UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAM TWO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP54-00337A000100030001-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 29, 1952
• Content Type: MEMO

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UNDERWATER DEMOLITION TEAM TWO
)01318:80%140--i-FLDNO:20C.
0 110 Clihifat
CLASS ECL.Vni 'CLASS ED TO: IL p BET. 1UST...22...
?(EXT REV DATFOL.REv DAT EVIEWE 9 1-5YPEDOC-Al2.-
130.PGSji..?CREATiON DA _OR C014P_irOP _ORO CLASS.f.1..
AS COORD.--..-Alreli: RE 70-3
0
CONFIDENTIAL
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'MD
1 'AIWA TWO
Frew Submersible Operations Officer
To; Cameander Underwater- rennolLtlan Unit 11110
Via* Oorunundire Officer* Underwater Dalolitim Tale TWO
Subjt Sneak Attacks
1. To date the nationr w :-111.770 e-ythibited the 'tee t active
interest in sneak attacks as a mival weapon have beer, Italy* .7a.da-t?
England and Germany. f?(.:,1 of these -ations has made notable
contributions to the development of effective, sneak? attacks*
but only Italy and 44; lam! scored netabl, auccesrea' eith
attacks in World War II.
2. The extent of ant-Asian endea 'or in thie field le r..ot lowere
by this coileand, but it in 'mown tat, the Monism heve captured
from the Clesegano nunt,errs of very stotToont sneak c-feelnt* as
as the technicians that built them, zind it meet be preowned ',eat
Ruseierhae not allowed thee() ,:ifts to remain wee--lrd.ted.
3, The U.S. has exhIbited very little active interovt In enc
attacks as 5weapon* and has never even built a cret for tic.a
PIM**. In 19148 UnTeLett acquired from theEn-e1-1371 b 513# IT
(Sleeping laanuty) in wileh submersible training has been conducted.
These eraft*.howoveM, ftue to their limited realm ell speed, Lave
not been regarded all eperational boats* their math value bei e,
as tletining craft. The office cf Naval Rosser& hecwee 1nte-4.ested
in sneak attacks, to 1-he extort of Influencing C140 to direct!1.2..11.1!.ile,
to desiO a "Moak craft ,;1'or the combined purporer et beach
reconnaineanee and transport of exelosives? tint ths 1)roPotocl
deal.i did not rvi r o rit!.cisr of the deel., lectiee ;71* the
DollPtee Of Submarines* W:',1.01 rent Tpapathy trLt I!:ne idea of rues
attadta. However* 04 t.u..s Stleeeeded n et finaitl.vated
BUI1111011- Waxen* discoVerod steeled iu a warehretne
Base* New Landon* etd '.his craft :f..$; slapeomed te be ready for
testi by J7)eLani in toel rs2. in addition, ,'217! ?roeured t,wo
SSBos from the Italians, me of wttich will be rtewy tor test 3 noon
after 1 January 1952., a L:a as aim boon extremely a i VT r ctIor
phases of UDT deve1e2reen-: S. t come:nes, depth f;31,:rers
rubber suite* etc., and f.a in tle, :ter reapac-eible for c,.7.1:sider,,-; -. -
recent developnen4r in lo s
There has been a reeient In Interest the J.S. rieet?.
notably on the part of the A phL1oa Force* in meek attacte.
However* the intervitt he. been from the stand7otm of defenve,
rather than offenee? and the cons'.derable number cl' etneak seizener
attack palercisee wh:Ich hive, "'Ale co, dieted throe flout the Al'latic
Pleat have been eairly t aelua'Lnt .1he U.S. 3hiP9 Id-th ?MOW
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technique). lf oeurees there does not. exist in the(
an organicat4on primarily oont trued with devalexent and del...1:AL7/
of sneak attacks' smd time, st,los their ',winery misaion involvo3
attimadng, 'I.;DT'P have 1?ts.'71 %Uroctittd o (50Adttet to 4113$1.1.2103?
