'FOLLOW-ON' OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000500390054-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2000
• Sequence Number: 54
• Publication Date: May 25, 1959
• Content Type: MFR

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25 May 1959
IEttttANDt 4 f T4 It C tD
3UBJNCTt "?ollov..On't Operational Considerations
1. Evaluation criteria for the "follow-on" vehicle are based on the
operational considerations listed below,
2. The primary consideration is ur i ?j. It is felt that the most
important factors contributing to survivability are detection; altitude;
time/speed; and tactics.
a. qtr
(1) The design of the vehicle in term of also and/or radar
reflectivity should be such that it will avoid detection. The
characteristics shojld be such that detection of the vehicle will
be unlikely at all altitudes.
(3) The performance of the vlh isle should be such that it
will allow for m xis exploitation Of any weakness in the onsgr
detection system and/or air defense system.
b. Al ti?t?:
(1) As reflective area isoreaees, the altitude must increase
to avoid detection. Ability to fly at altitudes above
etiv-e ceiling of known defensive weapon capabilities will
counterbalance any future significant iaproveents in the Russian
defensive system, including infra-red, and speed d fferential.
C. ,TJsWe,
(1) The effectiveness of any air defense system is directly
related to reaction time. The greater the speed, the less tieee
there is available for tracking, identification, coasand reaction
and intercept.
d. Thoticg:
(1) The ability to plan and/or program evasive action in
order to degrade the air defense system should be available; that
is, random changes in flight altitude and heading.,
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(2) The ability to program a tun-2inar flight path would
give the additional advantage of Obtaining maxim= mission ef'fec-
tivoness in terms of target coverages.
(3) The ability to fly directly over heavDT defendei areas
and radar sites should be available in order to:
a Peet the saaailtavst reflective area to the radar.
b Take advantage of any radar dead zone.
c Reduce the ties meter surveillance.
d) Confuse and deceive a specific radar. ('lights
which have been conducted in congested areas have necessi-
tated that the area be cleared in order to maintain positive
scope identification.)
3. The next consideration, equally as important as the first, is opera-
tional utilization. Factors affecting a War considered as pertains to opera-
tional utilization are exposure and operational. soplr sent.
(1) The number of knowledgeable parsons must be kept to an
absolute minis m. Speculation by friendly forces, controversial
discussions concerning minor aspects of the prograax, prarticularly,
during the early phase, dependence on overseas bases and political
approval to operate are factors that affect sortie rate and areas
of operation. Under a given not of condttirns, a combination of
the above could result in political disfavor, program cancel.l aaation,
and/or extended stand-down periods. Therefore, the ability to
operate from one permanent ZI base and utilize a Navy aircraft
carrier for recovery is desired,
(2) The capability to post strike On an aircraft carrier or
any established USAF ZI base is considered to offer the least
security risk. It is felt that in the future, the number of
US controlled air bases overseas will be reduced drastically.
In air event, the political trend is such that base availability
should not be relied on. As pertains to post strike overseas
bases which are available, the ability to expeditiously retrieve
the vehicle, dismantle it and return it to ha base is required.
(3) Continued fleet =answers in foreign waters by the
t 3 Navy can be expected, These uvers can be utilized for
operations because they usually coincide with favorable weather
and light conditions as pertains to reconnaissance operations
and, in addition, the ' NDUld offer a degree of cover.
(4) Additional considerations are; experience gained to
data as pertains to obtaining political approval', the cost of
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the program, indicating that every precaution should be taken
to insure maximoa# Utilisation and effectiveness, and the mini-
mal possibilities of a protest by derma the eneW all inf'or-
iation as pertains to point of origin, destination, and ae -
ciation.
b. Oa.r Sl MI.edeeece3 roe A s The next consideration of importance
is that of mission effectiveness. Factors contributing to effectiveness
area timeliness, maneuverabili tyr, system availability', navigation systems,
crew fatigue, escape systems availability s growth potentials maintenanoe
and training.
ZIgIUMM: The ability to obtain the desired type of
'trmation and reduce it to a useable form on a timely basis,
any during times of tension, is most important. The
ability' to perform missions an a 12, 6, and 4 how basis after
an initial 24 hour alert, is rtequired. This requirement also
exists for successful aaoo Iia ant of emergency evacuation
plans. The aircraft turn~o s d time should be 2-3 hours maxi
mm and, when dismantled, should fit into existing seed/or
available cargo type aircraft.
(a) Developawt and availability of airborne primary
mission capabilities and ground data reduction equipments
must be cempatible with the increased performance of the
vehicle, and consistent with the operational rreadirsesa date
of the Vehicles
(b) Past experience indicates that available space
and voight in the vehicle will, be a problem. Sufficient
and weight must be made available in the initial
design phases to insure that future compromises will not
detract from, or degrade the quality of the end results.
New equipments usually require, mom space and are heavier
expected, again indicating the need for adequate
space and weight provisions in the initial design phases.
(c) New se Ors to allow for night and bad weather
operations should be considered.
Photo, ILINT, and high resolution r
are felt to be next in importance.
(3) tion tl t Mach 3 speeds and polar routes
necessitate utilization of some form of guidance syrste
Presently used navigation equipment is inadequate*
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(4) Carewfatka: Weight liaaita the crew to one man.
