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Document Creation Date: 
November 3, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 30, 2013
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October 30, 1943
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. ? - 1-4.01.-1?11, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Mr11:10-x i. vAt, '441: M". rv4 'ii Utn Jo onovan$ ,4 3t.rmtwi:1 clAilooa# tt,1--Itct-r01)4(:. '7 I ^ , Win t 1' ,.? ' 1:..,` ' -il'ut 6140 itOttt -4060-1. 0411,4.; t,,ttliti IrOt4ik dio,no;,' , ., 1 , ; ,,,.. gotte--;110'cnoti3O isioto 6.40,14 o-ivi. Ittqf,torl ktft tittol -. A 4 _ ,,,?,41_ let, , 1 ' - Li ?? :'i. ' .113 QV 01.4r. tifthltli ! ...'--.11-tiM MI 4.1Atilt, .1)ta i 4 hi,3.4.. 1 -op- , ?;,.4,,, . -ka.'t r '' ? ' ../?,-'2-'40',..:' .L.Tr-'-:;- 1- ',. 4ititn v.i.olto: ii., ot4 igtil .1411A I h., olli., 1 Its * ',a.- ''''t? 401i, -1 .:.,4,.. ,t-, 1141040,11004 d0Alt41 voL013wi 1.-IPtii , , ,., : alluoitsiA V) Vtttl 4 41}3.-04 0 1 k 14644 A4AtIll ub?othitio. vitlt-1-i-Q1, pu. ,Otitlii IVA q11,..-91481 tri-; mott ? 011 (1. .4 ' t.). i i',:, t 1-14,, I, ,IIA -?):''',Inill ' ? - - do til ttitlig JO P '1:. I fiRki . iie ' -. tfrtilop04 it vm 1 : 9 dlip6.44,4)46 ttW A i "i k!Ali: P I tiktV lain 0 4 - i4 C., 4,t) I 11 t1.1 i, 1 v, till' til, akilt1-11 1)kti 6 Oil 04 ,;11 Ai ttAtt itpli.ibt.ilti ,Itialliffi4t,7' 6.' , '1;tt?i',,:.scAt', ? l'' ! .1', . ' tl, .1 '.... ,''''?t??-.... !. , r r i I i.r) r 4 .f",;vr,,a.- ' '''' - :: " . ! - : ;. At Vtit4-1.1 ? -, i A' -,ji ?:. , l'.4 ? I .!!!)''''' '' it t ,' .. f , -" 1 i r '-' ' i , :' -,, .,.. 1 0:'-- 0 4 4 - I, I-00081700 1-00011-0000XC 1-dC1I-V10 : oc/60/oz eSeeiei JOd panaiddv pue pewssepea IMPIENIMINIEMIEMBREIM- nefebM g- ? , ,1,.t ? e (1441.4414 ; Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Apvtl A00 1P40. tie mti tiotiti?s,ro t=1.&Itit hrophy (IA I 1it11141%401 MO 11P. NA NioAjailti Tito 000tyoto or Mortiot tow ottil Ws Mt J uovoromoliti lo Howolt. l'ep pit fin, or ttnwol I I, ti MIsu11, 14 ript, 01 Vie PriAJOIV lot+ tiomp sato movtiioi 1 itAW rop Any tetioth or time io taloa ototosly or lo to hhotiont witih tho wtooptitnno gif ad. or Amor tho divti %Imre ovotoeI ?y b%ti ho wol V$'1 id ot othor ift0.0 o roo tiovb 1 iJi?t taie I iy bho 1140 Iri6 womb omArito writ tto wttu bo p1n44 tmloti !.4P1 f1 lows Ui wi1t toms. bho PIO oihoti 1)400010w, fitioy hholati tio woo tho livivtim1. low, Ito arrooi4 owl tiho worhinam tir 1-1110 MtlItory uovorommut tioisoll Ity cow p0000roh AIM y m topoPboonii e Ph nifty imviotto t4toto fltulito ottoe ii cnn hiit Viti VP) 1101 I I,131011 IXI milk*I t 41111 vou4Aomontio oh mail hr owls. 3 s (temoroi gmmvItn Vtarooblv opprootobo tr o tihoPottith !AMY clotilwotoot on.optis hoi4i )r I:3m witfq, td t) MI Mirk! lags rotisultIot or's"! will. Vc3 Vniti tifAliiltt rilinit @KpartSe nooh otti(V. tot ho) nollo (4 Ws AT) WI poi MA 11144 or the) opattobitmo to howotto mhootel ho involual@is Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 r.h.t - t v-,11:14 4 ININOMMIN911111 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 - 1 ?. ? ? e "r. tl-tt ? ,1 17. WI??? ' 6 ? 1-, ? , 7 1 ?-? . !,; ? ,;#4.? - ? ????;?,1, - .;7' - ? - _ 1,4 ? I ? Rater 4,1'41 ?,? ? ? JApAnoato toreitsu.,Itigtmt ? ' -ty e 'Ell 0'1140 r ? ? . ? ^ It' ? ? 111 -49I if ? I e t-4.2 Th15 In n pot iii1i4pi-GOARri3 ,,A ylo way 10.1itill-eiJiwmoptodrwa,:!Vitliltilt? 1 Ittni 114 , PrdilitItItqd It 10 ?711.1.0 ' ittOV 401. 'fttiter''',--W,' if ?10.4 011it hAt would be exooecit y 'istApi.0 , ra4:141vo proport1( AtOwntion,and Iv, .plarOC ., m;t oab'y ?' t.t'*t.;'''-i.' ' /071 y .t_ t "erttgr ti 4fIV .1 n t hk,i Iti land V op.r4v.tigai .i5:41 , , i d car 3)4r t j'ArilliMi 6 ; under arizg' .40 ' 34.5f. 00,40r1-00 1441. -i Thono Ara the nvitgrowth oPlikte , 41,4-14isitioll.1: ororteen Attet 11/4)110e Department i'. A littill " - wool I probAbly products ,anp:thitir t. ritotil, Arnteti mon alle being. ?geed ag;;;Abar.Jti. Thoy mtiv widor monotant -6Urv:4411,4A90104n it-11,4410a eV Out br oak; irfeul,d be, ft amigo e ttOti.f). ?Or-, , ,r It" lflte opinion of moat 'mtary milirl???thaV?-? t)0 alit by t troop a the 411pmenC'116111t*N0411:2.i.',h,fiV y throat trivuel ens, Moreover. tlixtY-i'ulight Ue. otutrid or IA 10p10110 Intorna3 troublomow le arotre'''c khAlt tho' wn tkteititbro.ak ANonii tho Joodatinot ? MW.1011" And eithPo rot' Aro 6t the opinlIon ibit pran- ?." ? 9, I, 4101y 01,017 Ilftn of thiln potip votuntoor ? .1 ropotem borvi00 tx it wttra AgAinet the Oormana or , ft01i ttnit. 'rho !NI op 4000p ttimi remitad Honor, lldv. viola bo aumonted by porhuoe thml matrmWe at) fr' r oon 4* Tha ition Wire are wo13 t rained-444 properg: etorrigi Am mg% Id prfikAbly aboorb the Otaillernila 0,F.tItierint no the) wIthin A row monthffil witb trainin$ 4:#1:tonfl *IP Nt;w 4MA4-fia, Witty nhotAO'be An effoetive rtrbi 1411411, Thay arm ane4 'be hob Otm4her and tale. LT1,,i GC 011114te4 thoo. wo1114 oroUbly moot in the mlddle oort 1.)rig d nACOO Wattlatil. MUM4 ?And!, :IgItoro Watt; trOOpilg Andiwotild mak* eroOlvt 1104'0' Thp. 'lotto In tb6 m11416 ;it, n iiLlOpOeittAtite 4tmedpolob It wotad AOOM A Mitlarqlg ?Joi j ,leti r rtUti Vo born Jewtinetae tight 1114 tihe GertanD le) rtitio4 t prevent 1117 poyAbologiM11 mien ,h0" ' 'Alo?ofl t;111t4Atial :!NipkrIefuro a44-1.burl omit? jit siima velri 44w0i.whoro tohere wovad 011 4 'WI I 4,411/0 llOte A: 1JQJklUtlattf.4, r LiS,1 WW110 trnmA144444 06414itto bho 04m:wit of 04' .rz;.0w43ftel 151^,114 'p Ly ba ottogtivl riAhtIng ' (.0m0 rtt 4n 4pri4Ang Iftvaftitins ohmal hava kflist-441t Pr4PdiftlY144 4114W03 ot#311 Atikft in tton mi141ft tionet 0 won.41401plinikti- _ q.e.thmt110?fl un'A. Wata or Jtarimely troth/A ,., ,Nrr:4;14 I-0410404m .4Fir 11,17a-44.1.?4, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Attached please find a memorandum from Alex Budge. Mr. Budge, I believe, is on of the most influential and biggest men on the Island today. He is President of Castle and Cooke, President of the Hawaiian Sugar Planta- tion Association, and, I believe, is President of the Matsui Navigation Company. He has no axe to grind, is just a real patriotic citisen like you and my- self, and his criticism is, I believe, quite timely. No, obviously would rather not let too many people know that he has written this memorandum. thought it should be brought to the President's attention. _ AFru- Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 111111 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 - IeNeset t There ultimately must be a wOrking central Orakandi: ,40oid.4,nated,ai-? between the Arm and Navy right down the line this oommand sholil4'adt*U1., out rear- or favor as to civilian, Army or Navy pecreonnel,., Smdh ,S .0601msnd must overlook sentiment, must overlook rank, must'reeognise abilitvandiriono that ability authoritr to go to mork. ; To