5. Harover, it tv felt t,tat tqqsal examines can licaoc43 I sh
little more than to *Aso tie ILf Isneek attack er.)iscions",
IIDT's aro In no law eapuolo 04 deittiaring reAlst-Le a::,tacks eld
for that' resew the finfonsce evolved 1,), the *1x bo
reviewed, for the ;wallas" of deforrila against 1.43.rface satinsmrs
launched frtas P'4Kakee *ref t are considerably different from t
of defendini sttackerv t?tic. ars trailed and equipped Age meek
attack* and -who ars al,le to choose coaditions moist .favorable
Ar their ENC06400. he follesinf *Aline of *Peak s-',.takok
iseeitibilities n beal lars.-mtred as 4 passible aid ta ohipe
interested in pre'Llarine; an tii-rneer. at'Ack defoloos. novrevers
nest be borne !az t ukt this outline is no illoiblies wad
MS been ?relaxed wtho' e bsref it of copealenosi oriticirt.
outlioe ntiettk attiseks tc.Lli be divided I ibr'gol
ei (a) nteal'ty,thtcInc:1*km attacks 1,y- tirilamrs
craft, depolectim: etealth 3fl stoidirt.: ot detectiort
for t)zfrmeson) awl (b) Deceptive, irdsh are .Uttencied litemikr
to deree ve the eneat'W tl satisin,!, *rents or vikQuipshar41 oz bo%i's?
The first tatevOrr 3thri 4.14 into font' o,kt,astins (a)i'931tial)
by *AO. :al meant rti ! craft or ssitzserss toth,
the instediate are: Ot the attckao that the operutions isky L outlau
(b) Approach, which 11111110 the ts,'Inrportine,Otesalesivos to
tarot (c) Attacks 'faille-1h is The ,ieLivery- f tLe exaosivee
and (.1 ;Retirement, *Lich is the escape* The seeorld oat.e.iery ,1-11
be subdivided into tac ,ArkerVia tocadindat (a) i)piehe ,$) and (b)
riaregaerede, whth ilitAxdat asuAised ';)oats, ate ? i3.te fat-oass
a. S'.'FAIZ:111
1..-i'osititaf
"sort fa "to poi:* i* t 1 the lettaolzor 1,3
4011 if he it oleos asough to
Ms target to be able to launch Lit sneak craft, (.1.r -,ott!AsT rot*
swilsigess frtrt tht filliums for bo "rill b. az.. "4* jlek thF: Picot
advantage*** till* for ettiveks he Ida hole .the 1.vento7t porks.11)10
1111.koki1i iakinc", lastfasintte changpsth his:jai:bask ?UM*uv o
aOsttpasesents and the .prot lea of 'hir. esch2e after delivering
its attack eertainly Vdattu:sedo ulnae he iU not hav to
assies renderseus .e.ith A not:ler oraftp 'Ado env tht.. slaustdon
the Italian* in their h4.1;ir muctessful attants" at Clibraltar
Almost all of the 11441:r lerasn coplvy. craft '144sre ',92y.wtobbasette
attackin3 sh.ippinj, or, ',11;,...s contt,nocitst of course, tho
eraStd not have the attraltaList !cr,f 1ein FTterktpavods slace
sneak craft is known te have isafficient range for thi,;10 let.t
most oases such as the i).13I);1443. a ntasty Asiatic 1.sikerer .1::lore-
batied attacks ells vetr port:slap an nivt be aritifX.,.ed.
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b. rface Vessels. It seems unlikely that seiresers would
be launche roa-Tr"="iii?Face vessel, except as discussed later under
the category of DECtPTION, for the mother ship woula have to
saeproach to within at least two Miles of the target, and the like-
lihood of detection lo-eld probably not justify the risk, it is very
possible, hoeever, for sneak craft to be position& by surface
vessels. Foi example, the British I-craft could be launched as far
as 600 miles from the target, could execute the attack, ad relearn
to rendezvous with the mother vessel. This draft disolaces only
about 25 Aisne and is desired to to towed, so that transportin7
it is not difficult. Of course, this means of positioning is
not the most desirable, since the risk of detection at sometime
daring the operation would probably be hill; but it should not
be overlooked,, 'especially es noted under this category of
DiCCEFTIOR.
c. Airerart. Ar. far as is known by this comeend, development
in this field as been limtted. It is known that tee English have
experimented -,,,Ti t,71 droppine the i4elman from an airceLft, but tbe
results of the tests are not available to this oemaind. Certsin
tests have been conducted 'n p. era Chat in s swimmers froa aiTeraft,
but the results are not sufficiently conslusive for aomeent here.
