INDEX ORIENTATION COURSES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 298
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1953
• Content Type: LIST

Approved For Re a 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166AO 0010001-2
CONFIDENTIAL
1
Feb 53
Training Bulletin #1, DCI at 8th Orientation Course
2
Mar 53
Recommendation to D/TR that Remarks of Wm. H. Jackson at 9th Orientation
Course not be made the subject of a Training Bulletin
Mar 53
Training Bulletin #2, Training of CIA Personnel at Department of Defense
schools and colleges
4
Mar 53
Training Bulletin #3, Remarks of Vice President at the 9th Orientation
Course
Mar 53
Training Bulletin #4, DCI (Smith) at 9th Orientation
6
Mar 53
Training Bulletin #5, Dulles at 9th Orientation Course
7
Jun 53
Training Bulletin #6, Cabell (DDCI) at 10th Orientation Course
8
Jun 53
Memo for the Record re Distribution and costa of Training Bulletins
9
Jul53
Training Bulletin #7, Dulles (DCI) at 10th Orientation
10
Sep 53
Memo for Special Assistant, DCI re Training Bulletins from S/PP
11
8 Sep 53
Memo for Special Assistant, DCI re Training Bulletins from S/PP
Original returned to us with Drafts of Speeches, same as 10.
12
Sep 53
Drafts of Gen. Charles P. Cabell's address at 11th Agency Orientation
Course (Two)
13
Sep 53
Drafts of Allen W. Dulles' address at 11th Agency Orientation Course
(Two)
14
8 Oct 53
Memos to cover Training Bulletins Number 8, Allen W. Dulles' Address,
and Number 9, Charles P. Cabell's address. Handwritten notes to
DTR from'S/PP and to S/PP from DTR re Forwarding it in Present format
as Bulletin or send to Reg. - Controll Staff for regulatory issuance.
15
23 Nov 53
Drafts of Allen W. Dulles' address at 12th Agency Orientation Course
(Two)
16
23 Nov 53
Drafts of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick's address at 12th Agency Orientation Course
(Two)
17
23 Nov 53
Drafts of General Charles P. Cabell's address at 12th Agency Orientation
'Course (Two)
18,
23 Nov 53
Covering Memos for Training Bulletins 10, 11, and 12 re Remarks of
Allen W. Dulles, General Charles P. Cabell, and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
numbered respectively.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22L
-RDP tMMMIAt 1-2
 SECRET
Approved Fo! elease XN 1 to 001fiW00100010001-2
rT 0. DATE V v' li F/DE If
')"' DESCRIPTION
1
9
20
B Oct '53
8 Oct '53
Training' Bulletin #$, Remarks of Allen W. Dulles
Training Bulletin #9, Remarks of Charles P. Cabell
21
23 Nov '53
Training Bulletin #10, Remarks of Allen W. Dulles
22
23 Nov '53
Training Bulletin #11, Remarks of General Charles P. Cabell
23
23 Nov '53
Training Bulletin #12, Remarks of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2.
SEET
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 sional personnel for specified duty assignments, to increase the
proficiency of on-duty professional personnel in their current duty
assignments, or to prepare on-duty professional personnel to under-
take different or more responsible duty assignments within the Agency.
Intelligence Training Courses are to be distinguished from the Basic
Approved For Rer se 2d"Cf74'iRDP55-00166A00'9+t00010001-2
TRAINING FOR SPECIFIED DUTY ASSIGNMENTS
A. General Statement
(1)
as Intelligence Training Courses.
(2) Intelligence Training Courses are presented to prepare new profes-
CONFIDENTIAL
The Director of Training develops, directs, and conducts various
training courses designed to impart knowledge, develop skills in
methods and techniques, and increase understanding of the princi-
ples .~*crecN'.~sw..,v w
of intelligence as these are directly related to specified
duty assignments within the Agency. These courses are identified
Intelligence Course (BIC) covered by CIA Regulation
24 Feb 53
those courses and programs in specialized fields subsidiary to the
field of intelligence, such as courses in language and area, lang-
uages, and courses in various functional fields.
Intelligence Training Curses are developed as the result of the iden-
25X1A
tification and of training requirements, standards, and
objectives which are mutually arrived at by the various Office Heads
and the Director of Training.
This regulation prescribes the policies, responsibilities, and procedures
governing the intelligence training of professional personnel for speci-
fied duty assignments in the Agency.
O
r~ 1
Approved For Release 2002/08/? a P55-00166A000100010001-2
e rmatiorl'
 ~'`~ T'A. SS s
&l~ ase 200IN
r6 DP55-00166A10100010001-2
PROPOSED CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REGULATfON
TRAINING FOR4DUTY ASSIGNMENTS
A. General Statement
(1)
and operations which are designed to prepare new professional
-Y-11 I February 1953
The Director of Training directs and conducts various training
courses in theA methods and techniques of intelligence processes
personnel for projected duty assignments, to increase the pro-
ficiency of on-duty professional personnel in their present
duty assignments, or to prepare on-duty professional personnel
to undertake other:--or different duty assignments in the Agency.
(2) These courses in intelligence, methods and techniques are to be
distinguished from the Basic Intelligence Course which is de-
signed to give new professional personnel an adequate basic in-
25X1A telligence background (see CIA Regulation
,(and from in-
25X1A
termediate and advanced training courses for on-duty professiona '
, . r
(3)
~.JG1 ~7v1111G1 111 1Q11~j 110.'G C111LL a.j-t3L1, 11.11(1 111 5 pe ci LLzeu IuncTional
fields.
Courses in intelligence methods and techniques are intended to
supplementand not to supersede on-the-job training conducted
by the various Offices of the Agency.
() This regulation &~ the policies, responsibilities, and
procedures governing theAtYraining of professional personnel for
specifi duty assignments in the Agency.
B. Policy
(1) P1M Pr ~ .ai al personnel shall receive training in the course(s)
in intelligence methods and techniques prescribed by the appropri-
ate Office Head, in order to prepare them for their projected duty
aYp v% o Welt9 /08/2~~ A& rV.
F DP55
166A~ 00100010001-2
j
armatiiori ? ~ WENTIAL
 Approved For Ruse 2002/0 -R
DP55-00166AODVtOOO1 -iFID
Sp ~ v Inf nrrnafinn
(2) On-duty professional personnel shall receive training in the
course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques prescribed
by the appropriate Office Head, in order to increase their pro-
ficiency in their present duty assignments or to prepare them
to undertake other or different duty assignments in the Agency.
(3) Satisfactory completion of the Basic Intelligence Course shall
normally be prerequisite to the entry of new professional per-
sonnel in courses in intelligence methods and techniques. The
prescribed course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques
shall normally be completed before new professional personnel
report to duty assignments in the Agency.
(4) New professional personnel exempted from the Basic Intelligence
Course and on-duty professional personnel may be entered in the
various courses in intelligence methods and techniques, in ac-
cordance with the procedure set forth in D of this regulation.
C. Responsibilities
(1) The Director of Training shall:
(a) Identify, in cooperation with the various Office Heads,
requirements for in intelligence methods and tech-
niques to be prerequisite to various duty assignments,
(b) Develop, direct, and conduct training courses in the meth-
ods and techniques of intelligence processes and operations, .~..
(c) Transmit to Of ce A ads, from time to time, summaries of
the courses in intelligence methods and techniques currently
offered by the Office of Training.
(d) Establish and maintain performance standards to be met by
all personnel), Lin courses in intelligence methods and techniques.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 Lq1~)P55-00 i~000100010001-2
Secur' rmatio 14.1
~lF[IDENT[AL
 Approved For Refease 20 T6A=RDI055-o 16 . 00010001-2
Security ormnf
(e) Provide for training reports appraising the performance of
all personnel in courses in intelligence methods and tech-
niques, and transmit reports to the Office Head concerned
and to the Assistant Director (Personnel) for their infor-
mation and action.
(2) Each Office Head shall:
(3)
(()
Prescribe course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques,
as he deems necessary and appropriate, to be taken by new
and on-duty professional personnel of his Office and notify
the Registrar of the Office of Training, in accordance with
the procedures set forth in D of this regulation.
The Registrar of the Office of Training shall carry out the ap-
plicable provisions in D of this regulation.
D. Procedure
(1) Training Liaison Officers of the various Offices will transmit
to the Registrar of the Office of Training appropriate Training
Request Forms for all new professional personnel, for whom course(s)
in intelligence methods and techniques have been prescribed by
the Office Head concerned, as soon as possible after the EOD
date of such personnel.
(2) New professional personnel shall be enrolled by the Registrar in
the prescribed course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques.
Courses will be taken in the order prescribed; where scheduling
does not permit direct processing from the Basic Intelligence
Course or from one course to another, such personnel will be as-
signed to temporary duty in the sponsoring Office pending the be-
ginning of the appropriate course.
 Approved For Reuse 2002J08A TRDP55-00166AO 0001 0001,2
ecurit n mation
(3)
Enrollment of new professional personnel exempted from the
Basic Intelligence Course and on-duty professional person-
nel in course(s) in intelligence methods and techniques,
when requested by the appropriate Office Head, will be sim-
ilarly accomplished within the limitations of available.
training facilities.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 P55-00166A000100010001-2
Security rmation
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Si-Ett- E-T ti
Approved Foelease~lf2/X8 ~A-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 12
23 November 1953
SUBJECT: Remarks of Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
1. The Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, spoke to
Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation Course on 6 November
1953.
2, It is believed that Mr. Kirkpatrickts remarks and his answers
to questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are
attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circu-
lation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Distribution AB
25X1A
25X1
t 1) NO, DOC- NCB ? O CHANGE .
JOB NO.- IN CLASS! (DECLP*, CLA " CHANGE) TO: '15 SIQ P ETo UST Z
NEXT REV DA'I E.a .. ' DATE 1EVIEWEIC
NO. FGS REATION DATE-__OR COMP ORG CLAS~'
7~
REV CLASS COORD._ .. -AUTIb HR 711.3
0-i` "-
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RD,~" 66A000100010001-2
-R E-T
 Approved Fo (elease 2002/08/2 A-RDP55-00166'A000100010001-2
Securit Information
REMARKS OF
MR. LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
AT THE
TWELFTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE
6 NOVEMBER 1953
I should like to talk only briefly about the Office of the Inspector
General, and then I will devote most of my time to talking about a subject
which is very close to my heart, a career in the Central Intelligence
Agency, a subject with which I am sure all of you are concerned.
As to the Office of the Inspector General. Let us be quite frank
about it and say that in a good organization or in a small, compact organi-
zation the necessity for an Inspector General does not exist, and I hope
that some day, perhaps through some of my efforts, we can achieve that
result in this Agency. This Agency has gone through a period of rapid
growth--a growth which, by the way, was not so much of our doing as of other
governmental agencies which wanted us to do many things in many parts of
the world, some far beyond our capabilities-and it became very large in a
very short time. As many of you may realize, we are now going through a
period of stability, in which we are regrouping, reorganizing, stabilizing,.
getting our organization set down and developing ourselves professionally
to the degree where we will probably rank, in short order, with the best
intelligence services in the world. However, we did grow too fast and some
of the problems that come to the Office of the Inspector General are the
result of too rapid growth.