be effectively defended, Hawaii must be recognized as a war:sone- and military and naval precedent and redtape eliminated. The Vilitery Governor sod haw:, an able representative in Washington, who can call on any depart. malt of the government to aid in clearing problems which arise. The Military Governor should be able to communicate with this individual by telephone at will. It so happens that because of redtspe and cuMberaome gyatem, I have done a great deal of telephoning to our offices in San Francisco and Washington on behalf of the Army - particularly with reference to supply and shipping. ? f It has bcen apparent during the past few months that while!techniCalrli under Tarttibl law the Commanding General can do whatever he wants to expedite defeneet actually Washington has let it be known that'll? has to be very wary of Feder-41 statutes and normal administrative department*. As a result, there is . a hesitancy to act because of a fear of criticism from Washington. The General In Command under martial law should be advised from the 71r. Deoartment that he is to act in accordance with his best Judgment and not nave any hesitangy in IRO doing. He should know that the War Department will naek him and hip actions as against the criticism of other and possibly more oolitiPally-ininded departments. Vartial law nes narried on exee:Atonally well, all things considered, tr Ty opinion. Hever, again we have a reaidue of civil government which is loath to act, inclined to play politics and by not acting throw a monkey-wrench in th,/ mechinery of progress. Thie must finally be made cooperative with the nerviv:es, withatt respect to dignity, title and politics, if we are going to do a lele. There are too man, authoritieu out of Washington operating locally who Inrt reeognAze the necessity fo: coordinating everything througn the Military peeeener'e office. Teis must finally be achieved. The Commanding Gtine.ral in Hawaii, from a tactical standpoint, covers a trotendone arob. lk thould not he boteered with the details of administration e! the talitary :!nvernorfa office. Thte work should be delegated probably to a vith adelinief,rotive experience, in Whom the Commanding General has &boo- , !:!enridence. The one woeld then be free to devote his time to the tactical :,_svAnd and ita rtipisIbtlittftsi, and the other to the adainietrNtive raw /manta offlees *11:7h bro many and varied. MANI Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 7.??? 1311111121111 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 s? _1 U orders issued from Wash on, to adMinistrattve dptnii !)-le Territorial or Federal governments loeatta ehould,be- sate lutjeet to the approval of the Commanding General, A definition oe the duties of the General Staft and those of the. ,Iffice of the Militury Governor Should be made to prevent overlapping and repeti- tion of effort. Streamlining is a good re)rd,, Army and Navy training aed routine does not permit direct line through -,m,nectionA with action. Something will start at the to of the line, a portion cr 4h0) story mAy be elven to a civilian, then it in token up by another department mid finally there la the probability of a eolossal mistake became? the whole -ro,-lem was not 1.aced in any one individual's handa to Ivo* out, as it mould be ordlnAry commercial life. In other worde, a General m4y carry on so far, then a colonel picks ups MaiOr comes into the picture, then a Lieutenant, and hero possibly MO rA,n.ks froaxd for any Pacif!c wart and of clmrse the cross- w%ic- praCtically all cupplies ane troops 7;a:- 1!,), reaf-htIvt fortcific frot..:4; In entablishing an )f:Ici; :1.6re care erxr,ild be taken at; all times to point out t- ilyr%r a4t..oritiea thAt our f?Anction is to m-yro!n,!t,n riLlanci al.gmant and not to d pose or 118pol/seem; r.e. mre, rfsal17 a CA;arternanter'/I store for infOrnation ,ne! sne not mpor :5entayiie atma to out 7-1 }t'J-fr .1-Y4s11!gence carvIcesm Ihoever comes out Nu;lber One man In thle offfee ahemld haVe a good _z1,vre?7 Irnloy? ; ? 0:4 4,r ?ST/t 1-4,tr,9 or lePft trp wiao-v,14 po the fr% ei20*-..m 'a IT- f:apt, t 1 / *rit ? - f;T:, at tbot a re,t'ler th.s.n 11T7,0 name liat4Onluen cia77, rf:r:14,p5 bot-V name cro. Sweat tbfat If 1.1ot e'll-zr,flt sway, -oe roill$P1Ored itn -7;- tnF..c -11.jor and alt az iialgoni bettmen the .'.olrpr a/AA, inftlrect2y, ttv, nvoo ? fay ,4,V17 r54, :speilfr as Clv11 evA ! Altit cipkofty7 ?11 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 7". 4111,s arKIK.,1 ;;?'"1 "??? - 41.-"Eti 4,40 l'e44 - 7 !-- , ified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Figg4Mar mt,40.1 r.igt-1 3 ff*r:ii,11 ' ? ? ? ; 1 , ' 0' WWII NOMA Ds IL Oolamol Donovan Attiorton hlohordo iluguaV 01 1046 t t ;??"' -, ? , Jatitt WATA4N VAPPWION8 001WERNINOmiOUTOOMffl OP MART*. an..51; t alM114.110Zr 3; A ktionbor or twomotonm ditrivod by tho wvitor Pram persona 4416twit4I44otingovAtionfi# daring A fi1A4f in Honolulu o ihdirt - i014,T4 In tra$0 001 413# oubltrold Weir* 114 obtoffipt id Mittli, te' ;,040ait lgeAt AlmogontOn or Winilod ottitIV of mtPtial law,and Hg-g orraoti, Tho romorko Oloh roltow# r@lato In moot Inotmoon mtsIttvri Golohening thn 1@lond a 001tio motut.141 14w woo prooloimod tn TerriOry or Haw411 folloWn iHr pp,1014mAtjan lootiod POWIMWEI 7# 1041# by tho Oovernor of tho T4p,ritory ot4 itownii# whoPoin 1i i towo otalto4 von thp Oommnding (10110P4i, HftwAttan flopqrbmotai to prtri-qeit # 0 it 0 inywilonj "4 dk, hoposv amapon4 tbo pvivilog4r tiho writi of noboho t-oppag twithhe noblool sido hproby plftoo tho 4Aid Toevttory. unclor EfortiAt "AM t ao hott#44 outhorlto and poquont Ultio Oommanding Oottlar4lf i411,41.1,411 00P4PhOtalltp duritig himOvenimb *MOO oneY Ahd thA 4nogor Qr Invoolon tiromovod to oxoro oft titt ti-so soWMOtty 44)XtirOiht04tiMft 411 tOVOPUOPI "imul t 4o ratftor antihorino aod rostmot tho maid Oommondo Inv 14,114t,of UntyaMnilooetmont0 opd thon* ombovdinate -tflittary tO ValoM mAy aplooto tmoh AuthoPity# 414piv 010 mhotIont omorgowly gitn4 titt1 tho Ungor or inv*mton lA row4v040 4AorgtaoIEfl puitorr$ oommlly imorolood b 44t0A1 otnloppo ovloywo# or tido Tooritorr 6.04 o. -41i1 - Aktt Qtt tita t, ea t anil a aitpaP 4g4 th4 04.ormuloy fool= 14010rol 0 0 * 47 61- *MI6 Cr4 hi ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 n?14.9.E.MMAIDLIff ? ma= 10 Exmination or tho genoval ordord :toned by the Military Governor (up to Jr 17# 1942) disol000d the promulgation of Poguu 14tione, oontrolling In major ratihAon, dlrootly OP indirootiy, the ocionomlo ao4ivitioo onci wollpboing or tho entiro ?Within populations The Vollowing mattoro dwolt with thoroin aro oitod ao tlluotrative r th6 4000 or thnoo ctqw)ral ordoros and their appliotttion to iltan Wairet ao civil eourt uotivitioo and autboritloo APO pr000ribods All oil:mina.), 04?14, whothov efooting tho military 