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25X1A ?Siii204 Approved For Re!Nike 2003/09/03: CIA-rxDP33-02415A000400050048- 25X1A DRAFT A. Introduction 1. Following the establishment of the National Reconnaissance Office and implementation of the National Reconnaissance Program, certain problems and incidents have occurred which have demonstrated a complete breakdown in the understanding of CIA's relationship to the NRP. A brief summary of the NRO history as well as a capsule narration of the various problems and incidents which have occurred during the NRO's young life are included herewith to acquaint you with the framework in which CIA is now called upon to cooperate. We feel that the requirement for an overall coordinating body of the National Reconnaissance Program is a sound one, but one in which CIA should play a managerial, as well as a coordinating role, as oppose to its present secondary membership. 2. In spite of the past differences with the Air Force which have taxed our relations seriously we feel that the situation is salvagable provided certain modifications and suggestions to the present NRO agreements and understandings are adopted which will grant the Agency .a senior partnership in the NR.P. These modifications and suggestions are amplified as recommendations within this paper. NRO and USOPPOLE146trcl8f14131@k403/0910.4,i -RDP33-02415A0004000 25X1A EIFT COY' .E-C Approved For Releue 2003/09/03 : ? -RI") 33-02415A004400050048-9 DRAFT -410weimizellak, t)(45e Teo 6 1. The National Reconnaissance Office and the National Reconnaissance Program were initially identified in writing on 6 September 1961 in a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell L. Gilpatric, to Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence. That memorandum, which was concurred in by General C. P. Cabe11, the then Acting Director, CIA, defined the management of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) and officially established on a covert basis a National Reconnai -sance Office to manage the NRP. The Office was placed under the co- direction of the Under Secretary of the Air Force and the Deputy Director (Plans), CIA. It was charged to include a small special staff of personnel drawn from DOD and CIA. The Office was granted the charter of direct control over all elements of the total reconnaissance program, whether overt or covert. According to the 6 September memorandum, decisions of the National Reconnaissance Office "will be implemented and its management of the National Reconnaissance Program made effective: within DOD by the exercise of the authority delegated to the Under Secretary of the Air Force; .within CIA, by the Deputy Director (Plans) in the performance of his presently assigned duties The management and conduct of individual projects or Approved ForRelease 2003/09/0StiPA PP33-02415A000400050048-9 - 25X1A Approved For Releap 2003/09/08FOKTP33-02415A009400050048-9 DRAFT APIRENNWSSENzA Page -Qom.- Ihr-ee elements thereof requiring special covert arrangements may be assigned to the CIA as the operational agency." 2. On 15 November 1961, a working level meeting was held between Colonel Martin, USAF and members of the OSA Staff. In that meet- ing, Colonel Martin said that Dr. Charyk's stated view was that the NRO would not become a single geographic entity confined to one office. 3. By 22 November, a working draft of the NRO functions and responsibilities was forwarded to the Agency for comment by Colonel Martin which designated CIA with the responsibility for security of the National Reconnaissance Program and the handling of black contracts; technical and operational management would be the sole responsibility of the Air Force with CIA participating on a target selection group. The CORONA Program was to continue under CIA operational manage- ment since the project at that time was nearing a close. 4. On 7 December 1961, Mr. R. M. Bissell, the DD/P, gave 25X1 Executive Secretary of the President's Foreign 25X1 Intelligence Advisory Board, a document titled "The Division of Responsibility within the NRO." Mr. Bissell had received Dr. Charyk's agreement to the document by telephone prior to submitting it to In that document, the NRO was acknowledged as being headed by co-directors, each of whom would act using the authority Approved For Release 2003/09/03 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9 SECRET SECUr Approved For ReNese 2003/09/03 : CIA-rwP33-02415A009400050048-9 DRAFT Attniaainagatit Page 3ilbsPee fwr of his overt position within his own organization. With respect to major programs, it allocated responsibilities of the CORONA/ MURAL/ARGON to CIA as primarily responsible for targeting, operational planning, and control of payload operation; development and procurement of photographic payloads and nose cones; and finally security.. The Air Force was charged with launch scheduling and launching; orbit and recovery operations; and the development and procurement of boosters, orbit vehicles, and ELINT payloads. In the SAMOS Program, the Air Force was held primarily responsible for SAMOS with CIA in the supporting role particularly in target and security planning. The OXCART Program was the primary responsibility rof the CIA with the Air Force in a supporting role. With respect especially to the later configurations of SAMOS and to other advance systems, the document stated that "consideration will be given to gradual modification of this distribution of responsibilities. In general, it is clear that Air Force elements will retain primary responsibility for operations and for fuel development and procure- ment. For the most part, these activities not only .can but must be 'white,' that is conducted in a reasonably public fashion. CIA's main contribution will be in target planning