What the IG's office does in CIA is very briefly two things: First, it
is my objective, with a very small staff, to perform at least once a year
an inspection of every single component of the Agency. Inasmuch as this is
the first year in which inspection has been performed, we will be much more
thorough than in later years. In these inspections it will be our objective
to see that the component which we are inspecting is operating within the
jurisdiction of appropriate directives, is doing the job competently, is
well organized, has its personnel well in hand, has good personnel management,
handles its money properly and, in other words, is a sound part of the
organization.
I report directly to the Director of Central Intelligence and, therefore,
the Inspector General's reports go to the Director. However, it is my policy
in reporting on a component to give the head of that component, generally
k% I I It
Approved For Release 2002/08/ CIA-RDPSv-A~~a1fl1-2
 Approved Foleese
ecur
'CIA RDP55-0016600100010001-2
CONFIDEI4f IAL
the Deputy concerned, a chance to read the report before it goes to the
Director, so that if he has any strong dissenting opinion as to the facts
produced or the recommendations made, the Director will have the opportunity
to review his comments simultaneously with my comments.
The second part of the IG's office is perhaps of more importance to you
individually. We are open always to any individual in the organization who
has any problems on which he cannot gain redress through the appropriate
channels. I would like to stress that there are appropriate channels open to
you, whether you have a personal problem or whether you have an official
problem. But if you cannot solve your problem, if you become overly frus-
trated in trying to get it done through official channels, if you seem to
run into a stone wall and feel that there is a problem there which should
be taken up, the doors of the Inspector General's office are open at all
times; and it is understood by all of the supervisors in this Agency that
there will be no unfavorable reflection on anyone coming to the IG. I am
there to listen, and in case I cannot see you personally, I have two able
assistants who will be glad to see you, and we will be glad to do what we can
to assist you. In certain instances we may be able to, but remember that
bureaucracy in government is a great and complex organization, and we are not
always able to cut the red tape or the organizational roadblocks which may be
in your way.
Now, let us talk about career service. The very first question which
I would like to answer is: "Why should the Agency have a career service
which in any way differs from the rest of the Federal Government; why should
it differ from Civil Service; are we a privileged group over and above any
others?" The answer as far as "privileged group" is concerned is, of course,
"no"; but the answer as far as the Agency is concerned is a very strong "yes."
And it is "yes" because we have perhaps the gravest responsibility of any
group of individuals in the Federal Government. It is not the Army or the
Navy or the Air Force with all due respect to the men in those services who
are the first line of defense; it is the intelligence service. And the Army,
the Navy, and the Air Force will come into combat only if the intelligence
service fails. If our information is not sufficiently good, if our coverage
of the world is not sufficiently accurate, if we fail to get advance indications
of hostilities or of actions inimical to this country, then the military
services will have to come in and pick up where we dropped the ball. Conse-
quently, the first reason why there should be a career service is that we
have a grave and important responsibility to our nation; the second, that we
have authority and responsibilities given to us by the Congress, by mandate
to the Director of Central Intelligence, over and beyond any other government
agency in the United States, and over and beyond any authority or responsibility
ever given to any other government agency in the history of this country.
Obviously, the Director, himself, cannot fulfill these obligations and responsi-
bilities personally and must delegate them to practically each and every
individual in the Agency. With these responsibilities and obligations it is
vital that we have the highest-calibre people in this Agency that it is
possible to have.
Approved For Release 2.
-MA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Fo eleaseuri y, n Or IA-RDP55-00166 00100010001-2
The third reason we should have a career service is that intelligence is
a profession, a profession which is not easily acquired. We as a nation have
always been, perhaps, as far behind as any power has been in the intelligence
profession; only in recent years with the creation of the first Central
Intelligence Group, and then with the creation of this Agency by Federal
statute, have we started to catch up to the other great powers. We have a
great distance to go to catch up. We have made amazing strides in the years
since World War II but we have a large and sinister enemy in the Soviet Union
and, perhaps, the most capable enemy that this country has ever faced in the
field of intelligence and intelligence operations--sinister, ruthless, amoral,
and with nearly all of the assets and abilities that we can put into the same
field. Consequently, the intelligence officer who is brought into this Agency
needs training, needs experience, and needs a broadening which only time and
strenuous effort can give.
And, finally, the fourth and last reason for a career service is that it
is extremely important that we encourage everybody entering this Agency to
plan to make it a lifetime career and profession for security reasons and for
reasons of cost.
As IG, switching rapidly to the other hat, I would like to say to you
to remember always that the dollar you are spending as an employee of CIA
is your own as a taxpayer and that it should be used with discretion whether
you are writing a cable, typing up a memorandum, or engaging in an operation.
And it is very important from a security point of view that we have as
small a turnover in personnel as we possibly can. Regardless of what the job
of the individual is in an intelligence organization, he obviously acquires a
certain amount of information as to its work, its assets, its capabilities,
its competence, its knowledge; and the more people that enter this Agency and
leave it after a short time, the more information about the work of this Agency
there is outside of the Agency. I say that without impuning the motives of
the individuals who are forced to leave the organization for personal reasons
or for professional reasons, because we recognize that they are loyal and able
American citizens or they would not have been here in the first place. Yet,
regardless of how discreet an individual is, or how careful he or she may be
after leaving the Agency, the security barrier is gone--we no longer have the
daily knowledge of security by seeing guards on the doors, by having to lock
papers at night. And, consequently, little by little the information about
the work of the Agency starts to get out.
I am sure that all of you have heard about career service, and I am also
sure that many of you are skeptical about what this Agency is doing about
career service. So let me give you a very quick historical outline and tell
you what is going on today.
The Career Service Program, as such, started under General Smith in 1951.
He organized a CIA Career Service Board to study the problem and come up
with recommendations as to what should be done. That Board was composed of
-3-
Approved For Release 20,02 / 8/ IA-RDPS '-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Fo1 uR?Iease 2 i8 ZIA-RDP55-00166'00100010001-2
25X1A
Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors. They set up eight task forces on
which individuals, through the level of Division Chief, were represented to
study all of the problems that were necessary in order to establish a career
service. Some of those problems were rotation of jobs, transfer between
different components of the Agency, liberalized retirement benefits, medical
benefits for dependents, tenure of office, job security, and so on down the
line; all of the important factors that you are interested in as a career
employee.
These task forces met on a weekly basis over a period of about a year,
and they came up with voluminous studies covering each and every factor which
affects your career. When the final report was submitted to General Smith,
he established a CIA Career Service Board which was .composed of the Deputy
Directors, the Director of Training, the Assistant Director for Communications,
and two representatives from each of the Deputies' areas on the Assistant
Director level. That Board exists basically as constituted to this day.
Then each of the components of the Agency, each of the offices,
established its own Career Service Board, and I might just say that some of
them have worked exceedingly well. I would like to pay high tribute to the
Career Service Board of the Office of Communications. It is one of the best
organized and best operating in the Agency. Others have worked less well.
The motivation on the part of some for establishing a career service and
working toward this end has not been as great as others.
I would like to add parenthetically that I think the system as we have
it today is a little cumbersome. It involves the work of too many high-level
officials over too great a time. I think that in the very near future we
will come up with a plan for streamlining and simplifying it, and for getting
to what I think is the real basis for career service. This is the planning for
each of your careers over a period from ten to fifteen years and talking over
with you the plan for your career, insuring that it is in accordance with
your desires and your aptitudes, and then launching you forward on that career
so that you will know that today you are going to hold such and such a job;
then, perhaps, you will transfer to another office to broaden your basis of
knowledge and experience, and then you will return to your own offices; then,
perhaps, you will have a period of six months of training with the Office of
Training, and so on down the line over a period of years, in order that you
can project your career ahead. I also envisage a board which will screen
not only applicants coming into the Agency but also individuals when they
pass through their probationary period in career service and perhaps later
at a date when specialists and executive-type individuals will be put in the
proper patterns for their future. I feel trery strongly that each and every-
one of us has different characteristics, different capabilities and different
types of aptitude that should be developed for the best interests of the Agency.
I would like to tell you of some of the things that are going on currently.
In addition to the regular meetings of all of the Career Service Boards, we
have under the very able leadership of I I of the Office of Training,
-4- Q1DEflP3-
Approved For Release 2002/08/2 IA-RDP6A000100010001-2
S-F- _ E-T
 Approved FoIe se i
ecuri y
IA-RDP55-0016600100010001-2
a Women's Panel which has been meeting for some three months and is studying
the nroblems affecting women's careers in this Agency and seeing what should
be done to ensure that women can make just as much of a career and go just as
far forward as men can in CIA.
We have a Junior Officers' Panel which is studying the problems peculiar
to junior officers--grade levels of say five up to nine--to see what should
be done to ensure that they can make a better career in the Agency than exists
today.
We have a Legislative Task Force studying all of the problems of career
service to see what we should go to the Congress to ask for in order that our
career service can be the equal of any in the Federal Government, offer the
same benefits and, incidentally, the same obligations. I think all of you
should recognize that you cannot be on a one-way street as far as a career is
concerned. If you are to have retirement benefits, if the Agency is to look
after you in sickness and health, you must also recognize that the Agency
expects from you'an obligation to serve, to stay with the Agency over a career,
and to give it the best possible out of your professional abilities.
Then we have a Writing Task Force which is important from your point of
view, because I have so many comments like this: "I don't really know what
career service is." We have a group preparing a booklet which I hope will
be issued to you by the end of this year telling you exactly what career service
means to you, what your benefits are, and all of the details as to training,
retirement, and so forth.
That is, in essence, a very quick thumbnail sketch of a very large
amount of work that is being done. We are trying to make sure that it reflects,
not the official views of the Division Chiefs or the Assistant Directors, but
the official views of every individual working for the Agency.
If you have problems on career service which are not adequately covered
today, I urge you to submit them, preferably in writing, to your Career Service
Board, and it will surely forward them up to the CIA Board if there are
questions which it cannot answer.
In conclusion, there is just one word which I would like to say. The
objective of the CIA Career Service Program is extremely simple. It is to
make the Central Intelligence Agency not only the best place to work in the
Federal Government but also to make it the Agency that attracts the most
qualified and the best individuals for this type of work throughout our entire
country.
Question: Is there any conflict between the function of your office and that
of Organization and Management which is under DD/A? Do not the responsi-
bilities of 0 & M also include inspection of offices and activities?
-5-
For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-001i6bOO1OOO10001-2
Approved
S-E-C-,X E-T
 Approved For'Iease
-FIA-RDP55-00166)9b01 00010001-2
Answer: Yes, that is quite true. But the delineation between the Office of
the Inspector General and that of Organization and Management is that 0 & M
is here basically to be of assistance to the offices with respect to organi-
zation and in the solving of their management problems, and the IG is here
more as an arbitrator--to take the burden off the Director and the Deputy
Director in working out jurisdictional disputes which cannot otherwise be
worked out.
uestio : How does the career service affect typists, secretaries, and semi-
professional people?
Answer: It affects them in the same way as it affects anybody else in the
Career Service Program. If they are here to make a career in the Agency
and indicate this, it will give them the benefit of a job security which
it will not give to individuals who are here on a short period of time.