000urity Or tho Virrttnry or obbovwtoo, Aro hondlod by provoot oourto prom aldnd ovar by oorvtoo pormon010 Wo juoy t,vialo aro permitted. Poroonn havo booft hAld in ofmrinomont t000mmuntoodo, for A mitribOr Or licAyMe rut' violattoo or iowo not afrooting wIlitttry 4 ) ? amonrity, I./Strout prorormont of ohorgens Portionn OUP probihktad Prom onitina, doltvovIng, or raualgIng any otimmoOtty In violation tir ony mAximum prio* rogulation Or priOn mohodnlo intuod by Lim Mi1tbary Ovvornors Many olviltan wagoratoo tufa ottpulaLado nrood nofio tri-F1 la axaro14441 war labor oval') to tho extant or proonvibm tnn t141 followines "Ally In4iviehtal row or horotift4r omployod by Wooltlnd omployqrm) t fl0 It who r*iln to rapnrb lOthin m roanonAblo Um' thorogrtor, to tam Job te3 whloh ho la oraorvd b7 bin ompinyeep 01411, upon fotivi(Aioni h4 Tle444 tlat morn then WO or be Imer prioonod tor not motto tbAn two montho, or boW0 a, t000d lawa o guakblinhad and WIWI Otia nLopa opoolfied taw, eartath otraota, 44, fiolt,006 r bfliAi11111: tiMatilittristAtttlolliti htiVV bOtOrl /Undo .e? 44iFr,4"?=1'f'' ?1* ?,*?-? ??? t77,1FT? nAciassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 41..= ? to Rules and ronulationi have boon enunciated eovering tho sale and distribution of gasolineu g- A pork center (made up of two private oorporations) has boon ontablinhod and donignated an the,sole distributing norm, for tho purohAeo, slaughter and distribution of island hogs and pork for ronnle in tho Honolulu area& he A privkte oorporation is designated as the sole super. vloory agonoy for tho produotion and dietrIbution of misa food rrom I witsrn watora. (A markod shortage of moat has existed on Oahu and prootionlly all finhins from bot e in prohibited nxoopt alabloot to th000 rogulations. A matoria livine coot in ihun datorminod.) 1. Tho uao of pork in any form in proparing hamburgers In prohroltod? 4.7 2. Conoldorution la boing givon to froozing oivilinn employee' to thettr rurrent positionn and patron of pay, Tho roguluLlon of prootitution in Honolulu Imo reoently or am itunad by tho provoat mnrohal and military polio?. 4, no autual adminintration and intorprotation or gonoral order!) ront3 In tho hando or tho40 44* Drown, in many inatannea, from civil life (often om tiuninomo inatitutione or with afftliationo rinnnoinlly or oth*rolso afrootod by thoir deolainnn &uid aotivibioa) b. Whoo military bookground hnn,in moot oanoo, pro- v14od exporienoto to oope with t,ho 000nomio and problomo rulod upon 490 411I.MO 0111 3* Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 An analytle 1 review wolad wear to be warranPod to lpperr mine whether the all-inslusive military control mecourOso norr operating under the jurisdietion or tho Military Governorp plfky ligpt livito hostile critioipm or Army utreinistre.O.on in Waallia09p a.nd eloewhoret through Citation or the pattern and ovtoome or Martial lavf in 4twd I, af a rsaaonable rorooast or what my ?sour to soMe ot4or American coituntinits ohould it OhanQ40 ti Qom suestdonly within a ho3tilitle3 (a highly elastic Arca 4efinition When vlewc,* t)4 the light or aeral warfaro) /11-conoldered aotion or subordiLato corsonxtel A Temporarily absorbed Into the ovganizcAlon or tL0 L111 Levy Ovvernor, mid whose financial efVairs und rlituro mAy be influoncod bI the adminis tvittion and ' intor- retation of gotioral option) natured and inexperienced in 000nomio and civu adminlotraLivo probloms mao mtne inoquitit,0 of withal th* MIlitary Govornor would unal4kroo but for wILich tho any vioulli WI hold rouponniblo? MILITAn) 4)11116-1.1a-aqinalga-IHRIPP... oxiowd little Indioation of tiny desire to question tivo o.,411votion o sivIneso or military uonLrol. No evidence wa7.i apparoa 0V aTu gpeup dAsoussion, outlining oonditionn or vuturv vgitich witi.t. 1)0 doomed uppropriato for the repossession c1,it I-104to glany exproomed willini;ness to forogo oleotiono 1?watolli 4o404.tiod for thp noar futuro. 4. ? ' ? ' 11.5. npclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001 _Ill: c' ? Min Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 24 By virtu* or tho rigid military eontrol of all Would 4 outward freight movomont, of looal prioec knd through other 411-ino1ualve resolationns loofa bucinecn le oomplotely under Lb* domtnanoe or the Military Governor and aetn acoordinglyi 3, Large agrleultural and corpora:be bunineco organigationn Wive boon outntandImay eooperative In providing perconnol, eq4p$4 mant nnd otholl raqi1itledv for dorenne AotivLtioa. 4. Moo* omall tnloinoncoo width aro not catering from Inot or noruhAndiim throw)) priority aoaroltious are enjoying highly ppotit4b1o opovat1one4 6, Nopligiblo oondidoratton In hoIng given by buninoam 10 1 It to utitiga toderal n1* i4 tkeir oaphbilitions to flnantui find oonotruot at an appPoPvia46 tint? in tno futtwo, ruci1.1t1t40 tot. 1cml iwoduation at matorinln and 4upp1ioal flooded durint tha ouvrotr', orrtargonily; anti potonttully oil uonaltiarable vnitutiiiow,I flr. with 14ntiolpot6d tor4 Loplal 1)001...witty omploymont prbi4nrn, Pii0011,6:j 1. '7ftdual I tn Indiontod thAto at, Inntit OHO out. of :orA43a ?itC,orad 00 Lho alrootn or n000ltau tiath 4 /1014103' c,r 124iior. -4.14111;0ot oft:: on" dtayo tinier Ind 1,41mo Ga wal too MAtikti ? 1'1'140'41)6111y thr, e4itsiro b440h APOI or Claim la litold with :)Pb tbiro ep 110144 or rtro aro aloovo4 ror maohino a7n4 and -0 t)4tm trtplod. r411;/. aro oonoupnlodo Pc.l Vr?qt; 91.0 orftwdod Iiimniq Innttobohlie narlaccifiPri 2nd Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 MOM _ 4. Bidden and camouflaged artillery posts exist on man of the mountain ridges, commanding bays and beaches. 5. Every civilian haw has been required to construct an air raid shelter adjacent to the house. Practically all parks and school ground areas in the City of Honolulu are also provided -with extensive air raid shelters. 6. Civilian organizations, made up of many hundreds of Individuals, htve been developed for the handlins of evacuation from congested aroas, hospitalization, gas attack, fire emergency, and to provide extra police and accumulate a blooa bank. 7. Over 00 percent of a computed six-months, reserve for c!.vilian food requirements has been accumulated. A seed supply has been stored for emergency use, for local production of a number of Important food products. 8. wide15- scattered depots have been filled with construction aupplis and vaterials for the Army and Navy. 9. Tile writer was informed that the U. S. Engineert in charge of Army constrretion activities had mrrently on their employment rolls over 20,000 persons. 