'FOLLOW-ON' OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP33-02415A000500390055-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2000
• Sequence Number: 55
• Publication Date: May 25, 1959
• Content Type: MFR

: - 33-02 ,5A00050p39OO55-3
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GUS-0087/B
25 May 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: "Follow Ontt Operational Considerations
1. Evaluation criteria for the "follow-ontt vehicle are based on the
operational considerations listed below.
2. The primary consideration is survival. It is felt that the most
important factors contributing to survivability are detection; altitude;
time/speed; and tactics.
25X1 D
a. Detection:
(1) The design of the vehicle in terms of size and/or radar
reflectivity should be such that it will avoid detection. The
characteristics should be such that detection of the vehicle will
L_ __n9.2 1__`I-_. _i _11 _-. ?.
(3) The performance of the vehicle should be such that it
will allow for maxim+m, exploitation of any weakness in the enemy
detection system and/or airkiefense system.
b. Altitude:
(1) As reflective area increases, the altitude must increase
in order to avoid detection. Ability to fly at altitudes above
the effective ceiling of known defensive weapon capabilities will
counterbalance any future significant improvements in the Russian
defensive system, including infra-red, and speed differential.
c. Time speed:
(1) The effectiveness of any air defense system is directly
related to reaction time. The greater the speed, the less time
there is available for tracking, identification, command reaction
and intercept.
d. Tactics:
(1) The ability to plan and/or program evasive action in
order to degrade the air defense system should be available; that
is, random changes in flight altitude and heading.
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(2) The ability to program a non-linear flight path would
give the additional advantage of obtaining maximum mission effec-
tiveness in terms of target coverage.
(3) The ability to fly directly over heavily defended areas
and radar sites should be available in order to:
(a) Present the smallest reflective area to the radar/
(b) Take advantage of any radar dead zone.
(c) Reduce the time under surveillance.
(d) Confuse and deceive a specific radar. (Flights
which have been conducted in congested areas have necessita-
ted that the area be cleared in order to maintain positive
scope identification.)
3. The next consideration, equally as important as the first, is opera-
tional utilization. Factors affecting and/or considered as pertains to opera-
tional utilization are exposure and operational employment.
a. .gMo sure
(1) The number of knowledgeable persons must be kept to an
absolute minimum. Speculation by friendly forces, controversial
discussions concerning minor aspects of the program, particularly
during the early phase, dependence on overseas bases and political
approval to operate are factors that affect sortie rate and areas
of operation. Under a given set of conditions, a combination of
the above could result in political disfavor, program cancellation,
and/or extended stand-down periods. Therefore, the ability to
operate from one permanent ZI base and utilize a Navy aurcraft
carrier for recovery is desired.
(2) The capability to post strike on an aircraft carrier or
any established USAF ZI base is considered to offer the least
security risk. It is k felt that in the future, the number of
US controlled air bases overseas will be reduced drastically.
In any event, the political trend is such that base availability
should not be relied on. As pertains to post strike overseas
bases which are available, the ability to expeditiously retrieve
the vehicle, dismantle it and return it to home base is required.
25X1 C
(4) Additional considerations are; experience gained to
date as pertains to obtaining political approval, the cost of
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the program, indicating that every precaution should be taken
to insure maximum utilization and effectiveness, and the mini-
mal possibilities of a protest by denying the enemy all infor-
mation as pertains to point of origin, destination, and asso-
ciation.
b. Operational employment: The next consideration of importance
is that of mission effectiveness. Factors contributing to effectiveness
are; timeliness, maneuverability, system availability, navigation system.,
crew fatigue, escape system, availability, growth potential, maintenance
and training.
