted, end miorofilmed on smell sheets of peper. Theme wire immedittely dtspetched to the oilskins end ell, without exooption, demanded more. They wanted eaoh and every man to seo end itudy,sech individuel report. The results were astounding. rho order of bettlo reporting inoreased by leaps and bounds, As did the train *Oohing sorvioes. It would be interesting to know how many railroid judotione our ()hiking "ooverftl". I km *Lire the n4mber would be rather impremtive. "Simon" assured me on one 000.11i0b thet he and his brother oould not hey.) worked 60 hard and enthulieetioally if they had not belal dO pleaued ut the way the fleroelont ?Moe hendled the, AKAX ohein. They boti- .d the utmost oonfidenoe in 116 end followed our instruotion J the letter, never questioning Any Adoision or inetruotions. We too, on the other hand, never let the* down end carried out to the letter every request they made. It is only under *mob oonditicni that e strong And effioient ohkin lean operate. Post Dedey initruotions were sent +0 the a/liking in oipher and all ohein heads were impressed with the one-.time-pads arm thv were received Slid hid mastered the teohnique. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Nowa - gla ? rdd014.141 end walked right into the trap. Re neglected to look at the living room window and when Luoie opened the door anuesked him, as ir to a perfect stranger although they were old friend*, "Whet do you wants hc still didn't realise anything waa wrong and *aid "hello, Lucie, is Pierre in?" At that moment a Polioeman etepped trom behind the door and It..4.) then realised what whim hkppienind klid darted down the stairs, but unfortunately woe captured by other polloemen awl overpowered. had he heeded my werninge, oe at least have lived up to oecurity rules or gawky. looking At the living room window batons approaohing AJAd's house, he would not have been arrested and spent WV days in jail. he wks very fortunate that we were able to get him oW thet soon. Another man, peening that day, us did X also driving by in Iv air, immedietely notioed the lowered drape and knew aomething Wks wrong, Office ui merits We were required to purohase all our neoeseary o oe equxpmen . The typewriters were rented on k MOnthly bolls, as waa our own private switohboard, whioh was con- neoted to the Consulate mwitchboerd. Doak*, chaira, rum Wel. tables, etc. were Nroheired in the local stores. The doors leading to other Consulate ?Moots wore 'sound-proofed with oork board purohased looally. 104 els? purohesed atninvaluable photostat machine and a comer* and tripod for miorofilming, s6ventuelly we had an entire room Used exolusively tor photostatio and photo- graphic work. This "leboretory" was turned over to X-2 when X liquidAted SI affairs in Baroolona. Corres anden.21.!Lh and Inst.....tions to tItZtAnat it is a talla;710rt*TnIZer thcrrprlriirort 'fflirtri741 a ohairall that is required is to send a man out and merely ait in an ?Woe end await results. To keep a chain Punotioning properly and to obtain the best results Prom its operations, requires the monstent attention and etre of At lomat one individual. And it ie pre- ferable that OAS Mn superviee one ()halt from atort to finAahs - Chains are like intriakto meohaniame which, in ordet to f4otion properly, muat be kept oaretUlly "greased And in trim". Tag psy- chological taotor is by fir tho most important and col agent in the field, usually risking hie lite, will do hie best only if he is eonfident that his welfare, is Also keenly approoiated and his intereet0 prOtetotka 140 the "home oftioe", Also that hill one and ',wry queetion be antwered immedietely and his requeets tor aup- pliee to parry. out his work be attended to without delay. /n the Oircelom4 office X hod an inflexible rule thet a letter from at *gent :Ismer left loty dOkk until each question had been enswered *AA Jecme oonesterit made on romontly received intelligenoes Replioi wore ittantly filled with *hair and SathUSikiM Md preise when it was deeorved. WilOn k question could not be answered by return 4 ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 in Barcelona. We acknowledged as a foregone conolusion that the Police knew w;lo in the Consulate was carrying on extra-curricule activities but what we did do, end successfUlly, was to prevent the Police from finding out who our contacts were. Of the a,;ents arrested in 9arcel0na, no arrest can possibly be traced as huving been caused by personal contact with any member of our staff. None of the 3arce1ona agents of any of the chains had been arrested or interfered with in any way up until the time i left. 6e were indeed most fortunate in this respect and I am frankly proud of this record. Our telephones were tapped by the Germans hild we knew this but as far as the Germans are concerned this was a watOf time. No real nem es or addresses were ever mentioned over, the 'phone. Each agent had a code name and when he hue a pouch to deliver he merely called the Consulate from a public 'phone, asked for an exteneion and, inateud of asking for a person when the 'Rhone was answered, merely stated his code name. Careful atten- tion on our part kept all these numerous calls straiglit and no difficulty was ever encountered. At interesting, though disastrous, case involving lack of security and an e.xemple of how an agent must constantly be on the alert are the following facts regurdin the arrest in Barcelona of AJAJ and BOX on the'same day and at the same plaoe, but at different times of the day. Long before 110110b arrival in Barcelona we were aware of the fact that the Police knew of the activities of AJAJ and since AJAJ end BOW were old pereonal friends it was essential in order to protect BOW that he never be seen entering AJAJ's house. I warned him repeatedly not to go there and a "neutral" meeting place WAS arranged where they could see each other. We had also arranged a "danger signal" to be given by the occupents of the house in case of the arrival of the Police or it it were noticed that the Police were watching the house. This "signal" consisted of the Simple lowering of a certain drape in one of the front living room windows, whioh meant a warning to Stay &Way, On a certain Saturday /kerning the Police appeared at AJAJ's house. It turned out later that AJAJ had been arreuted on the street efter leaving the house. The Pollee deteined Lucie (44..lia'5 wife) and servant in the house, searched it thoroughly and sat down to await the arrival of an unsuspecting sub-agent. It was merely the usuel Police trap. In a moment while the Police were not looking, Lucie lowered the drape and then returned to her room to take care of the baby. BUM that Lac/ming decided that, notwithatending my most emphatic warning tad order not to do even near the house, decided he must see AJAJ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ""..1.4.".".111114.11161711111111111r. ? S ???'' vs to act as guerdi. In other words, the responsibility for the proteotion of this Americen Consulate, looeted et one of the most strategically centered neutral spots in Europe, rested with the OSS -- the Coneulate did not "have Auldn" for this purpuue. Another reuson I think our seourity was good is thet none of my local contaote for the "communioatione ()twins" have ever been arreated. I never met one of these agents on the streets When I 'arrived in Barcelona I immediately saw thet the laok of adequete and numerous sefe meeting 'Acme Wk$ a danger whioh had to be remedied us soon as poosible. This is infinitely more ousy to see then to remedy. Nevertheless, eventually the Baroelona offioo was provided with at least fifteen eefe meeting plums -- opera rooms in. vorbments of trustworthy agents or friends, cure houees, for which in some oasee it was neoessery for us to pay the rent, eto. It was elweys my unbreakable rule never to atop my nur in front of el "meeting placoo" I was going to. ConnequeAly nor ohauffeur never saw exeotly where I went. Invariubly he let me out of the our two or three blocks *Aviv und met me two or three blocks at a pre-arrenged spot in the opposite direction. 1 hid e supply of brown wrapping paper und oord alwaye on hand at **oh "meeting plaoe" und when an uGenb brought me a paokage of reperts, square in shape and wrapped In newspaper, I left the buiL'ing later with a round or oblong paoku6e wrapped in brown wrapping peper. This wau an inflexible rule and neither an agent nor I wan ever seen leaving a "meeting plaoe" with the IMMO looking package the other had a little earlier entered the building with. This Wee especially true in meeting the AUK Barcelona agent with suoh voluminous materiel. In despetohing voluminous pouches to Frenoe the peckages were wrapped first in newspaper and then in wrapping piper, in the 01 flue. Onoe at the "meeting plaoe" the outer wrapper was removed and the agent left the building with a package wrapped in newspaper and with a dif- ferent kind or string tied round it. This method brought several favorable oomments from the agents themselves, who were impressed and enthusiestio about the lengths to which we would go to proteot them. Sines it wan neoessury to see the AUK agent at least three times a week and then on oocasions twice a day, there were four different meeting plume/To *,-here he wee seen in order not to b000me too frequent visitors at the same piece. Our office itself was adequately proteoted under the eonditions existing in Bareelena. We had a strong safe, the doubtful protection of the Amerioai Consulate premises, reinforoed steal filing pabinete and eaoh member of the staff burned his own trash tWi00 a day. Only the necessary real home end address records wore kept. Since our activities reached much a large noale and we expanded so rapidly we could hardly hope to esoape the attention of the local Po1i0e and oounter-espionage organitiRtions existing 1,zry Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 liaison with the Consulate, eto., leaving me time to devote myself ettirely to the French oheins, by that time it was epperent that more secreterial help wee required end ,lueen was sent to inoreese our etaff. She to soon beoame e key-member of the organization and, am the work was increasing every day, she became indiapenouble. The number of oables received and deapatched increused daily and, einoe the most importent ohaine bad been provided with one-time-ped ciphers, ?ode work took up muoh of the aeoretarial help's time. It wls unfortunate that, due to Polaris leaving Medrid, Monte hed to be recalled to teke his pleee. This left 4 serious gap in the Bercelona offioe w..ich could not be eaally filled. Mon,';?, was soon replaeed by Viking who, unfortunmtely, did not prove capable of taking over an/ of the aotivitiom in Baroelona end he was returned to Madrid. He In turn was replaced by Sieti who, elthough inexperienced, had a lot of common Menge and ideas and developed repidly end effioiently. However, end unfortunately again, it was deoided to open 4n offloe in San Sebastian, and :heti we reoalled. Be was replaoed by Bergen, whose extreme youth, heppy-go-luoky way and lack of languages, did not permit me to entrust more than odd job. around the offioe to him, We did, however, carry on and by this time the chains were operating effloiently, and aside from voluminous letter-writing and the despetohing of instructions, did not require oonetent planning and supervision. Rawly in 11)44 we were fortunate to have arrive in Beroe- lona a 100% Oil Miselon man, who aseumed the oil control work entirely and it was also possible to get him a :leperete office and aeoretery. This relieved the atrain on our time to a greet extent and permdtted our uncivided Nttention to the gathoeing of our intelligence. At ebout this time X...2 *lo opened el office in Barcolone, thus greetly relieving us of this time-coneuming work. I shall oomment on X-2/S/ relatione in a sepurete purttgraph. 114 were litter indeed fortuneto in being able to neoure the essistanco in Baroelone of 706, who proved to be extremely helpful and oapable Of taking charge of the offioe during my by then frequent trips to Frenoe. 840011 I believe that on the whole the aeourity of tho Bareera.a"otc7ftroe wee extremely good, We were working under severe haftdioaps and mooh too overworked. The Uonsulate did not have st night watohmen end, in order to proteot our eeeret files end *fee during our ablence at night, it wes nooessery to reOrUit two trustworthy Speniarde, ermed with pietole IooglIy purchased, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 .8 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 411114.# I conditions along the truntiors Tho he uf the uhein was the Polite Oommissioner of Oeret, ond he pruvidod sevoral agents with false doeumonts and border region travel euthoritationi in addition to providing us with 'ample* or Prench duouments whiuh we hkd duplicated in Borcelono, 104,14O1tlta sail" is atou, enthuoiastio Alsatian rooruited by A1tA0 in Horoolottol Liko all the others, he woo oarofully conelderod ond briefed and despatshed, together with #1, 'Jolson agent to provide oommunioatione, to Nanoys his job was to Qum. the Nancy oroe and report to us through the "Jaime II" organisations In order to ocsomplish this we providod lint with A sore "lotter*drop" In Perpignon, from whenoe h$A ponohes would be brought aosely bo Us he tO provide the oosisuniootiono from Noknuy to Perploan Vitt tht, mon who acoompinied him. "Oalw apporentiy built up a nit), little oroolsetiun In Raney and fur A. short time we reoolved enthusiestiu roportm ui hio progr000, howevor, unfortunately "dal" rooruited an %reit of the gestapo in whom he pl000d Poll uonfidonue ond who tWOR botrayed hi. entire ijutj* costing the lives or soverki end the deportotion to olovo laborers to Germ ony or moverol other*, "mai? himmoll barely stooped with his lire, he hod met "Armor" peroonolly in horoelono and by coinoidonos sow him in llyon one day) thereby re- satablishing (towboat with us, I relb at the tithe that the boot thing for him to do Web to join the UP* ohoitt end help "Armor", which he did, providing uourior morvieto for "Armor". This is the short ond trogio history or whot we dolled the Huai" ?holm, It121101110lfrioe OrAonixotiont In egely 1044 it we ne000mory titt*WreIrre po? n ont ol wee briktiliterPed to bilhoo. In Jommory 1044 wo weloomed with open AMA OUP rieht stenoomphie hOlp, 1004, IP*4 was sorely needed ono, fvenkiy speaklni he liereelone wild not hove grown to the proportionm it even- tuefl diii hout her. Uho worked enbhusiketically ono gently end without ono oingle word Of oomploint literally daynight, and Oundoye and holidoyie her leftwago, quolarloations wore perfeirt and, she is eUtieiy b000me o keyemomber or the boroolona Wiles To repi000 SOO, whom, 0)1141100 Wel keenly Nato Montle efte Oppeinted hid this combination woo the most perreob ottoinod at *ny the by the Dorooleno office, Monte oolumed oupervioion ot oil local contoeto, i.e,, local intelligenoe, UYUY, neoemoory ? ei.lr 4' 4.. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 This chain, also known as the "Morere chain", is an old chain which originally operated direct from Madrid with the help of the now notorious "Carlos". At one time, I understand, it provided some interesting and valuable intelligence, but during 1943 "Moreno", the head of the chain, was almost caught by the Gestapo and his place was taken by a sub-agent, "Lt. X". From this time on the quality and quantity of intelligence declined, and since it was not worth all the work required to keep it going, it was discontinued in mid-1944. "Idorere" escaped to the Alps and later made his way to Spain where he was rather a problem- child, and we eventually got him to Algiers. I understand he returned to France (kfter D-day and undoubtedly Zenda has arranged the final liquidation of the chain. It was through reports received from "Artichoke" that we found "Carlos" was submitting WIWI pouches to the SIPM for photographing before delivery to us, thus confirming beyond doubt our previous suspicions as to exactly where "Carlos" loyalty lay. These two chains, developed and operated by AJAJ in the latter part of 1943, never developed into the organizations that had been hoped for. Headquarters for both chains was in Faris and, although it is known they recruited a sizable organization in the Paris region, their oommunioations were weak and it was only with extreme difficulty and much careful planning that we were finally able to contact the OPOP chain through the AKAK chain. By this time "Hennessy", head of the OPOP organization, had not heard fram us in such a long time and had not received any money that he had been forced to abandon all the work he had done and seek a job. Be was beginning to start again, with the enthusiastio cooperation of the AKAX brothers, when the European D-day disrupted his plans. "Souk" lost contact altogether and we received a letter from him through a British chain via London after having been out off from him for about eight months. By that time it was too late to start Over again. This chain, which developed from the left-overs of the "Drop' organization (operated by Commandant Divi from Barcelona), was taken over by the Barcelona office after Divi left for Algiers. tivi had become known to the Police and it was feared he would be arrested at any time. The YAYA chain operated only in southern Franc). in the Mediterranean region, but during the time it operated it provided interesting information on coastal fortifications and Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 - 414i, ? 440' 4:17, 4. ? the BIM chain who wax behind the German lines secured a map of the terrain and charted on this map the location of the main Gorman camouflaged artillery pieces and, with the map in his pocket, started through the lines. While crossing the country-aide he encountered a peasant who was trying to get out of the line of fire and took him along with him. Evidently he told the peasant about his mission for soon after this he was struck by a bullet through the heart which killed him instantly. The peasant took the map from our agent's body and Proceeded through the lines, reaching Allied headquarters safely and delivering the map to the proper authorities. With this map in ha our artillery and air forts* were able to concentrate on the camouflaged German positions and the advance up the Rhone Valley was assured. NANA CHAIN The NANA chain is an interesting example of how close coordination and cooperation between field offices can be extremely beneficial to the organization RS a whole. It is also an example of the extreme importance and, I might add, the vitally essential necessity of the head field office (Madrid in this case) being thoroughly familiar with the operations that are being conducted in the field -- clear down to what agents are covering what areas. The NANA chain was a Bilbao chain to start with but, curiously enough, the majority of the intelligence from this c_lain originated in the Mediterranean area. A single glance at the map will show the absurdity of having reports travel from the Medi- terranean coast to the Atlantic coast and than to Spain via Bilbao. The Barcelona office was ignorant of thin until 361 left Barcelona to take charge of the Bilbao office. Not long after 361 took over at Bilbao I had a meeting with him, and he brought up this matter which came as a flabbergasting surprise to me. Vie discussed in detail all the possibilities about improving the service of this chain and agreed that we could quite easily enlit this chain In two, at least from a communications standpoint, and thus greatly imprc,ve the efficiency of the reporting. A plan was worked out and discussed by 361 and the head of the chain, who readily agreed. I provided him with a safe "letter-drop" in Narbonne, on the Medi- terranean, and henceforth all reports from this area came in ria Barcelona while the intelligence from the Atlantic area remained under the control of Bilbao. The point I am trying to bring out is that, had 361 known absolutely nothiig about what Barcelona was doing, he could not have possibly seen the possibilities of im- proving the service, and no one at Madrid had ever thought of it. Pram this time on the NANA ohain was split into two parts and instruc- tions, MOnfyi Ste. for the Mediterranean operations were forwarded by the Barcelona office. SECRET Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 various sections of this chain. Prior to PITCH's departure to the United States, the Barcena office assumed supervision over this chain. PITCH lel' as his representative in Barcelona a friend and sub-agent, known as "Rossi", who was in charge of con- tacting the courriers of the chain and actually writing letters of instruction to the cha 'Rossi" worked closely with the Barcelona office and, to al.& intentc and purposes, the ZUZU chain received all the supervision and care devoted to the other, strictly Barcelona office, chains. This chain contributed several most important intelligence reports, for which we received congratule- tions from Algiers. ? HIBI CHAIN This is our oldeetchain and one which, although it lost more members than any other chain, provided us with some of our most valuabie intelligence. It was operated from Viohy by agent number 1942-2-5, also known as Vichy-2 and who, by the way, is a woman of approximately forty-five years of age and an authoress. Unfortunately this chain had very poor communications from the standpoint, of speed. It was, however, a chain which could be counted on and reported to us approximately every fifteen days. I tried every conceivable way to improve on the time it took re- ports to reach us, but for many reasons, too lengthy to discuss here, it was impossible. Then, at a very late date, agent 1942- 1942 CMG from France to Barcelona to announce that he could no longer provide the courier service between Toulouse and Bourg- Madame (on the Franco-Spanish border) I decided to call upon the AKAK "communications chain" for help and, although Vichy-2 was successfully "contacted" by Jacqueline of the MAK chain, unfor- tunately a few days later the AKAK chain also crumbled and we wore out off altogether. This, however, happened in July 1944 and by that time their most important work had been accomplished. I might point out SOMA interesting highlights of the accomplishments of this chain. A sub-agent, known as "41", sub- mitted a beautiful report on a landing beach on the Mediterranean which brought forth enthus'Aastio comment from Algiers (this beach was used in the landing) and a request that he make an identical report on another section of the coast. This he did and the re- port reached us before the chain was out off. Only G-2 can ade- quately explain 10,16.t these two reports meant to the successful invasion. After the landing and at the time the Allied divisions were advencing up the Rhone Valley, they mat serious resistance from entrenched and camouflaged German artillery which was causing serious losses and temporarily delaying our advance. 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WI Atmatif pod0T4App 00014044 HT PPATT if fog 0,1-004 '44 5qT4n0 moll/ Pic PP1101JJ Ilivolui41 Jo truTou vuTfiliTguo0 pug quid to, P04000:4T4o "4140 47.112 NT= A= $oviTomod 41Tan000 plow ologq TIT* NTli Ore, p444TWOM044 0,10 0110"51011.40UT 134010014 0110 Poloomp 44MOU A4.4 Ppm uT pl 40-up ano Olf0T41,0TuMmalM0 JatidIn J0 WIWOpidwOOT,1,10110 WM fgur4q0 awilo ie.F4M fpoppopid novo 40[41,44 1444[000 priw Immq411010 uT tamcioTA 04 poluriTaquon uTipto Pm pill* mous wpamm .lows Aan* Paultrogq.puplog #Vrelis* pTp q01144 0110110% 401104M41-ut TcvNe14%* i09,1*T PowillIalo OPP, Mt "0404TITY gmaj wird 10 Rft pil.nquaavd Jollogodo ()Tom 0 IRT* opprAo44 Ism ww mulo oi pus iiro,I9oad pcou olna01,30 ITu Puliquip9Jo qa*Toujo Pilo 0TE169.1i010 Aawytiorwid 'Piot 4140T4*ITU119,10 ()Awl Jno 10 010 cluT 0010T4400P 4ITIfinlaiAii pan 1.4m0TA [woo Mit 04 wr1Ta4A1,11 MnJJ ',111194,tia fupitqn in ring U004 0.1014,1ym 4oupplio Jowl pan wpf4 %ICJ fimpplIplimmoo 'pillow* pun Wici 41-ap0J pooTApad tpsol om. wpm ..Tuedo *A.0110111(6 vita otm OnnitITAI NoTqm IterMAAP411,40 HIT imP0P* payluo com fmm 014 au 04 witlo 'wound lop souumwiti pui 140401 1i0M40(1 wu0T4s31uniumno wit). pol=440.0 ou puo auoorialiN uT wkitvp 4J*0 4 111IM UsjIPLAPIA04d OM eviitilag Jo *1110.1 opt guInt, 940.0.0 tuom 110.1i ruii titIqUaR pualq.linothce 4110 pOp0000 .NJ 101044.1V0 opolva40 until fOOA uToun *44 pus vtril 641114s1440 6610,1441 R4sP mu3 $ 44011444 JOJ 1,TaT Off 0V444 444q 404%00 rail Mt uT Paifollapoiti vpirtmliolo 01 ant-T4a4 04 ma was 01 pooToap 0104 41 104(010 aim un Prvq, luouboaj pm' UOTWOpT0400 in JO$JV loot-awn WM TIA0 pI11011P a* 9uTtplTally ROIOVIOPIP 4DAW J61441 40.10W.Wo Jo oho otil Trok poualmT.1140 mnti* u04OT INPAJ 4410144404d.x. 011oT4110 41441aaluy ftito pg* armithin .4?160TIT*IuT 44004 * '410.10 PQ)1 qw1ai4 119110a111iu ovev iscoqutituil ur UTV40 &WA I ar" C-90001-17001-00011-0000X?1,c1C11-V10 SZ/60/e1:0EZseala -10d panaiddv pue Pe!PsseloeCI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 During "Plats." etey in Deroolona meny problems were dismissed end mottled end it wee plenned thet onus we heti ironed out ell the difttcultite involved ih radio ooingitunioiktion end pera ohatint he would retwei to Frenoe end run the entire ?Hein from Tarbes, trevoling olendeetinely between Tarbes end Letignan. Un- fortunetoly, during his etoy in heroelona "Frits" wee *rreeted by the Spanish polio. And the entire burden of running the ohein fell upon my shoulders. AJAJ was elso erreeted the mime dey, whioh wide tettere muoh worse. X shell uover the intereiting details or these two arrest* under e perearaph entitled "Ueonrity". During "Frits" /obey in Daroelona BUY romonnended e young Freftehman in whom he hed the utmost confidenueime on honest end trustworthy Fren0hisim who wee enxious to do something for the WOO* 1 mot hit ieverel times end hed long ounvereetione with him and finally introduood him to "Frits". "Vette end 1 weed thet this fellow, whom we knot kg "Oeurge Morel" might be eble to *rotas' e new "eommaniouttions uh*In" for H-18 from Tarboi, thus redacting even more the time Won by the Wth '. to treneport the MOO pouches,. After muoh ookohing end providing him with the neeessery dooments end instructions, he Wee deepetched to Frailties 44 heerd ebout fifteen Civil leter thet he hod errived safely et Turas end were delighted to hoar els? thet he had dotobliishod co*Whicktionio direct from Terbes to heroelont end that a tried youth wee already on its way. The pouoh errivod sefely end we deeided to *witoh the It..lrk section of the 11011U uheit ewey from the AXAil ohein end let A-iti use his von new ootturtuniotitiunsi reierving *the AXAk uommutioetione is on emergenoy. "Ueorge Morel" roturned to Spin ebout it month liter to report personelly on eonditions irt Tarbes ando efter * short stay in Deroelone, returned to Vroinoe to egoist RwIti in 601tDiritig more intelligenoe. UnrOrtunately, goon lifter his arrival in Frew)* he wee murdered under very mysterious sircumitenoie and whieh ire still t mystery to this deli It fell upon me to break the news to his fiancee in Deroblona end when I ealled upon her, the beeree or wed tidingep she entiounoed teerfully thht he Mother hid just passed amity elloi thus lowing her oompletely *lune MI the world, with her Fether whom eh* rarely sew Re he is e Otpteiu or a Openish ship. $oon sitter this the new 1146 Noommuniouttione ohtim" established by "Oeorge Morel" bogan to breek down end it wee neeveeery to revert to the AXAK,s for help. The H}1 oliiin unutioned up until the end and 1 hams 10000, assure that individuel members or this ohain did velueble work behind the Oermen lines after tho Mediterrtnetn inVe4i0A, The lest X sew or WHO he Wee working for Untie on the positretioft uf the still eAisting Geroota pookots it Mt. Nikkikireo Larionto oto* Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ?^.?? _ ? ? r. liMmted to talk to him at length *bout the possibility of rekdio Ocomunication and the newly born parachute field program, per- alaSion was granted and he arrived in Bercelona on February 9, 1944. Although his health had not yet been impaired, it was readily motioelable that the strain of working indoors and at night had taken its toll and we were all glad to see hin *gain and to make his atay Lb Bercelona 44 pleaeunt and restfUl as possible. At ebout that time I had taken 4 l*rge house in which, tnstalled on the seoond floor wee "Franolsook the radio operator, intercepting the Milloroe/lAadrid oomPuliostions or the Uermans and Sp knish Military, and where it 444 decided "h4ita" should without'atay since it would permit us all to oongregate at one time undue riak, and reap the benefit of hoering "Fritz's" personal rGport on tienditions in Franoo. This sit-up worked perfectly and long *nd mutually beneficiel hours were spent in discussions au to fUture operations. Pairing "Yrits0" stay in Barcelona a rather unfortunate incident happened olose to his headquarters in Perpignan whioh. for Alture seourity reasons, Jedruir the moving of his headquarters to Tarbes. This W43 done but e same time it involved a new problem of setting up an entirely new oommunications chain Pro* Tarbes to Barcelona In order to avoid the delay of routing the l" to Baroelona via Narbonne ou the Mediterranean coast. This proved extremely diffioult and tor the time being it was teoessery to ?all on "Simon" of the AKAK chain to provide the communioations servioi via his steedy and effioient "oommunications ohain". This turned out satisfactorily and no undue hardship I 144004 002 the AKAN ohain as a whole. While this set-up was far from ideal from an organisational standpoint, it was never- theless essential that *a do It at that time, and Justified for the first itme our original "trouble..shooter" idea of uaing "Simon" to patch the breaks. It was later destined to be of even more value: With "Pram" in Baroelona and his prinoipal agent, R-18, tor central end southwestern Prance looted in Tarbes, and with the Mediterranean organisation and communiomtions still intaot, it W44 decided to split the hOW organisation into two chains with the ointrel and soutwestern headquarters ane oolleoting place at Tarbes servioed by th* AKAR Ocommuniwition4 chain, and the Mediterranean area with headquarters et tesignan in charge of "Cisoo" and using the old BUBO "eommunioations ohisin" Vi4 Narbonne, Port Bou (Spain) tor this section or the ohain. This plan not onloved on the rapidity of the reports arriving in Barcelonay impr er nt but also separated tWO 744.14 each as a "subi.heed", who we aagonistic, towards eaoh ether. -,4 ? '41h -7,1w Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 IL z a ebb 4 whale. I tkught hiM how to ust donble trot's.) isition olpher, thou providihg 4 dkre tadV of nommuulumting nsmef2 and mddressee to hist, 4nd he left for Prone! that some- month. Thus the AAAR ohaln wake born. Wo goon ?44411sed that MVP hod uhderestimoted "Simon's" capabilities and thet not only Wks he +acting me "troublemehooter" but W*4 building up * 4114ble omit' or hls owh Whioh woo destined to become the moot efficient ond volueble ohnin wo hod. In J4hUory 1(044 "Simon" (lolled tor help in hondling the fast growing orgonisoti4n. Ohd we despafohed him brothgr to loranoe to %saint hi*. This team work goon bore fruit ond the AAAA chitin cohtinued to gPtiot until, eventuolly. In NIMV id44 we were reoeiving Ithree voImminous pouchey from AKAR g week, withone and 4 blot omy's service betwitten Toulouse and Baroelons, k distmuoe or approAlmetely 40 sales. The AKAii "communioations ohoin" W114 eAtieptiottenx lorriialeitt, kilti I laavo Wit! greo(.est admirotion for the outstanding work done ky the rive men involved In trstispurtifle, the pouohed .'4.