MISSION NUMBER C-019-C

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000300180033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 1999
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 17, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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25X1 C8c
17 January 1969
A. Due to loss of Article 385 on 5 January 1969, a
comprehensive,Security review at Detachment H .
was undertaken on 9, 10, 11 and 12 January 1969
25X1A9a by Project Headquarters
Security Staff Member of the Accident Investiga-
tion Team. The Security investigation embraced
the period 30 December-1968 to 5 January 1969
and explored unit pre-missioft procedures and
compound personnel activities in support of the
25X1C8c Pilot and Aircraft ,(Article 385),prior
to and at mission launch on 5 January. Although
all areas of personnel, physical and operational
security received thorough consideration, the
investigation was specifically addressed to the
matter ? of sabotage as a possible cause of this
loss and in this context all team members were
consulted on findings where Security factors are
pertinent.
MISSION NUMBER. C-019-C
7. Security:
25X1C8a B. The investigation team inquiries didn't extend
to beyond the Detachment H compound
areas; therefore, investigation must be considered
an internal unit matter; however, no evidence
existed to warrant security extension of investiga
25X1D2e tion beyond current.limits although ~trackind25X1D2a
occurred, ~rior awareness,,evidence has not
been disclosed.
C. Security office activity logs (Attachment A:& B)
covering time frame 0001L, 30 December 1968 to
2400L, 5 January 1969 were examined without
evidence to suggest unusual activities or inci-
25X1C8a dents within the mission areas by American or
ersonnel before launch time 05/0030Z.
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25X1A6a
D. Security activity logs for pre-mission alert period
reveals that aircraft 385 was under continuing
surveillance by Detachment Security Assistants
with no irregularities being reported.* Although
aircraft had not been flown since 30' December 1968,
.no evidence uncovered to reveal tampering from
that time until mission date-.
E. As-reported in Section 5 and by affidavits, pilot
was functioning in a ~rojeet controlled 25X1C8a
environment from 2000 local, 4 January 1969, with
no irregularities or unusual events to suggest
compromise of mission pilot from Security view
poi(nt. Food consumed by pilot at mess is 25X1C8a
established by Flight Surgeon affi avit. Samples
..were confiscated by direction of Security after
loss reported and forwarded to U. S. military
lab-for analysis. Results of.analysis
still pending.
F. Fuel samples confiscated by direction of Security,
(See Attachment D.) Samples taken from sump
tank and fuel nozzle during mission aircraft
fueling sequence., Results pending analysis. 25X1A6a-
Samples also taken from tanker sent to lab
and Wright-Pat; analysis pending.
G. Oxygen samples confiscated by direction of Security
(see Attachment D). Samples taken from pre-breath-
ing room, Van transfer bottle and mission aircraft.
Results received indicate oxygen in mission air-
craft favorably analyzed but samples from pre-
breathing room and transfer bottle not acceptable
under analysis. Another sample sent for further
analysis, results pending.
H. Personal private interviews were accomplished by
Security investigator with representatives from
all sections participating in pilot and mission
aircraft alert sequence for 24-hour period
preceding launch. No irregularities were reported.
Personnel behavior and pattern of pre-mission
activities not considered unusual or contributing
*Attachments A, B and C
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25X1 C8a
factors to loss. However, the long term intimate
social indigenous contacts of our personnel
cannot be ignored as a channel for exploitation.
I. Investigation disclosed wide lack of knowledge by
most Detachment personnel as to occurrences or
activities within channels during alert
sequence. However, eed--to Know" criteria and
25X1C8a internals policy prerogative considerations
govern access to matters within their channels.
J. The Security Representative of the Accident
K.
Investigating Board conducted a visual and physical
review of the-Detachment areas resulting in a
favorable judgment of the existing physical and
personnel security program. An effective defensive
posture exists to preclude unauthorized access.
Pre mission operational security procedures were
also reviewed and are considered sound and in
accordance with Headquarters policies.-(Att. C)
L. The Security Representative inspected the mission
aircraft fuel storage area which is located
adjacent to the North East compound entrance
within a fenced perimeter. This area is under
24-hour visual surveillance by security 25X1C8a
guards. No irregularities were o served.
M. It is Security opinion that Survival Beacon
Procedures,should be reviewed in the .,light of
missions, over international waters.
25X1 C8a
N. Matter of US and SAR procedures should also
be reviewed since SAR plan is unknown and
USAF SAR obviously in need of additional details
surrounding emergency, i. e., nationality of
pilot, type aircraft, nature of survival equip-
ment, color of raft, etc.
25X1 C8a
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IV. CONCLUSION:
1. No evidence of sabotage was uncovered associated with
pilot or mission aircraft in the pre-mission alert
,period. However, final judgment is reserved pending
outcome,of food, oxygen and fuel samples analysis.
. The question of an external - threat as a possible 25X1
cause of loss is no s ported by-evidence and the long
term concern for prior awareness is obviously
not an issue in Miss on C-019-C fact situation.
No significant discrepancy or unexplained events noted
in Detachment mission, generation activities from
mission alert to aircraft launch. Pilot and aircraft
were unanimously reported as being.normal. Mission
generation is a team effort with no one individual
possessing unbridled access. System of inspections,
certifications and observations collectively minimize
opportunity for. unreported discrepancies or damage
to pilot or mission configuration vehicle. Pre-flight
checkout of pilot and aircraft serves as check and
balance against intentional or inadvertent damage
being unnoticed.
V. RECOMMENDATION:'
1. That food samples be obtained when pilot is actually
consuming food and then turned over to Security Staff
for control purposes in event of contingency situation.
2. Although no evidence or facts exist to sustain belief
of safe landing.-,,by pilot; nevertheless, quick recovery
of downed pilot would be enhanced by revision of cur-
rent procedures to allow use of automatic survival
beacon activation in international waters in lieu of
manual activation required by current policy..
3. Recommend improvement in SAR liaison procedures to
insure information needed for rescue purposes reaches
appropriate levels. Necessary information could be
made available without classified disclosures.
25X1 C8a 4. Recommend SAR contingency plan be'available at
Detachmen ' to insure separate efforts known 2 l C8a
American and - sides..
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intimate non-prpject indigenous relationships.
5. Recommend that additional insight be gained regarding
handling of alert details when transferred to 25X1C8a
channels. This knowldge is necessary to any investiga-
tion where question of sabotage is related by evidence
of-threat or attack. Fortunately,-threat
did not-have a bearing in this event. 25X1DOg
6. Recommend a reindoctrination program of all Detachment
personnel re-emphasizing security/cover obligations
and special reference to dangers posed by long term
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