10. :nformation was received that on other Hawaiian Islands, defense preparations were being rigorously carried on and would soon upprc,ximate Oahu;s strength. FERTPINiNG TC RE3IDENTS MO ARE JAPANBSE ALIENS OR ARE OF AllaSTRY AND ELEMENTS ASSOCIATED, THEREWITIL 1. A l&rge proportion (possibly exceeding 50 percent) of cot-Awn aad artisan labor used on defense projects on Oahu, are of thts cls.. Defense work would be seriouPly hampered if such were certralp jrdbs, the Japenese aliens are excluded. 6. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 .- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 e? 2. Bawalian National Guard mats which were on duty, and contained a large number of this group were withdrawn from the seashore and strategic areas during the Midway battle. Approx- imately 1,000 from this racial group have been sent to the midwest to serve there as a military unit in uniforme 3. A proposal, recommended by Army authorities and G-2 in Hawaii, has been forwarded to Washington to permit a volunteer force from this group to be inductedr for active military service in non-Pacific areas. No rejoinder to this recommendation has been received. It is possible that lack of an answer may arise from the non-desire of Army headquarters to provide a precedent for the handling of special racial groups (which might be embar- rassing in view of the request of Jews, Poles, etc.) The transfer from the Territory of this volunteer force (which has been estimated might number 10,000) is looked upon as having major long-range implications in territorial population trends. 4. Conduct of this group has been most circumspect since December 7th. Besides the operation of normal law abiding in- fluences, the group has been constrained by the known inclusion in concentration areas in the Territory, of a considerable complement from their number, the black-out and curfew laws prevailing, fre. quently repeated comments of recently arrived U. S. troops concern- ing what they were prepared to do to the group, and the publicized action or aentries, the result of whose unheeded challenges, had brought inatantanoous fatal shots. 5 Young wombers of the group have been organized at the requeet of local authoItios, to assist in wfaclaating their group fron congested eas, and to handle thAir casualty and indigent cases; itCr' -?? rifdz anri AMMVed For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 r=z7.41-44r- 111*.i4 -rsz?ret. ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 60 'Responsible military And civil authoritioa voice the ?pillion that tho situation portainirel to this group is well in hsnd and has been erroctivo17 handled. TRUCX CROP PPODUCTXON, TVRNITORIAL ACREAGE MVO= THERETO, AND Lump INVOLVED THERM 1. Out of approximately 260,000 acres normally devoted to corporate sugqtr and pineapple produotion in the Territory, it was rtaiably reported that lona than 1,500 acres were allocated to producing truck crops aa of July 1, 1942. *.? 0 Approximately 2,000 acres in addition, ao of tho same date, is being turmoil to truck crops by small growers. 3. Th.1, aforenoted acreage tn truck crops (approximately 3,500 acres) reproaenlin about a ono-third Increase in poreage as compared with n year preview; (pro-war). 4. Using the month of July an a comparison, it is estimated that July 1q42 hervent truck crop production of only approx- imately 10 porcont greater poundape than wnn eatimated was pro- Ouced :'or July 1V41 (approximatoly 5027b,000 pounde)4, b. While adoquate ohippinf.; rocilition from the mainland are frocA3'md to bo available, military authorities are not pressing for local production. rrimary raanono rivon for tilts non- ntimul&tIon of love' Loh crap production, arc the convequent elimination of demand_ for the Importation of bulky fertilizer a.no lnneotiolde requirements, and the 1.0(141 shortage of labor/ C. There hap been n noteworthy non-000rdination or importa- tic,nv rrum thot mainland, with maLurIng local truck crops. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ovor.ampOy Lao rosulto4, with ruinous prises * oonicaumos not) a largo mount awantages It Wow,. AppoAra to bm no forookating of roquirammilta Por tetiak crop pro4u4o by alm Army and Nan,* No oombinad purohAaing 4e0107 w44 round, LAoking ttpraarantss of puvohamo 4 gtvon voptity. 4 opoottiad prim', or A poriod ln which dolivary 0: pr6doot wo1.414 bo cwooptad, largo Agrtoultural intaramtm AN) withm foot an,l, inpantivo for produoina tvooh oropm, 0, WM no raliAblo tntarmia3an1 Mapping m000mmodationm up Wiil. dohodulom afVordodi oontadarabla eottint.. of truok orop prodmio hom oncluod th tho otawtdo 141Anda (etbor bhan OfthOs V. It wtim vdpoPt04 that' only omall groworm hAd the* voquini6o oxporipm,0 to ppoottoo t*t*teti4U I i'X3.1 truolf oNspn* 1. Inctloationo woro p000lvod thut Ulm O. Mi VInat and Navy tklittivEtnit 13 t 1'0 40t-A lifjt (3011(441-qt t00111 W1 MI th0 poltotan oppviotono or tho Mllitkvy OUVPMOVe P44 tivOrloritIn ot thtl loo41 4otivit1oa iut1 pvwry4mo ,k;,0 p,0.1, hp thely portnin Lo tho LolAnd population, ham 714.tWi proviaoa rt).1. taidor Lho cJrt lidtmo or 0.11. it ffon roi.tirtnei t441, 40,1v1ty twivtirdti 41l1plirlod oemanlmam ?,,ion or 101Jov al) dotoflmo pujooto 1444 oatiapti ator D000mbov 4. mnthunlotont WW1 MAIM+ Oh tho inapt, or oltivaltin 000141,0tod, .ii.,1,4athoomorit tho uptotoltititiont fir um now '.Vorritorimi JtI11r,0 anlb6tioh. ,f1Wk tho rovbrifth 011/11 P43+ 1 S fir C. olJnntruotion mntAvity, and ova. 4Ate1110100 mminly orapttitorl, m How oyoto 4ormion to 041 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 1111111111111111111 ot4htftWoo tho MilitoTIAB614 Or moral@ in it vollOibly in Vo Aofto# will OthotibUto a oefitilderablA ppoblom$ TWA oaoom* of tho moofit Mithlty bollttls, brought An imitiOd A103. loVadowl4 1.11',32614.0 - - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ? COORDINATOR Or 1NFOPIMA1ION INTEROPPICE MEMO rtmoft Captaft Doering To! Colonel Donor.= SUOJECTt AZIOXIMUMAjajbargl F Pv? X r DATE July 21, 1942 have examined with a great deal of inter4st Mr. Mchards, memorandum doted Julys 6, 1942t which was attach to your memorandum to me dated Jul 18th. I have no doubt that the conditions which he describos prtsent very serious problems for tho military authorities. However; in my opinion, this subject is not within the scope of the duties assigned tc this office, and any suggestions from us, unless carefully handled, might be misinterpreted. It is my recommendation that if any action it takon in regard to this matter, it should be done on a purely Infcrmal basis. 1 am returning herewith Mr. Richards' menorvn4um, together with an article from Harper's Moraine on the Army's future political power. nu's. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 MIN Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R00010048000e. 1-1 v ' NALL.