#4 paokageg gg lst.ge kit two shoo boxes) from Toulouse to Bkr4010n4 in auoh 4 /Mort time' it lo olmost unhellevible that iiinbh k great emount of intelligenot traveled to ropidly without ono single break, it it alio interesting to know that this Doottunumi.. elation* Ohile id *till JfitkUt kid (Jan be utilised whenever desired. up until this time the AXAR ohoin hod functioned *lone and had not orosted path. with khy. of the (Aber UJ iii We were holding the ARAR resouroes 44 411 emergency in the event *Iv other ohtin booime out orP by the irrest or4 V11141 link in the communi* 04tiOne route. It is interestihg to know that the ARAh Main alio had two odditiohil OomMutioittione routes whioh oould he used th th emergenoy and ih the event the originil ufle got out. Am / eholl point out later in this report, the Paot that the met..up of the ohkins wag suoh as to allow gate in4Jerweeving or the ohoins in kU emergency, eeveral oP our most Important uheins were solved it a time when events were moving Not ih southern Fronoes MAO (MAIN Although the WM ohain W44 operobing efficiently In SO 4 1044* ?Wits% the head ot the ohain, W44 uumpiniiiing of ovorftwork, that he heeded a *hinge otatmosphere 4fld that he w*nted to sft o to 8pain to consult with tieon Puture operation*. It should be pointed out that sPrits" was wanted by the Gegbppo. hiving *swiped fro* them twice, and 'Viol Oleo wonted by the Smash polio, tor hto parbielpdtion An guorrilla sot:tattles on the Repub. liven eido during the Upshish Oivil Wtri 81no, we had Nitre milling or etting hi* from Perpignan to Baroolons, and we pHrticularly Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? ..4144mgm.? ? ? 4 ? 74'1 Weal Iftt!jjAgeftool In late IWO we hod In horuelono two orohlisaMlInorione /WM ond 111Y "601111116 Niings" whloh wore doing striotly looal Aek work+ Within the limitablone ur time available fop this *11 important work we worked 411 olooely 48 possible with our holpfUl OM mogt uouperotive nrItlah uountorpon, Sinoo the zutroelofta ortioo had had hu por000nel to ov.eom.index gikrarkilty the onormoui *mount of loumi A-L motorist omling in evevy day) ono or oho Pirst thing* 1 sot doom to do W44 to ectoblish 4 Wird'qfidOX or all tho uktel mentioned in the potiono) thereby making order lt of ()hooey Thie 1 mno mged to du little by little end ovor * r -lad of soveral monthop in my "spore time", The lm- portanoo ol Ail work otkl the time dodiumtod to lb bort; f:suit at M loter dote with loth, ieneotional (oa for ma out' luoal opepotlouo were oonvorfted) reeLlts, ond led the Britieh bo ounoult no un X.41 matters move than theor had In the pooti Pitoh oloo developod io kkkIl but very. efriolent X-P oponlmotion In limFiuslono whiuh filled the gape in the AdAj and 'MI organixotions. We oleo had at the time 4h organisoblun known 4./4 bhe daimio?I "gang" whiah reported mainly on movements In the port of A*is Shipp,g and also mottle oil oontrol mottevoi Spenish politioal reporting Mild) to o small sktont, oeonomio reporting wee done by. BYtir who, by the *toy/ ohould still be ih a vory good position tu oontinue this some work ir ollowod to do sok wahainswo At tho timo or kty arrivel ()hove wore in reality only two ohaima tunotioming - tho /0110 and WV ohaine, Tho ORO and OPOP ohaina had %Nit boon etertod by AdAd) who handled bhom tem*bareelona, but Wily morel soon out off knd Horror devolopod i*to tulloriodgoo ohainsi the DUMOP a i organisation) olthough or queitionoblO voluej wai Mi 'l oxiir5enoos Peaukinkrtork of tile IOW ohain wIn PerpIgnan and thou* ofthe lila ohain, lh Viohy. OomiAioatione with the MAU ohain wero adoquato ot the time) but a littlo to slow. The eame applied to the 11111I oholni whiuh woe eve* dowers Al ti m# wont *ft both thee* ohaine Improved thoir 00munioationi) thoy on tile 1414410 eide end we Oh the Uponloh lido) witil we wore satiefiod that We wore rooeiving the report, Me quieklly ao poseiblo within the bouftde ot all important seouvity* MAX OUA1N Is D000mber4 lio43 plans were oompleted to 'pond "Ulmon" to Pram,* to abort a small ifttoillgoftoo ohain of hie own but) linos wo oonelders0 him oft exoeptionelly oepahle mono hie MOin Amotion *Oa to kat ko "troublo.ehoover" tor the obhor ohoins ond to help repair break? in sommunioatiOna end improve tho solivluo al 0,.:4n4,4 , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 a. -6,".0141 : 0441 etoplvees travel on a bout with . mby a more oolnoidenoe", identioal medloal oortiricateo. Allthat io noeded is tor ono. ,DO. liardie patient to become known ao fAh osa man to unoover ill the row: USAA6 the SIMS oertirioate. All personnol ohould be told what Jo ropired ilt the way or a modlobil oertitioate *lid they *hould go out and have it done on their own. Medioal cer- tificates are oarertilly ?hooked end oopied - at loaot when trot- veling on noutral ship., Akdridi Upon arrival in Madrid 1 round that during my trip to thrnaloula, Siliy had hkd to leave Madrid on *hurt notice knd Polar was la ohargo. It did to take me long to too that what WS* needed it Madrid wag not 141 order of' battle expert. but rather a big Job was to be done in the field to gather more intel/igenoe to oreate enough work In Madrid to make it worth while Nioting it mth dedioabe all his time to order or battle. On ArGus. and Folkr's order* X proceeded to Daroelona together with 300 and his wire, Who hippened to he in Madrid at the time. sThen I arrived at Daroelou* on September 30. 11043 obl"irTutiriliaironk orrice oonsieted of only 300, 301 and 6uOto wire, without whom our work would haviv been more sorionely hampered? The work PAIS distributed ts rollowss half of 3til's and tlmt wal to be dedioted k to oil control (.& most unoatisraoLory end oom- pletely unworkable oet-up) and 660o t.lme entirely to U60 work. We hkd one 'mall room, approximately twelve root by' thirteen feet, tor the Pour of us, in tho Uonoulate. The mot-up was most unoatisractory rrom Ai seourity otandpoint, wino@ it Intl' n000ssa* for Us (end our vloitoro) to peso through the propaganda eoetiOn's public rekding room and the private ortioe of the head of the OrOpaganda Notion, whom, there were invariably too many people for our peace or mind. Rowavor, that le the best that oould be arranged with the Oonoul Mineral who we, to say tho loaot, pito antagoniotio towtrde our oven being there. We had two deoks and two tables and numorous shelvos oft US walla to hold photographLo and photostat maohlne equipment and, althOugh wo were very crowded, it did nob hamper our work boo muoh. kt soon book*, apporont that I oould not do juotioe to hoe the Oil Miosion work nor the OSS work. Prior to that, on 1010,-Ocoaoloo, it had boot n000seary for me to drop the oua *oek is O1 ri4 tour oti000asivo daya In ordor to ohook Al ship and inatallationsp ogrood at the timo tiiato in return for my working eaoluolvely ,nittors, 301, wiis to work excluoively on oil oontrol, It is .at the vootiou to try to vont, intolligonoe ohains whioh Nair* 4A1 time work and careful timing, and do other work whioh oitiontlt,roquiroe Pull time for several dive in ouoaesolon. a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? t4. OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, O, O. ? April 20, 114S TO* Ohiet, SI wjvtk3outive Orflooe, St PROMs A. Odott Lookwood OMUTA Field Report lt had been originally plonned for ate to go to tha Oanary lelknde and I wits almost rekdy to deport when thie plan was changed. The Ambaddador in Madrid hkd expeedmed the odviiability of having oft order or bkttle experf dent to Modrid tin iteit, and, sin?. I woe ready to logy**, it 'mg deoided thot I 'should ttend the better of batfle oourot et (lathy Ritohlet Thim I did and finally Sailed roe Liebob on September 3p 19406 POVOrs W "(River" WItg thut of an Attkohe to the bmbkosy ift !Skald and * member of the Uil Miasion6 The orrongement Made with the State Deportment hod been that they were to poy me the atandord aklary for the job, but without the oust or living allow- ance, rent ollowonce, oto* whioh go with the job Mild whloh, ?.1"1 the many staged of registering, digning popeed, etot it the State Department, marked me immediotely oa m non-1003 State Department AM end aany emborrkeeing questiond hod to he anewered in Ote non- tioamittal a *Iv- a4 possible but whioh, in ally event, could hot poieibly stop tongqed from wogGing# Ir 0t 011 humanly poisibles mants "cloverlijob ihould not differ in any reopeot frOm that of other employees,khd from the deourity stiond,iolut his work mhotad be greatly facilitated by kllowing him to pesoont it "solid and impenetrable Profit", empeolkily *mongol; ills fellow employee!** Thii hoe 'tot been the dace in too many inetanotla in the pket end has been tit ?one-bent vire** or emborroommenb and needloos, dangerond goisio At that time it was the oumtom of the 008 to IiY its personnel pr0000ding UVOWNeite hove thole innooulkbione ond "dilute d*hi by the Army Mediol offioar abbaohed to the uau and then, In order not to have o civilian leave with it army medical oertifluate, arrengements had boon made With it looal dootoe, * De6 flardina td %IWO medioal certificated inetead* What happens In prachidl is that altogether too many people live Washington with a medioil liertiribetei identical in every peopeob, signed by "Or. Hardin" and it is ekelly ouncleivable tio have two or more anppumedly unknowo ?????? ? ? _ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 716 711. Goa'. 4". if:14 ? nromi SUBJNOTI April 28, 1946 Chief, 21 Viso Ittecutive ektioer, Preak T. /Van A. thett Lockwood - Pield Report The atteohed is 411 obly written report outlining the operational carried on during sub.. jeot'e stv in 4ptin. Oubject will rewein ift Waehington to teke up duties with the Xberien Demk. 7 1. Attaohment Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4. ??.- % ? 't ? ? suipmrh .!ield newt w Alexander 8. Lockwood I ? ?? tallied at length with 8ohools and Training Bransh regarding his praetioal experiences and diffieulties. You will no doubt be impresmod, as Isms, by the fast that loch of our early instruction actually "prov.ed out" under field oonditicns. : ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Owgt ,OPiltfiVIMRZPV - , ? ? e:'.h e. 71 4 ? -Pr?I'ntr.Filk0944VtliratttlWirttliPMNE-?4141".""-... ^,.t.J.".E.0111Affy-0.--...iltU".1. ....-644%41f...47t0e0-.540.44.1A5W-016frP,V1:7e. DOM Mw 1640 Th. hold ',opt tof Mr* tooftemew to mutt/MAO 1w:with* Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 I ? - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4%41.4 , , - ? 4 . ""'"U:':.-P1- rtf.:%v.irizlok TolV ceret ) ? s " Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 IV: RBCOWIN4ArIONS, Xn this case oondltlons In the field which alight be ImFroved and apeolfio dIfficultles encountered may be treated as.one item. (1) Xf at all po oul be ssible, 4 oables a better moans of cable delayed oommunloa- tion shd tbund. Sending through the BrItIsh in BIssau often means that message Is (2) Lette more than two weeks. r pouches sent vlaArproved to be 4 44tlet40tOry J444ftr Or autintalnitg oontaot with the home offloe. Lk:waver, it must be mentioned that the method la far from safes Inasmuch as 4 pouch snt tram Solana to Aocra Is directly handled by at least four people havIng no connectIon with our organIzation e . . (3) Were another man to go out with my former ?over, he wouid encounter oonsiderable doulty in writing hls reportss Inasmuch as existent iffl ng accommodations afford no privacy whatso. (4) it Is a simple matter to obtaln of ever these are undeslrablesprlmarilys they are of 4 9ulte low intelli- In general alUbs.ag.1 *1 au ndesecondaril yoh, bt , because thelr only interest MOneys Real trust can be placed on verz. is uese Gu few Individuals in Portguinea. Most of them are the lowest of all Portuguese. (6) the cover provided me offered no freedom not oentrall,y located Ibrerrt , now that the oap l ita has moved to , Els,sams and very little reliable intelligence Information aan be ob- ',talmoid there. hing fin:nobs to Bissau, and Bolaisa roe:pelvis only back-wash. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 _tiro I 4- e Memorandum ? UNITED STATES G TheDirect:616 64 OVERNMENT SEC, a T /(?, c, , 425 Cer, Si Report on Assignment in Portuguese Guinea I. WaRB STATIONED: Departed U.S.A. is 9 Vey 1943 Arrived Bolama, P. G. - 22 May 1943 Departed Bolama, P. G. . 21 December 1944 Arrived U.S.A. . 13 January 1944 II. WORK UNDERTAKEN: The purpose of my assignment in Bolama, Portuguese Guinea, was to make a full study of that colony. III. .15.11.2LDcNit: During the nineteen months spent there, it vas possible to obtain an almost complete file of background material including reports of a hydrographical nature in the Bola area, topo- graphioal maps of the Bolama, Bissau, and Fulacunda regions, produotion figures and facilities of strategio produots4, road studies from Bolama to Gabn, Portuguese Guinea ha.rbor faoilities, land-plane and sea-plane lahding areas in tho oolony, etc. In addition, a filo was oompiled of important personalities in that region. This included not only suspected and known enemy agents and/or sympathisers, but also Individuals engaged ha intelli- emcee operations by the British. it may be said that over 90% of the information reaching the Washington *Moe during the period May 1943 to December 1944 on this speeltis reglen. was seat in by myself. DATE: 17 February 1946 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4. ;) ? ;'''?`..V4:1.? ? - : Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 1111,00*Vai' 9govrabioylepolg36.0-4,eNO3,--..*,.,-,witoppika"valmr,:re.-amVitt: riNr SECRET (3) mitin I was etationed at c1for? Xp roonany observod an fabt;0- luto lack or loaderabih ih the k.0, PranoY Pc.r4S.M. Yrahoa? Diffioultior.?......,_ _in the t4olti. found it almoot empoomible to rot doilO*I.vinr e'lliotod mon oro- . moto4* At }lariat)? Londoh Hqs. eniletod mon holdihr loon important ,itibo Wein, rapidly prorot.fi. /r conclusion, boliovn th3 Ot;3 is doN -...nitathle work, but 1 *novo more oaf) bo a000liloliahod with Power persohno] and loan woattnr of morey, SECRET :41.101ftlgal4tyreftgigkittik?I'Ais00, , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 "1"""41?11?011111.1.111111118m.... _ Az - f. I tEen o receiv Ponter/Ier t el orders from Co) Bruce t estanlish a base at \ O assist Alle'n Dulles in every way possiblhe e was to handle radio messares, prov bas ide housing, ...bed, t O. T ransportation, courier service t'nd surplies for OSS peraonteI 2r. Dulles. This was done.. As X was the only working for Arurican officer or dLty in this twn I aided Aerioan aviators o m ess- cap!ng from Switzerland, and arrested ardsent t Nesarcor V.S. Amy deserters' erd 4VOLS. (b.) Ithen the 1st Yrenoh anced to tl-o Rhine, I moved thia base to y adv colfort where the same work was done for :r. :'ulles' nission. After the fa14 or the ere prorTt cont Colnar ;,00ket I wi moved th Pasl e base to iegenheim whset th oaf; In e was ver easy. As German was the pre- vailint lanz-uage of this area, I sqlcol to to releved by an officer who could sneak German (o) Conditions in the field which mirht bo improved. ....?... ,...............,........? (1) /ore careful recruitinr for the field. There was an excess of personrel in particular an,onr officers of field, or simulated field, gmde. Sore of ti-ese men were obviously poor officer material. Others.were "eager , Leavers" witb no practical oxoerionce. Still others 11.11eared to be interested prloarily in havinE a vood tin o or gettinp thomdelvos promoted. It is believed -that only blet of excellent or superior alilities should be retained in this ,erganization and,all others discharged. No men at a/1 Is better than an unre-. ., Able or weak 0,YS mstn. This organization can accoAplish more with 1t( (2) Discipline. Lack nf discipline in the fis hampering the Accorttplishvent of the OSS misslon. It is believed that discipline esn he km- proved if *11 persortnel are tekon into the Army or all nre returned to etivilian ...?? status. Also discipline it the field wou/d he Improved if transtressors were PratPtlY punished. - ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ?? . ,..