(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP55-00001A000100040005-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 17, 1950
• Content Type: PAPER

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1w WE so a
1. Opening, Statement
The purpose of ti t_s paper .s to provide a broad fran work r' i 1.c_
which national i ntelli?ence planning can be initiated. On the pre-
sumption that national intolliBence is one of the principal factr)ro
upon which national security action is decided, the plannin ; for such
intelligence should proceed in a clear understanding of the national
objective, and of the major circumstances affecting this objective.
Accordingly, the United States objective and world position are
treated in paragraphs 2 throuryh 7 below, and are followed by a
discussion of the related intelligence planning problem in the
remaining paragraphs.
2. The US Objective
0
Regardless of the cordllar as and qualifications attending
broad statement of this type, it can be assumed that the overall
The development of a world composed of free and cooperative
nations, associated in an organization ca,,able of main taind4-,,;
peace and of continually improving the relationships and
welfare of its members.
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objective of the 'United States is approximately as follows:
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Under "normal" circumstances, the United States would advance
toward its objective primarily through the United Nations Organization
and secondarily by L;'ie benevolent exercise of its wealth and power
in situations lrhich the United Nations Organization was not yet
capable of handling.
3. The Obstacle
It is generally conceded that "normal" circumstances do not
prevail in the existing world situation. A condition of abnormality
persists because of the existence of a power complex inimical not
only to the objective and very survival of the United States, but
hostile as well to all other states which do not share its ainis.
The characteristics which distingu sh this pourer complex, the US Sr ,
and give it the stature of a dangerous threat are:
a. Its existing strength
b. Its propensity for growth
la.. The Interim US Objectives
Instead of pursuing coursss of action which, under normal
circumstances, would bring about the realization of its overall
objective, but which under existing abnormal circumstances are seer
to be ineffective in the face of a formidable and dynamic foe, the
United States most concentrate upon the follovrin interim objective;:,
designed to overcome the chief obstacle to its overall obj.c!:ive:
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a. Arrest e zemy growth
b. Reduce e:dsting e ten r capabilities
c. Alter enemy objectives
5.
The Complementary Courses of Action
An unprecedented series of political, econ_.ic, and non-
aggressive military cor: ratznents made by the US in the last few
years has failed to reduce Soviet capabilities or to stop Soviet
expansion. Persuasion and good example have not succeeded in
altering the objectives of Soviet leaders. Self-imposed conditions
on the use of aimed force by the U3 confine its military power to
self-defense, and to the fulfil -hient of ill-defined and hence
uncertain international obligations. Under such circumstances,
direct axTied measures by the US against the USSR are possible only
when the latter is read;,- to incite and repel ahem.
For these reasons, it appears that there remain to the US
only three general and interdependent courses of action for
attaining its interim objectives:
a. Systematic prosecution of an offensive and
dangerous "cold Saar", as opposed to the defensive and
relatively safe "cold war" so far conducted.
L. Tightening and clarifaction of the conditions
under which the US will take punitive action against Soviet
or Soviet-inspired aggressions.
c. Preparation for the obligations and risks inherent in
a and b above, including "hot war".
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6. The &.istence and Implications of Polarity
Thus far in the discussion a concept of dualism has been apparent,
with the United States seen as protagonist and the USSR a;, anta:oriel.
Hotiaever, the power and influence of either the United States or the
USSR is so much greater than that of any other state or organized
power complex that the concept of dualism, when placed in :rorld .~ersp?e-
tive, becomes a concept of bi-polarity, in which the high imLilitary,
economic, political-, and ideological potentials of the two polar
states cause an inevitable drift of the remaining; states toward one
or the other. The direction and speed of this drift are consequently
matters of utmost concern to the United States and the USSR, secondary
only to consideration of their innate and respective power positions
in relation to each other.
Under these conditions the United States and the USSR, vrhile
each concentrating upon the other as the problem or danger of first
magnitude, are at the sane time constrained to attempt influencing
or manipulating the rest of the world in such manner as to best serve
their respective aims. (Objections to the exercise of such influence
or manipulation by the United States stem from a ai sinterpretati.on of
our overall objective, a prime corallary of i:hich is United States
leadership and initiative in guidii-ig other nations toward their own
best interests.)
In a very broad sense, therefore, the United States and the
USSR are each confronted with two major external problems:
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a. The forces of opposite polarization.
b. The forces of weak, neutral, and uncertain l;olarizt .'_on.
As far as the US is concerned, these do problems constitute
a frarrE of reference Within which the interim objectives to be
attained and courses of action to be followed should be co itinuously
surveyed.
7. Consequences for the United States
Certainly for the present, and a -parently for ,he forseeable
future, the interim national objectives and the corriplementaxy
national courses of action indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5 above,
siren surveyed in the li?ht of this frame of reference, lea(! to
the follovrjnr conclusions, , hich become in-effect, the principal
determinants of US action:
(a) That the US must, chiefly by the cysttematic nrosecu~ic>n
of an offensive cold war, arrest the "rotii th, reduce the capabil.i_ties,
and alter the objectives of the forces polarized against it.