(1) Timeliness: The ability to obtain the desired type of
information and reduce it to a useable from on a timely basis,
particularly during times of tension, is most important. The
ability to perform missions on a 12, 6, and hour basis after
an initial 4 hour alert, is required. This requirement also
exists for successful accomplishment of emergency evacuation
plans. The aircraft turn-around time should be 2-3 hours maxi-
mum and, when dismantled, should fit into existing and/or
(2) stem availability:
(a) Development and availability of airborne primary
mission capabilities and ground data reduction equipments
must be compatible with the increased performance of the
vehicle, and consistent with the operational readiness date
of the vehicle.
(b) Past experience indicates that available space
and weight in the vehicle will be a problem. Sufficient
space and weight must be made available in the initial
design phases to insure that future compromises will not
detract from or degrade the quality of the end results.
New equipments usually require more space and are heavier
than expected, again indicating the need for adequate
space and weight provisions in the initial design phases.
(c) New sensors to allow for night and bad weather
25X1 D operations should be considered.
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Photo, FLINT, and high resolution radar types of sensors
are felt to be next in importance.
(3) Navi ation stem-t: Mach 3 speeds and polar routes
necessitiate utilization of some form of guidance system.
Presently used navigation equipment is inadequate.
TOP SECRET
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25X1 D
(4) Crew fatigue: Weight limits the crew to one man.
Due to added work loads and inherent dangers, adequate pro-
vision must be made for ventilation, temperature control, sim-
plicity and reliability of operation. All known factors con-
tributing to fatigue should be adequately provided for in
order to allow the pilot to devote full attention to mission
accomplishment.
(5) Escape system: Primary consideration should be given
to a capsule type cockpit for safe exit. However, minimum accep-
table would be a full pressure, high altitude suit arrangement
with a tumble free ejection seat.
(6) Availabil_ity: Desired, early 1960. Required opera-
tionally ready, 1961.
(7) Growth potential: Airframe design should allow for
growth potential in the power plant, load carrying capability,
and range. Although no growth is anticipated for the first
two years, design should allow for increased performance
during the 1963-1965 time period. If this is not feasible,
planning should be such to provide a successor to the follow-on
vehicle that will meet the requirements of the time period
involved (para 4 below).
(8) Training: The need for a minimum training syllabus
is desired. Utilization of available service pilots is required.
The aircraft should accommodate and utilize as much of the
presently available and proven equipments and instruments as
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c. Tracking: As pertains to a Mach 3 vehicle at 90,000 feet, the
following applies. The proposed vehicle will be detected by radar, iden-
tified as hostile, and will be tracked the majority of the route over the
USSR. The missing tracks will probably be filled in by the investigation
in areas where the sonic boom is prevalent. There is also the possibility
of the development of an advanced type of detection, i. e., infra-red or
Krug, that will further add to the efficiency of the track.
d. Reaction: The defensive effort will be as extensive as possible
to destroy the vehicle. Against fighter intercept attempts, the altitude
and speed of the vehicle will exceed that of the fighters. This factor,
combined with limited reaction time, makes successful intercept negligible,
even% with air-to-air missiles. It is expected that the certain areas that are.
defended by surface-to-air missiles should be avoided. The state of the
art developments and SAM indicate that the early period will have a limited
capability that will grow in magnitude and be a serious threat to survival
during the later period. It is recommended, therefore, that tests and/or
modifications that will delay the operational date or restrict performance
be viewed in this light.
e. Political considerations: It appears certain that by a single
means or combination of radar, sonic boom, ionization, and infra-red, the
vehicle will be detected and identified as intruder. As such, it must be
expected that protests may be evoked from the USSR. However, this will
require firm knowledge of the responsible country and not simply one of
suspect, and the following considerations must be fully exploited:
(1) Security - Though high standards have been set in the past,
they must be improved in order to allow full utilization of the
collection device. The single base concept in the ZI offers not only
a chance for greater security, but also does not require the utiliza-
tion of bases in foreign countries which could be subject to Soviet
pressure. It appears relevant to addin light of the above, that a
political conditioning factor for the full utilization of the vehicle
must be more fully exploited than those undertaken for CHALICE In
retrospect, it seems unrealistic when a collection device that'has
immunity is not utilized to guide events of the state and national
defense in years of increased tension and threat to national survival.