-,,,,,,, 4?,, -.. ..i ,.. , .. ..?..., . .:.;:...t., vP,1447,4 et .., 'c 1 '.;' '"? - 414' -...' t : 4 .' ' !, - ..., he ..?N -, i _ :r,',,o4- -':It. .." jillk**VIIPt4ItS1' 41V '' .- 311e .a..11,...' ... pavc. ....,.... .?i_itt.';'.?..i.ei ': = , a:2 irlt,2?TrIlatt.',1146.", ,4...-4.:E.,---7.',2c4-Ale Major Liimon is at present on terminal leave. He is gettin out of the Altly. Ixpects to be out about the 20th, He is in Nriw York at the moment and today oun be reached through the Barclay Hotel. After today hs will be in t he country. This information I got through Mrs. Hood, 61, who oallod Major Thurlow who is Major Limon's brothel& in-law. Major Thurlow is on igx. 2642. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 - ? ? A, ?-11114, 46.* ? rig,. L., Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 TO: Captain Harrison T. Barrow PROM: Lt, Colonel Cha.eles Brebner SUBJECT:Report of Activities in the Field Reference General Order #63, karaFraph 3, dated 18 August 1944. (a) Zile undersigned is ExecutLve Officer of the SO Branch, Lonaon, and as such luls .1( Luties in the field beyond Staff visits to Army Detachments. (b) Progress of work of tlico 1,ranch, ETO, and its achievements are covered twice monthly in reports initia- ted by this officer at his permanent station. (c) At the present time there is no indication of conditions in the field which might or should be improved. It nas been normal policy procedure to take immediate action on the reports of field peraonnel and to immedia- tely effect desired improvement. (d) This officer has encountered no specific difficulties in the field. -rg7 CtiARLES 3REDNER Lt. Colo:lui, Cay. Executivs Officer, SO/TO 1st Ind Operations Officer, E3012173 Q Bidg.Washington,D.C. 4 May 45 TO: Captain W. B. Kantaok Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 2nd Ind Repots Office, Secretariat 7 May 1945 To: Director of Strategic Services Forwarded in compliance with General Order No. 63. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? .? .4. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 %minnow- AcitV .0?41t.,??~441oLowEb?b=????-?....,_ 7*? ?r, " AEU IR 14" s thp rtnotIon of en1i1t4,.1 L,en nor fnct thnt nttnono,. -,to un army win, have to work with or.11vtod mon. rofiomilondatIol; Is not that all olYlliann n llotitnnant thl! agenoles sand1n.7; elvilIana to work with Rriot tF3Lto,-otiolr ou rr hmndling of the rctter. MY FINAL REACTTON TO this report I have listed some criticism:1 of u;'). I si!oul0 like to emphasize that I roard the:;e 144 minor. Tho tho$:t. thine I ran Into Wes the $car-ant-Ian": ttticlo of too mibn. I have seen operations bionked beeab,ile' An IJIMvIducil CAY,Ildnno In them no porsona1 p:ain or credit. I.lavo soon oivt1Imin more interested In collecting oouvonirs 0)1an In doin A Joh. Thor; we too !Web scheminr; for personal agil:randl.zomnnt end not onnqh !'or t ecutin Min war. or olnonrmty wits _ am vr.174:: linvpy to have onon ioocInto'i w'th I Am thatilaul thst I found work to do while In tho ora,anl7hfl,.), snd thgt 1 wns oxtremoly busy durInp: my oIllt NionthvI iwrfulco. no th0-, many CiViiitrIS In both O rind In 0 we, pr, f.'ort nun too who- ther from pr,roonnl c1)olco, I cqntot thinR OS: 11,3c1 inrInite poutibli I tins ror 0,00d nnd erf'elotIvn v; .% rim I . ooif1i dcI1t (lint the or,-1,Ani7ption win reniiro the!lo ? ??' I 1.1tIov. ""Inn11Nr. If' 1 had it to in ovor er-,Aino C,1:I t.tin r atIon wl wrint to work. ?????,., 0- es ?_1,, 1. I ? /?4,4?., ? lt or 1: p lun nTi ? t, rtitilty:V+ F*4'4Sd.. 41:Z?1 t " 41,1C ? I? ? *-. .L5?,.: ? ? _ : ? ? ? ? , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 '? 4-* ? ? .411.?"4"0.11,4?40%,... -4-- ? ? ????????? ? fi,ghting?" "What German units have the Russians identified as rea,fighting on the eastern front in the past week?" "That references ...have Germans made to daemical warfare in the past month?" "Please send us daily a summary of every broadcast made in German from Rus- sia." Requests of such kind we met in addttion to our routine ser- v4ices. Hellschreiber too, began to send formal notifications of changes in rationing within GermenS the extension of some coupons, the can- celling of others, changes in travel restrictions, etc. These re- strictions, usually announced at night, were to appear in German newspapers on the following day. We sent them immediately to our white and our black radio transmitting stations, and these would $i go on the air with them, .telling the Germans in detail about further re- strictions they were going to be subjected to. Since these restric- tions would be verified verbatim in German newspapers cm the follow- ing morning, our radio transmissions established AKIMMUMIMMOMIX AMMIAMWRIMMIAMMIV in the minds of the Germans a confidence in the mews carried by 'those staticns. MY RESIGNATION With four enlisted men as editors, all oC them capable, conscien- tious, and genuinely interested in doing a job, my editorial help was no longer needed. The responsibility as chief of the unit was merely one of receiving requests by telephone or teletype and assign- ing them to one of the editors; keeping peace in the monitoring fanily, not difficult even though the-,e were twelve britishers work- ing as monitors; and seeing that supplies and equipment remained at /Ththe peak. Lt. Charles Hoffman, Who was attacl'ied to the section, of- fared to take this over inasmuch as it involved no writing. Colonel Powell, when I approached him on the subject, indicated his willing- ness to accept my resignation if the section ran anoothly and met all requests for one week while I was absent. Consequently I took a trip into Germany, where a forward detach- ment of our monitoring section was working with the First U.S. Army, and to the 1iinth Army headquarters, whom we were supplying with in- formation by teletype. Upon my returnI found that both Colonel Powell and Mr. Alfred Toombs, OSS man and chief of intelligence, were satisfied that the monitoring section would run without me. Mr. Toombs urged me to stay to do the type of work being done by Mr. Padover and Mr. Sweet, both OSS men, but since this would take me beyond the cessation of hostilities, and since I had already been gone from my firm longer than I had stated on mr. Bodfish's assuran- ces, my re Agnation was accepted. ASSIMILATED RANK Upon joining OSS, 2 was told that all civilians would be given an assimilated rink of captain, simply for the purpose of protection in the event of capture by the enemy. I worked more with OWI men than with OSS men, and OWI seems not to have the same impression as to the purpose of the assimilated rank. At any rate, almost all the On men with whora I worked outranked me by far. Enlisted men, although they regard all civilians as just that, civilians, invariably aski "What is your assimilated rank?" There is no doubt that they have more respect for a lieutenant colonel than for a captain, even though that rank my be only assimilated. Per- sonally I regard t4e Whole thin as unimportant, but one cannot deny C.a.kir 1, Annrrwpri For Release 2013/09/25: CIA- 00001R000100410006-3 J f ? Declassitednd Ap?roved For N ? - Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410um-0 ...0111Nter SECRET eT4oticons Divisions. When the Germans staged their counterattack at sAvranches in aft attempt to cut Patton off from his Normandy =suinsly lines, we had nightly bombings by the Luftwaffe. Although this was disturbing, since our work was done mostly at night, the aitoring section managed to deliver all its reports, aad on time. en teletype communications broke &yin, we delivered them by cour- er. I cannot praise too highly the work of the enlisted men in 'V?aik Areetion. We were alone in a nall Nonnandy field, about two lea from the Third MRB Company. The men worked without sleep, With only X.-rations as food, through bombings, and did it enthu- elastically. THE:TWBUTH ARMY GROUP HEADQUARTERS After-40 had been at Beauchamp some four or five weeks, the Third APB Company, as well as the Second MRB Company, was recalled to the TerreIrth ArOy Group Headquarters at St. Sauveur, where Colonel C. R. Powell was the Psychological Warfare Officer. Mr. Miller at first ,refused to return with his half of the monitoring section, and later received Colonel Powell's sanction to remain with the Third Army. My half of the section was attached to the monitoring section cf the Twelfth Army Group, whose chief was Mr. Gordon Cole, an OSS man. The editorial work was now carried on by a Mr. Keiste Janulis, OWI, by Pfe. Amgott, and by myself. Besides the voice and Morse monitors we had brought, this unit possessed ten voice monitors of its own and a Hellechritiber, which received transmissions from German news- paper agencies to German newspapers. This unit, rendering 2 urgely the same services we had previously given in the Third Arr7, c-ntinued to function as such from St. Sau- veur to Laval to Versathes tc Verdun. At Laval the propaganda saa- lyeis cane to General Bradley's attention, and he demanded a copy of It each day. .Circulation of our Allied news bulletins steadily in- creased, many of the corps and division headquarters remimeographing them to reach more of their troops. It is anazing how scarce the new!, -f one's own and other Allied units is in an operation of this kn aad since we monitored not only voice broadcasts but also the Associated Press, the United Press, and Reuters, our publications were literally duvoltred. NEVi ORGANIZATION Shortly after reaching Verdun, Gordon Cole was transferred to Operations, and A eiste Janulis became chief of our section. This ',gain left Pfc. Amgott and me the only editors, and we returned to our fifteen-hour daily stint Meanwhile, Janulis had asked for a transfer to SHAEF, but luckily before it came throu.3h, we managed to secure from the newly arrived Fifth MHB Company three enlisted 0 men with training in journalism. This relieved the pressure on our editorial staffs alad when Janulis was transfered to SHAEF and I boome head of the section, we still had enough editorial help to meet all reo(uests handily and on time. Requests from sourcen such as SHAEF, G-2, (1-3, Eagle Tac, Lucky Tao; as WO 11 aM from our own intelligence and Operations divisions, been.now te increase. Such luestions as these were common: "What 'bay. the Germans said abott the fighting in sucL-and-such a sector?" Allied units have beer tdentified by the Germans in tne past fOrtleeient hours, and on what sectors at these supposed to be nVOI _ PplAaSe 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ,.. ? ? 1.? ,.'. e Upon my arrival in London in May, 1944, I was well received by , : -.033 *d told that a series of interviews with various people would ???i% '-cletarMine where I would beat fit. My first interview, with Mr, HeitArd Baldwin, seemed to indicate that my background of German and *ditorial work would be of use in the publication of a German I 4 magazine then in the planning stage. XY second interview 11,441 with Captain (now Major) Patrick Dolan. His first question WAS "Who recruited you for OSS?" When I an- swered? 10. Bodfish," his immediate retort was, "That certainly it. no recoimendatian for you. How long and In what capacity had - you known him before he recrutted you?" I told Captain Dolan that - I had never even heard of Mr. Bodfish until I received his wire asking ma for an interview. After further questions regooding my ,. background, Captain Dolan informed me that I was to be on a combat ?,::, team which he was organizing, intimating thatI had no choice in the matter. In subsequent interviews with Colonel Whitaker and Mr. Oechsner, t 1,, I told them about Captain Dolan. They aaJured me that the Captain ,:),....- "meant well," and urged me to ignore Dolan and to join a combat team, In both matters I followed their advice: I joined a combat -, team and compler;ely ignored Ceptnin Dolan. After being attached to SHAU, I Was immediately sent to Clevedon, England. ...., CLEVEDON: At Clevedon, af-er an interview with Colonel Clifford R. Powell, slip: I was assigned to the Third Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company. The ,. Company, flavIng been in Clevedon for some time, was already pretty well Organized under the .divisions of Intell5gence and Operations. All civilians sad practically all enlisted men had already been as- 4.,',.4.'?: signed to the various sections in these two divisions. While I was simply aoldiering, waiting for an asstgnment, SHAEF sent a request ?1 for a doily analysis of enemy propaganda, to be transmitted to ;,.,. London by teletype each morning at 0700. I offered to write this analysis, using the material of the monitoring section, which was _ covering German trRnsmissions for about eighteen hours each day. 4, After several days of writing this analysis, I was assigned to the : monitoring section and given the high-sounding title of Editor-in- "Nr Chief. Mr. Huntington Miller of OWI, head of the section, scrounged 1t1'- ,7,,. around trying to complete the equipment we needed, while I continued , to write the propaganda analysis. jApe " 4 ?1' ;* ': -Several weeks later a forward unit of the Third WRB Company was JA,T!'? sent to France. Mr. Waler, with two of our monitors, went. This left 1141, in obare of the section N4 . the obligation of completing the, securing of equipment, w-itinc tne propaanda analysis, sad put.. ting out daily Allied newslotinTmlgA und that a Pfc. Milton , 00, a calsp who had passed tge Xei* ig State Bar Examinations, Was doing orderly work, artdONsr I . pip 1 a I t 1 on e d him to assist in ths editorial work of the mdn o g'it. ',41Wriqbn, He remained with me throughout my .ht months in Prance, an Invaluable help, ay.? - ? ??I a-U.. . ? v. ?s?nusat.???#, ??? rI CCI I rid 10101-0Ve lease 2013/09/25? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA- . ??? 'Amur -2- DP13X00 mi? 01 RUUu vu- SIDCBRIT S. ? ? Iftlle at Clevedon I had also to complete the purchase of my per- sOnal field equipment, since OSS had discontinued to issue clothing, hoe, shirts, socks, etc., in Englend. Some had been issued in Vaahlrxgton, but more was needed by each person going to the conti- nent. Some equipment, such as sleeping bags, was still being is- susd by OSS at Clevedon, but I found that being an OSS man was not sufficient recommendation to 8vt into that UK cache. You had to know someanto and I saw indivdnals not in OSS receiving such equipment when some OSS men were told that none was available. Before leaving Clevedon for the marshalling area, detailed plans had to he made for the carting of all the delicate receiving in- struments of a monitoring section -- the radio receivers, the Sound- scribers for making reeores of transmissions, the Morse receiving units. This required the building of boxes, the buying of hasps and locks, the purchase of immense amounts of packing material to avoid ahoek t- the instruments. OSS had made no provision for the pur- chase of such items, whereas OWI had a special funds man on the spot to take care of such contingencies. Consequently I had to pay for suan materials out of my own posket if I wanted the equipment of our section to arrive in France in operating condition. Again, in regard to paying men (civilians) in the field, OS) had made absolutely no provisions. This resulted in no end of confusion, and much imposition on the OWI, which, again, had a finance officer in the field to pay its personnel. *ARSRALLING AREA The monitoring section interrupted its operaiion when the entire Third MRB Company was ordered to the marshalling area at Brook Heath near Southhampton. Upon arrival there, we immediately resumed ope- ration, supplying Lucky Tac with the daily propaganda analysis and the German High Command Communique, and supplying many other units in: the artila with news bulletins. After about a week, we crossed the Channel, reaching Normandy on 16 April. NORMANDY In Formandy the Third MRB Company established camp near Nehu, and the forward elements, who had gone to France earlier, rejoined the Company. Themonitoring section began operations on the night of the day in which they landed. The section now consisted of Mr. *Mar, *nose time was entirely consumed by administrative details; two editors, Pfc. Amgott and myself; about eight voice monitors, capable of monitoring many lazguages; and about eight Morse moni- tors, headed by Lt. Charles Hoffman. We supplied the Intelligence and Operations divisions of our own Company and Third Army Head- quarters, to whom the Third MRB Company was attached, with German, Allied, utd Russian communiques, with Allied' news bulletins, and with the daily analysis of enemy propaganda. We monitored from 01 Amen to twenty-fouri hours a day, depending upon the nature of **Won taking place at the front, n the First U. S. Army broke through, and Patton followed with ve out of Normandy into Brittany, the monitoring section was up. Mr. Miller took half of the voice monitors forward to te his staff to monitoring of a more tactical nature, while the ramaindor of the voice monitors and all the Morse men, ..sont to Beauchamp, near Avrancbes, to continue the established Services to Lucky Headquarters and to our own Intelligence and MMOREIT , C. -1-nce 2013/09/25 CIA- DP13X00 01R 001 - 410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 a 410 _ et S. ? . ? ..t ? t? ? G. ? ? -a The Director Executive Officer, MO BRA ClUfft N, Waltar Attached is a copy of subject's that 1&.