^1rUG.:.4-62..;-.1.4 Aga.' Woili&L7.34....1L.T.ivi. THE ARMY'S FUTURE POLITICAL POWER BY HAROLD NI, FLEMING D. mi. likely that the Army will take con- I trot of the country after the war? Leaders of our armed forces have, with startling suddenness, betotne the largeat buyers of goods and Nervicea in the United States. They are now the largest direct handlers of man power in American his- tory. They are the largest customers American industry has ever had and they are spending the biggeit stIM8 of money ever handled by any group in American hiatory. They operate the moat extensive mechanical equipment over men in any comm. ? cept in Ger. iii many and perhaps It 1i____ they have a hand In operating what soon be the largest merchant shipping fleet ht our history. Oniy two years ago the Army men were fighting, Congress for a couple of billion dollars a year; now they spend that much every twenty days, and the appropriations which are expected this amid next year to their maintenance and equipment will run to $150,000,000,000, Cr nearly twice the nation's entire hi. Cot in 1929 and five times its 1932 in- come. Only three years ago Congress argued over Army and Navy approprin- th0113 of a million here and ten millions there It recently passed an approprin- ti,att bil; of eighteen billion dollars with no more than is momentary hesitation in order to keep in mind its nominal control over the national pulse, Ail of this spells unprecedented poten- ti tti politictl power for the armed services of the United States. Within the year item!, set-vitro will be the employers, di- rectly or indirently, of at least half of America's man power, Thereby they have acquired also a majority interest in the methods by which the whole Amer'. can economy is runt in who gets how much, in the level of prices, profits, and wages, and in who hires, fires, and directs labor, threat of Army or Navy set- auto and operation now hangs over all labor and management, mince it was ac- tually exercised last year by the Navy at the Kearney shipyard and by the Army at the North American Aviation plant. Now there is talk of the Navy's taking over our merchant natrIne. The "industrial mobilitation plan" of the nitietven-twenties and -thirties was a recognition by such farsighted persons as Bernard M. Baruch that for effective war-making the Army and the Navy must take a direct hand in the ?minim. tion and running of the national econ- omy. "M-Day" never actually came off, but ch lefty been arie the distinction be- tween a state of peace and a state of war had bectIne progressively blurred from 1937 on. "Beyond a doubt," said Douglas Mac- Arthur seven years ago, "any unkior war of the fliture will see every belligerent nation highly organized for the single purpose of victory, the attainment of which will require integration and in- tensilicatIon of individual and collec- tive effort. Economic and industrial re- sources will have to assure the adequacy of munition, supply and the sustenance of the whole civil population. In these latter fields the great proportion of the . anri Annrnved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 . rifd Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 POORIMPRIMPRIPECIPIERIFIRRIFFinwilmiplIMErimmimmovemaimmown - TRH vimmild wiper, docribeA the dkattt Ore taI ihtitt: "It trit tOld the hot tiltplt out t Wtt3klopittq untitt lilaqket with well 4 lieu. bi LIigJim kif whit tittic kopt tayitig tti Oki) 'W e me tome or that blanket,' liut he wottldn't ltt -kw*. finally I ItrablA froto Ith 3ttt ity milt, I ttiutheti itls hand . ; It was mgt.( . hit wag dead the wIttAtt The pattol tpteat Is slip tiot adt% qthtahhottO vs:41vh%med. .tt a it tter t Seleittlq of tht Nnvy Knox last ttiarelt. Iviesitient loseph thttratt of the ritati-ohat lkItaritittat tJtiteti angoro:sted that Ow flootttf boittli MOO ttt which nit il?t)VV lkth be fitted mit tut rtt bmits the' :Want* tom, at was done thuirtg he last with The st,ottrt this Is door the bettet, TheTe Is no doubt t?but lt, the niet%. rttant ,teittnen took It :in the (shin tinting Ow !trio: holt' tf titbi tItt Witt% ottrott, antitInaked lireLelts, _and practically tro w.fety pteautiont. They citi* OVIt helpitg: targets for the sobs; bat thvir %notate viols at maw-4- ,441f tt wag tenheraltied That ittes vittit tons ate WM, bring lAk111 tk, Phlkt'et 1110.1'4 thltASII1 tteirfel 64eAll th*ir VOkirtage Ali tin. iiettftlett kttOtly whAt they are ihrittg thy ship out. Vet they 16-4-45 %In itattinz ltrvit.s.nber, they don't hare vet. 11A1 MN+ in the private trier- 14i ant 11%44'1:UN thi they ran (Oct any tittle ritev want to Most or theft% tontd vet Avpoid show kolt.s. wot-king tit ship- rtlYtt Wetcters i.!tted me, chant./ and mitat-nm, where ktie dna' worty wonM lit the iLltet rowitotre kin-owing a wrench on tiveir Feet immtev that keeps them Oa Ott tvnistuiirr **lit New Vs, yet 'Num. Ithev 4gtt a war t.mtrats whieh miotlat- oat to atottnil a day, Narelty 4.,ret% titikint !Awn- tar for Also the twAvett vty to At rtglittet form former rrtavertm 1.4.mfv.rivt, tv#IN veot4ktrt* Iktottlithe livAn aiive Wit; Itt4-41 T-11 rell, A few rittoldalu &o thNtthmal Mathittiblitittiii issued tti BRAWL' samba, Siete theft' over 21000 tit4ttlItita have tutted up to gap Wit ataliii huuthttit of them at the mitt% halt le the port of New Vorit ahme, tutioug them itlett who have httii hitt AI At,triem truek delvers, elect& dots oftitt workert)attort; tutisttottlati Voirketat tightit) *Am) mid bake* ThOtt wRiu htiVe beta torpedoed and istsidittti Alp right out agaiu as toou at they.euu get out of the hotpitai, That takes piettlit of fterves but the kuertitatit havti they don't get meth publitity, ttL b11 *eltlOkit ha t ahydrit5 hitiktirg speochtt About them, They don't get 11%* pt* to the theater or the ihtiNittiattI to tit* girrts dates Air them) with prettl voting attrestet amt. debt. tatttel hi entertain theft No one twi. thinks ninth about their "morale" th? how to keep it %Yip: It will. only recently that a Witt was pasted to give them kittams, And ban so th,ty wtat ottifortnt they don't even have the satit- fattion havirl people In the atteets and sttbwa k at them with respect when they It is not he seamenthentselvest, ate askit4 for any toetial et'-edit or hon. ors. When you mention words like heroism ott. pattiotimit to them they look enthartaxted. "Lime% brotherN there% XPtt on they say. Ashot, they fec. oitrentIy tyrttoiid that they are not brave at MLNot long ago I wat talking to a littAtt tAtikkil Windy, mAto had fast Witte bit 'ate' Dotal van and had been thased Itv a submarine for time days, "No OmN ot that for rtter saiO. "I ten yott4 way rty who keeps on sitip. pint klrege day* hat got IntiliblesInMs thitak,tattIA ?My Ica* rim is Orval St. Lovas n'arrittnati. I'm going to get tne a *tore Why ekniteatit mi otde at tw.iy avr We believed hint; anti ram. tre. of ot mold blame hint. Tire next ii,?ty 4yohrd tht Oh. vefiktt itttlitih, tie is vow on the t vex% en wart to Indic 121111MINIMINEINISIIIIIIIIIMI111111111 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/301 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Ti116 Aithil"S FUTUkt POLIMAL POWL14. 