Of course, we obviously cannot interfere with matrimony or motherhood,
which are two of the largest causes of the ladies leaving us, but it is
still quite important from a security point of view as well as from a
straight cost point of view to keep our turnover down as much as possible.
Consequently, the Career Service Program will encompass the clerical and
semi-professional people just as thoroughly as it does professional people.
Question: Is the lack of a college education a hindrance to advancement with-
in CIA? Is the career program, for which many of us were hired, going to
work to our advantage even if we do not have advanced degrees?
Answer: You will be judged in CIA strictly upon your abilities and your
qualifications regardless of whether you have a college degree or not. As
far as advanced degrees are concerned, if you are in CIA and doing a job,
your advancement will be based not upon the degrees that you hold but upon
the job that you are doing and upon your qualifications to advance to another
job. If there is any action to the contrary, as Inspector General, I would
be glad to examine the case.
uestion: What about rotation between Offices in the Agency in Washington and
rotation between overseas and Washington?
Answer: Rotation is one of our most serious problems today. It is a very
difficult job, indeed, to preserve compartmentation, which is absolutely
essential in every intelligence agency; and also, simultaneously to
encourage rotation because you get a certain amount of resistance to rotation.
It is, I think, simply a matter of more education because we have a system
of rotation from your office to a training site to another office and back
to your own office, which should broaden your career. I think it is mainly
a matter of maturing our career service. As far as overseas and Washington
is concerned, that is almost strictly within the one area of the DD/P, and
I think that in itself can be worked out with time. Today, I am very dis-
tressed by the fact that some individuals come back and do what I think is
a very invidious thing which is forced upon them, and that is, shop for jobs.
-6- !hA1C1T1'~j~
Approved For Release 280 /08/ IA-RDP55-0?1 S ''0'00100010001-2
-cmff- -T
 Approved Forh leas 2'dDt fY$/2*2 tM55-00166
0100010
CONFIDL
CVifre",
I think we can stop that in short order and when they come back, well e
before they come back, they will know what their future assignment will be.
Question: Is there any tendency toward setting up a specific period of time
for work in an overt position within the Agency before applying for a
position on the clandestine side?
Answer: Basically speaking, that is the opposite of the normal way. It
is much preferable to move from the covert to the overt side, but there
is absolutely no reason for not moving in the other direction provided
you go into a staff job where the fact that you were overt and may be
identified with CIA is not detrimental to your work on the covert side.
Question: Since CIA is putting emphasis on improving the calibre of its
employees, has any regulation been put into effect to enable CIA to
dismiss employees for incompetence or mediocrity?
Answer: This does not require a regulation, basically. There is an esta-
blished system in the personnel procedures, an established method for
eliminating incompetent or mediocre employees. That is through the
Personnel Evaluation Report. This is something in which I am extremely
interested because, to be very honest about it, it has never worked well
in the past. It has never worked well because we are all human beings
and we do not like to call a fellow in and say, "Well look, Joe, you
haven't been doing too well and we're giving you an unsatisfactory efficiency
report." You probably know him and you probably know he has a wife and
children and when he gets that news, it is going to raise certain mental
anguish, if not greater than that. But basically speaking, that is the
way it has to work. If we are going to have a highly qualified service
with only the best people in it, unhappily there will be those who get
evaluation reports indicating that they are not on a level with their fellow
employees. Those evaluation reports must be discussed with each individual
before they are accepted. The individual must be told what his weaknesses
are and only then can the procedures be implemented for his elimination or
resignation from the Agency.
Question: Do we have a retirement system tied in with present planning? Has
anything been done about a twenty-year retirement-law for CIA people?
Answer: The answer to both of those questions is "yes." We have, of course,
an existing retirement system. We are all under the Civil Service Retire-
ment 9jstem which actually is quite a liberal one, As far as a twenty-year
retirement for service of a particular nature, that would have to be enacted
by legislation.
Questio n: Because of the economy wave, do you anticipate any RIF's--Reductions
in Force--in our Agency?
Answer: There will be none, as far as we know today. We obviously cannot
predict the future actions of Congress, and we will have to be very careful
-7-
Approved For Release 2002/08/2 IA-RDP55-00166A0001Q0010001-2
S-E- E-T
 Approved For leas~eec 9 nformaRj 55-00166 00100010001-2
on expansion either in our expenditures or in the use of personnel, but
as far as RIF's are concerned, I certainly think that we will avoid them
if we possibly can.
Approved For Release 20( ld&t&tl-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 S E E-T
Approvedr ReleaW!$& ? t 55-00`f6A000100010001-2
W NFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 11
23 November 1953
SUBJECT : Remarks of General Charles P. Cabell
1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles
P. Cabello spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation
Course on 3 November 1953.
2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks will be of general
interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information
and guidance of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circu-
lation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.
25X1A
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Distribution AB
Y^R Na. 5?4~.. aRA
IN ...:~CS 25X1
CI'rll=1?~sB
NO PGE RE.M"110r4 DATE- ORG COMP_.1t
_Y'0 CHANGE
JUST.2Z
E DOC.-..__
ORG CLAs&_S._.
Approved For Release 217 ECjA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
25X1A
25X1
 Approved For ease 20g2p
~
,C~4-RDP55-001660100010001-2
OOO
Secur Information
CON tug.'
TWELFTH ORIENTATION COURSE
6 November 1953
IAL
There are just one or two things I want to say. This is really
a half-hour in which you'talk to me rather than a half-hour in which
I make an address.
I have no major reorganizations in mind. The only kind of
reorganization I contemplate is a general tightening up and, as time
and attrition take their toll, a slight reduction in numbers here in
Washington. I think our headquarters should be smaller and our work in
the field expanded. We have placed upon us from time to time new tasks
and new responsibilities which require additional personnel. In certain
areas additional personnel will be required in the field. This will
demand of us here in headquarters more efficiency, more performance,
and possibly--and this is a headquarters problem--more concentration on
the main targets, the main responsibilities, and the most important
issues of the day.
What we are seeking in our Agency is quality, devotion and
performance. Intelligence can never become an assembly-line type of
work. For its success it depends upon the character, ability and hard
work of the individual, and no type of organization and no machinery
that we install can take the place of that. In the last few months we
have had some signal accomplishments, and I have had occasion to be very,
very proud of a considerable number of individuals who have had an oppor-
tunity to show their mettle and have come through with success.
I have often mentioned my own experience during the war. I arrived
in Switzerland in November of 1942 just at the time the curtain came
down, and I had no chance to add substantially to my staff. Starting
with a small group which was increased by local people whom I found on
the spot, I built up an organization which had to concentrate only on
certain essential operations. And I found that by and large during the
first two years when I was unable to build up a large organization, I
was able to do more effective work than when the curtain was raised and
I had quite a flood of people.
-1- -a V+f I hX
S-E-C-
Approved For Release 2002/08/ : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For (ease 200aM rZfZ-RDP55-00166 1-2
Securit nformation
I am setting aside an afternoon each week to get around the Agency
and to meet with you and talk with you and learn of your own problems
and see how the work is being done. I hope to visit all of you in
your various lines of work so that before twelve months are up I will
have accomplished a complete personal on-the-spot survey. I may not
thereby have the answers to all the problems, but I will have a better
knowledge of your problems and difficulties, a better knowledge of the
Agency, and a better knowledge of you personally.
CIA remains somewhat in the spotlight. I would like to see us
stay out of the papers as much as possible. We will probably never stay
completely out; but we have to be, to some extent, an anonymous agency.
It is the most difficult thing in the world, I think, for a human
being to do interesting work, to achieve interesting and significant
results and not be able to tell them to the world, and sometimes not
even to his own family or friends. And I realize the problem; I have
it myself. You will all have it to some extent, but if we are going
to succeed, we will have to resist the temptation to talk about what
we are doing.
Our relations with other parts of the Government are steadily
improving. In the intelligence community, State, Army, Navy, Air, the
Joint Chiefs, Atomic Energy Committee, the FBI, all are working together
as a team as we never have worked before. There is room for improvement
but our present relations are quite satisfactory.
Every Thursday morning when the National Security Council meets, I,
or in my absence General Cabell, have the opportunity to brief the
National Security Council on the important intelligence developments
of the week. This is becoming fixed as a governmental procedure and it
gives us an opportunity at the very highest level to present quickly
to the leaders in Government, including the President, a sketch of the
situation from the intelligence angle. I consider these briefings a
trust to exercise, not only on behalf of CIA, but also of the entire
intelligence community.
In intelligence today, we face the most difficult task that any
intelligence community has ever faced. The Iron Curtain is a reality
and a real problem insofar as the procurement of intelligence is
concerned. To meet that problem will require more ingenuity and more
skill than intelligence agencies have shown in the past. Yet, if we do
not meet it, we will not have fulfilled the vital mission we have. We
are having a measure of success. The measure of success must be greatly
increased in the weeks and months ahead. This is a very real challenge.
It is because of the nature of the challenge that we must concentrate on
building, on a career basis, individual skills and techniques backed by
the greatest improvements available in technical, mechanical and scientific
aids. I was greatly gratified recently to see in our Technical Services
0-2-V . -n-1 W.
Approved For Release 2 U-TA-RZ1W A000100010001-2
 Approved For` l (ease 2002/08/22 ? A-RDP55-00166010001000 1
S E-C - _V -m
~
Security formation CO `~
Staff that on the technical-mechanical side we are preparing, for you
who will be the operators in that field, the most modern techniques to
meet the modern problems of intelligence.
Since I place much emphasis, in fact the top emphasis, upon
individual capabilities, I realize that the training programs that Matt
Baird and his associates have set up here are a vital and essential
part of our work. I had to learn my intelligence background by the case
method, and I sometimes wish I could go through the training that you are
having.
From this you will realize how much stress I put on protecting you
in your jobs and in the opportunities which open to you a future of
absorbing interests and of vital importance to the nation. I want you
to know that that is my chief concern and I won't let you down.
Question: What influence do you, as Director of Central Intelligence,
have in formulating U.S. policy?
Answer: Policy should be based upon facts. It is our responsibility, in
coordination with the other intelligence agencies of the Government, to
lay before the National Security Council the facts of given situations.
If policy makers propose to base their policy on facts they ought to
listen to us and, in general, they do; but I have no absolute control.
I cannot force them to take our estimate of a situation as the basis
for their policies. I can say generally that a very great respect is
shown to the reports and estimates which we present.
Question: Do you believe that Congress will set up a special committee
for Intelligence Agencies or for CIA matters?
Answer: Senator Mansfield has introduced a resolution for a Committee on
Intelligence that is comparable to the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy of the House and the Senate. There is no clear-cut decision as
yet. It may be considered, to some extent, at the present session of
the Congress. At the moment it seems to me that existing machinery is
adequate to bring before the appropriate committees of Congress the
essential facts of what we are doing. If the Congress feels that more
is needed, naturally we ought to cooperate in giving it the informa-
tion that it requires within the bounds of the security which is
essential for our operations.
Question: As the Director of Central Intelligence, are you ever consulted
on the budgets of the departmental intelligence agencies?