- Brackman has performed hereto. manner and is deservinE of a le h report. It Is our opinion his Outies in a sunerior tter of commendation, attached ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 :4%-? 'eft L.:: ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 -4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ???? -41114a. 411. ? . .111. 41' _ ? se , intelligence, or the economic and political situation involving Yugoslavia, or even such titles as living with the Partisans; but 01 of this would be only a twice-told tale. Therefore, it was better to devote effort towards the construction of a report which would give the reader some basic Indication of the writer's background and reactions since entering OSS and also his personal opinions that might be of help, or suggestive power in the possible organization of future operations. The success of Darien Mission is hard to appraise from my personal interest and viewpoint. We were able to supply the Partisan movement for a time with tons of arms, clothing and food stuffs. We were able to gather intelligence on military targets to warrant bombing and straf- ing of enemy troop concentrations and towns. There is no question about the value of assistance given to Allied airmen and POW.. It is only of personal interest to mention that during the entire period of seven months in the field only one-hundred and seventy-two dollars were spent out of the Mission funds. I do not bring this out as a matter of ostentation, but rather as an absolute Pact that it was not necessary to spend large sumo of money in the specific type of duties that we were performing. The persona] satisfaction and contentment derived as the direct result of this work far surpass any hardship. encountered. I an only too willing to give full support and assistanoe to any work in which 41613 wishes to plaoe me. ? Ot,tAxNA Harry Plowman ? ? n-Iifir1 nd d For Rel 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? - 8 - or for gold plow's. then ask for an explanation, but if the requout is for ten pounds of salt send it bseeuse it is needed. 2. Lack of Informations It was very evident that field portion., nel tiers not always informed of ohanges in positions held by base of- fioiAls that would have a direct bearing upon the Mission. For exsimple, if a Mission's desk head or superior is being replaoed then infOrm the Mission. xplain the necessity of the ()hangs) and always give nnmea and a little personal hi/story outline of tho new offiolal if he is unknowt to the Mission. In thin manner, there will possibly exiet a better understanding between all parties coneerned. 3. Extendin De roe of Enooura ement; I boliove that it its quite natural for subordinates to appreciate a few words of enoourage- &ant now and then from their superiors even under the most suitable add pleasant surroundinge. The same is equally true for those operating under the adverse oonditions that often exint in the field. Field work may indireotly add morn burden to already heavily laden shoulders back at the Theatre base, or even in ftshington, hut the Mission def- initely should be informed of their worth and usefulness. I do not mean praise only, but &leo adgrioss by which a Mission would benefit. Mo one can work alone he must have the ceoperabion and useful hints from these above him. It would be appreeiated. Conelusions It is difficult to exprear the full approoiative moaning behind the writing of this brief report. Much more could have been included) but the nature of suoh would only have human interest values It could have included diteils on methods and diffioultios of gathering Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and A proved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 111181141?8141Vr* ? ? r ,?. ? ? ? S. Both types of men aro esuential, and eaoh placed in the position for which he is best fitted will do good work. What I wish to bring out is that (1) recruiting of administrative and operational personnel should be separato, (2) that training administrative mon will also in.. elude briefing of operational aotivities, and (3) that the training and briofing programs for operative dutiem should be intensified and more strint categories of tentative operntional planning should be adhered to. Fieldt With Ute experienoe of some seven month,* or fiold work behind Pie ONO Or the di frioui tios onoottnta-#1d them) t100111 taillOat tat) trivial to disouss or give much thought to. The foltowing examples may be helpful in pointing out difficulties that might hn avoided In future operations' 1. puppillus Darien mismion wan no doubt very fortunate in the receipt of supplion, We almost alwmyn were mble to receive supplies whenever the ETA or airoraft oast? over. Food and olothing stores r?ere ample, and moil was most Alwayn inoludod with the PX rations, Put it was the little items ...- item* that atmost no ono woold know why they wore roquented that counteo. Items like mosquito oandien, Insect spray and salt little thinrm that meant no muoh to the mon on such a mission. When eu911 items are requested, you may rest asnured that they ere needed. All four mon of this mission suffered unduly from dysentery which .uld easily have been avoided ir we had had means of keeping ay. from our quarters. If the requen.i be for a radio, e Jeep mnri A rInr ved For Release 5 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? ? 'AS'.". ? ?..% , t; Z.S nitl? kft nature cit he field work and were subsequently often assignod to Wino duttop or IA very routOlo eqd monotonous oharaotor. A great many auoh Ww00 are dissatiatted siati disgrunt4Wd. They do what is reouirod of them but only by virDue of a sense of obodionoe And painfUl duty. believtl the Adopted oouree of treinini; hae proved to be very good, equilly so for both field and orrio4 men, since the offina mAn is theorem by mad* *ware of the nature of the field man's work .. but I think somowhore near the dose of the period of training, isen should be piokod ottner or thoir own vc.litictn or by oareful seloabion and personal olivine theroor ror aaoh nranoh or 00b, J1,,..!ts no doubt that muoh a polioy would be prootioablo Nino* thera is always 4 4001 Or oleavsge in the preferenoes, likes and in all groups of men. flout.' prefer bo be on hand even though in a very minor position *hero brood goneral deotolons are medal they like to be near the adminietrotivo headquartere cAose to bigger men, like to enjoy more or lose regular working hours and oonditions an proror living in ?lean And orderly sumundings. fluoh men are offlos men. On the othiPr hand, some profor in livo in an atmosphere of tension or unoorbeinty, dnn't liko 1,o remain ip one plane long, don't e4peoially enjoy prolonged imediate ammoolation with sup. *Prism, like to got their orders And be left LO themselves to ?awry out the purpose of their instruotionse they to be on their own resouroeso like to plan and work out ia their own way the dotalie or oaoh alsoions Web men are bored by ?Moo routine and like to return Wheadquarters with a report of work su000asfully dune. Those men fire ovitlible for rtold amoignmentioi Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R0 =0"4willgilligl11111111r1=Ar ? 0410006-3 Was twice visited by Colonels Huntington and Macfarland. Due to enemy action in Like., I was forced to move to the coast. Arrived in Split on 26 December. Had no radio contact for nine days, all personal kits were lost. Received word from Colonel Thayer to proceed to 5th Corps Headquarters. Returned to Bari due to illness and remained there in the hospital throughout January. Returned to Split to take over the base there and moved IMMO to Zara. The purpose of the mission was 'or intelligence and also to supply other missions in Yugoslavia adoessible by motor trans.. Received signal stating that Washington for reassignment. Conditions in the field that might be trunITI: 2.. Training and briefing of personnel: It is quite evident that in some cases personnel trained, for example, in either SO or SI never had ample opportunity to express their abilities in either of these lines. Some who had special train. ing in one specific btandh only had the opportunity to perform types of work which required other special training progrms, Of course, we must admit that this is not the case of OSS alone, but of the Army as a whole. I do believe though that it dous occur more frequently in OSS than in the other branches of the Service. Many men recruited by OSS for administrative work were never intended for field duty. It may be erroneous to say *never* but this seams most usual. I am of the opinion that in many instance:linen who have been passed through the regular Course of training were attracted thereto by the interesting and romantic . _ Pnr Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X0000 R000 S. 1. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 -gim"..."."1.11.111141111"11112:2.111r."-`41..".11.1."*"." S. ? 4 ? supplying information to the Hritish 001100Phitig eowy, op viclIt hs rartiman *roar or bawl,, oohnontrohtons, poAttto.11 notiviblom knd ellio?Y ?1000011.te information tht.t would h* rf yahoos 'oho owkouktion or POWs and Allied kirmon WOLN peal important as bho work mentioned above. Colonel Kriegher or fah@ 1h0 Air Force wae very wilJinit to drop supplioo for illniuM1 ahd when poseible to land atroraft for the evacuation or COMO' puring Ahe period thst 1 *eh ih Yngonlavia, some sixty.three airmen wove cered rop by Delieti Mtee1011, They were &law OVROVated tr,v air or infiltrated to Mh.. ooket where mars peee14410 by bob to YIP or Italy conld he erranged. This number doik nob inotude 18g (and many others) who 10'0.4W Uti NOviombee POI 044, by mhiltIr bronsports 46 aided th000 pouplo by feeding find bodding knd by glvtur thom whatever clothing we could supply. Following kro (WAIN or only a few or tho Inhosmitilik, events that occurred durlag vily by in Yugoslavia' August le, 1P441 Flew to Kordon find Vikti received by Unphoin Oonrkd dolvig. Autemot 13, Arrived kb XOPOO1Oh 10 Lik knd oontkmboti bum ooftiokfids. Int ()Moor ot the 3Dth Utvimion. Aug. PI.Oot, 118i Okrriod mut obov* dublok$ Durinr Wino, bwonhym nino klrorott with suppilos were roceived) witit able to supply otiough kits target intelligence ror the Oftlican Mr loom, Go okrry out rive bombing raids in my arca. This included the towns oo utooes, gospi0. knd Mime. During the same period, we evacuated sixteen airmen. eatotoer 41i Darien Mission became a separate Ameriosn intulltgenoo million. This action, at the timo, jeopsrdited re0 lationship end prestige with bho look) Pltrtitituill on whose *ouporattln II11 intollitono* gnthoring in thkt *rot depended. 00t$ MO.Di*, 141 NvAankbed W operators Peane an4 Tompson and continued with intelligence reports knd the evacuation 0 (armor). ??? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? 1.. I 1. nand and the proper distribution of duties between these two missions. It was finally agreed that Barnett would move to a now area; and due to the almost continuous movement of the enemy in Croatia at this time, Bell evacuated and returned to Italy. On 16 August, T. Korolchuk (enlisted Navy radio operator) and I flew to Kordun area of Yugoslavia and WAS there received by Captain Conrad C. Selvig. There I met my British W/T operator, Corporal Harry Deane; and a few days later, Corporal Vincent Tompcon, RAF, of the Balkan Air Force, joined me as 17/T operator for my direct link with that Air Force. Geographic area concerned and economic conditions After arrival in the hordun, it was necessary to move into the central Like area of Croatia and there Join the 36th Divinion of the llth Partisan Corps. This move of over one hundred miles was aeoom- plished with 1 charcoal-burning truck, taking three full days to oom- plot.. Lika is in Croatia in the general area eant of the fiepale and Velbit Mountains and west of the Bosnia-Croat boundary. Pro-war Like was one of the less a0vanced areas of Yugoslavia, composed chiefly or mall farms and home industries. It is peksant land, and only the larger towns such an Orospie and Otoons poasessed electric and water utilities. The smaller settlements knew only an almost primitive rural mode of living eom ,tied by wooden plows, cooking ;n the homes over an open wood fire, and the spinning of yarn (wool) by means even less siodern than our ancient spinning wheels. The small towns like Udbina and Korenica were almost uninhabitable and the whole liberated Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 1W1 v 11111110WIRP POW MO OS (e ( I a Of7ice Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT sUtpuMNReport on conditions in the field - Yugoslavia The writer was recruited by OSS the latter part of September 1943, for a specifil SO mission (the Cambridge problem) in the Middle East area of operations. First interview was with Lt. Comdr. Green (then Lt. Sr. Grade) who was with the Personnel Branch. Comdr. Green arranged for interviews with Mr. Manning, Mr. Berg, Major Young and Major Sebly, all then with Middle East FO Branch. The plans for this SO mission were never put into effect and I remained in Washington until January 1944, at which time overseas transportation was arranged to Cairo. In Cairo, interviews with Lt. Wood (Navy) and Major Scott Dickenson ensued; and along with Captain Rainer, I was accepted by Major Dickenson for his mission (Spike) to Yugoslavia. Later upon arrival in Italy, it was thou-Ilt best by the British interest that only two American offJoers be admitted with the Spike mission; so being, junior to Captain Rainer, I remained at Bari, awaiting assignment to future operations. It was in July that the British Military Mission to Yugoslavia, headed by Brig. McLean wanted an American officer to replace Captain Barnett, British Liaison Officer, who at that time was operating in Yugoslavia along with a Balkan Air Force mission (B.A.T.s #1) under the direction of Squadron Leader Bell. The advisability of such a ?hang. was due to the frequent occurrence of questions concerning cow- d For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4tic Vi1.44., 1.1, 1,H, :1:?Knrc, ??1?,' (.1 - 7, WORT ON FLULD OONDITI0N8 by Gaptain Rarry B. Plowman (Yugoslavia - Darien Mission) ? PAGB Ittl..1.111.111..,112L tield. 16 Introduction 1 20 Geographic ions concernod and soonomic oondlti ......ons 9 1 3. Description of activities 5 .....200111.tastlatl1211that NA t bo 1m rovod ......... 