serving as the communications channel for operational control and security and that development and Approved For Release 2003?116E:f1A-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9 Approved For Release 2003/09/KNEFDP33-02415M100400050048-9 DRAFT 25X1A Pagebstres* %ve procurement which must be 'black'." The paper went on to state "consideration will also be given in due time to the desirability of gradually converting the NRO into a more unified single office with a single directing head. This development presumably will require a delegation of authority from both the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence to the Director of the NRO so as to permit him to exercise an appropriate degree of control over elements of both agencies. It might also render appropriate some re-distribution of responsibilities as between the two components of the NRO and a change in budgetary procedures." 5. On 20 March 1962, Dr. Scoville as the DD/R forwarded in a memorandum to the DCI an agreement for the management of the National Reconnaissance Program. In that agreement, which had been concurred in by Dr. Charyk, the Central Intelligence Agency was tentatively assigned the primary responsibility for OXCART and CORONA and future truly covert satellite projects. DOD, on the other hand, was 25X1A granted the responsibility of and future semi-overt projects. ( ? 6. On 20 March, James Cunningham recorded the following comments relayed by Dr. Scoville concerning his meeting with the DCI on 19 March. In that memorandum, three major reactions of the Approved For Release 2003/09/03: CIA-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9 g ? 11-;-pnrir 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Releue 2003/09/4" fP33-02415A00041.00050048-9 DRAFT DCI to the proposed NRO management agreement were as follows: IIa. The DCI does not favor a dual chairmanship for NRO. He believes that a single source must be the chairman with the other Agency's senior individual being the deputy chairman. The language of the agreement will not mention individuals as such, but the DCI is reportedly ready to concede to having Dr. Charyk as chairman, with Dr. Scoville as deputy or vice chairman. Within this general statement, however, the Director insists upon specific assignments of projects to each Agency; i. e., OXCART to CIA, SAMOS to USAF. Amplifying this, it is reasonable to infer that the senior responsible official will be determined in each case by the assignment of the project to a given group; i. e., Charyk to head SAMOS, Scoville to head OXCART. "b. The DCI wishes to have language written into the draft agree- ment specifying that programing and even planning on all new collection systems will be done jointly by the NRO chairman and the deputy chairman. ."c. Lastly, it is the Director's wish that CIA control, through all security clearances for all programs within the purview of the NRO." Approved For Release 200300p01A-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9 25X1A Approved For ReIgoe 2003/0 ? 1St cpTRDP33-02415A000400050048-9 DRAFT --A4hawivaisecubbA. Page Xtior 'euev-1 7. On 2 April 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Under Secretary of the Air Force, forwarded a memorandum to the DD/R stating the delegation of responsibilities for the LANYARD Project. Within that Project, contract administration of the payload and those portions of the recovery system which must be procured under covert contract were assigned the responsibility of CIA. Technical management of all aspects of LANYARD including the payload were assigned to the Director of Special Projects, OSAF (General Greer). Operationally the CIA was charged with the responsibility.for pre-mission planning and on-orbit operational decisions in the same manner as currently followed in the CORONA Project. 8. On 5 April, Dr. Scoville replied to Dr. Charyk stating CIA's agreement to accept responsibility for the operational aspects of the LANYARD Program as well as contractual administration for payload and certain recovery systems. 9. On 2 May 1962, the Director and Deputy Secretary of Defense co-signed the agreement between the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence on the responsibilities of the. National Reconnaissance Office. In that document, CIA was designated as an executive agent for the Director, NRO for those covert projects already Approved For Release 2003/09/ la:FDP33-02415A000400050048-9 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/09/03: DRAFT -02415A009400050048-9 alitiWisistneteDele- Page f.'s under its management and such additional covert projects as are assigned to it by the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director, NRO was held responsible for funding the National Reconnaissance Program. The agreement stated that DOD funds will be allocated on an individual project basis! 25X1 NRO NRO CIA will be responsible for funding covert projects for which it has management responsibility. Secondly, the D/NRO was charged with the responsibility for all NRP contracts with CIA, as executive agent of the D/NRO, responsible for administering procurements and contracting for covert projects for which it is assigned responsibility. The D/NRO was held responsible for advance plans (post calendar year 1962) in support of the NRP. In view of the DCI's major responsi- bility to the NSC for all intelligence programs, all NRO advance planning will be coordinated with CIA. 10. On 3 May 1962, the DCI confirmed to the Deputy Secretary of Defense his agreement that Dr. Joseph Charyk be named Director of the NRO. 11. On 22 to 23 May, Dr. Charyk, General Greer, General Curtin, Colonel Martin, and Colonel Geary met with Dr. Scoville, Colonel Beerli, 25X1A Mr. Gene Keifer, Mr. George Miller, and Approved For Release 200 