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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
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Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 10, 2004
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Publication Date: 
April 25, 1958
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PDF icon CIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1.pdf534.15 KB
Suwon': Approved Focpelease i001R/19SMIP33-0244A000400380185-1 TS 155065 Copy of,a 25 April 9 Director of Operations Operational Procedures and Coordination with Headquarters USAF and SAC 1. Reference our conversation on 15 April 1958 concerning ope ationa/ procedures Operational procedures used in the planning of AQUATONE flights have been reviewed. In addition, the procedures for coordinating aQUATONE Mile= planning with Headquarters USAF and SAC have been reviewed. The following represents the results of the review. (1) it is often considered' good operational procedure to have a second aircraft follow or fly with the primary mission aircraft to serve as backup in case of an abort. However; the U-2 has an outstanding record of reliability. This reliability is much greater than that of operational and/or combat type aircraft. In two years of operations, involving approximately twenty-five actual overflight missions, there has been only one abort. This abort was experienced on the latter part of the mission to Baku and resulted in a relatively small loss of coverage. The cause of this abort was an inverter malfunction, Camera malfunctions have occurred during the course of operational missions. However, to minimize the possi- bility of a pilot continuing on a mission with inoperative or faulty camera equipment, a series of indicator lights is incorporated in the system to indicate proper operation of the camera film trans- port and shutter; two of the paramount sources of potential trouble in any aerial camera system. In addition, detailed check liats which cover all aspects of camera operation are completed during pre-flight. The in-flight indicator stystem, comprehensive pre- flight check lists and high experience level of camera maintenance personnel account for the high equipment reliability rates realized to date. Camera reliability is estimated at approximately ninety percent successful on past operational missions. In eonjunction with a consideration of reliability of equipment, it should be noted that the quality of AQUATONE reconnaissance photography greatly surpasses that obtained OD previous operational reconnaissance pro- grams. Proceseing of AQUATONE products is accomplishea under optimum laboratory conditions, consequently, the high quality obtained in the original negative is retained, which increases the intelligence exploitation potential of this photography. USAF review(s) completed. Approved For ReleisnrCONICIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1 Ma -4, Approved For Releue 2004/12/45: W00,0400380185-1 ization of two aircraft simultaneous poses, the following is submitted for consider the decoy technioun was fre n ed by 25X1 b. su1ts of Iiasion 6011. (1) to cover proposed was roii Chita, southwest tration into the overflight time back into China SB entry. $ originaUy planned as a canned mission et of a. This mission as originally to the southeast tip of Korea, into north through China, making pens - ed A of Dairen, USSR in the vicinity of Ukrainia. Penetration was approximately 45 miantee with exit from USSR, and return to Atsugi on approximately the same route (2) Based on addittonal requirements, the proposed mission was altered to return through North Korea on generally a north. south heading from the Ulu River to the northern tip of South Korea. ) tater on, the mission plan was changed to exclude entry hrough either North Korea or China as it was not desired lye a third country. This was based on the protest which resulted fraa the first eight missions in the summer of 19,56. The decision was made to enter and exit in the Sea of J an outside the presumed enemy radar on headings which would indicate the aircraft mei operating from South Korea, thus disguising the actual operation base in Japan. This is thought to have been successful, since the protest notes do not state or imply that the violating aircraft was operating from Japan. (4) The missien was planned to obtain maximum photographic coverage consistent with the weather forecast and film available. This explains one reason why the mission was flown over the coast line from a point approximately one hundred miles north of Vladi *met:* to a point east of Komeomolek rather than staying off shore a considerable distance. In addition, it was felt that the U-2 Approved For Release 2004/12/1,5it,CIA14D1331 2415A000400380185-1 ? Approved ForRelease-20D71 2 DR33-02415A000400380185-1 mould have provided eore radar reflection flying off shore 40 or 50 miles than it would be by flying over the coasaine. tisaion results indicate that the results mould have been the sane as regards the Russians' ability