The present Soviet government does not view overflights as a threat
of war. The spy rings of the USSR exposed in the US would indicate
an extremely active collection agency. The USSR recognizes her
relative immunity from these sources and identifies the overflight
program as a reconnaissance vehicle.
5. Intelligence Qualitative Requirements: Responsibilities to the
National Security, criteria for job to be done; timeliness and major threats
are the primary considerations.
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a. Responsibilities to the National Security: Priority require-
ments will be based on the operation agency's responsibilities as
pertains to the National Security. Secondary requirements will be
based on the operation agency's Vresponsibilities to other national
agencies such as the Department of Defense, National Security Agency,
Department of State, etc.
b. Criteria for the job to be done: The operating agency's
responsibilities are to provide adequate, timely and reliable intelli-
gence information to the Executive Branch of the government for use
in the following situations:
(1) Threat against the US from a foreign government.
(2) For the security of the US, its possessions and areas
of vital interest.
(3) The advancement of national policies and other interests
of the US.
(4) The internal security of the US.
(5) Government sponsored research and development programs.
The development of tactics, techniques and organizations, the pro-
curement of weapons, equipments and supplies and all other factors
that could effect the overall "well being" of the country.
c. Timeliness: It is felt that any future war (general or local)
will be fought with the weapons on hand and the initial phase will be
fought with the intelligence information gathered before "Det day.
Therefore, the operating agency's capability must be most responsive
to requirements generated by technological advances. Past Russian tech-
nological advances surpassed all expectations, and the qualitative and
quantitative aspects of their advancements are still an unknown factor.
The amount of ooncern exhibited gy the US and the rest of the world as
pertains to the Russian surprise-type scientific demonstrations is
offered as an example.
d. Hajor threats
(1) Strike capabilities have out-distanced defense capabili-
ties. As relates to national survival, this gap must be closed.
In terms of requirements; the operating agency's capability must
be such that it will be responsible to this demand. From this it
can be seen that the requirements for such a capability must be
measured in terms of its ability to react in peacetime, in time of
tension, at the imminence of hostilities, and during war. The job
to be done cannot be accomplished utilizing conventional forces or
capabilities. It will require a special self-sufficient and inde-
pendent effort operating under the jurisdiction of a very high level
government agency, on a high priority basis and with minimum
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(2) The Soviet capability in the missile, atomic energy,
and heavy bomber areas, constitute a major threat. The require-
ment for intelligence in these areas is shared by all US agencies,
and the entire free world. Intelligence resulting in or leading
to the successful penetration of the Soviet air defense system
by friendly forces will become increasingly important as time goes
on, as will the requirement to obtain and maintain missile mrder
of battle.
6. Recommendations: It is recommended that action be taken to obtain
the best available "follow-onto capability within the shortest time possible.
This recommendation is made without "qualifying commentstt pertaining to
utilization. Whether or not the capability is used at all, or used sparingly,
should not influence the decision. Factors influencing this decision are:
a. The job to be done.
b. Overall lack of information as pertains to the Russians.
c. Political restrictions vary with personnel in office, as well
as with conditions (peacetime, tension, imminence of hostilities, and war)o
d. The number one national intelligence objective is the warning
of the imminence of hostilities. Peacetime, overflight and peripheral
type of reconnaissance is one of the best single sources for this type
of information. The intelligence obtained with a suitable airborne
platform is unique in that it cannot be obtained in any other manner
(sole source).
e. In the event of loss of existing ground monitoring facilities
due to unforeseen political reversals, the "follow-on" vehicle would
be the only effective collection capability available.
f. Although it is recognized that the relative merits of elec-
tronics airborne collection techniques vs. electronickgrourid techniques
are controversial; a recent test conducted by USAFSS indicated that
the airborne collection techniques are the most effective and efficient.
25X1A9a
Colonel USAF
Director of Operations
OP SECRET
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