4. Submarine. 'oecause of the relative security afforded
by this eiethod ot positioning it is by far the most desirable
of thelOur listed possibilities. The British T-crafts for their
succeseful attacks on the Tirpitz in Norway and on the Japanese
cruiser Takao in Singapore were towed to position 1:--e fleet-sized
submarines. It is unlikely that a awireser attack would be laenched
from a submarine larger than the X-craat, for a torpedo with
greater range than a swimaer could be used with less risk to the
subOarine. But any harbor within range of enemy submarine, as are
all 'U.S. harbors, are liable to ettacks by sneak craft, and thus
these considerations slay ',e worthy of note:
1. Sneak craft, properly manned and handled, are capable
of penetrating harbor defenses that would be impre Table to fleet-
size submarines.
2. Such csraft arc capable of cerryine a leaettro :orpedoes
or as much as 7500 pounde of explosive.
3. As nentioeke(: before, 'Dur eresent enee :en known to have
captured eumbers of excellent Center eneaa craft, as well as tee
technicians arei Si ?Isere cone creed leith their devei ?omelet, see
production.
2. APPROPLCI',
a. Surface. The risks involved in a surface approach,
either by swimmer or sneek craft:, eloccept as noted under the cateece
of DECEara1011, are such an to mal:e such an an)rsa _ anlikely.
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Ibis is not to say- that defensive meeeeree nek aeulect tht z,u'.7face
entirely, for the ariculty of sutmereed nav'.Lation :lakes it
desirable for both retmeers end seeak craft to cceer lart of IcLeir
route to the target on surface. But in either can only the
hedd of the attacker reaee surface, and a mants head on serflce
at night is practically iepossible of detection fr,m a -,hip until
he is -within a range of about 150 yards.
b. Subsurface. A well-planned sneak at'eack, either ly .wirmer
or w sneak craft, will a.most 'always utilize a au' surface a. leech.
It has been 'oand by 3111,18Lant that from the dock e: a ship at
night, even in very clear water (e.g., St. Theras), detec-lo-e of
properly canou'laeed swimmers eqeipped with re-cir eletin
SCUBAls ia extremely lifficul1 if not impossible? at a deet1 of 20
feet, and there is no reason to believe that a sneak craft woad
be any mbre detectible. Almost all of the successes by the )baLians
and the Enelish were scored by means of underwater approachet, and
the Germans achieved notable successes in sUbsurfeee attacks 77
dock and harbor Installatjons on the Rhine Bilrer and in Fren( , and
Belgian ports.
3. ATTACKS:
a. Towed ex loeives. Swimaler attacks, in wh:.eh the attacker :ColE
his explos ve to thu tarot ( eartuey on surface ), mv be d(1\eree-
from as great a range as mo miles. It now seems ',hat withi a
very short while OTeLant swimme-s will he capable of towing charese
of at least 300 pounds underwater for about this thstance. plosivc
may be attached to the target in a number of ways, but the
most promising means, bot of w ch were popular with Italiar and
English swLmmers were: (1) atta-lhin the charges c the hull by
means of a very strone permanent magnet, and (2) hanging the tree
underneath the keel from a line running between tl bilge keels,
fastened by 'leans of elamos.. In either care a tine delay fuze alloee
the swimmer to escape before the cheues expltbde.,
b. Explosives caLTied by anea37 craft. Rcplosves charges c)rriec
by sneak craft are usaall; in th:, form of detachable war heads, a
favorite method eith ';he Italiane and the Japanese, or in blister
compartments on the Cedes (e.g., the X-Craft). Both the magnet
and the keel suspension methods, of attaeh:ng explo,ives were eved.
In the case of the bilge keel suspension, it leis neceslary fcr the
operator (s) to anchor their craft and perform as ewimmers while
rigging the lines and placing '11:, charge. 1:311 if a magnet wcre usee,
the operator simply nudged the tareet with the bow cf his craft and
tripped a release controlled 1.011 the cockpit, detaching the eerhea6
from the craft. The latter methodis quicker, but s adversele:
affected by marine growth on hulls.
C. Torpedoes. Torpedoes were se ideldly used Ty Eneltsh, eermers,
Japanese, and Italians, most craft being designed carre eer ore
or two, dependinj on the size and range of the bca ,. The ?'if;aclvant4: _f
this method, of course, is the security is lost when the torpedo
explodes. The Japanese a, tempted to overcome tele- disadvantaue by
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by deelenine a torpedo el'h a raeee Df aboet 250 yards, wh'c 'ad a
11R. tic nOr2 terneane of w%ich 't could attae,' itself to iht
side of the target and l eee lode after a ruttabl- -Vele delay, -11(evine
the attacker to nake good hie esceee. This method, however, Is
regarded more as intercsteng nal as having practical value.