-3-
I \X
Approved For Release 20 /O8/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Forlelse 2 ?rma 2DP55-00166p~ (~Qg9VQ1-2
ecy on
C~~1 vL
Answer: You can realize that this is rather a difficult and delicate
problem for I do not desire to b4p placed in the position of censor
of the expenditures of other agencies although it is my duty under
the law to provide a-measure of coordination in the intelligence field,
to endeavor to prevent duplication by the various agencies, and to
try to see that the area is adequately covered by the agency most
competent to cover it. I doubt, however, whether I should go into
the question of whether the amount of money spent by other agencies
in carrying out their intelligence mission should be left at my
doorstep.
Question: What is your view regarding the administrative separation of
the overt side of the Agency from the covert side in the interests of
security and efficiency?
Answer: I think the present administrative arrangement is functioning
quite well. We have the overt administration and then we have an
Administrative Officer on the covert side, who protects the security
of the covert side and maintains necessary liaison with the overt
administration. Nothing is perfect in as complicated an organization
as we have, but I think this arrangement is pretty satisfactory.
Question: In the past, new and high-ranking operations officers, who
have had no previous interest or experience in language, area, or
intelligence, have been brought aboard and have been set above career
officers of known ability. What is the career management doing about
these "political appointees?"
Answer: Since I have been associated with this Agency, and that means
even before I became Director, nobody, as far as I know, has been
appointed to the Agency for political reasons or under political
pressure. If there has-been anyone, I don't know the person and I
doubt whether the assertion can be documen+-u. I wish the person
who asked this question would kindly give the Inspector General--it
can be done anonymously--the names of those persons; the Inspector
General and I will handle that situation enttre?v alone; and I may
report on it the next time I speak here. But I doubt the assertion.
I don't believe it's true.
Question: May we be so optim.dtic as to look forward to a new building
in about three years?
Answer: I hope so. We become involved in the problem of dispersal when
we consider a new building. Too wide dispersal would seriously affect
our efficiency because of the close relationship we have to the Pentagon,
the State Department, and other organizations of government. And,
therefore, I think it would be rather difficult for us to accept a
dispersal that would take us far away from Washington. We are working
very hard on the question of a building. It is at the present time
under consideration by the Bureau of the Budget.
4 F
f6
Approved For Release 200?/%11? ~LIIT-R
MIJ0010001-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rase
-00166A6A6100010001-2
CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 9
8 October 1953
SUBJECT: Remarks of Charles P. Cabell
1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Charles P.
Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orienta-
tion Course on 4 August 1953.
2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks and his
answers to questions will be of general interest throughout the
Agency and are attached hereto for the information and guidance
of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circu-
lation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.
THEW BAIRD
Distribution AB
Director of Training
JOB NO. ; X NO, F.LD P:0, DOC. NO
IN
Oaf CHANGED TO: TS
NO. PGS RE TION DATE ORG COMP
r,,,
REV LAS REV COORD. AUTH: HR 704
Approved For Release 2002/0862,
O 00t
O CRANGE
71ET. I?TST.2Z
i,F. DOC.?_
ORG CLASS-S_
25X1A
25X1
 Approved For Release 20aa
tip 166A000100010001-2
REMARKS OF
CHARLES P. CABELL
AT THE
ELEVENTH ORIENTATION COURSE
4 AUGUST 1953
There is somethig a little unusual about this particular gathering
which may have escape; your immediate attention. Gathered here in this
auditorium today are members of the Agency representing all its parts ELS
well as members of some of our cooperating agencies in the intelligence
community. I say this is unusual because in your career with this Agency
you will seldom have the opportunity of sitting down in one body with
fellow CIA workers from the whole operation. If you will look at the
people on your right and on your left, I will lay odds you will see faces
that you will not see again during your entire experience with us. Nor
this is an unfortunate thing in a way, because it means that as an
Agency, we can not always enjoy that comradeship which comes from
continuous contact and interchange within a group, the size of this one,
We are in fact compartmented, and however unfortunate it may be, this is
inevitable in ail essentially covert organization. There are two reasons
for this, the latter of which particularly applies to Central Intelligence?
The first is the very understandable reason of efficiency. In any
extensive and complex process like making automobiles, running a railrcad
or a university, governing a great commonwealth, or producing intelligence,
efficiency demands a division of labor. We produce so much that we must
have many people on the job. It is far more efficient to have each person
become a specialist do that he does those things he is best capable of
doing in order to make his contribution to the whole. Now the developuent
of this concept of division of labor is one of the most important contri-
butions which the American genius has given to the world of industry. It
is equally applicable to the field of government and thus to CIA, We
find ourselves organized into offices, divisions, branches, and desks so
that we can properly take advantage of this division of labor. Unfortu-
nately, this means that the individual who works on one small aspect of a
piece of intelligence seldom gets to see the whole picture, and more than
that, he seldom comes into contact with others who contribute-to the same
piece of intelligence, This kind of compartmentation, although it keeps
us part and keeps us from seeing things whole, also helps us to operate
efficiently.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rd!14se 2002/y
/ 2 l~ F P55-00l66A0 00010001-2
4formation
n}
n
n
r
~CQ
E
FIjJ
TIA
~1J~ L
{V
There is another and a special reason why we are compartmented in
this Agency. That is the reason of security. You have all had or will
have security indoctrinations which stress the need to know. As CIA has
grown, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the sort of
security upon which successful intelligence depends. I mean by that,
immunity from having our secrets known, not only abroad but also across
the hall in an adjacent office. For security reasons, we allow an
individual to know only those portions of our business which he needs to
know in order to do his job effectively. Inevitably this means that
we have security fences between the different parts of our Agency,
security fences which again are a part of compartmentation.
Now both efficient division of labor and the maintenance of security
are important and useful devices. But they can be dangerous to the
ultimate attainment of our objectives if they are abused because of
exclusiveness, jealousy, false pride, or thoughtlessness. Then, instead
of resulting in boundary lines dictated by considerations of efficiency
and security, there will be barriers hampering the speedy and effective
production of intelligence. The only counter-measure that I know which
can overcome the inherent disadvantages of compartmentation is coordination.
Now, coordination is a term of which you may have already heard a
great deal in your experience in government and you will hear a great
deal more of it as time goes on. My definition of it means simply taking
into account the responsibilities and the capabilities of all those involved
in any particular decision, operation, or piece of intelligence production.
This has almost come to be a dogma in the intelligence community. You
know, for instance, that the intelligence which CIA produces is the pro-
duct not alone of its own efforts but also of the efforts of intelligence
onerations,.in other departments and agencies of the government. After
some experience in intelligence before coming to CIA, and as Director
of the. Joint Staff, I have become convinced that there is no danger of over-
emphasizing coordination. Rather we have got to stress it even more than
in the past in order to achieve an effectively functioning intelligence
community. This would be a community in which the resources of the whole
could be geared through a process of coordination to satisfy the highest
demands of policy for sound intelligence, without breaking down the
boundaries which efficiency and security have erected between our agencies.
If coordination is important in the intelligence community at large,
it is equally important in the specific part of the intelligence community
in which you are engaged. In my experience I have seen too many instances
where bureaucratic subdivisions and false conceptions of security have had
the effect of hampering smooth operation of the activity, and I am determined
that as rapidly as these come to light here, they will be eliminated.
Without in any sense overlooking the importance of either the efficient
organization of a complex operation like ours or the high importance of main-
taining security between its operational units, I still insist that we keep
our eye on the ultimate goal of greater and more effective contributions
SEC ET 7o(Y1 ~ L
Approved For Release 2002/08722 : RDP55-0018
 Approved For Release 2002/08f.22 %_C,
S E-C-R-
Security Inf
tion C-Of 11)
to policy makers. After all, that is why we exist, and anything which
obstructs our attainment of this objective is to be avoided. Where there
is a will for coordination, it will be rare indeed where a way cannot
be found to effect coordination and still follow the dictates of sound
security. In the final analysis there may be specific occasions when com-
plete coordination will turn out to be incompatible with security requirements.
But the burden of proof will be on the individual bypassing the particular
step in the coordination process.
There is one more aspect of coordination upon which I want to say a
word. That is the development of adequate coordination between what we
call our customers and ourselves. Our customers, of course, are those
whose policy and operating decisions demand sound intelligence. It is a
self-evident fact which can escape no one in the age of commercials that
the customer's wants and needs must be known to the producer and the
distributor if the customer is to be adequately served. The same thing
certainly applies to the field of intelligence. We must know what the policy
makers want, and we must try in every way we can to see that this want is
adequately met. This cannot be done in a vacuum. It can only be done as
a result of close coordination between our policy makers and our intelli-
gence producers. They must be frank with us as to what they need and we
must as frankly tell them what we can do and what we cannot do. This is
a two-way street, but just as we must know what the customers want, so
also we are obliged in the customer's interest, of course, to do a little
bit of advertising. I mean that we must convince the policy makers that
sound decisions require sound intelligence and that before fundamental
decisions are made, recourse should be had to the intelligence community.
I trust we will always be!ready to come up with a useful answer if not a
perfect one. But the process is not complete, even then. If custom-built
intelligence is. to be the most useful, the producer of it needs to be
called in by the customer to sit with him in counsel while that intelligence
is being integrated with other factors to form a decision. And the fact
that the Director of Central Intelligence regularly sits as an adviser to
the National Security Council is a recognition of this need and is thus one
of the most encouraging features of the current organizations and practices
for national security.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22,/1FIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 S -E-,
For Re sis" 2TQ
130-00166A0O1 00010001-2
CoAVIDMA"t
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 8
8 October 1953
SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles
1. The Director of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles'
spoke to Agency personnel at the Eleventh Agency Orientation
Course on 7 August 1953.
2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks and his answers to
questions will be of general interest throughout the Agency and are
attached hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this.document be given as wide circu-
lation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Distribution AB
N DgANGE
O
-_ NO FL! NO CH ? E
'IN NO._____ IC ASS C !A1 GED TO. S . - IF) IN CLASSI f ey''': q?y VIEWER L= nG OPE CLASS S~-
IMXT REV EOATE2a 1"0/ uRT 14fP_L~ + Ft
NO. PGS-(a-.Mr- sit~31 DATE HR 70-3
REV CLASS_ .J C0011D?_~.-
25X1A
25X1
Approved For Release 200210812J IA-RDP NGTIIMQ1-2
2-500_ E-T
 " Aft
Approved For Releas ee .J - 5-00166A000100010001-2
REMARKS OF
MR ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE COJ FIDENT1A ,
ELEVENTH ORIENTATION COURSE
7 AUGUST 1953
There's one advantage of being Director over being Deputy Director.
When I was Deputy Director I was supposed to come here and make a long
speech. I still have to make a speech but it can be shorter and I can
come to get your questions and your ideas and be as helpful as I can in
answering them. I have gained a good deal from your questions in the
past, and I'll do my best, to answer any that you have today. As you know,
we have in the Agency the, Office of Inspector General with one of our
ablest career men in that. job. Before I came here today I asked him if
he had any objection to my advertising his office a bit, and he said,
"No. My door is open at any time to anyone in the Agency." He and I
work together very closely and any especially difficult problems that
you nett to him will always come to my attention.
We have been a bit in the spotlight recently--for my money, far too
much. In our form of government, given the character of the American
people, it'is probably essential, probably inevitable that we should have
more spotlight than a secret intelligence agency ought to have. It is
right, in a way, and certainly understandable, that there should be
inquiries, that people should want to know something about what we are
doing. I've always felt it was very wise that the authors of the law
setting up this Agency provided us with an umbrella of overt activities
under which we could cover the more secret operations. I hope the fact
that I've had a little bit too much spotlight, will not lead others to
seek it. I think we can Edo our work better without it.