213 employable population will find its war duty." Foresighted military mett were evert then taking no hottest in matters once considered purely civIllatti, Stich MI they had never before taken ih Vertu,. &net or e'en In wartime except &tilt% the last war. If the services took such tin Interest in hitherto civilian altars in peacetime Woe this war, they will take a vastly greater interest In the civilian etotiotny after it ends. This time there may be no disarmament conferences except those car ed by the victors for the disarmament of the vanquished. Continued arma- ment for ourselves will not mean 3Imp1y the maintenance of a large standing army, but also the maintenance' of ti large degree of supervision over the civil ectmoitty by the armed services with a view to continued preparedness fist an. other total war When economic plan- ning becomes a peacetime habit it only be ei monde planning for national secu- rity under the close supervision of the Army and Navy The political wherewithal to support this new economic power will not be hard to find. Ily the end of this year the Army will have 3,600,000 men anti the Navy perhaps 500,000, and the totals are iiiated to go on up to 10,000,000 or more if the war lasts This will be a higher proportion of the population under arms than was ever seen before in AnterIran history. Those men Mean votes, not c.nly of the men themselves but or their relatives and friends. It will be the big- rest rIefiritite group we have ever known. After the war a considerable part of this Army will be demobilized, but it will not cease to be a political pressure group. he vete /title vote is one of the ()lent of all tortet phenomena, long antedating the actual fimt like Only the suciolo- gists seem to have overlooked it The am toed farmers of Athens drove their hop- lite formations through the Persians and went hone to ttifikt new economic gains. over amid over ntaitt tkmiughout history, iiho, members of a ViuttitititiS HMS, have hvoti un as a prz.sittte group, demanding and getting advantages' benefits' and sinecures. More simply 'Jut, to the Vita tors bkititig the Spoils, tit home att WO as tihrelatil It has been SU ttli through Otit otvit history Vetetatit of the kektualtItitii of the War of 1812) and tit the Meideitit War ail desired to be looked eller, The Civil War of course produced the (CAA., one of the biggest prthute groups of modern times. Pot thirty yeses ono the war the waving of the bloody shirt was deemed Indispensable to political success; high and low, the mettiu bers of the Grand Army of the Repulilic got theirs in the shape of pensions, laid granti, receivership: 7 and offices front that of constable to the Presidency. Iti, deed, the demands of the Civil War veterans finally outwore the public gratitude, and In the muckraker days the popular magaelties ran lurid articles about pension scandals and the burden Imposed by those whom "the nation tie- lights to honor." The Spanish War produced a President fbr us and a pension army of ita awn. The pensioners of the. First Worldr were most numerous of all and the !ideal influence of the American Leg mi was feared and courted, one of the most hopeless of Herbert Hoover's political blunders was his ejec- tion of the bonus marchers from Ana- made tiros There is nothing new flit oil about a crowd of veterans looking fbr lam gesse. Our situation this time, Itotve ever, is difierent. For the pressure group of veterans after this war may be so large as to dwarf all other pressure groups. The civilian's attraction to Army 11113 to-day, for peculiar social and econunile reasons, is grmiter perhaps than it has been In any other time In our history, and is in sharp contrast with the civilian reeliag toward Army life twenty-live years ago. Despite time superficial con- trast between twenty-one dollars a month In the Army and fbrty a week in the Me- tory, the financial comparison Is by no means as sharp as it looks. hut that Is It Millar factor compared with the lure of security to members of a civilian world which appears to be falling apart. A ...-?ees1 /Cid Pnr Release 2013/09/30 CIA-RDP13X00001 R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 214 HARPERS Twenty-five years ago men looked upon' war as a temporary interruption to an established way of life which they ex- pected to find intact upon their return from a purely patriotic interlude. To- day there is no such confidence, and the soldier has a feeling of being in a socially safe. berth. A younger generation enters the Army feeling that civilian life was never secure anyway. An older genera- tion of men looks for commissions even at financial sacrifice believing that the Army is the safest part of the community to which to belong during a period of bewildering social and economic change. Though history repeats itself after ma- jor wars in one way, in another it changes. Soldiers and veterans exercise grear power after each major conflict, bet they use it in si.fferent ways. The Athenian hoplite farmers wanted relief from debt. The English yeoman archers wanted currency depreciation and the freezing of rents. Criiit's veterans wanted homesteads andWnsions, and the veterans of the First World War wanted cash subventions. This genera- nen of veterans, it already begins to ap- pear, wall want sometaing else. That something will he the future peacetime equivalent of the present soldier's with for equality of sacrifice. This wish and its outcome were curi- ously foreshadowed after the First World War. Getting cash relief out of the federal government was only 4 part of the organized activities of the veterans of that war. The other part was "law and order" enforcement. The veterans took 4 conspicuous part in the battles between eapital and labor in such ways as the roughing up of the 1WW in the Pacific Northwest in the early 'twenties and the quiet preparation for strong-arm moves which helped bring a halt to the syndi- cid at sit-down fartkes in Detroit in the late *thirties. Somewhat similar fed lags p;row to-day in the breast of the enlisted man sold this commissioned officer. MAGAZINE Army men are already speaking their minds in this direction. "News of high profits," said General Ben Lear recently in Detroit, "of strikes, of stoppages of production over petty quarrels, bluffing and horse-trading, are blows at the bod- ies of American soldiers." "There has been a good deal said about labor," remarked General Brchon Somervell a fortnight later. "I'd like to say a word about the officials of big com- panies who are out playing golf when we try to get them on the 'phone. We've got to have the same devotion to duty from these men as management expects from ite employees if we are going to put this thing