4. Retirement
a. Return to Parent VesSel. In the case of sleek craft centr_dEr le
navigation may be necessae/ tc effect, a rendezvous eith the rp'her
vessel, particularly if t:3 pareet i- a sdbmartne. If tl'e relde.,vois
is far enough from enemy territory, light signals way be used, bet,
the risk is alueys ccneiderable. Infra-red homin is both eessible
and practical, as is underwater ound. In the case of swimmers,
at present the only reale le homing devi:e is a lie from th
parent vessel to theJareet, paid out by the swimmec as he aeeroacheu
the tercet. However, I s obvious thee, such a method is imeracticti,
and there ar- ender development )uth infra-red and underwater sound
gear, by means of which it is hoed that the swimmer or sneaL craft
may be able to return to the home vessel with a minimum of'd fficully.
b. Return to Base, ebvionsly the attacker's homing erel lee is
considerrPETFEFEri77 I hia tarlet, is within rate of a base
to which he ma, return, far the reasons that (1) ho TIV avail
himself of laedmerks to aid his nevi ation; and (2) his ime limita-i(e
is not likely to be so in)ortant, i.e., he is returning to 17e-eee
instead of nakin rendezvous.
C. "Pick-up" by Aircraft. Mi. is not a form of sneak a'lack
which would ordinarily be unllertaken 'by UV's, for (ereful
of a very seecial net rh eoeld be, re-leired to )rehire vent s'er
activity. Nevertheless, in view o7 the fanaticism of way a1oerente
the philosophy of theeeneey who are active in the LS., it 1 e )ossf, !lilj
which must be seriously considered. At least three mihoes could be
employed in ?at'eepts to damage U.S. vessels: (1) Enemy aeent- eeeld
board U.S. vessels witb false orders and identification add 'lose
as members of ships' compeny for extended periods. Trained oents
could wreak eetensive daeage over a )oriod of time and make it apoe ir
to be accidental; (2) Merbere of the U.F. Areed Forces could be
proselyted by enemy agents and influenced to perform acts of
sabotage; (3) Agents mieYt gain illegal entre to CI. ships fcked
or at anchor aid remain cboard lone enoaeh to accemIlish iderab_e
damage.
2. Masquerade
a, pis,Nided boats. Cossibilities in thie acid are rnand.
Illemy attackers couldI7erarried in bun hoats; fishing vessels, ceen.r ?_
craft, pleasure boats, ferries, etc., and any excuse could 1 , used
to approach close enough to the target to diliver ea attack. The
attack itself could e d(14veree in lumber of ways. For exaiele,
undervatee swim -rs with exelos3ves eieht be tower' to within range
of the target, in thicb case tho disguised craft r teht not eeeroach
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closer than a mile; or diseuised craft might laimch swimmers
explosives upstream of thc tare e and dump debAs on the surface
of the water to cover ther approach. Japanese using this teehnieee
were nhnuccessful, but it was mainly because they latked proper
equipment. Of course, thA danger from such attacks seems inrienificee
in home water* since it neett be very difficult to effect the necessal::-
extensive preparation, i.e., rigging the boat, prozurine the exploeivee,
etc. But in foreign ports these attades may prove tohe a real
menace.
b, Captured Heuipmene, it Is possible that a ro ou cefel (melee
might make use of captured naval equipmentplee, bots in execlehine
a sneak attack. On the recent exercises at Viequez a sneak attack
boat disguised as a modiff.ed LCP(B) was taken into castody 112 an
alert patrol boat, but it would have been hoisted aboard the cnpturiee
vessel without having bewe searched' had it been euieped mite. ?Lee*:
slings. Many sehemes might su eat themselves to e canny adversary,
once he hao acquired j.Se equipment, i.e., a leoat, a. vehicle, etc.