TriCIA-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9 , t.5AL in an effort to 25X1A rSEg Approved For Relea,se 2003/09/? . g --DP33-02415A006400050048-9 DRAFT Page=AW establish the mechanics to functionally carry out the May 2 agreement regarding the NRO. 12. On 15 June, Dr. Charyk forwarded a memorandum to the DD/R which stated, "In regard to our agreement that the NRO Staff should be put into a single office located as closely as possible to the D/NRO, I believe that the satellite operations functions requires an early resolution"; Dr. Charyk proposed that all satellite projects of the National Reconnaissance Program be handled in the same manner by a single operations unit of the NRO Staff, which staff would also make all on-orbit selection between target coverage options based on target, weather situation, or intelligence factors. He further proposed that the nucleus of the CIA satellite operations unit be integrated within the NRO Staff. 13. On 26 June, regarding the procedure for initigion of overflight reconnaissance, Dr. Scoville proposed to the D/NRO that the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance would submit its recommendations on reconnaissance for U.S. intelligence needs to USIB, who in turn would forward its own recommendations to the NRO for submission to the Special Group. However, in the case of on-going programs which have already been suggested to the aforesaid procedure, COMOR will forward its recommendation for additional reconnaissance directly tatftrOpiticEat glakolt9,714911/9WiWriachtgRFahn4t156451CIPASS9414M. 25X1A Approved For Release 2003/09/03 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9 SECRET DRAFT .4o* -tektalchnunthsa Page.. I 14. On 6 July 1962, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President on Intelligence Matters, directed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence wherein he remarked that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board in its report to the President noted the agreements that had been reached between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense with respect to the organization, management, and functioning of the NRO with the following comment: "We believe that the actual structure of the documents is inadequate to support an efficient organization when the present experienced and distinguished group moves on to other tasks. We,therefore recommend a continuing study of a more satisfactory, permanent documentary basis for the NRO with particular references to existing NSC directives with which the present NRO plan may be in conflict." Mr. Bundy indicated that the President had approved the Board's recommendation and was therefore requesting the DCI and Secretary of Defense that appropriate implementing action be taken and that a joint report of the progress made be furnished to the President and the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.by 15 September. 15. On 12 July in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the DCI, as Chairman of the USIB, Mr. McCone stated, "The US1B also wished to note that they felt that the FIREFLY proposal had Approved For Release 2003/09/03 : CIA-RDP33-02415A000400050048-9 25X1A Approved For ReUse 2003/09/0SY ItiElP33-02415A004400050048-9 DRAFT -AZINAPRIussamit Page 4?1111r., leve reached higher authority without adequate consideration by the NRO or the USIB: The Board therefore believes that in the future for this or any similar reconnaissance system, the NRO should first, as a result of coordinative development and testing, advise the USIB if the NRO believes that it is a suitable reconnaissance system including all necessary information on capabilities and characteristics of the system involved. The USIB would then consider the use of the system to meet appropriate intelligence requirements and make recommendations relative to targeting and priorities for consideration by higher authority. 16. On 19 July, Dr. Charyk, as Director, NRO, replied to the DD/R's memorandum concerning the procedure for initiation of over- flight reconnaissance. In that memorandum, Dr. Charyk stated that it was his opinion that as a normal procedure, the COMOR, which is ticomm410,47-fc solely concerned with requirements, should submit its iwoonnet-s-eaprvze for U.S. intelligence needs to USIB. The USIB in turn would forward its recommendation to the NRO. The NRO would forward its specific recommendations to the Special Group for a decision. In cases where pv,,t )1st cp significant new factors entered or where new systems were the NRO as a normal rule would forward its assessment to USIB for comments and would include these in its portion tb the Special Group. Approved For Release 2003/09e IrERDP33-02415A000400050048-9 25X1A Pja Approved For Release 2003/09/03 :Cr DRAFT 33-02415A009400050048-9 In the case of on-orbit programs, the NRO treatment would be perfunctory, but Dr. Charyk felt it desirable that all such matters go to the Special Group through the NRO since under the charter the NRO had the operational responsibility for the total effort. 17. On 23 July 1962, Dr. Charyk, as Director, NRO forwarded a memorandum to NRO Program Directors and the Director of the NRO Staff outlining the organization and functions of the NRO. In outlining the overall concept of the organization and operation of the NRO, Dr. Charyk established the NRO as an operating agency separately organized, concealed entirely within other agencies using personnel and other resources of these agencies on a full- or part-time basis as required. The NRO was designed to consist of the D/NRO, the NRO Staff, the NRO Program Directors, and their Project Directors, and any Staff Officers at that present time. At that time, there were two NRO Program Directors: the Director, Program A being responsible Ti-tat DIR