1. Training and brtefling or personnel 8 26 Dotter cooperation between Base and Field 7 1. Supplying 1 2. Lack of Information 8 6. Extendirig a doves of encouregement 8 11 ?s? 04:410*.04"64.410WIA.4.0.1- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 : Chief. SI DATE:May 7, 1945 FLOM : De DeBardoloben StiiiiCrs Report on field conditions submitted by Captain H. B. Plowman . ? It will be noted that Captain Plowman entored Yugoslavia as a member of the SO Branch. However, two months inter the team of which he WAS a member was assigned to independent into)... ligence duties. Plowman was formally transferred to the SI Branch on DeceMber 18, 1944 -- four months after entering the country. Captain Plowman'a remarks on training stress the desirability or assigning personnel to dutims for whioh they aro bent qualified and giving them spooitlised training in keeping with their assign - mantis. I believe that much a policy Is the ideal toward which OSS should strive. However, nmooesity demands many deviations from the ideal and personnel muat often be used rhere they are most urgently needed rather than where they would bent fit. Train- ing mast be suffioiontly general to prepare them to tho grmatest possible der.eft or emergent assignments. ?..P.Aciy11.? ; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ' ? AWN 11 ? ? ? ? sR. I/// Captain Plowman's penetrating observations on *abaft& la particular have be brought to the atten. aut4 Training Branoh? ? ? - A ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? 4 ? 'Ms ???? ? ? ? ? ? .? ? ? ? ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 of relations with the FFI, instructed in double-transposition code and the Use of the Army 300 radio set, evaluated and disseminated informa- tion for Div. G2, found soft spots in the lines and arranged for passage of agents and radios, sometimea accompanying the agents or "passeure into enemy territory. On November 40 1944, while enroute to Baccarat from Bagtemenil to arrange for an operation, my jeep turned over because of a faulty steering mechanism, and I was sent to the llth Evacuation Hospital at Bayon with a dislocated shoulder and a broken collar bone. In a few days, I wns transferred to the 46th General Hospital Rt Besancon where I remained until December 23, 1944 with little noticeable improvement in the condi- tion of zyky sheuldero On that date, nevertheless, I returned to duty with Seventh Army G2-SSS at Saverne. After a short time it became apparent that would be unable to continue working without medical care and arrangements were made to send no to Lyon for duty under medical supervision. Once in Lyon it was discovered that such supervision was unavail- able there and I wan ordered for treatment back to the United States, where I arrived, via Paris and London, on March 5, 1945. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 A ? 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000 Declassified and Approved For Release ..414.4.7"%?1 ? '1; OIL ? JaP :'?;.,# lipeallaNIMIEWO pirER-OZFICE VELIORkliDUli TO: Chief, SI Through: Executive Officer, SI FROM: Ramo Balaguer SUBJECT: Field Report 1A1,6* :Ara ,as, ?allaja ? - - 7 Uky 1945 410006-3 On February 1, 1944 I joined the OSS in Washington. After having been through Schools, SI E, B.O. and the "Farm"I left the United States on April 25, 1944 via boat, and reached Oran on May 4, 1944. On May 9, 1944 I arrived in Algiers where I was assigned for duty with the French SI Desk under Henry Hyde. In spite of the usual difficulty of becoming integrated into this closely-knit organization, I soon found myself an accepted member of the team, with numerous duties in the Operations Section under DeWitt Clinton. This work included the intelligence briefing of agents, obtaining approval for parachute pinpoints, making false documents,(cartes dlidentite, cartes dialimentation, certificate de travail, and certificate de demobilisation), holding and processing agents in various areas, providing agents with black market clothing from France, obtaining operational equipment and funds, dispatching agents by plane and many-incidental duties depending on the individual mission and the whims of the Joss. There were, in addition, certain duties which were not directly connected with operations, such as, degarbling incoming code messages) which required a complete and colloquial knowledge of French, negotiation with the French authorities for obtaining permission to use freely Radio Alger for fifteen minutes a week to broadcast messages to agents in the field. A short time before 1)-day (August 151 1944) I was selected to stay in Algiers with Ensign John Garnett and continue the work of the base until our teams with the invading forces had established direct contact with the agents remaining in the field. By September 7, 1944, because almost all of our agents had then been overrun and work at Algiers had correspondingly declined, I left Algiers by plane and arrived at Salon-en-Provence. I was nssigned in Francs to Seventh Army Headquarters at Lons-le-Saulnier, and later at Epinal to serve as liaison officer with G2-SSS (assisting LL. Carre) and to collect and disseminate intelligence. Toward the end of September I was assigned to the 45th Division 02-SS3 team, heeded by Lt. tuff, eters so os of my duties differed widel7 from Amy in my experience. I recruited and briefed agents, took charge SECREt - ? `..,..4-za aqa.,..aaa.aa ?.,taaaaut.aAnca4aaav.amiaa,a,aag.,aa;,a,,07.0:%.; LA*, ir,4-0,;,,,,,u,s4 Majamearyaest a-a^a,a?awg. ? PrIt- Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000 410006-3 4, 4 Declassified and Ap ? roved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 T: Report an Field Conditions submitted by Romeo Balaguer Mr. Homer Hall, Chief of Western European section, SI Branch, has described this report as "A concise, intelligent field report, submitted by an SI representative whose opnrations were regarded as Mr. Balaguer is at the pr going treatment for his arm. On his anticipated that he will be given an appropriate to his very considerable la a nroved For 13/09/25 CIA RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 P.. ICA 011000d to Alt li*Asen with the PP; for sembst tseks? At ese I 4iso lod * battalion sf MI tote &Men 44 41. Oorsso prisonoro? NS woo stwoosolq in eor too 04411444 Antollitionoo tohet ambled tho billets* to wit* leis of lib' When tho **snow slomoot dtwo we were ohle to smsy Atonto of a network et Intostlics000 to shish is ie laps of 4orman detocsoo snd troop w,ss4e An so ores Madrid sales behind ammo times, No Aso Wood & *O ttt4 I. N in the ettiot of Ooross eritilery seosoottottoo and with itlCD rem.. dividdenol sod grottior 0414 ot Oorpo sesotoombatt fir% 41 SAN with this tem, hosidos the atamsod oosa su w_ pegp Md puttini agents threogh tho Woe, Ls sod oftriero, and writing op 0 sli *At eapkurod os Dotobse 27, f?f VP ? analliainant x. my Otiose or sivillsn working soder oombst oes44tio40 shoold hAVO A domkto idee tt,os thst An 4004 0 *piers it *sold POok idootifioation hy the mos, diffilott? tiky name weo koem i0 olviltmo Wand the is tio00 440 At 044 war br the 1444014144111 &Ammo thst I woo ablii to oloapo idontWootien hy the # 2$ Provtalson tor nrpilpino *gent& LULU.* OP fellomiog wounds( *onto situ inadessete4 In too afoot of bottle ssrg On ofinnoi ifiko Woes details as thsy de set Ws tho this from ontoorol obltokies vs inour Lk dimialsisso the eftiotonlAY At kness toskoro ars not prepsolly looked otter,41 ,34 4,44iion betweon visohington sad tio! in 4Ar porsonal 0400 OIA00 no on. to Aigiors hsd1U pi why X wss lent %hors to work And it los ersr otintioniho doing tnithing spprosimoito4 kho to* ter *JohI 40 ? ? or. ? ? ? L. a. Mena Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 proved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R00010041uuu0-0 X was ewmt4 to Algiers in Jeme, 1944, to work with the Prom* Sok. 34 thaw** Upea arrival r wee tremeterred to Servieee and mode Vbs. Calmer at the Algiore Needquarteres / also acted am Vedioal Wiser for the some headquarter.* Om flepaesher 1, l944# I was lowed te CON as Liaison matte Ara* field interrogation of the trench refugees sowing Artie* and Cisablemos4 X interregeted approadmately 150000 In velem ee gathered the greatest ameent of intelligens PtISd lit MQesawsinsing Frames and were felicitated for cur work by 'Waists% Londe** As the stream of refugees dwindled, I began waliiimg mare endear* with Ostend Zing in eer Casablanca Wise se his ueii?mdreplaeed him oaring hie absences. Cor main astivities wire reverting eseditions wthisMeroose? We set up sebmarine petrol ' 406eiaholiereeeas Oast Lime sad attempted a kidsropieg operation the Wet Caroms Intelligemes in the area (this was wesmsasmsfel)w le , 1944. I reported to Algiers where / worte4 on 'The Midaia nem 4Utbank Sehimeseeker? I reerulted and treined wadi* qpurstcrrs for the Openiek Maims am4 than direeted operation* for their intoe saes. July. 444# I lett for Italy and landed in Southern Prams ANS1114 1,, 2$440, I *es appointed Commanding Offieer of WI Viviosiestmem at 346004, 7th iron sad remained in that function milopftve. As sir eperetiime Wiser was eapture4 after two days I performed the teees lemmata's slew for almost a month, pePosemel no eappliod and at the time of captors I had under speretiemo effieete, * headtpartere anew, and four Our duties es4 aetivitiee were emaitold under field eonm vire the ear *gene, ter forwarding intelligenes with the lie hod se ear maim task teetleel intelligens* for the Army by WM.ftjtc oleo oblate **bet intelligent's* of AR, so riproomitatime. we were on mew oesseione r?-s, PaiRase 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ?.? ? "4""dat j.;'? f,t Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? MOM ?ItS ?"'" ? ? ? ? ' Ste likf 19411 TO, *tier. III PUN'a. liemer =MOTs Amnia Lb Greases Captain, EC.? Pield Import thediging tram the attached report and fres bite of Laferveatlion gleamed from ethers in the sem eaptain +heti* L. irilika La., evidently went !mato a distance *above end beyond the call of Atty.' leadinia NI Ihittalissi into a miner cations It ie maderetaating that in addition to a metal* in the foot. Osittain 0110?1111 aufferad frost- bite" of tho toes on both root ',Idle la a Gomm prison wisps Vie reports deny tor treatment at the Walter Seed lieeptimil? Attealemeire EL H. SECRET , 4rtlie neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X0000.1 R000100410006-3 ? 4 ? ? A - . ? alb Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 4116 11211PailiDIX _ CIA-R0P13X00001R00010041u.uov-, a .4?1?????? 23 May 1946 TOI Chia, SI MOH: S. Hamer Hill SUBACT: JUstia L. Greene, Captain, LC.. Field Report Judging fraa the attached -.report and from bits of information gleaned from others in the same unit, Captain Justin L. Greene, HA., evidently went quite a distance **bow) and beyond tho call of duty", in lecding an 171 Battalion into t minor action. It is sty understanding that in addition a wound in the foot, Captain Greene suffered frost- bit. of the toss on both feet while in a German prison (tamp. lie reports daily for treatment at the Walter Bead Hospital. Afton:brat Blia: , V ri r-?-?? ootpase 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 It te, ? 1 '7'. ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 2,214 9 4ggil".11 4 .4 .r obliged to act as liaison with the PPI for combat tasks. At one point, I ovum led a battalion of FFI into action and we captured one hundred Gormen prisoners. We were successful in our intelligence mission, obtained intelligence that enabled the Division to take *Lyon, Grenoble, with a minimum loos of life. When the advance slowed domm we were able to cover the whole army front of a network of intelligence agents which sent weekly over- lays of German defenses and troop movements in an area fifty to one hundred miles behind German linos. We also placed a SCR 300 radio set in the midst of German artillery concentration and with it directed all divitional and greater part of Corps counter-battery tire. Specifically, my duties with this team, besides the command functions, were recruiting, training and putting agents through the lines, interrogation of agents and couriers, and writing up of all intelligence reports. I 1470 wounded and captured an Octobe- 27, 1944. atallatWa..1 T MIGHT IMPROVED: 1. Any officer or civilian working under combat conditions should have a double i4entity so that in case of capture it would render identification by the enegy difficult, My name was known to hundreds of civilians behind the enemy lines and it ..as only by the utmost good fortune that I was able to escape identification by the enemy. 2. Provisions for helping agents' families or following up wounded agents are inadequate. In the heat of battle operational officers cannot look into these details as they do not have the time and aside from avowal obligation we incur it diminishes the efficiency of agents if these factors are not properly looked after. 3. Liaison between Washington and the field fell down woefully in ay personal case since no one in Algiers had any idea who I was or likr I we.. sent there to work and it was over six months before I was doing anything approximating the task for which I had been recruited. I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ????? Declassified and A 4 ? ? AM. ? proved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R00010041uuu0-0 Am, .liew.11:...41?1????????. lc: OFF"CE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES WASHINGTON, O. C. TO 1 Chile, SI FROM : Justin L 'eens, Captain, M.C. SUB= : Field Report 26 May 1945 , 3 I was sent to Algiers in June, 194, to work with the French Desk, SI, thsrs. Upon arrival. I was transferred to Service, and made Mess Officer at the Algiers Headquarters. I also acted as Medical Officer for the same headquarters. On September 1, 194/10 I was loaned to CSDIC as Liaison Officer and to direct field interrogation of the French refugees coming late North Africa and Casablanca. I interrogated approximately 15,000 refugees. In volume we gathered the greatest amount of intelligence received at AFHQ concerning France and were felicitated for our work by Air Vinistry, London, As the stream of refugees dwindled, I began working more and noes with Colonel King in our Casablanca office as his assistant and replaced him during his absences. Our main activities were reporting conditions within Morocco. We set up submarine patrol of the Spanish-Moroccan Coast Line and attempted a kidnapping operation of the Chief German Intelligence in the area (this was unsuccessful). In April, 19440 I reported to agiers where I worked on the Medusa Plan with Frank Schoonmaker. I recruited and trained radio operators for the Spanish Chains and then directed operations for their parachuting into France. In July, 1944, I let for Italy 3nd landed in Southern France on Dy, August 150 1944* I was appointed Commanding Officer of the 34th W.vision Team of 8$841-20 7th Army, and remained in that function until m7 capture. As my operations officer was captured after two days in the field, I performed the teamis functions alone for almost a month* Oredually, pereonnel was supplied and at the time of napture I had under my ecomend two operations officers, a headquarters officer, and four enlisted mon* Our duties and activities were manifold under field con- ditions* V4 were the only meetly for forwarding int4lligence with the Division* Is bad as our main task tactical intelligence for the Army but were ioreed by battle sonditions to also obtain combat intelligence* In the 'Wefts of any 30 representative, we were on many occasions r?-s, PaiRa se 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4 4. . A. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Judging from the attached report and from bits of information gleaned from others in the seats unit, Captain Justin L. Greene, 140.., evidently. went quite a distanos "above and beyond the mal of duty", In leading an Fps Battalion into a minor aotion. It is my understanding that in addition to a wound in the Not, Captain Greene suffered frost- bite of the toes on both feet while in a Germnn prison camps Us reports daily for treatment at the Walter Reed liospital. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 -?C 4, ?,?N?rtsiegli--"--- 'a S. . ? ? s. ????' ? omer - Fl ase prepare letter of ?transmitta from WHS to Director, SS. Indicate (1) Where returnee (3)Your very brief appraisal of is work also your agreement or sagreement with his observatlons een taken to correct difficultie eturn to this office for forward VI 1 should be numbered to coTo Column rrespond with number 1094414 4rawn *cross sheet under each comment. *444114,404/t should be used in rp column. ii-atiotiad initial (check mark Insufficient) before further routing. or ActIon taken should be Indicated In Comments column. ., should allows be returned to Registry. -pesignationa see separate sheet. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? :IS N. ft 31 2:ay 1945 ? S. to TO: Director, OSS PRIM: :Thitney R. Shepardson The attachea report is a brief history of the experiences of Captain Justin Greene who served in the Kediterrane(In Theater of Operations and subsequently accompanied the 7th ;.rmy on its invasion of Southern France. An elaborate verLal -planation about his activities, his capture by the enemy anu his release / was given to the members of our Planning board on 24 Lay anu his :- written report is only a brief resume. Although the early phase of his assipament in ,frica was marred by confusion and misunderstanding of his assignment, he nevertheless fulfilled every assignkent to the great satisfaction 1 and praise of his commanding officers. His work in klorocco, where he was on temporary duty with CSDIC (Combined Services Detailed interrogation ,enter) indicated a profound appreciation of the people he was dealing with and his contribution was conseLiuently of the greatest value. After conclusion of his work in Eorocco he was charged with all operational details of the Medusa Plan and finally accompanied the 7th Army at the time of the invasion. During his assignment to the 7th Army Captain Greene indicated a dee of resourcefulness and energy lar beyond any expectations. His conduct as Chief of tactical intelligence with the 36th Infantry Division awarded him inddual commendation by his superior officers and contributed substantially to the high standard of the 7th Army OSS Field Detachment. As a prisoner of war, durin which time he I was wounded twice, Captain GreEle showed unusual resourcefulness 1 , to conceal his affiliation with the OSS which resulted in his ! liberation without the enemy ever realizing what his functions with ., the arally had been. Several recommendations made by Captain Greene to improve conditions in the field and SI operations will be clreflUlly studied and will undoubtedly prove invaluable. li 1 ( ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 .00 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 : 410,_ . ? 4 ' - 1. Capt. Greene served in Algiers fro. (Tune 1943 am. stolid to SI/Prance, he at first worked as a Services Officer, , . -. . 4ster, 4114 prisoner interrogation, then directed operations for , 'parachuting the apaish Chains into Prance, and finally with the 7tth Army was Mita? of the 36th Div. 8S8 tea*. He was wounded and ,;:': :11aptidro la October 1944. .. _. 2. ft recommeads use of a cover identity for any OBS man ? -_. la' ii"esabat position in case of capture, and stresses th. need 04.p littention to agents' families in case , . .? _ t41 agent, ?, . 7 ?41 ? OPP Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? o 4 ? - 1. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ,10.0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 "-, ' ',Pack 1V3t4.111i-Au';' 6131r:4'0;1;714 4/* 1221.1141.52.211FAtftl.a!! Obtaining intelligence without reciprocating with supplies for the local population beoomes a thankless task. Fortunately the British were sending large amounts of military supplies to our area which eased the way oonsiderably. f? 21.E1-2114.1_Nliqr The Partisans were much interested in obtaining as much in the way of war material as they could get and were not averse to playing off the Allies against eadh other when the opportunity afforded itself. g. Pro-Partisan inter rotor was openly anti-British. It ohane his funotjo telligence to a screen. Partisan /ntelli snot, Re rts Partisan intelligence offerings could not be of the restrictions imposed could not be checked. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 (-. r ? Jo' contribution would have been considerably lessened. What training I did get /had to beg fOr. b. 1111 and Uncertain in Ob Mission The long period of waiting between the time I joined the OSS in Cairo and the time I aotually got into the field oould and Should have been profitably employed. As it was I was assigned to a mission with Mlballovich by Cairo. Thin was canoelled. / was then assigned to western Bosnia and sent to Bari. in Bari this mission was discarded, and / was to go to Vojvodina. This mission was approved by0perations, Caserta, but was dimcarded. I was then to go to the Dalmatian Coast and Eighth Corps. I got as far as Vis when the matter of an American Mission with Tito ammo up. We were advised to return to Bari by the Partisan Coassandant, Colonel Cenci. Finally I was assigned to the mix. 'ion to Slavonia, which ultimately came off. The period of waiting had been fram February 1944 to 11 September that sane year. The composition o," the team ()hanged several time, curing that period as well, o. rtance of hidssion. Requests for withdrawal of the Unaware rejeoted for the reason that the area was important. The British considered the area dead or sterile for two nontbs before / took the plane out. to Pr000ssi of E. rts Bo fir AS I could find out in Caserta my rel.-ons were never assembled and edited to present a ?complete and chronological tabulation of events in Sixth Corps area. From any results that I was able to find the team served only one main !Unction - to check on the British aotivities in the field.* ISLD apparently did not forward to 088 or did not forward La tine nor in usefU1 fora the re9orta of their teams in the field. 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ,srp, natters of existenee and operations. d.letellipmes from Other Ansa Field teens, because of thoir isolated position, do not know about events in neighboring areal, the situation in other areas. trainim of Personnel events that may ultimately affect More adequate training in information pertaining to the purpose of the mission is needed. For example, if military intelligence is the purpose of the mission, knowledge of the enemy battle order in detail is a prerequisite. I". &Greening Personnel ? V. Personnel sent an missions should be more thoroughly screened particularly as to inclinations of a politioal nature. For example, a pro-Partisan leader or a pro-Partisan interpreter is unsatisfactory as a non-partisan agent for the transmittal of intelligence. Promotions and Promisee Promotions for team members in the field are not sufficiently pushed. Many people have been promised much. Many of them have re- eeived little. The fact that promises should never have been made does not alter the fact that the failure to keep the promise ic hard an morale. 3. Ditft.i<i,s of Became Aware a. Personal ?minks ify own training was woefUlly inadlquate. I had had almost no training in Battle Order on the German Are'. It so happened that the British Intelligence Officer warn very well informed on such matters or -6 SECRET ..teht.44, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2-013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 the team, *manse of the apparent futility of the proposed new assign. meet, and booaus? of the desire to return home, the undersigned having then Wen overseas for twenty.nine months. The interpreter was re. turned to Italy an 6 February 1946, for the reason that he and the undersigned seemed to be in constant oonfliot over polioy and behavior. Oneditions ia the Field that Night be improved It would seem &waste of manpower and expense to maintain teams of more them one Ally in the same area. If one Ally or the other is not willing to turn over all material gathered, and turn it over to the other in time to beet value, the remedy lies in a oonference at head. quarters mad not in duplicating effort in the field. Duplication in the field (muses either competition between the Allies, or the ea. ordination of one to the other. Neither is satisfaotory in that it give, the local people a bad impression. Teams in the field have not been kept adequately informed on 4:slumps taking plea' in Bass areas. Thr example, w were using a directional antenna beamed at Bari, not knowing that the receiving station had been weed to Rome. No were taken off the Roster of para.. ohmtiste with oemsequeat loos of pay *without being informed. New Desk heads were appointed without our being informed. hea4s owes not to be thoroughly familtar with field problems and diftioeltiost err wail& not expect knowledge of pelaliar problem' *ad issoOlit woo, but no wo414 axpoot familiarity with the routine Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 t- r. set up a radio network in the area, with Partisan assistanoe, and that the British were present when the plan was presented to the Allies and the undersigned was not, the British TSLD representative was se- looted to make the daily oontaot. Therefore, the Britiah got the in. telligenoe and provided the Amerioan team (Walnut) with the material that vas Obtained. So tar as oould be ascertained, no information was withheld by the British* The team led by Captain Nowell was working as an SO team, and was not muoh interested in general 111itar7 Intel. ligenee. The party led by Major Mee was attempting to infiltrate into Magary. and had little interest in the local intelligence material. Within &month the other two American teams and one British team were withdrawn, leaving the Walnut Team, ISL, and 371116 The work of the Walt Nava was, theftfore, that of sorting, and transmitting such in- telligence reports as the British turned over, and the obtaining of such general impressions of the Partisans and JUgoslavia as was possible within the limited range of movement allowed by the Partisans. e. Isles Value of /ntelli and Withdrawal of Team The amount of intelligence obtainable deoreased steadily, and thifth slams items of importanee and of interoat oontinued to oame in tram time to time, the value of the work also diminished. On 13 February the Germans forood the Corps Headquarters and the Allied sions to move. Ybr a period of two we all intelligenoe reports *mood* The Bklnut Mission returned from the field on 12 March 1343, 'with th? istmtlas of ultimatolj, sag to Partisan 3rd Armor Beadquarters *Leh imcluded in its territory the Sixth Corps. This move was never esitsilly lode a/though a team did get as fir as Belgrade in the hope OM% 00e the undersigned had meaemhile disasswiated himself from 4 ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ift Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 .11?????? ? .1a 4 ? oft up a radio network in the area, with Partisan assistance, and that the British were present when the plan was presented to the Allies and the undersigned wee not, the British ISLD representative wee se- looted to make the daily oontaot* Therefore, the British got the in. telligenoe and provided the Amerioan team (walnut) with the material that was obtained* So far as could be asoertained, no information wag withheld by ths British* The team led by Captain Nowell was working as an SO tea*, and was not *WI interested in moral Military Intel. ligenoe* The party led by Major Mem WAS atteapting to infiltrete into &nom and had little interest in the looal intelligence material* Within a month the other two Amerioan teams and one British team were withdrawn, leaving the Walnut Team, ISID, and 371416 The work of the lhanut Team was, therefore, that of sorting, and transmitting euch telliganos reports as the Britiah turned over, and the obtaining of sueh general impreesions of the Partisans and Jugoslavia as was possible within the limited range of movement allowed by the Partisans* e. Unseal Vlue of Intellf nee and Withdraeel of Team The amount of intelligenoe obtainable deoreased steadily, and though some items of importance and of interest oontinued to oome in tram tine to time, the value of the work alga diminished* On 13 Aohruary the Germans formed the Corps Headquarters and the Allied hls. sift* to move* Ybr a period of two weeks all intelligence reports iramed? The Inlnut *scion returned from the field on 12 Mkroh 1945, With the intention of ultimately going to Partisan 3rd Army Heedquerters *fah imeludeld in its territory the Sixth Corps* Thia move WAS AMOYAr 41441144117,14440 although 4 tOSI did get as far as Belgrade in the hop* fat Mae tie undorsismod !lad maimhile disassociated himself fro% ? "V+ Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ???09?11?. r proposed, and operations commenoed with the landing by plane in Partisan Sixth Corps territory in the early hours of 12 September 1944. b. General Duties and Team Colposition As understood by the undersigned, the duties of the Mission with the Partisans were the collection of primarily Military Intelligence, and in addition such other items of general intelligence as seemed im- portant or particularly interesting. To accomplish thin result, the VI= was made up of three membersi the undersigned, a radio operator, and an interpreter. The team name was "Walnut" for operational pur- poses, and "Bluefish" in the reports section. c. Other Units in 6th Cor s Area The Partisan Sixth Corps area was already somewhat over full of Allicd personnel upon our arrival. Major Flues and party, and Captain Nowell were there from OSS, In addition, there were three British teems representing MAU DILD, and "A" Force. Partisan Sixth Corps, although extensive in area on paper, actually was largely confined to the Papuk Mountains and the Psunj. 44. The Walnut Mission iwrived at a time when the Partisan Headquarters was beginning to look with a critical eye at the operations and aotivities of all the Allies (Russia excepted), and, eonsequently, in accordance with the wishes or the Sixth Corps Headquarters, oontaots for the pur- pose of obtaining intelligenoe wars limited to strictly official channels, *ad were further restrieted by the request that only one officer make the daily eontaet with Corps Headquarters. In view or the faot that the British were alre447/ en the ground, and that tho British had already ?. n QC! Rel 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 SECRET Aft jap ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 The undersigned was recruited in Cairo. Egypt, In Pebruary 1944. At that time, the undersi witgned WAS on Detached Servi ce froa the 284th Ordnance Co. 60) h the Headquarters Commandant had, USAPTME, as personnel officer. The undersigned already been overseas sixteen months serving with the Ordnanoe Doartment in Eritrea. Tripoli, and Bengh*si. While in Tripoli, the the undersigned beoame acquainted with MajorDickinson, at that time Ordnance Officer/10r SootTr R. BASS Cairo* ? Command, but who later beoame a member of 088 through the Calroliadquarters. When the undersignotrea. turaed to he again 04M4 in oontaot with Maj or Dickinson ***working for tho SO Branoh firt bro of OSS, Cairo. rho idea or joining 04111 SRA sught up in the course of oonversation with Major Diekineom6 Concurrently, * drive VAS being made by OSS in Cairo to reerutt personnel for 058 work. The undersigned m 'with . Comdr. *Butz* And Lt. Wood, both **y et Lt vy Offloors serving with 008. it was *he original intention or the undersigned to be aseIgned t "ranch. but beoeueo of the rec to the SOruiting drive there was a slight mix- up aad he undersigned was assigned t the sr Branoh. Several ads- sifts were o proposed to the undersigned, approved end then disoarded tifor reasons unknown* Xs August 1944 the hUssion to Slavonla was .st.ym Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 gIVIrt4I4, 1, at I Did in the Field a, Background b. General Dutitm and Noma Ccmposition es Other Units in 6th Corps Area 4, Intelligence Procedure In 6th Corps es Lessoning Value of Intelligenoe and Withdrawal of Tema 2, Conditions in the Pleld that kIght be Improved a, Duplieation of Wort be Situation at Base os Inexperienced Disk Beads 4, intelligence from other Ann. 4.4. Training of Personnel I's Screening Personnel 0 Promotions and Promises 3. Specific Difficulties of Whioh / Personally Became Aware 4. Personal Training b. ',kiting and Uncertainty in Obtaining Mission c. Unimportanoe of Illation d. Insinuate Processing of Reports es *wiles as Exchange Item f. Partisan Polioy go. Pro.Partisan interpreter h. PartissA Intelligence Reports Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? alb - - - . e ? ? ? ? valuable teacher and it is expeoted that suoh defioienoes will not be found in the future. ? ti ? ? ? I ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERViCES F La 14?e et WASHINGTON, D. C. ( pia') A 5 t1Ltc ce ek... Report on Field Conditions, Capt. Robert J. ftiler 1. Attached herewith report of above named returns* who served in a mission in Jugoslavia. 