over." General MacArthur does not stick to communiqu6s on traditionally military matters. He follows economic develop- ments here even from "down under." He wires congratulations to men and managements of armament plants that beat their munition-making schedules. And the voice of the enlisted man is be- &no. ! to be heard. He writes to his Cong mouton, or more often his relatives and friends do so, reflecting his views. He comes into every home through the radio script of "This Is War" and is cited in the President's fireside speech. Shop certoons remind the factory worker that the soldier walks a long way for his twenty-one dollars a month. And this is oniy the seventh month of the war. Meantime the way of the civilian pres- sure group and special Interest gets harder. "Capital" loses ground as taxes cut deeps'. Into the profits and salaries which corporation managements them- selves fail to limit. Labor leaders have lost the right or power to call strikes, and the new general price ceiling makes any further 1;fting of wages unlikely except as sub-standard scales are lifted in an evens lug-up process. Hence labor leaders have little in the way of inducement to hold their members, and become de- pendent en awards of' the War Labor Board to hold their unions together through "maintenance of membership," maintenance of dues, union security, and rleifiQr4anri Annroved For Release 2013/09/30 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 4 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001 THE ARMY'S FUTURE POLITICAL POWER 215 so on. Price ceilings also jeopardize the position of the farm bloc in Congress, which faces more determined Adminis- tration resistance, defection of farm or- ganization support, the conflict of interest between grain and dairy farmers, and adverse public opinion. More and more also, economic clues - dons once settled by the push and shove of competing legislative blocs are coming to he settled by administrative author- ity acting on obvious war needs. The sugar-quota system was once an annual political frce-for-all among different pro- dueling interests for a share in the sugar market; to-day the supply, not the market, is subject to quota and along lines determined by the Office of Price Administration in order to effect the greatest economy in transport. Sec- tional blocs once struggled over the pork barrel of river and harbor improvement, power dams, and transmission lines. To-day these things are allocated largely on Arategic and economic patterns, and Congressmen must go hat in hanci to the WPB or the Army and Navy authorities on the shrinking hope of wheedling a war plant into the home bailiwick. Few housing plums remain accessible to po- litical pressure; defense housing must follow the arms plants regardless of votes. This is a one-way trend, and in large part it means steadily more power for the heads of the armed forces. All these things add up to the prob- ability of frozen wage scales, horizontal price control, rigid profit (imitations, and rigorous rationing. Such moves may be on.ly a beginning. The recent sensa- tional letter of William Beveridge to the London Tunes may have meaning for the United States as well as for Britain, where war economy is further developed, with all its wider implications. He called for "the prineip!e that service rather than personal gain should be the mainspring for the war effort in industry as in fight- ms" Criticizing the whole "system of economic rewards," he said, "hit is true that the output of our factories improved suddenly when Russia came into the war, this does not mean the workers are stupid, preferring Russia to their own country. It means that in war the most effective spur to heroic efforts is an idea, not hope of personal gain." "Equality of sacrifice" is likely to mean that the gap between the soldier's twenty- one dollars a month and the workman's forty dollars a week is due to be narrowed in one way or another so that their real wages will be evened up. The soldier may get more mcney or more payment in kind, or the workman may be able to buy less because of rationing, pay roll allotment, higher prices, or all three. Likewise the gap between the pay of Army and Navy officers and that of min in positions of comparable civilian re- sponsibility is likely to narrow. If the war lasts long enough it is quite possible that, as in Germany, civilian and Army living standards may reverse their pres- ent relation, with those in the armed services getting the best of everything. III the positioll the Administration may With su astic possibilities in sight be jeopardized. Its rearguard defense of economically indefensible positions makes it appear to occupy the same posi- tion in relation to the war and the public mood that the Hoover Administration occupied in relation to hard times and the public in 1931. Too little and too late has ben its program on prices, profits, wages, taxes, rationing, stock piling, and all the other essentials of war economy spelled out by Baruch and the Army and Navy authorities years ago. The atti- tude of both the services and of the public is likely to get tougher, and a political shake-up in November may be only the first omen of the significance of the new poli cal force now due to be predominant in America. The armed services can scarcely exer- cise the economic and political power they seem likely to achieve without feel- ing and showing a heady sense of power. This is already beginning to appear, not Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 P34444* :.? ?-? Min 216 HARPER'S on the record but in asides and implica- lions. "From here on the public and the government will have to do what we want," is the feeling. Army men have stated, though not publicly so far, that military control of our newspaper* is de- sirable. Stubborn under-cover str?tggles between the civilian "defense" authori- ties and the Army and Navy have already occurret. and are likely to increase in scope, as the long-standing American tradition of ultimate civilian control over the Army receives its greatest test in our history. The structure of military society is usually reflected in civil society. Alfred Vagt, in his History of Militarism, traces for the past two hundred years the close connection between the mores of the army and those of contemporary civil life in Europe. From the perspective of 1942 it scems to be a story largely of the Colonel Blimps of Europe and Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth century; the officer caste of the peacetime army was always the custodidn of the aristo- cratic tradition of consp* us leisure. a Now that new equalitari ations be- tween officers and men being im- posed on modern armies by the nature of model' . ultra-open-order warfare, this influence may he reversed in the next era MAGAZINE of American-patrolled