7. The recent interest ial sneak attacks displayed by the Uefe. Fleet
is thought to be vege timely, for ruch attacks couIC: erove to be a
real menace, to certain types of aaval operations le tee feture. As
observed before, however, it is felt that the sneak exerciser
which have been carried oet to date have accomplished little mere
than to make the Fleet nseeakemiscious". The reason for thee seemz
to have been:
a. For lack of both euitableseaipment and experience Umsbai t,
who have conducted the ex raises, lave got been a to aeeroxi:mate
a satisfactory degree of eeellem ir, theIr imalatEel attacks. The
result of thilehas been that in mary cases the ships lave received
erroneous impressionA of eneek attacks, and many of the defenses
that have been developed, though effective egeinet the UDisLeat
attacks, would be inadequate against a well-developed attack, in
fact, some of these defenses may evee aid the attaeker at tL;ee.
Worse than thie? it is feared that the ships which have had eeecese
in defending against the UDTeLant exercises mev be ieclindd te belitele
the threat of well executed sneak attacks.
b. The conditions eoverning the cixerciae havc not been well
defined, with the result ehat there hasbeen some eentasion eeneernic,;
the claimed succession or failubea of attackers. Ie _order to eUrreeleee
interest in the exercises it is eell to conduct tees on a ofe2etitive
basis; but heretofore the co:easier, conceeninj ceaditioas wtieh apple
have given rise to a "copseand-robter spirit in which the Iprpose
of the exercises has been lost.
8. Provided that certain classes of euipnient )reeeetly under
development or in prodess of being procured beeeee available
Inv- be able to imprxte the quality of their sneak attack exercises.
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Her, for the praesen realize the iwerilmun value frog::
the exercises a cleared definition of governing colditions
Each :exercise should aestvx- a general s-ittration (ioeo, friemily fori
Many forces and capabilitiee, energy di.FpOsition, :31.4.) and
CaptIlretii ZUCC.0503, gen.:1(V precatitioxvi, rt0., sl:Lorad .be
Up Preliminary to such a treatment of precedure for rva
attaoIc 'exercises, hek-Jever, the .-yresent eapabilitiest.Of UDiSLaiU
raist be determined, ong with the defensive TrOasliziel.s most tui..ed.
the Ships. The efialeral alcak attaolt capabilities of Urresi?an'.-:
a. STIALTirt
1.
a.
Thi P f.,s the tot teanf., 1707.: ;)05:17*::: ;:r L.
t sneak a ere. Ths -bass -;,lay be the "61..Z bast at 1.:` Ltle
Creek, or it may be near the larvth-13 beaches used for 4--Imphibou.s
Moralises It le not usual, however, for anchorages to be clo:io arit
to the beach for !winners to -.Ault,-,3 d..rec attaSE? awtalem
boini oonvred rL .sota PiMiXiar to wthin radL:m of L,.1(
b.
It is not desirable that surface
veseels be c attackers, or i..-Lray met aFiroach.
the target close enouji to be ul-thin easy radar or visual rev ,e,
the attack in :PPM away. in facto no of t flagrant =trt5ii L.tio:7
of the ULTsLant Vneak attck exercises to date i'l&C; been tto haeaaSii
for making use of LCPta)111 and/Or IB a to )(mat :ion awimuerv for
their attacks, It is east.,, to zoo that tiles? 37.raft are very
to detection by radar, search 11.43.t, patrol boat, eta.,
be used by other the* a atdcidal enemy. Yet lost of the ..:',uccalineb
which have betel claisaed the to.rmts tn the exerciseellavel.-racn cap :,.;.nd
by LCP(R)(s) or IT3(R)ts 41.ch sOOPIU to indicai'm t aecessit ler a.
rule gov4mint tra di an unioalistLc Mal:kV of pomittliili; a,ttacAx-re.
co aft, Use of th.f.s means of emitioning tr; not
anticipated int ettidtte future. No oonefLdera' ion .,1a13 4ve
to droppirk: sneak craft from aircraft, and since ILL; flTtS arc-
in imp school, drops fro helimpters 50131$q tl) 110 i-h3 arlly 1111IIV
of positioning by aircrafil cm:1111bl? to UDTeLant zu::1 ao plans for
have been. ;lade.