We do have certain problems these days. There is, as you all know,
and rightly, a strong trgnd toward economy. Economy in Government means
economy in money; it means economy in personnel. It means, in effect,
that we will have to do a4 better job, probably with less money and with
fewer people--and this moans that all of us from the ton down will have
to be more highly trained. From now on we will have to put added emmhasis
on training, because it n a.y be that in many parts of our Agency one man
or one woman will have tQ do the work of two. I don't really regret this.
Over these difficult wee1s when our budget has been under consideration,
we have ha6 full and fail consideration by the members of Congress concerned.
They have i nretty:hard time of it because there is no Agency of Govern-
ment for which it is more difficult to make appropriations, and where it is
more difficult for those.Lwho are attempting to prune the budget to know
Approved For Release 200112 RDP15?100166AOOO1 1gO01-2
 Approved For $jJ55-OO1 6A1 bo~io~01-2
where they can rightfully nrune. The members of the committee expressed
that difficulty but they left it very largely to us, within the limits
they prescribed, to do our own pruning--to select the wheat from the chaff--
to try to do the things which are most essential and do them most efficiently.
We have for this coming year a budget within which we can operate and,
I believe, operate effectively. We have, in effect, certain personnel
ceilings which are not going to be easy to keep, but I am confident that
within those ceilings we can do our work.
I remember an experience I had with personnel ceilings when I was
assigned to Switzerland in the days of the OSS in November of 1942. I
arrived in Switzerland as the last American to enter legally before the
curtain came down at the time of the landing in North Africa and the
occupation of the southern part of France. Events imposed a ceiling on my
staff and nothing could be done about it, since no one could legally get
into Switzerland from that time on and work with me officially.
Well, I was able to search around in other government departments,
and by finding Americans in Switzerland, it was possible to put together
a small, a very small establishment. But for about a year and a half I
had to work without any reinforcements. That imposed upon me a great
measure of selectivity, and very fortunately in a way, for I could not
write long dispatches since everything had to be enciphered and sent
through the air. I had to restrain any tendencies toward verbosity. The
selectivity forced upon me resulted in my doing far better work during
those eighteen months than I did after the frontier opened up. Thereafter,
because of the notoriety which Switzerland had as a center from which so-
called glamorous operations could be carried out, a flood of people descended
upon.me, whereupon I became an administrator rather than an intelligence
officer., And I hope that throughout the Agency, while we need administrators
and must have them, we'll be able to cut down the number of administrators
and really build up the number of top intelligence officers--men and women-
on our staff. We can only do it through training, through building up a
career Service.
The longer I'm in this work the more convinced I am that it is a
highly personalized affair. It's not the amount of money we have; it's not
the number of projects we have; it is the skill and the devotion of the
individual. I consider it my duty to protect and defend the assets that
have been already put together: the magnificent work General "Beedle"
Smith did in getting this Agency along the way, the work of his predecessors,
the work done by predecessor organizations, and the work Matt Baird is doing
in training the new arrivals. All this has meant that we have gathered
together in this Agency men and women of whom I am sincerely proud, and I
want you to know that in the performance of your duty you can always look to
me to stand up for you and back you when you're in the right.
Question: How do you evaluate our present intelligence output? Are you
satisfied with it?
-3-
Approved For Release 20 0$L( $l _Gl RDP55-061664, d 601-2-
 A
Approved For Release 2002
Answer: I don't think in intelligence one should ever be satisfied. If
we are, we are lying'down on the job. I am highly satisfied with the
manner in which the subjects are presented to me and the briefings that
are given to me within the limits of the intelligence that we have.
We don't have enoughintel]igence, however, on the major targets. I
might just describe a little of our work with the NSC, which is the
highest policy-making body in government within the field of national
security and foreign problems. It meets, you know, on Thursday morning,
under the chairmanship of the President, with the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the
Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as regular members. Then
on specific topics of interest to any other department of government,
the head of that particular agency meets with the Council. The Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence
serve as advisers onlmatters of military policy and intelligence,
respectively. The usual procedure is for the Director of Central
Intelligence, or my Deputy in my absence, to brief the Council on the
intelligence background of matters that are coming before the Council
or are on the agendafor the Council that day; and, in addition, to
raise any urgent matters where an intelligence briefing is deemed
necessary. If thereis nothing that has transpired during that particular
week which seems to the urgent enough to bring to the attention of the
Council, I generally restrict the intelligence briefing to the particu-
lar subjects before he Council, occupying ten to fifteen minutes
generally--sometimes, with a very intricate topic, up to half an hour,,
Subject to my own failings and shortcomings, I think the procedure is
working satisfactorily.
Question: Does CIA sug4est policy?
Answer: I've tried to keep the Agency out of policy. If we espoused a
policy, the tendency would be to shape our intelligence to fit the
policy. In my briefings I always keep out of policy. I've had this
situation arise, thoigh, at the National Security Council: if I
present some situation that is critical, where something should be
done, there is quite!a tendency around the table to say, "Well, what
should you do about it; what would y do about it?" Well, then I
refer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, whoever it
may be, pass the buck to him-very possibly because I haven't got the
answer myself.
Question: We have read much about the possibility of the establishment of
a joint coiimittee on'Central Intelligence something akin to the Joint
Committee on Atomic nergy. Do you believe Congress will set up such
a committee and what do you think of the idea?
Answer: I rarely speculate as to what the Congress will do, and I think
it is probably unwise to do so. This is a matter, however, which I
have discussed with oertainof the leaders in Congress, and I propose
,&DP55-0016 000100010001-2
Approved For Release 200240'W-rt%%RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 S-F- -
Approved For Rel s'e 2019#1 ~o 5 Qp,~E
IIM TAL
to discuss it further when Congress reassembles, presumably next
January. At the present time the practical situation is that we
report, on matters which are of concern to Congress, to the Armed
Services Committee of the Senate and the House, and on matters relating
to the budget, to the Appropriations Committees. Those arrangements
are working satisfactorily and I would assume that they will continue.
The problem of a new committee has, I think, been raised and will be
studied in order possibly to protect the Agency from having to report
to a multiplicity of committees. Such protection, of course, would
be helpful. I am not clear in my mind, however, that a committee of
the size now proposed would be the most effective way of doing it, but
this question will be approached with an open mind by us here ands
believe, also by the members of the Congress.
Question: What, in your estimation, would happen to our Agency in time
of total war?
Answer: It would probably grow, we'd have new problems, and in areas of
military operations there would come into effect a new relationship
between the Agency and the American Commander-in-Chief in the field.
That has all been worked out in a satisfactory way which would protect
the integrity of the organization but at the same time adapt it to war
conditions in the field,
25X1 C
Question: Are you satisfied with the present structure throughout the
Agency or do you contemplate reorganization?
Answer: I do not contemplate any more reorganization at the moment. I
think it is wise to work with the organization we have--to give it a
chance and only reorganize as we see particular needs. I do find that
in certain areas some of the key men are overworked, particularly with
the added assignments that we've had to take over because of the
activities of the NSC Planning Board, the Psychological Strategy Board
and its proposed successor. That may require certain added personnel on
the top echelon. Apart from this I have no plans for reorganization.
-5-
5-E- -E-T
Approved For Release 20021081
 A p p r o v e d l F o ' r Release 26OiMii" RIP55-001A66AOOg1 Q~'~QAQfttNT!~I
Se_euri orma ion ~~jj~~~~jj[[''jj((JJ
25X1A
Question: As a part of the Career Service Program, do you think its a
good idea to have rotation between overseas intelligence officers and
those from the Washington offices--ORR, OCI, etc.?
Answer :
M R2
C# a?
Yes, I do, and I think it is a very useful thing for those in
CCI, OSI, and so; forth, to have periods of duty on the covert
and +han HAy ditty in the field, and that is being done. Apart
Question: In answer to a question posed at the last Orientation Program
regarding discrimination against women, has anything been done? And
has the Inspector General made a report on alleged discrimination
against women?
Answer: The Inspector general has, through the CIA Career Service Board;,
made an official pronouncement that there shall be no discrimination
against women in the Agency. Also, we had a meeting a little while ago
with a selected group representing the distaff side, and Kirkpatrick
and I sat down and went into the problem. I was glad to find that a
dozen or fifteen of the ladies sitting around the table did not seem
to feel that there was discrimination. If there is any evidence of
discrimination, I want it brought to Mr. Kirkpatrick's attention and to
mine. We are looking into that problem because I am not clear in my
own mind that we have taken full advantage of the capabilities of women.
I'm going to work on that some more.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved o
e 9 IA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
C TAAL It1TELLIt" CE AGENT
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING iTI ETIN
NCR 10
23 N ember 1953
Allen W. Dulles
of Central Intelligence, Allen W. Dulles,
1. The Director orientation Course
,poke to Agency personnel .t the Twelfth Agency
on 6 November 1953.
2 $' remarks and his ansvs"
I lIe
It is bel.j eed that general Mr. interest thr out the '
rned.
r
questions and are
will be Of gene dance Of all conce
Vi
attached hereto for the ingo~,tion and
van as Wide aircu~-
nested that this docent be
3. It isrOq Aged` personnel as is consistent wf.th its classification*
lation among
S/ lkTTf BAIRD
Director of Trsining
Attachment: 1
Distribution AB
C? FF .EATION DATE,_-ORC CoMU' c
AEA CLASSAWO,M COORD.-......-. _....A: HR 904
;'33i.2Z
YI IL D ---z5-Q .
ORG CLASS-S_
;CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 20
-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
25X1
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Reloooet 0 r MP55-00166A0M00010001-2
tONFI DE iAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TRAINING BULLETIN
DER 11
23 November 1953
SUBJECT.- Remarks of General Charles P. Cabell
1. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles
P. Cabell, spoke to Agency personnel at the Twelfth Agency Orientation
Course on 3 November 1953.
2,. It is believed that General Cabeil's remarks will be of general
interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the information
and guidance of all concerned.
3, It is requested that this document be given as wide circu-
lation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.
WIUTTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Attachment : 1
Distribution AB
101 $O. _ L t ; ;C. ~._ LD NO. DOC. Ia= 0 CUNGE
IN C BS ~A, ~~?. n /ji, t s~' ~; ~' RE's'. MST,
Rnff ttx'
C?. '`G rb_
REV CIASSD ILV COODD.-__...._.-_-AUTh H 10 the Congress to ask for in order that our career
service can be the equal to ar~y career service in the Federal GovernmentT-
offer the same b/~e''neff.ts and, incidentally, the same ~,~~~~ obligations.