world peace, if and when it comes. The social implica- tions of this subject take off in so many directions that more questions are raised than can possibly be answered. Perhaps tt type of civilian or a civilian group will develop, capable, by reason of tough-mindedness, of compriting with the new post-war military influence. But that does not mean that such a rival group, a merger perhaps of hard-boiled politicians, labor leaders, and indus- trialists, might not work closely with the Army and Navy authorities. A group of this character would have to eschew the visible emoluments of power for the inner essence. Ii: would be essentially fascist in nature, but probably would be considered "anti-fascist," confirming Huey Long's prediction that if fascism comes it will be in the name of anti-fascism. It would, however, be essentially radical, in the sense that a man is now radical who puts the war program ahead of every other consideration or tradition. Periodic upsets in Washington are al- ready weeding out conservatives who still cling to other things than further- ance of the war and of the armed serv- ices' interests. Further similar upsets are almost certain, and their significance for the future may be great. , Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ? ? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ? UNITED ?STATES -9POORNMIENT COORDINATOR Or, ISlirORMAT10141 WAHfllGflV*4 D,C41 Jul7 6D 1942 TO: Colonel Donovan FROM: Atherton Richards SUBJECT: Twc.....ac'atrit..atexampleats in Hawaii. Opportunity has recently been af.17orded to review general orders issued by the Military Gomiernor of Hawaii and secure some informal reactions to local developments there since commencement of hostilities. The experience of Hawaii, a U.S. community under martial law, will doubtless be used as an example to the bal- ance of the U.S. of the probabilities inherent in military control. It is likely that considerable publicity may take place in tIm% United States on this subject. Already there has appeared in leadinc newspapero, discussion as to the dubi- ous legality or the application of martial law to Hawaii. smjor slcnifIcitnce, however, is the possibility Li FIT the inclusiveness of Army dominion over all phases of life in Hawodi may be used politically, as a means of creat- inc a MO...ay suspicious and antagonistic public attitude to- wrdA-inay administration in Washington and elsewhere. A number illustrations could be drawn from Hawaii under military eon- troi which would be irrefutable and might prove embarrassing :Y041V ri nnrnvAd For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ,- ? :41 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 ? (-i? ? _ Colonel Donovan . 2 . to the Army authorities in Washington. In large measure this condition arises from the comprehensive control which the Mil- itary Governor in Hawaii exercises. An examination of the Military Governorts general orders discloses the issuance of regulations controlling, in major fashion, the economic activities and well being of the entire civilian population. Illustrative of the scope of these general orders are the following matters dealt with therein: le Civilian Wage Rates Established. 2. A private corporation is designated as the sole supervisory agency for the production and dis- tribution of sea food from Hawaiian waters. (A marked shortage of meat exists on Oahu and prac- ticclly flshing from boats is prohibited ex- cept subject to these regulations. A material living cost is thus determined.) 3. Rules and regulations promulgated covering the sale and distribution of gasoline. 4. Rentals fixed,. 5. Control of prices of food and feed established. 6. The slaughter of immature hogs Irevented. 7. Speed laws established and even bus stops spec- ified for certain streets. 8. Broad control exercised over labor oven to the Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R0001nn4Rnnn1_l Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Colonel Donovan a - 3 - July 6, 1942 extent of promulgating the following: "Any individual now or hereafter employed by (specified employers) * * * * who falls to report within a reasonable time there- after, to the-job to which be is ordered by his employer, shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $200 or be impris- oned for not more than two months, or both". 9..Civil court activities and authorities prescribed. From the foregoing can arise a basis for contending that a new form of dictatorship may be in process of establish- ment. Since much of the activation of these general orders comes through local civilian personnel, temporarily absorbed into the organization of the Military Governor, it is probable that cases of provable inequity may ariae of which the Military Governor would not be aware, but for which the Army would be held responsible. The extent of control over labor is doubtless the feature which has the greatest explosive potential. Despite what might be the local necessity for such action, it can por- tend baneful interpretations. Solution of this problem could come with a voluntary d fferentiation between actions required for the Military exi- gencies of the situation and the restrictions and control of activities needed, of a purely civilian and economic character. The satisfactory achievement of this can arise with close col- lat,oration between a civil Governor of ubility (operating with 1111 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 t_t Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 Colonol tiolovnn ;ay 6, 1042 martial law torminatod)i who WI tho oonfidonoo of tho Milm ttot7 Aothorttloo, ond who oould orf@obivol$ tunobion undor th4 wido latitudo of Iowa Iowa now in orrocit, whlob W0110 dootmod to opt wtth tho qpo of omorsonoy nrAvailIngs Anothor ovIttoal probtom popalgtin in nAWAii, whigh aloo dedorvon tho oonotrttottve attontion or tho Uigh Oommand. 004pIto tho doalrahtlity or m000rtnttLnUuui foaolb10 produo- tioll or fvod atttfro in Lho 'tory from %Oath AOW040 tho MiAttary forooa owl lnoal populotton oot114 bo otiotatnod, tho btirdon 011 ohi p tonntwo from tho mtatitnne b* roliovod oort- Ouvrantiy nor:IWO:10 pPOSVOg0 heIg boon modo LO Aohlovo tho goal. hgok or Iii t()1 rop tntor.lalmid tranaportatton id otirviht- to doovonno golf gariotonoy rnthor Limn anhanoo thn pugatbIlity thoroor. Ol000 coordiriaLion botwoon Army nnti Navy puvoltago utilintion V0110104, Protdotlon ror Int0P.Inland ohtp- or Lhei omnproiloy rimmoilw at14 ot.hov 1'odop41 raal11tlom owl* oo tho :;tivoluo Vit4motlatom Covpovatlon, tho O., thn onrnion CurporaLicttio and n ropwat'd loon' p;OvorIlmont 4t t1) ? WOU1 4 Iuijci L t total moth- tion to thin probloM. 16" . _ ??? ? ? npdassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/30: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100480001-1 (MA