(b) That the US must, while retain.; -ig and strength ni:i
its existing allies, inL?luence and manipulate, to its and
their mutual advantage, the forces of wreak, neutral, and
uncertain polarizatf_on.
(c) That the US must prepare itself and probable :;flies
for engagement in partial or full-scale armed conflict.
(d) That the UJ" 1-,rust, in accomplishing ,he foregoing,
strive to maintain and create conditions compatible writh its
overall objective.
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8. The :Helationship to Intelligence Planning
On the premise that the broad responsibility of the national
intelligence structure is to furnish intelligence tishich will assist
the government of the United States in planning, implementing, and
checking the effectiveness of its courses of action in the externa:_
world, and since these courses of action will be largely dictated by
the conclusions or deterainants derived just above, it follows that
a consideration of national intelligence planning should originate
with an examination of such conclusions.
Relative Priority
'1t is not conceivable that a strong and rejolute Pow-ter such
as the USSR would be affected to any great extent by even the most
savage "cold war", unless convinced that the US was rzilitarily pre-o-red
for the consequences, and was supported in principle and in 'act by a
comprehensive array of sympathetic nations. For t-J.s reason, the
preparation for armed conflict and the expansion of pro-US polarizai,i[n
are matters fully as important as the systematic prosectuion of
offensive "scold war". At the sane time, there is no assurance that
either the gathering of allies or the amassing of armaments, or both,
by the US, would have a salutary effect upon the USSR, unless reinferc-ad
by the techniques of "cold war". This leads to the conclusion that
the principal determinants of US action are all interde;pendent and
equally compelling, and that they operate coordinately.
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10. Nature of, the Intelligence Planning Problem
It can now be said, in broad terms, that the national into 1:1A,-, en ce
planning problem* consists in:
a. Deriving coordinately the frill implications of the
four principal determinants of US action, as listed in
paragraph 7 above.
b. Translating the visualized intelligence requirements
of these implications into plans for actual- production of
intelligence desi;;ned to assist those responsible for US
courses of action.
11. The Need for Ideniificaton.s
The derivation of intelligence implications from the principal
determinants of US action depends, in the first place, on clear and
continuing identifications and Groupings of the forces of -rari.ous
degrees and kinds of polarization. Such identifications and ;rou r tgs,
which are obviously an intelligence responsibility, are not complo-t,,
at least for the forces of weak, neutral, and uncertain polarizat_o;
If brought to completion, these identifications and groupings vrould
lead to "intelligible fields of study", wl-Lich would be found most
useful in guiding intelligence effort, production, and orga:nizatL,n.
* Manifestly, tly, planning can be done only for problems or situations
1vrhi ch exist., or which can be forseen. lnergency requirements and
specific requests do not fall in this category, and vrill, as alwa .-,
have to be met by the intelligence organization as they occur.
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12. The Relationship with US Policy
The derivation of intelligence implications from the principal
determinants of US action must also be continually related to
established and tentative US security policies. Such policies
provide information on the present and probable future developnst
of national courses of action, and afford intelligence planers tl::o
opportunity to prepare for impending national problems, and to
detect and report factors and developments ;,rhicl-i may warrant inocdif _ sa-
tions of existing or creation of new national courses of action.
13. The Broad Phases cf Intelligence Planning
The general nature of the national intelligence planning
problem, indicated in paragraph 10, as affected not only by the
problem of identifications but also by the existence and developix;n `-
of US security policies, suggests an approach to its solution along
the following IL).es:
PHASE I
A definitive identification and classification of
states, organizations, movements, and forces into groups
according to the nature and strength of their orientation
in the bipolar struggle between the US and the USSR.
MUSE Ii
(Note: This phase is suggested in the '.iowledge -:,hat
the role of intelligence is to supply information on which
decisions are based, and not to recomiend decisions. `,rote
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such information, to be of value, must be supplied in advance
of the decision-m.ldi.n; process, and since, moreover, those
making decisions have not developed the habit of long-range
anticipation of intelligence needs, it is necessary for
intelligence planners, from a combined knowled&e of policy
and the world situation, to anticipate and arrange to meet
intelligence needs on their oan initiative. The only way of
anticipating realistically the neod of another is to place
oneself in his position. Therefor intelligence planners are
obligated to examine the validity cf current national securi:
policies and the need for changes or additions thereto, but
only to arrive at the intelligence implications of such a
critical exanti-nation. These intelligence implications will
give rise to estimates and reports which will not recommend
alteration or creation of national security policies, but
1?rh.ic h vrill furnish, on time, pertinent information upon which
decisions for changes or new national action can be based.) ?<
Critical examination of established and tentative US
security polices in the light of the principal detexminants
of US action, and in the light of Phase It to determine:
(a) 10.hat security policies are o current valichitv.
(b) "hat security policies are in need of : odificz,tion.
(c) at security policies are needed but
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Derivation of national intelligence p_'oduction re quireitents,
immediate intermediate mid Mange, essential for:
(a) Implementing and checking tie effectiveness c f
....y.._
valid national secur't olicies
( ) DDmmonstratiXig the need for modifications of
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