do Sub vcry possible t, :ubluarines
wq be used to pos Lisalerso Perhaps the oee: tent Lior
on deliver/ of sneak attatIcsct ii ilme is lack of sneak craft,
so that maxima w- of nut:mariner May not be is. however, cert
suitable *It:rations.: a carefully Landled fleet rubmrime 111E4y
assnuevered to within me Lar or ranize of targets. irl.kojpciA,
at this time to an ata: of tIlit nAure is thp diffloulty: which the
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swimmer has of returning to the submarine after the attack, and
this limitation is so serioie that if it is at all possible, the atLa,t
is planned so that the swimmer can ewid to friendle forces ashore
or be picked up by surface craft after the attack. int both i _Sea- e
and sonic devices are deviiloped tricot to operationil production,
so that hopes are very prising for oVercaming the lonine problem in
the very near future. However, when a fleet-size sebmerine is uded
for positioning swimmers, :It should be noted that thiu is an a tifici, which could could be mAeading; for the submarine is actually representine
a sneak craft, thoush eanelverability in close quarters is meet more
limited and detection much easier than if it were a sneak craf,e. qlie
rules for the exercise shoild take thie inisaccount.
2. APPROACIT
a. surface. All 71)TsLant approaches will erobably be surface,
at least until just before the swimmers come into visual ranee of
the sentries aboard thetareet. Although, as will b- described below,
some UDTsLant swimnere have been trateed so that by using SCUleals
(self-contained underwater breathin; apparatus) they are able ts
eubterge to avoid :patrol boat activityl and to deliver the attecS e
training required for their qualification is FO extensive that their
number is limited. Consequently on meny occasions 'et is necessary
for sneak attacks to be carried out be surface swim ere, who meet
swim all the wa to the target to deliver their attacks. Such
swimmers are, of course,, velnerable to illumination by lights 'aenglie,
above the waterlines of targets arid to detection by alert dece sentree, ?
Thus this is an unrealistic element of the simulated sneak exercisen.
for presumhbly a potential enemy *mild be equipped it least e,th
adequate SCUBA's.
b. Subsurfaie,.. UDTsL t equipped to execute e subsuefeee
approach bymmeans of a sneak craft. As mentioned above, limited num ,0 e
of UDTsLant swimmers are able to serform a partial uederwater
submerging as necessary to avoid patrol activity aid to e.t.a= c the
target. This technique if in fact, the most realiEtic form of elmule,id
sneak attack that TIDTsLan4, i8 able to deliver, and if properly execitel
is very difficult of deter tion. The only Verealistie element of the
UDTsLant version of the underwater approach is the trail of bubbles
that the SCUBA's now in use by UDTtLant swimmers leaves behind. it
is very unlikely that a real sneak attack would ileolve use of ,
such obsolete SCUBA'S.
3. ATTA4
a. oed 1xplosiTes. At present, sieulated attacks wfleth
explosives towed by eSimmees is the only form of sneak attic : shich
UDTaLant is capable of executing. It is a valid anstuiption Lat
arey swimmer readhing the hull of a target undetected may be .0-iin!
up to 300 *ands of 7:Lie'l exeloeivee with which th cargummate Lis
attack. UDTsLant surface senners Eimulate euvh attacks by eenitin
mk 13 flaree alongside t!e, hulls of targets. Undeeuater swil, era el,
attach each flares, )roarrly waterproofed to the eleeor chutes or,
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rudder posts of targeto iuld the flares may bo rigged with nech:nical
time delay firing devices ret for such time delay as to allow oscape
Of the swimmmr. In the near future, time delay flares may els? be
attached magnetically to hulls2 that so the attacks seed only tAre
,
contact with a target to censummate his attack and r:uickly make
his escape* This method of delivoring an attack has the advantage
of affording positive proof of a successful attacks having bee-1
delivered, even thou* the underwater flare is a. dJ(.1, as is often th
case; for the magnetic device is evidence that the swimmer ret ed
the hull of his tar t.
b. pplosive s carriel by snail: craft. TinsLan- at oresert has
no such o
e. Torpedoes. This fGrm of oneek attack is not, used by nTsLant.
4. =DOCENT
sip Return to Part VAisel. At present tas mwArreliable
aid to utSEERT homing to parent vessel (usually an 1,(1)
or an IB(R) is a hooded waterproof flashlight by'mens$1 of whle honl
boat and swimmer may make flne directional signals. If the parent:
vessel is a submarine, 5w-ix-piers may real out a line behind them as
they swim, using it to Nide their return after completing their
attack. If this is not feasible, as it seldom la, 1,t is usually
friendly forceo ashore or -rAet a surface craft afte,' their eV -71.1k
has been completed* It ElleiMIATn, either surface or from a su-barine
rendezvous with an MOO, ome success has been realfted with
infra-Ted snooperscopes in homing on an LCP(R) or a submartneE. but
such gear has many linitations for ITDC ufies for which it was rot
designed. It has been 1)rattliedtrTsLant that in the near futnre
improved infra-red (for .TarfaCe) and sortie (for underwater) devices
will be availablc for heming*ide, 1..alt until such devices avear in
Operational form, homing &1.d, are Iikely'to remnin a major problem
for UnTsLant sneak attackers.'