2. This is a frank report of a miesion which proved to be Unprofitable. It in reasonable to expect that oertain undortahings will prove unproductive but when such proof has boon established, ?flanges should be Redo without delay. 3. In paragraph 2 a, Page 4, Captain Weiler oritises the duplication involved in having British and Amerioan representatives oovering the 'widens* of intelligence aotivities would appear much more important than the undesirable :aatures of duplication as described. Denial of independent action by the Partisans redwood the value of SI activities greatly. 4. The oritioisms contained in paragraphs 2b, do e, f, g and 3 coma roloonablo and Justified aorirjrmed by others a stalls: experisuoe. Experience has ?been 4 AA Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 1. Capt. Weiler was with the Partisan 6th Corps 1944 te March 1945. ? 2. The *Walnut" team was frankly an unsuccessful mission because of Partisan uncooperativeness, tile previous arrival of several British aissions, and inadequate briefing. Chief of the OSS *Walnut" team in Jagoslavia from September Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? - 11/4?1:4- ! . I 141?;'741'-il : : -4??? AIMMittilleAtetrAV""et401"qtr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-R6P13X00001R000100410006-3 *barge and it vas difficult to get gas. Dropping at supplies by British Aane vas not very efficient. They spread our supplies all over a large arca. We hunted two day* beftre finding all our chutes. Cylinders were overloaded and *Loh of our supplies and equipment were damaged. On our original drop some 11 to 14000 rounds of 9 ala ammunition were packed into our things that sensed oonsiderable denote. Men moat np to meet the boat at Xaife-.at considerablb damage and afftlits. Our courier presented me with a very Woe bill of lading fOr two moo radio sets that weren't there. Fortunately I got enough peris to repair the old one. Larry didn't get supplies or equipment tor Lis udasion and we had to give him some of ours. of th. 41:114?N ermine, ?Mooredb lift by surrender ifteminstmeas.44isinjurr;:r7tV44 did, all ot g t1141:::711110wir the r4410 $124 PIP?rx"14411""P jacauding a tdottroy Br fo Ammer torn s?tataa at *1" .63 c?14,1**1 rod thiltihadsh thwroist?thon : Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? 4. ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 --71.1611111111trthirni stominfli olloy. t'lltaltterlt$ AA, AMA. sots should bo moes stmedily oonstruotod. *or, oloro owibiritio. but soostpd *or* dopindAblo. bri bish modois $0 Lrittlw Moro dotai1o4 brioring should bo given roe bhp opooiriu pont*saimori otndy of tsrestn ood 000dItious In tho 4004 or 0001446ton. 4. 11.11=1V l000rity tn cou0P*1 W40 404 OK tilw,hb AO i bmi4kb bob. Provision shouid be 100400 to koop 4044 t0 owny Cr0M th. ortioss finblroly. This I.144 don* ikh Otki r0 1041ii1 Al' Mill it.ocopmoin worono? No intny pooplo know about NON" 'old tot 440nto hod bo rwpolot to its orrlows? leatallsaltaiss ifthloh Pi? tioniltattat staing, so Oavtian, AO, without pokl or rorpod powoorm 104 Kt tfil0 or mogotiations with fleus'ity TOktitallona, porttoulsrly 4h K41oombft whin I woo *ion*, It mJght holm, moont my hood IC thsy hs0 dommudsd thot T givo proof or bOthC K4 AmOVIOkn ottioor imid nob nn &Wort posing 40 ONO. rortmootoly thotr ti*ortotiwy? kngolopoulos, wool 4 Cormfor boom mho of milood on tho ?rook Mkttu1 rook boom IAN nnd hi %Andy rsowlvod 15* ood thoro W40 AO (14P0?10A 40 tO elth?r T wets 44 AM00044 or nti Tho ordors ohangt; book *nd fit) WI rem tut] town, to OA Mout 'fto ..moisorro stag I 1 i* tt PAP410 evarynns %Nampo1 woo ofdAohod llitiNgilifs U bhp boyo loxperl *mod tiss soots., di CCouI by Awl momp ha4 to pwt OR n04 Lisutomsnt actor holithK boom sob1ss ssOsploglose, We NW tooth tiemalilib rtt *it! redlo inoto lihokb onenow bn h.vepry 4.11. oitto. &too had troutiZo with lel tish ioottorlso uhot woold nob hold 4 1**.4041 SECRET na n cc" ri 2nd Aooroved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? 4 d. 1 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 mg7.... 4 er+A- s,d?ai I f, Ve^- .1r 4-:-IIIPS.5,a* leaders and was informed that ILAS would not lay down arms and would fight unless Government disbanded Sacred Battalion and Mbuntain Brigade. Brought Milton and Skokos to Athens on 19 November and on 20 November left with Imes on trip to Peloponnese and Island of Kithira for political and economic information. 17 December British pulled out of the Peloponnese and Kansa and lure left behind to keep Headquarters posted on events going on in *LAS occupied territory (battle of Athens then going an). On 3 January came into Athens during the last day of the battle on pass fro* ELLS and us flown from Blefsina to Kalamaki, taken by oar to Headquarters. Returned to Peloponnese on 17 January. Made a round of Sparta, Tripolis, Githion, Ialamata, Georgitsi and other places, reporting an treatment of BLAB prixoners, economic and political conditions. Returned to Athens on 4 February. Acted as Reports Officer until flown to Cairo on 2 March. From 3 March until the time I was shipped k=are I worked on translating reports of Greek agents into rn lish. Reported at Washington 11 April 1945. Conditions the Field that XLght be irovedt 1. Cooperation Between Departabentss On the *hole eosditions in the field were good because we were supplied with our absolute necessities and money which mad buy meet earthing even during ocoupation. However, there should be elosher liaison betimes the desks and the diellatohing agencies. Iertamately in war came Captain Gerald I. use cams along and took ear* of it for us at Bari end Brindisi. It would be well if it were a _ - - Aro-wrwAri For Release 2013/09/25. SECRET P13X00001R006100410006-3 IIP 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? * ? ? '??? 11.? 4ra". t t, I sodas or battles at Weligala, Pyioa, Moo/M*110* Io ;00 MeRnof time the Dritish roversod their polioy it Oepteln David (libeol. ot the Wettish askod M4 to work with him in negotiebion. et Oargalienos (upaueoessful) end then it Tripolio where we IWO su000motul in staving oft a battlo thet would have romultod in it lomat 1600 oasnaltioe on both sAdesi (for doteile see roports turned in 44 Athona in Ootobor 104400 We then osoot0od 8b0 4sourity 4tbellon. from Tripolis to Milloi and pat thom on oeiquao POP Opotoa whorohey were Loternod until they were lAboreted by the Oritish In D000mborw They took part with the kW.% l.a flighting ageinst KAU (fee Jan roporto)* A1so nogotieted the surrender et Natplion* At all oono foromoos X was spokosman tor the Allied Mission sinoo I hey* R good command or Orook* On 10 vytobor I reported to Athons on ordero and on 17 Ootobor I loft for Ohalkis to bring modicel oupplios end roplkoo John Oalveoorossi wit* had been orittoelly wounded* Took pert in the negotiations at Ohalkia and Poahne and the ourrendor and intornmonb It 1600 Maturity battalions Ai) tho barreoks et Ohelkls. Alco turned Ln a report aa 000nomio conditions and dotallod mep end drawing or the herbor amd MAIN tiOldlie Drought Oalv000reosi to Athens on SI Ootobor. On 31 Ootobor took Georg* Skoures and Commie Awl.* on a trip all through tho Pelopenneeo, whir* Miuraa photegraphod most or tho Importent Immo tiket lore Aostroyed tir the Normans* lirought nkoureo back to Athena ** 10 Ilevember* OR 11 Nevembor wont to Petrel end talked with Andert 0A0140* SECRET - e. _ ,nr4 nnnIVAd For Release 3/09/25. DP13X00001R000100410006-3 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 CIA-RDP13X00001R00,0100410006-3 e - 3 .? a ? by profeesions wto after liberation beeame Secretary of the Newarbiaki Rpitropi" (the State Committee) and an influential leader in the aeting goverment* did *oh to help us gather soonomio intormation.faeilitating our transportation. passes, oto.. and the supplying us with leads for following up information we wore after. On 12 August I left on a trip alone up to KW* to meet the Brittsh mail boat in order to nail our pouoh, piok up radio parts we neededi and to oontaot Larry's mission further north. This trip took*. through many towns and villages where I could personally observe ?conditions in general. Many of the areas were patrolled by Oerman and Becr.kty Battalions. Some of these towns were Georgitsio Boum Derbouni. Andritsena, Lela, Paloumba. ludo Zaharo. Figalia. I oontaeted Larry, mailed the pouch, got my radio parts, and returned back to box. on 2 September. By then the Germans were moving out and we were giving fairly detailed aocounts of their movements by radio. The Andartes also became very active in their preparations to attaok and "liberate" the cities from the Seouritor Battalions. At this time we also made repeated pleas for at least token troops to be sent to avoid the inevitable battles. Germans move's out of the southern Peloponnese 5 September. rt in So otiatione between ILAS and 3eourit Battalions, September 5 to 8 we were penitently with the Andartes trying to got ./mms to otter reasonable terve to the Seourity Battalions (see detailed messages in tiles). On 8 September Panes and / entered Ialamata and ooatorred with the members of the Collaborationist Owversessat ter ever three houre..useueeessfully a44 then let for the nommulail again. Oa 9 September MAO attacked. Won, and then followed SECRET j",""r;? m+0,4 - -?? )4iW ' - pnr Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP 3X000 0100410006-3 It 1 40.111 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09!25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 4?1??,?" ,R?er (.1 171 ix ;immoral, we oporatod 44 r0110W41 Wo established our base tit 4 denso wood ono and ono.holf hours walk from Noldusse, jnst about 41 the point whom tho throo kstctes" or "Homes" or 0040.4. M4440414 44d L4404i4 meet. Mgt. X4444 WAR loft thore to keop nolo oontaot olth (*Ira and *Mob tho base while Pawn andI set up our inform*. titan systos and kopt oontoot with tho Andartecp Yor security miscue' wo hirod 40 help oor purehaeed mules thot would have neoossitoted having men orounn constantly. At NedussA we hed two members or the P0:4440 rangy oho did our buying ror Us Ab K414M4S4 and also 44,40d 44 40tvt0130 ror our agents, Adios, Alkie and Norge. 4 BO 410 Or r04114140111 1064145 cooperated vory closely with 40 In rompeot to military latomation ocncernin& tho movoments or the aermans, inetallation and strongth of garrisons) and oleo let 40 quoetion thoir prisonors. uood thair information 44 a *hook on that gathorod by our mon Md vise perim? Th. SAM4LA$ organisatiln W*4 very woll organisad... and suvprielagly thorough for a guerrilla organisation. They had intiltrato4 well into the *0.410 (titles and MOW or their egants had good joillo with tho collaborationist government. In addition to 1141114LACI 40/110 44444tby tho Or *Wel Ald noolOY that wwg wcwwpolitioal. Miry gave UN valuable economlo informat4on 404 grfttly aidod us An eomptling our &mood* rsports turned in to our WA,* An Auguot, and later the poriodte reports OUP 114r4o4 tiegio DI addition to the sib souroos Alox Sonsios, A4rIoulturiNt 1-ttt? t ?14'? i..kt?to tit???? rah ''P s Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001 R0001 0041 0006-3 -4 . Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? ? . ..011114.e.'14, ??? ? ? 1 Office Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT may Director, OBS TO ' through Chief, SI DATE: /1143" John S. Patseas SUIJECT: Report on Field Conditions -- Helot Miamian Greeoe AA at I did in the field 1. ..!..............._____DfrocathettnitedStates and assignment in Cairo: ? ? On 17 Deoember 1943, left Miami, by air. Arrived at Cairo, SS December 1943, =dyes loaned to Schools and Training. Instructed at Cairo school from 3 January 1944 until 30 May 194/4 taught SI subjects and gave special briefing to agents and operatives leaving for tho field. Instructions were in English and Greek. Period of 1-216 June was spent in Bari and Brindisi, Italy, taking parachuts oourse and preparing mission for entry into Greece. Arrival in Grew's: On the night of 25 Juno, our Mission, comprised of Panos Sakellariou (Captain, Greek Air Forc*), Sgt. Charles Danes and myself, were dropped on Mount Taegetos on a small field near the Tillages of Medusas. and Dirsehion where we were received by two members of a British mission, ?Carpenter., who helped us a greet deal during our first days in Gree. Pamos and I made first oontaot with the RAM-CLAS at Dirachion, on 27 June, and we were well received although it soon, became obvious that we were to be watehod ?constantly and that an effort would be made to ?educate' us. This, however, was disoontimued about &month later, whom they were convinood we were not involving ourselves in internal polities. SECRET 0 ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ? 01. L. Departure from the lAtl,ted States and Assignment tar Ire Z. Arrival in Crime* 10 Method of Operation 4* lour.* of lnformation 46 Pitt in Negotiations between BUS and Security Battalions I. Motivates after Negotiations were Finished Comditiona in the Field that Right be Zmproved 1* Cooperation between Departments 14 Radio liquipment 11* briefing 4* Seourity Speoifie Diffieulties of Whieh X Personally neoame Aware ? ...-WW.in-CfffiCA-434+:....1P. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 . Declassified and A?proved For Release 2013/09/251 CIA-RDP13X0 0001R000100410006-3 OFFICE OF STRATliGIC SERVICIIS WASHINGTON. Eh C. Dirpotor, ?trio, or dtrabegto 800JX0Ti Report on Floid Conditions, mr. John 8. lektiloal le Attached herewith report or Wu) woo oonb rrom Cairo to Orefooto. ono of our best field mon. lb Is felt aro reasonable knd oonotructilve. to say that bhp great importance or supplying our field team. le now kpprooletod knd r000lvin$ deserved sonsidore- 3 ketoronoo paragraph 04, Page do the quiok. shan't, roalno theroln deseribed certainly damonsbrated no profound planning 44, inspired Ingenuity. 4. Ur. Wows hao boon asoignod bc 11411-10I to servo al an instrnotor in OI in (Mink. Cnr Pease 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R00010 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 a ? ? ? - ? . ? 4.1 t7'. The Director Seeretariet leports *Mee Metursee Report, SEVET ? UNITED STATES GOVElt4INItiE Chlet et witeloto mission that parachuted into Oraee 47*. 044) 114%. Altoona describes his adventures and acmes., shAshmeits la geed Weil) both in gathering intelligence on the Germans and in Worts tc avert battles between MLA' twee. lad Soeurity lattalions? 4 ? a 1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 a Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3 ?,. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100410006-3