Becu I thinks#~.11 of you should recognize that you can't be on a one way
street as far as a career is concerned. If you are to have retirement bene-
fits,`the Agency is to look after you in sickness and in health, you must
also recagnize that the Agency expects from you an obli
tion to serve, to
stay with the Agency over a career and to give it the best possible out of
Approved For Release 2002/ ~ $ I~-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~ ,~e~urit~~ ~m~{i~t~
 Approved For Rele~e 20 0166A001'1Tf90010001-2
~~~6f~~~~~~~
? your professional abilities. ~/ ~; u r
Then we have aiting ask orce zYlzich is important from your point of
viev cause I have so many comments ~ I don't really know what career
service is. ,'ve had a group preparing a booklet which I hope will be issued
to you by the end of this year telling you exactly what the Career service
means to you, what you benefits e, and exactly all of the details as to
d"t~~
training, retirement and s~
'~~hat is, in essence, a very quick thumbnail sketch of a very large
,~..~
amount of work that a large number of the top level of the Agency doing
and that we're trying to make sure that it reflects, not the official views
of the Division Chiefs or the Assistant Directors, but it reflects the official
views of every individual working for the agency.
{~~.,~.,, P. R i 34"...
If you have problems on career service which aren't adequately today, I
urge you to submit them~preferabl~ in writing~to your career service board,
_.
and they will surely forward them up to the CTA Board if c are questions
which they can't answer the\m~selves.
Thers is just one wo rd in conclusion which I-would like to mention. The
objective_of the CIA, career service program is extremely simple. It's
to make the Central Intelligence Agency not only the best place to work in the
Federal uovernment but also the Agency that attracts the most qualified and
the best individuals for this type of work throughout our entire country.
Approved For Release 2002/08/2fA~RDP55-00166 0 00010001-2
 Approved For Rase 2
-00166A0~100010001-2
Que t' n: I~,ow do yob-"e lain .., e adv~ e Qt' m n to ~gszts.or~,,s of autinoritiy;
we ceded fog ~'~~matri~r-e'~iy? ~r?'you'r's damned `its you an~~ dame"~.'``if `;yot~ d~~it.
'on of offices and activities also?`
of O&P,~ include inspects
Answer: Yes, that's quite true, they do. But the dileneation between the Office
of the Inspector ueneral and that of Organization and &lanagement is that Organi-
zation and Management is here basically to be assistance to the offices iri
the organization and in the solving of their problems, and the IG is ere mare
as an itrat~r and an individual to take the burden off the Director and the
Question: Is there any conflict between the function of your office and that of
Organization and Pvlanagement which is under DD~A? Do not the responsibilities
s~n~nr~~rc +i,~~...,~t fts simply a matter/or e ucation because ti~re have a system
of station frarir yaur office to a trai.nin~ site, to another office and back
to your own office which should broaden your careers. I think it's mainl:~,% a
matter of maturing our career service. As far as overseas and 1."dashington,
that's almost strictly within the one area of the DD~P and I think that in
itself can be worked out with time. Today, I am very distressed by the fact
Deputy Director for working out jurisdictional disputes which can't otherwise
be warked aut. In other words, management is exactly what its term is. Its
here to improve managernae,t of the different conrdonents.
question: You didn't have much. tia-~re to touch on the subject of rotation. Y9hat
about rotation between offices in the Agency in ~~~ dlashington and
rotation between overseas and ~lashington?
Answer: ~at~quite frankly,~'e~d neem~is one of the subjects
which perplexes me most and is one of our most se'r'ious problems today. Its
a very difficult job, indeed, to preserve compartmentation, which is absolutely
essential in every intelligence agency, and also, simultaneously to encourage
rotation, because you get a certain arnountyof resistance to rotation~f-
that som~q~t(~y~..~~~~~eb~~1/~}2P~01616sA00010v010001 2 us thing
 Approved For Reuse
which is forced upon them, and that is sh
~P$5-00166A00~ 100010001-2
~:-
for jobs. I think we can stop
that in short order and when they come back, well before they come back, they
v~rill know what their future assignment is to be.
question: Is the lack of a college education a hindrance to advancement within
CTA, and is the career program for which many of us were hired going to work
to our advantage even if we do not have advanced degrees?
Ans~er: tiYithin CIA I would say that the answer is you will be judged strictly
upon your abilities and your qualifications regardless of whether you have a
college degree ar not. As far as advanced degrees are concerned, if you're
in CIA and doing a jolt your advance~ent will be based not upon the degrees
that you hold but upon the job that you're doing and your qualifications to
`~'~
advance to another job. If there is any action to?contrary, as IG, I'd be
glad to examine the case.
Question: Is there any tendenc~ toward setting up a specific geriod of time for
tivork in an overt position within the Agency before applying for a position on
the clandestine side?
Ansvrer: Edell, that's a very tough one to answer. BU.sically speaking it's the ~
opposite of tivhat is the normal way to be. ~a,~ie~r, ur British cousins
an their problems of a career ser-
vice aI'm sort of happy to see t11~,tl~e~; have had a lot of the same prablens
that we've had, even though they're a lot older and more established service.
But basically it's much preferable to move from the covert to the overt
side, .but there's absolutely no reason for not ruoving in the other direction
provided that you go into a staff job where the fact that you were overt here
and may be identified with CIA is not dstrirnental to your work in that jab.
Question: ~` ou t
is .putting the emphasis on improving the calibre of its employees, has any
Approved For Release 2002/0~~~-RDP55-00166A000100010.001-2
 Approved For Ryas 55-00'I~~~Q1~Q(}.1, ~-2
_ ___~ __i_ ..rr,.,,+ +., 0?~1,'i o f'!TA t.n rli ar~avi+:~s e((m??n~~l((o~~v~~ee ~~~-
corlpetence or mediocrity's
Anserer: It doesn't need a regulation, basically. There's an established system and
if our supervisors read the procedures as laid down in all of the personnel
procedures, there is an established method for eliminating incompetent or
mediocre employees. That is simply through the Personnel Evaluation p.eport
and the Qualification #~.eport. This is something in wh~~h I am extremely
interested because, to be very honest about it, it has never worked very well
in the past. It has never worked tivell because wei, re all human beings, and being
humans we don't like to call a fellow in and say, hdell look, Joe, you haven't
been doing too yell and we're giving you an ~~~~'~ unsatisfactory efficiency
C~
report. You probably know him and you probably know he has a wife and children
and when he gets that~its going to raise certain mental anguish if not greater
than that. But basically speaksig, that's the way it has to vrork. If we're
going to have a highly qualified service with only the best people in it, un-
happily there will be those who get evaluations reports indicating that they're
not on a level with their fellow employees. Those evaluation reports must be
discussed vrith each individual before they are accepted. The individual roust
be told what his weaknesses are and only then can the procedures be i:nplernented
for his elimination or resignation frorn the Agency.
~~uestioal: In the past we have seen new and high-ranking operations officers brought
aboard who have had no previous experience in intelligence, in language, area
or other such activities, het they were set above career officers of known
~abil~ty. What is the career management doing about such "political appointees"
In vietiv of the emphasis on a career service, how do you account fora 1a rge
turnover at the top of CIA officials who are brought in fro: the outside?
Answer: ~A(ell, now, T think vre are talking a little in the past on bath of those
sub j ectsApp~Dv~~~f+e~~c~3U2~
~~~~'~o~~~A~~~~fooo~oo~ 2 ~~
~~CUrity~~natian
 1 i
Approved For Rel~se 20~~Oi~l''~-. 00166A00~00010001-2
~`~~~~LN~IA~
~
scrutiny is given to arty officials brought in on a high level. They are
brought in, almost 168 percent, because they have had experience of some nature,
not necessarily in intelligence, it may be some area experience which qualifies
them far the position which they're brought in for. As far as the high turnover
on the top of Agency officials, I think you all recognize we have gone through
a period of growth, we've gone through a period of maturing and I think that
now we have stabilized and I certainly look forward to a long period in which
the tap echelon of the Agency will be fairly stable. ~'Jith the Director here =
to .hear me say that he can i dicate wethe` he agrees or not. ~~~-te ~ ~ `-~'l ~~rod
...,,.,
Question: How does the career se~vice effect typis-~s, secretaries, and semi-professional
people;
Answer; It effec-~ them in the same way as it effects anybody else in the career
service pro gram. If they are here to make a career in the Agency, and indicate
that, it will give them the benefit of a jab security which it will not give
to individuals who are here an a short period of time. Of course, tine obviously
~"t
can't intefere with matrimony or motherhood, which are two of the largest causes
~~:
of the ladies leaving us, but it still is quite important from a security point
of view as well as Pram a straight cost point of view to keep our turnover down
as small as possible. Consequently, the career service program tivill encompass
the clerical and the stenographic,: semi-professional individuals just as
thoroughly as it does the professional.
Queion: V~ould youa~e to comment, an~c~e you concerned aut`~e large personrl
,:.
ver of die Agency
an that in the pr
us connnent~ Of co
't o _-il,~ a f in~ial po ~_nt vie~~v b
~.~o int o f view a
ror tL7e point of
=~asBible tus~`iover we c
Approved For Releas
s?r of sound managem
 ~'uestion: 13ecuase of the economy wave, da you anticipate any LI"'s--Reductions
in Force--in our Agency:
Anstiver: There will be none, as far as we knotiv today. 'Ne obviously can't predict
the future actions of the Congress, but there will be no reductions in force
in the CIA. ~ e--mot a level, e 'nr~-11 have to be very careful on expansion
either in our expenditures or in the use of pe rsonnel, but as far as RIF's s.re
concerned, I certairLly think that we will avoid them if we possibly can. .As--
_. -,
I say, onee again, we donit_know the action of Congress~~the Director.?ean?speak
much be~,t~er _ to ...thi..a ..~k,~:n I but I think it can be said that gener~~ly s_ .~' ng
t-eis.._~,:~~~~da.,...faable .
true s~o:ri:,I s it p"sble t
Question: Do we have a
urm. ac~'rood~
~ ~+
that's wYI^~t I will have ~ind out wh ~I ge'down there.
present
retirement system tied in with/planning and has anything
been done about atwenty-year retirement law for CIA people?
c~ r~
Answer: The answer to both of those questions is ~es. ~"Je have, of course, an
existing retirement system. tiYe are all under the Civil Service Retirement
System which actually is quite a liberal one. As far as a twenty-year retirement
for service of a particular nature, that would have to be enacted by legisla-
have
we
ether that d~~rood rimers to
be very carefully made.~~`th
me we have our plans in line as to what
eed for a career servi
k the Congress fo
^and wheher the moment would ~~5roppiate to
Becau ere'
ditional ben'its or not. one thing which I
think you sho
all recognize is i~hat the 6a
ess has ha "a tenden
a~rticularly in reference it~.,thPa`st to milita servi to pla
gatio~~ fE,~.e3'i~e~rsed~,
~t~ons may
 Approved For Reioase 2~~~!TU81i
~~5-00166A0~ 00010001-2
f~. :4 ...rt~ ~ON~ID~~I~~~~L
..r'x
Question: Ho~nr long .s._e wage freeze going to cont~tue2 F.S.. I'm also very
hungry.