to pick us ep. In addi- tion, the aircraft would have been under surveillance by both the radar etatione on the mainland, as well as those on the Sakhalin peninsula. (5) Attached as enclosure,is a graphic swary. of the route as flown and indicates suitable weather encountered, as well as equipment performance. The tracker malfunctioned early in the minion. Thie malfUnction has been traced to a new operating procedure which was to turn the tracker on approxi- mately thirty minutes after take off to avoid photographing the launch base and surrounding geography. It is believed that the delved turn on of the tracker and the resultant lack of heat due to equipment operation resulted in freezing of the film and may have contributed to subsequent failure. However, since the tracker camera is utilized primarily for orienting photography obtained with primary camerae, and since primary cameras operated with complete success, there was little loss of arty significant intelligence in- formation due to this malfunction, (6) The malfunction in System III was only a partial failure of two of the three channels and was caused by a break in the antenna lead to channels 2 and 3 which occurred approximately one third of the way through the mission. This is the only known failure of System 1.11 on operational missions. (7) Both the A-2 camera (primary mission capability):and the System I operated 100% and obtained excellent results. ed Meet (1) Mission 6011 track was reviewed by at least one or more liaison officers from the !connaissanoe Section of Headquarters e at least two or three days before it WA flown. No objection to the route was indicated. (2) An objection was voiceet by 3AC. This was in regard to cur procedure for; lon missions volving _RAINBOW atr 2 )(1 craft, This an rescinded and SAC did obtain full and timely reaction reports on the mission. Approved For Releas0064/ : CIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1 Approved F0rReleasie4SFATIA-RDP33-02415A000400380185-1 tration and peripheral niieeione, the at Headquarters notified at ve hours in advance. One of the cleared officers section personally comes to our Control Room and is briefed on each mission. They are given the route to be flown by coordinates, which includes points of penetration and exit. The reconnaissance Section then passes all of this information to 6AO not later than six to eight hours before the mission takes off, usually earlier. If the Reconnaitsance Section kneels of a SAO minion which may conflict with our proposed mission., they advise SAC immediately. (2) The reconnaissance Section reviews our proposed routes primarily for glaring errors as they realize minor points of routing are either dictated by requirements or are matters of individual opinion. At no time has USAF or SAC objected to any of our planning. It is understood that Gen. Preston and, in some etses, Gen. Tunner or Gen. LateNr, review every mission plan in sufacient time to voice a tinely objection. A working arrangement exists that it objection is taken by USAF, they would notify us Ismodiately at the working level through our established liaison people. (3) At one time, San, erreU, DCSO? SAC, thought that SAC should have a liaison offieerpleyeically located in Project Opera tions to aid in planning. Subsequent diecussions with the officers of the Bacon Section, Hqs? USAF, satisfied Gen. Terrell that existing procedures for coordination between the Project, Headquarters USAF, and SAC were adequate and, therefore, agreed, that a SAC liaison officer was not necessary. (4) Close liaison has been maintained with SAC over the past two yearn, particularly on the subject of ROB. In fact, the Project operates on SAC ROB information which in received through Headquarters USAF. In the cased the first Klyuchi mission, and on the basis of SAO,* recommendations, we launched froal lrather than Ateugi. This was done in an attempt to avoid radar detection, o all missions I Ekcept for the missions from r--------lfindi v not been auffi- ciently Consistent Approved For Release 2? 12(11V RDP33-02415A000400380185-1 5X1 5X1 5X1 5X1 Approved For Rele 0 : CIA-RDP33-0;415A000400380185-1 I With the in- creased nwthers and types of 'Russian radars, as well the obvicue increase in efficiency of their operation, it is Oper- ational opinion that no matter how mission 6011 had been planned it would have been detected and tracked\ 2, Full considerationis given to all aspects of opera tional planning to include taking advantage of the experience which Ileadquartere USAF end SAC can provide, as well as effective and timely coordination with both Headquarters. Further, it is felt that he reliability and performance record of our aircraft and collection equipment is probably unequalled in the history of reconnaissance, Therefore, no major change to operating techniques is considered necessary. 3. Although AQUATONE operations have been exceptionally successful to efforts to improve reliability and effectiveness are being continued. Att. I map msn 6011 Approved For Release Inf 12tpri -RDP33-02415A000400380185-1