Due to added work loads and i rent dangers, adequate pro-
vision must be made for ventilation, t ature control, siun-
plicit,y and reliability of operation. All known factors con-
tributing to fatigue should be adequately provided for In
order to allow the pilot to devote full attention to mission
acoomplishaent.
(5) mane e~rst+, s Primary Consideration should be given
to a capsule type cockpit for safe emit. However, Wmlnm accep-
table would be a full pr's ssure, high altitude suit arrangema nt
with a tumble free ejection seat,
(6) AU 44 z: Required by a4d--1939 or as soon as
passible. Max. muse elapsed time to first operational. flight
should be one year.
(7) ftadh entis2 t Airfram , design should allow for
growth potential in the power plant, load carrying rater. Although no arm caPaability,
growth is anticipated for the first
two years, design should allow for increased performance
during the 1963--1963 time per".
(a) The need for a mirdmum, training syllabus
is desired. tion of available s ice pilots is required.
and
as
iz
f
--~.
e
much o
he
presently available and proven equtlts and instruments as
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Co OJOn: As pertains to a Mach 3.0 vehicle at 90,000 feat,
applies:
(1) Radar: detection and tracking is considered certain. As
pertains to radar reflective plattorsee, surface-.to-air missiles will.
be a significant great throughout the entire period. It is felt
that the Russians will have the capability in limited areas to shoot
dew a Mach 3, 90,000 foot radar reflective vehicle throughout the
2) Asa-asd: Tbchnlogica La, an adequate detection and
systew could be available in early 1961. Although it
that an jut re-red detect .o and tracking: device will be
developed by the Russians, its effectiveness will depend on their
ability to utilize the 1nteea ation on a ti any basis and/or in-
ation of the inf ate obtained into the existing air
d+efe a system. A United moor, of effective areas (at or near
iortg targets) should be available in aid-1963,
criteria for job to be doe : timelinese and aa_4or thr':at8
a. : Priority requiree-
mente will be based an the operation agency's responsibilities as
peed to the Rational Sec uri'ty. Secondary requirements will be
based on the operating agency's responsibilities to other national
agencies such as the Department of Defense, National Security Agency,
t of State, etc.
bo t its .a for .90 j9b to be log: The operating agency' a
re. ties are to provide adequate, timely and reliable intelli-
' ` - `
a to the cecutive Bradkah of the government for use
situations
1) Threat against the to from a fserei n government.
2 For the security of the US, its pass ession& and areas
of vital interest.'
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(3) The advancement of national. policies and other interests
of the US.
4) The internal security of the US*
5) Gorsrmont sponsored research and development programs.
ft e development of tactics, techniques and organisations, the pro -
ent of wtapane, equipments and supplies and all other factors
that could effect the overall '""ll being" of the country.
local) willl, be fought with the weapons on hand and the initial phase
will be fought with the intelligence information gathered before "D"
day. Therefore,, the operating agents capability must be most
responsive to requirements generated by technological advances. Past
Russian technological advances surpassed all expectations, and the
qualitative and quantitative aspects of their advancements are stil1
sneeonastrations is offered as an example.
'ire"- .ss s It is felt that arm future war (general or
world as pertains to the Russian surprise type scientific
) a.3or threats
(1) Strike capabilities have out-distanced defense capa-
bilities.. As relates to national survival, this gap must be
closed. In terms of requirements; the operating agency's
capability avast be such that it will be responsible to this
demand. From this itktan be seen that the requirements for such
a capability must be measured In terms of its ability to react
In peacetime, in time of tension, at the Imminence of hostilities,
and during war. The job to be done cannot be accomplished utili-
zing conventional forces or capabilities. It will require a
special sefl-sufficient and independent effort operating under t b3
jurisdiction of a very high level government agency$ on a high
priority basis and with ad nimum political restrictions.
(2) The Soviet capability in the missile , , atomic energy,
and heavy boar areas, constitute a major threat. The require-
ment for Intelligence In these areas is shared by all US agencies,
and the entire free world. Intelligence resulting in or leading
the successful penetration of the Soviet air defense systems{
wtor. The amount of concern exhibited by the US and the
by friendly forces will become increasingly Important as time goes
On, as will the requirement to obtain and maintain missile order
of battle.
1: It is recommended that action be taken to obtain
capability within the shortest time possible
without "qualifying comments" pertaining to
or not the capability is used at all, or used sparingly
luence the decision. Factors influencing this decision are:
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A, The job to be done.
all lack of inf arnation as pertains to the Russian,
a. Political restrictions vary with permmel in office, as well
as with conditions (peac.tie? tension, imminence of hostilities, and war)
d. The muber one national intelligence objective is the warning
.imeinsnce of hostilities, Peacetimr, overflight and peripheral
reconnaissance is me of the best single sources for this tyN
The intelligence obtained with a suitable airborne
s unique in that it cannot be obtained in ax other manner
sarvroe),
of loss of a fisting ground .monitoring facilities
din to unforeseen political reversals, the "follow-an," vehicle would
be the ouly effective collection capability available.
f. Although it is recognized that the relative merits of else--
tronice airborne collection technic ss vs, electronic ground technique
are controversial: a recent test conducted tr TOSS indicated that
the airborne collection techniques are the most effective and efficient
Colonel
Director of Operations
tba/an
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