~.
i~nswer: l~~~fe erta.nly-don't grant arty o~.~~ux~ people going. hungry. If there's a
fc~ ease involved, Iid belad _to look into it. ~s far as_ the ,freeze,
itself is: coxicexz~c~,_-~-'t answer as to_.how long it will continue,
__ .
,,_
Question: `~e.~au~.Ao~,,.rc -pressure -of- ti.~e,, Mr. Kirkpatrick; iro's'liy
fast and av~~.~~:~: ~e~"~iat'~.=-.sse . a1~ these .c}u~~~~,n`: ,a"~:,we~k~~s~e5~'~ve
.. le - /1~
heard about the intelligence system, so wnac weaknesses
i~
in ~n~~lligence or-
ganization are of mast concern to you at the present time's
Answer: 'dell,,, ,S,h~'ne,-:,T don't think it eras fair Y~ldng that till fast.. beca'~~-u"sue
~_?~~ r,
that Qo3..d o?~~uPy ~?:.~i'`
length of `'~i.~-.e. ;i~ct-.'T:..#~-eove~?-,ir~._.:~ery' ~^Yef3y.
in,~is--?ashon. The weaknes es that exist in the intelligence organization
at the present time are main7. those due to the rapidity of growth which I
3
mentioned in my talk.~$e fact that we're now b-eing able to settle down and
acquire maturity without havingiforced upon us so many jobs that we couldn't
t
possibly do that were beyond out capabilities. b2ost of the weaknesses stem
out of that. We have some organizational weaknesses ~ ~h I think we're
r
a little large I don't want to worry arty of you about your jobs,
natural
because ~ ~x attrition takes care of most of that, but T think we
could be more compact. ,As far as our relations with the other intelligence
services, I simply reiterate what I am sure has been said to you, that they
are at the highest level they have ever been and they are constantly improving.
Approved For Release 2002/08/2
Security
f4t"t11~#Oti
 STAT gpproved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 ?~ ~~ ~' L i 953 ~u:~^+~
Approved'For Rel~'X9dkari8y8 ~~j~RDP55-00166AOb~-~
REMARKS OF
MR. ALLEN W, ~ULLE.S
~~~~~~ V~IY~~i~~
crc ~ ~ ~ No~ber~195n3 ~ ~~ ~ ~. ~ y
~ # ~ ~# - 7 w -~,,~
i ._ _ D_ ., A _efJ _ __ r
organization I contemplate is a general tightening up and, as time and
attrition take their toll, a slight reduction in numbers here in Washington.
I think our headquarters should be smaller and. our work in the field expanded.
We have placed upon us from time to time new tasks and new responsibilities
which require additional personnel. In certain areas additional personnel
will be required in the field. This. will demand of ua here in headquarters
more efficiency, more performance, and possibly,-and this is a headquarters
problem~anore concentration on the main targets, the main responsibilities
and the most important issues of the day.
What we are seeking in our Agency is quality, devotion and performance.
Intelligence can never became an assembly-line type of work. For its success
it depends upon the character, ability and hard work of the individual, and
no type of organization and no machinery that we install can take the place
of, that. In the last few months we have had some signal accomplishments, and
I have had occasion to be very, very proud. of a considerable number of
individuals who have had an opportunity to show their mettle and have name
through with success.
I have often mentioned my own experience during the war. I arrived in
Switzerland in November of 19~ just at the time the curtain came down, and.
I had no chance to add substantially to my staff. Starting with a small
Approved For Release 2002/
-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~3
Security )r-~nna~l ~, ~ ; ~/ ~ ~ ~~
 group which was increased by local people whom I found on the spot, I built
up an organization which had to concentrate only on certain essential operations.
And I found that by and large during the first two years when I was unable to
build up a large organization, I was able to do more effective work than when
the curtain was raised and I had quite a flood of people,
I am setting aside an afternoon each week to get around the Agency and to
meet with you and talk with you and learn of your own problems and see how
the work is being done, I hope to visit all of you in your va/rious lines of
f~GGeAM ~~S R~
work so that before twelve months are I will have a complete
personal on-the-spot survey. I may not thereby have the answers to all the
problems, but I will have a better knowledge of your problems and difficulties,
a better knowledge of the Agency, and abetter knowledge. of you personally.
CIA remains somewhat in the spotlight. I would like to see us ste~y
out of the papers as much as possible. We will probably never stay completely
out; but we have to be, to some extent, an anonymous agency. It is the most
difficult thing in the world, I think, for a human being to do interesting
work, to achieve interesting and significant results and not be able to tell
Approved For Rel~se 2002/~FP ? Ate[~55-00166A000~'I~0?a.~.2.:,
them to the world, and sometimes not even to own family or friends. And
I realize the problem; I have it myself. You will all have it to some extent
but if we are going to succeed, we will have to resist the temptation to talk
about what we are doing,
~,~ Our relations with other parts of the Government are steadily improving.
Navy, Air, the Joint Chiefs, Atomic
c~'rrv'~`ihe intelligence community+~State, Army
y V^
V~A~
------A~: Energy Committee, the FB~~~e all working together as a team as we never
have worked before. There is room for improvement but our present relations
are quite satisfactory.
Every Thursday morning when the National Security Council meets, I, or
--.-?===-in my absence-..General Cabell, have the opportunity to brief the National
Approved' or Release 2002/08/~~? ~~DP55-00166A,0001000100:01-2 3
Security rmaFio71 ~,
 Approved For Rele 2002/~8%2~: ~55-00 0 1-
ecuri i ~~~ ~~~ ~i
Security Council on the important intelligence developments of the week.
This is becoming fixed as a dovernmental procedure and it gives us an opportunity
at the very highest level to present quickly to the leaders in Government,
including the President, a sketch of the situation from the intelligence angle.
I consider these briefings a trust to ex?rcise on behalf not only~of CIA,
but also of the entire intelligence community.
In intelligence today, we face the most difficult task that any intelli-
gence co//mmun}}ity has ever faced. The Iron Curtain is a reality and areal
problem in so ~$ the procurement of intelligence is concerned. To meet
that problem will require more ingenuity and more skill than intelligence
agencies have shown in the past. Yet, if we do not meet it, we will not have
fulfilled the vital mission we have,. We are having a measure of success. Trot/
measure of success must be greatly increased in the weeks and months ahead.
.~
This is a very real challenge. It is because of the nature of'challenge
that we must concentrate on building, on a career basis, individual skills
and techniques backed by the greatest improvements available in technical
mechanical and scientific aids. I~~eatly gratified recently to see in our
Technical-Services
Staff that,?;on the technical-amechanical side,, we are pre-
paring for you who will be the operators in that fields the most modern
techniques to meet the modern problems of intelligence.
Since I place much emphasis, in fact,the top emphasis, upon individual
capabilities, I realize that the training programs that Matt Baird and his
associates have set up here are a vital and essential part of our work. I
had to learn my intelligence background by the case method, and I sometimes
wish. I could go through the training that you-are having.
From this you will realize how much stress I put on protecting you in
your jobs and in the opportunities which open to you a future of absorbing
Approved For Release 2002/08(~~ ? '~RDP55-00
Security {o'rrnati'o71
p~~~P'~L
 Approved For ReP~se 2002/08/2~~~~DP55-00166AOO1T100010001-2
~e~urit format~ate
interests and of vital importance to the nation. I want you to know that
that is my chief concern and I won't let you down.
~I: ~ ~
Question: What influence do you, as Director of Central Intelligence, have
in formulating U. S. policy?
Answer: Policy should be based upon facts. It is our responaibility+ in
coordination with the other intelligence agencies of the Government, to
lay before the National Secuxity Council the facts of given situations.
If policy makers propose to base their policy on facts they ought to listen
to us and, in general, they do; but I have no absolute control. I cannot
force them to take our estimate of a situation as the basis for their
policies. I can say generally that a very great respect is shown to the
reports and estimates which we present.
Question: Do you believe that Congress will set up a special committee for
Intelligence Agencies or for CIA matters?
Answer: Senator Mansfield has introduced a resolution for a Committee on
Intelligence that is compe.rable to the Joint Commi~tee on Atomic Energy of
the House and the Senate. There is no clear-cut decision as yet. It may
be considered, to some extent, at the present session of the Congress. At
the moment it seems to me that existing machinery is adequate to bring before
the appropriate committees of Congress the essential facts of what we are
doing. If the Congress feels that more is needed, naturally we ought to
cooperate in giving it the information that it requires within the bounds
of the security which is essential for our operations.
Question: As the Director of Central Intelligence, are you ever consulted
on the budgets of the departmental intelligence agencies?
Answer: You can realize that this is rather a difficult and delicate problem
for I do not desire- to be placed in the position of censor of the expendi-
k1o~t1 erscY@?2~u~il~i~l~5S30(l~i~A
~~ L ~
SecuriFv In matiefi
;~gD~,}~O~.~g to provide a
 Approved For Rele 200~d8~~~~P55-00166A00~60010001-2
measure of coordination in the intelligence field, to endeavor to prevent
duplication by the various agencies, and to try to see that the area is
adequately covered by the agency most competent to cover it. I doubt, however,
whether I should go into the question of whether the amount of money spent by
other agencies in carrying out their intelligence mission should be left at
my doorstep.
Question: What is your view regarding the administrative separation of the
overt side of the Agency from the covert side in the interests of security
and efficiency?
Answer: I think the present administrative arrangement is functioning quite
well. We have the overt administration and then we have an Administrative
Officer on the covert side, who protects the security of the covert side
and maintains necessary liaison with the overt administration. Nothing is
perfect in as complicated an organization as we have, but I think this
arrangement is pretty satisfactory.
uestion: In the past~new and high-ranking operations officers, who have
had no previous interest or experience in language, area, or intelligence,
have been brought aboard and have been set above career officers of known
ability. What is the career management doing about these "political
appointees?~~
Answers Since I have been associated with this Agency, and that means even
before I became Director, nobody, as far as I know, has been appointed to
.the Agency for political reasons or under political pressure. If there
ham been ~a~y, I donut know the person and I doubt whether the assertion
can be documented. I wish the person that asked this question would kindly
give the Inspector General, it can be done anonymously, the names of those
persons the Inspector General and I will handle that situation entirely
a'~iF~re$~p~~~8~ t ~5~Q1~6O1Q~1~Q01~,t I doubt
 SE T
Approved For Rel~se 20~,Q~$~ ~DP55-00166A00~00010001-2
the assertion. I donut be ieve it's true.
Question: May we be so optimistic as to look forward to a new building in
about three years?
Answer: I hope so. We become involved in the problem of dispersal when we
consider a new building. Too wide dispersal would seriously affect our
efficiency because of the close relationship we have to the Pentagon, the
State Department, and ~I other organizations of government. And, there-
fore, it would be, I think, rather difficult for. us to accept a dispersal
that would take us far away from Washington. We are working very hard on
the question of a building, It is at the present time under consideration
by the Bureau of the Budget,
Approved For Release 20~c0$ CI'A-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Y ~o~nia~fo7f
 ILLEGIB
The Direci6t~prt~v~fitir~els~elII
Ins. Allen V+Telsh Dulles
As I 1r~1oked over ~~ notes last n
`t ~ my ~revio" appearances beforq:
P55 0166A00 0 0001-2
MA?l8N
~~,,
this, I ant t say tk~is group, but,,roups like this,~~ found that this w~
rvals that T am mor~~or
1e ss .making
a report~~xto the s~e audience. I donY ~ fully realize that,~~ach time we have
a rotation and~ew faces and new people, but all with tl~ same purposes end
I didn't reap
.~
realize Ird been Y~fre as
so rapidly..~~I think I'm always
periodic in
4
in and to hear some the question~;`'and I Yrant
}~_
to getack one of the qu~stions, I think, that ~~as very adequately answered
but want to add a li,,ttle to it. This is rely a half-hour`~in which you
talk to me rather f,Y{an a half-hour in which ,~ make arm address.