b.. Return to Bases I!; Ls seldom that a UDTaLant sneak erirtmer
will be Aie to reu4i by 3wilstin.., a base. Usually water deep
enoupi4 for an anchorace is so far off a beach that the sneak swimmer
should return to a base, I if probable that he wil navigate by
of landmarks,
been
aircraft. TILL lens of rut resent has no.%
Op,
13. DECEMVE
1. E5P1 1AGE. his '7orm of sneak attack ia not, of :.:011,2Th
in use to ant. its elployme-t in thp past TVISI.ant hcx been
confined to placing mcn at target ves:3c10 by meant of false orderS
and this subterfuge may aoin be used on appropriate occasion .
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Since espionage iv not a cearseeteristic OPT attack, re farther
methods of its employnent have been devised at preerte
2. MASVERADE
a. Dispieed bots. Thie form of sneak attack may well he used
by UDTA'ants or tbe :meet part of which was described prevloeele.
In facts if exercise :sneak attack ratee for this do not take
into condideration the anroalism in positioning swimmers by rface
crafts some sort of boat disguise may be the only feasible me an of
Cloning the target close enoueh te launch swimmers, and maid
well be expected.
b. Captured Eql erne*, . Use of *Captured Equipmere would depedd
entirely on the possr litles allowed by the rales capturiee of
equipment, by IIDTes but if rlach a form of attack i oesible, it
should be expeeted.-'
9. The defenses welch the ships of the U.P. Fleet have develoeed
against the UrTsLant sintelated sneak attacks :lees
a. Searchlight manned throe vhaat Alert period, rearchbv periort_c-3.31;
and clese guard of radar.
b. Flycatcher ie t (ir fleet olnrations)
b. Extra sentries posted so as- to ceard the entire preblen of
the waterline.
d. Patrol beate manned, eireliae target vessels centinuoesly
and often more than OAO bc t ci r (lint in, concentri c rc1es o qt t
as far as 500 yards.
e. Cargo liehts easperided out 10 feet ehove tee waterlines
of targets at close eaou.gt intorrale 80 as to illunillte their
entire waterlines includIne the enehor chain ane the ruddieft.
f. During theFLEX operation certaLn%tareet versels uere et eervel
to be tureine their serewr at intervels, -though it 11 not knoen whet
this was for the purpose of defendinc k2;ainst Enot&, ettackere.
g. Passwords were estehlIshed for use by tee flveatcher eetts
and the patrol boats eo au to aid in a ptehending d 3 raised rface
craft.
During the FLEX oeeraion, even ariJerin.; the many oriflicI.in# els Jr -.3
and the widespread criticism of UD1 tactics, It seems fairly clear
that the above defenses wore .tudrately mlccessful in de aIne eth
the ST ALT!! tepe of meal- at'acks that were 4:rtaintel. How :ors it
ie felt that the claimed :accesses were attributed fer 'love t,
limitations of tie exervi r es 111= to thu orfee ..iArt._e813 of th
defenses against real Is ti e meek atte eke . Th'L: c e el lei on i f 1 asnd
on the follow1nee
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3.. Due to the adverso cor:litionr, it was not .)osa:U to onrr: out
an attack by underwater mrierriers. Such attacks ..tere planned ee tle
IBM's which were to position the =inners wore etected ane
&Ppm/handed before the zwirAMSTS ? Li be all :LauaA-ed. Consereent
the ships' defenses were Levee- tester:IN-7011st on erdereater at
2. Moet of the eueCeSSOS ;elich were a:sin:led tht target vele
were /leered durine the "pcsitionne phave of tho :e1 Wj1 the
attackers were in LCP(R)' r or in If, (I0 Iv. It has already heel
pointed out that this ie ';he most urerealistic ishaFf- of th,, s7; est,: att
which have beei simulated by UnlinLent. /et ceneickration ef
defensen listed above will SLIOW 'that nos. 9a, 9 le, 9,1, and 9e
are directed manly at th- 1 hae, ind lioald have crily a lird'r