/
Matt Baird; Lyman and :Ladies and'ge~lt~].,rten~.
p ,
,. - ~
ere are just one or two things that I want to say. I have no major
reorganizations in mind. Z -think i~r._, Kir.kpatrick has.. mentioned that. The
only kind of a reorganization is a generaltightening up ,to w~.ic-lti9.r. -~5~'kpatric~k
,,re~erre~d with, I hope, as time and attrition takes it toll, a slight reduction
in numbers-ossibly, a slight reduction particularly here in 1~lashington.
I think our headquarters should be smaller and our work iri the field expanded.
We have placed upon us'frorn time to time 71,=`t~ r~~.pi~d7,~ a nevr task, new
m. .~_.
responsibilities and ~t require personnel. In certain areas ~~e gc~i~g to
of us here in
ill
t
rq
w
r~~u~,r~ added pe rsonnel $.n the fields. And tha
headquarters more efficiency,more performance, and possibly,
~h~,tk~~and
this is a headquarters pr oblem,~more concentration on the main targets, the
main responsibilities and the most important issues of the day. Intelligent
s~'~ ?,
become an assembly-line type of work. 4'--.
t
"
ivities can never
?ur,Q~her related ac
For its ~~ovet~"~or~elease~'8~2/~8%22h~laA~RDl~55 0 166A0001 00 0001 2 ?f the ~
individual; and no type of organi~'~~ machinery that we n install] can
 Approved For Rel~se 2002 - - ~~5-Q0166A00~1T00010001-2
take the place of that. y~e have had exam les of that recently in our worlc.
'JVe have had in the last few months some signal successes and I have had occasion
to be very, very proud~of a very considerable number of our personnel who have
had an opportunity to show their mettle and have come through with success.
~:'tr~.. I have mentioned before, in the other meetings, my own experience
during the war where I was in Switzerland arriving i~fi ~wz~cl~id in November
of 19.2 just at the time when the ~o~~iurtain came down around Switzerlands
and I had no chance of adding substantially to my staff. Starting in with a
small group which was increased by local accretion of people whom I had found
on the spot, vre built up an organization which had to concentrate anly on
certain essential operations and discard other operations. And I found
that by and large during the first almost two years when I was in Switzerland
without the ability of building up a large organization~I was able to do more
effective work than when the ~~o~ Curtain was raised and I had quite e flood
of people,vPho" thgught ,that Svritzerla~l ?v~as the p7.~ce "to e~rcise_ t~s ~;sote~ac
:.: _,_ - ~~ r,._
wl~:~ they "mistakenly -t3iought- was the Moak and da~`er siti'e, of the word.
Not~r I knoy~r whatr2 say nya~ seem inappro~xrate some ?f? you,,~many of you,
.* -
- F_- r~
ha~~ been'i~vith` ~ auite~ a long while, ,~me of u coring on in the been=-here
with us on,~ty'~ a sY~orter ti=,ie but tY~.t only Means ..that ti.at we are seeking is `"
quality, devotion and performance,and when we can get that~we tivill find the
place far y u s~~ those qualities.
~~5~ ~~
"I hope ~ryself now to be able to get around in the Agency and to meet
with .you and ~ talk with you and get to learn of your own problems and see
haw the work is being done. ~I'm setting aside an afternoon each weelc~ I've
done that now for the past two weeks and I'm going to fs~'wa~`d~,~^f ~~
visiting all of you ~ in your various lines of work so that I hope that
before twelve months are gone I will have completed a complete personal on-
the-spot A;p~lr?yed Fbr~~lefia~~F)0~~22~ G~[~P~~01~vi~UO~?s2to the
EET
 Approved For Rel~erse 2002/OS~22 : C~-RDP55-00166A00?OM'i00010001-2
~~
problems, but T will have abetter ~iowledge of your personal problems and
difficultmes, abetter knowledge of the Agency, a better knowledge of you
personally.
rem somewhat in the spotlight in government, fortunately not
quite as much as when I appeared before this comparable group last August.
I would like to see us get more and more out of -the papers. We'll probably
,~,~~?rp ~ ~~/e22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
SEC~'ET
 ---
Approved For Ruse 2002/08/22? IA-RDP55-00166A0~00010001-2
11tH!
~~~ protecting you in your Sobs and in the opportunities which open
~ yo ~ future of obsorbing interests and of vital importance to the
nation. I want you to know that that is my chief concern and I won't let
you down.
T ~%you ver~`'~uc.
Approved For Release 200~~IA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Ruse 20k~1~-RDP55-00166A00~00010001-2
~,uestion: s Director. of Central Intelligence, are you ever consulted on the
organizational plans and budgets of the departmental intelligence agencies?
Ansvaer: ' T.he perso~'t~t
asked that question must have a~very good source~f
~.
intel7genc~, bec~.use
hot~:r
tY~t very problem ias ,one that wasp discussed' fox an
,row+or~aa~Tv rer~~esenta~ives the bureau of`~the Budget yyho,.~~'ameover
~~---~
see me. You can realize that is rather a difficult and delicate problem
~'a I don't desire to be placed i_n a position of being a censor of the expenditures
of other agencies of the Government in the field of intelligence, although it is
my duty ur~l.er the law to provide a measure of coordination in the intelligence
field and to endeavor to p~?event a duplication by various agencies in that field
and to try to see that the area is adequately covered by the agency most com9
petent tv cover it. I doubt, however, whether I should go into the question
as to whether the amount of maney that other agencies spend in carrying out that
mission should be left at my doorstep.
questions (Her n~:~n ~?~-~'1v~taYs'- kilS, -very, v..e'defititsly.l You spode
C~ - .,.. _
,~ ~~
~` about briefing the National Security Council, dir. Director, what influence do
you have as Director in formulating U. S. policy?
s~rsr: Policy should be based upon facts. It is our responsibility to lay before
the National Security Council in coordination with the other intelligences ~
If
agencies of governmentthe facts of given situations/ policy makers g~opose to
base their policy on facts they ought to lc~sten to us and in general they do
but I have no absolute control I cannot always force them to take our estimate
of a situation as the basis for their policies, but I can say that in general
a very great respect is shown to the reports and estimates which we prepaxe
'~1~`.in coordination with the representatives of the other services.
y~ --~ayi~.g--1;hat you .ka11 t~~do ~u -~gecify.-~e~3.r~i.tely that...
we do ' ~,~~8?~e~`~ai~~ 2~~/0~'I'2~r' ~~~~OQ~166A000100~10001 2 don ~ t tell
~L~~~
 25X1A Approved For Rele~cse 2~~55-00166A00~`'00010001-2
.hem what to da ,?~' say)
{Dulles: Are yon:` answering the.::~uestion)
`No, I'm just 'king you, sirs
Answer, 'Our main tas`s to give tY~~`'facts, ,bdt I d~n~t think that it's
breaking anyr~s~nfidence, Ut~t one d''~at the Nat~nal SecurityCouncil. I
made a l~r'iefing of a ,~tuatio~w=it was a f~i"rly critical: one--and the
Prudent turned,' to me and`said, r~~3c ,yell, what vycr'uld you do`?'" ~~~~ll, I
but occasionally`one steps ou~~~of one's character. One c~~sn't rest~'ict
aid I thou~g~t the ot~iers around -fie table would have more ideas on that,
~~~
ocirp~ct tit deal with the facts~-thers determine the policy.
s?t~-?
~.0
committee for Intelligence Agencies or for CIA matters?
Answer: At t~ae'`present ~~re CIA ~,a.tt~rs come be
..
;ore t~e~se cora~nit#~ss of the
'the =Armed Sei'~ices Conusi'~t~es of,,t~e
~
d Hc+'e~sed the
enate ,,~~`i
~,ppropri~?~.on Corrut~tees of ,th~Senate,~~dnd the H~ede"ve reonab
freient tiet~.2vs with ected ers of
x ~ ~,
-~,
machinery :,. deal '.v
.. ~ ~; , ~~
n f c~'~Se , will h aveT`~-~,o
,.th the ,~ippro~ations
ee in
h our za-or'l'. That matter may come ups Senator I:`ansfield
;~,s intro:Iuced a resolution for a Committee on Intelligence that is comparable
to the Joint ConLYnittee on Atomic I;ner~;y of the House and the Senate.
There is no clear-cut decision as yet. It may be considered, to some extent,
at the present session of the Cangress. I would say at the moment it seems
to me the existing machinery is adequate to bring before the appropriate
con~rnittees of Congress the essential facts of what we are doing. If the Congress
feels that more is needed, naturally we ought to cooperate in giving them the
informa,~o~i~d~F~~l~2 F~~~~s08T66tA~0~~~010001 2 ity which
~d~~
 Approved For Rel~r`se 20~~1~P55-00166A000010001-2
is essential far our operations+ I have never found arty members of
Congress who wanted to pry beyond that. ~~'rd` perfectly ~3.~.rt~ to ?a~~?'
r s.,..
general ~stant~~'~our actv~,ties,._~?i:t~ut ~ri,ng--into the detail~w~f ...,
eur...A~i~rat~s~~s,~
Question: ~i '"~fee~`. ou ~`idrti t` ?~an abo,,..~b,~
~~~ ~o ~
w~.
In s. ~ have some questions here about ~ so o~stic
::
ears?
t three
b
i
ildi
b
''
y
ou
n a
ng
u
as to look forward to a new
r: I hope so. uVe're working on that very hard. Vde came up in that situation
against this problem of dispersal. ~~~~-.-~_~ I believe I am correct in
stating there have been no large government office buildings erected in uVash-
ington in the last few years--not since this problem has arisen--with regard
to the possible dispersion of government bui~.dings in connection with the
atomic menace. 5a we have one or two questions of pr inciple such as that to
Si~C~
determine. I wouldn't want to get dispersed too far ~ I feel that that
would seriously affect our efficiency because of the close relationship we
have to the Pentagon, the State Department and to other organizations of
Government. And, therefore, it would be, I think, rather difficult for us to
accept a dispersal that would take us far away from Washingtonr '~ are
working very hard on the question of a building and we have it up at the
present time at the Bureau of the Budget.
Question: WYrat are your views, Pv~r. Dulles, regarding the separation both adminis-
ratively and physically of the overt side of the Agency from the clandestine
ide in the interests of security and efficiency`s
Answer: Nell, I think the present set-up on the administrative side is functioning
quite well. T~Te have the overt administration and then we have on the covert
side an Administrative Officer vaho protects the security of the covert side
that maintains the necessary liaison tivith the overt administration. I think
Approved For Release 2002/08. P55-00166A000100010001-2
-, .
 },hat's working reasonably satisf~ctoril.y. Nothing is perfect in as complicated
an organization as we have but I think it's pretty satisfactory.
Questioner Taking you on the worl
the moment, d
you think that the abandon-
ing of e peace movement by the oviets is beneficial in~'ew of our more
Ansrv~ There you're tong me into a rathei~~broad field; but I would~~nlc that
~ aggr ive attitude of late?'
.~
the~~rson that vrroteiat question may not we read the 18-page note
Lk,
the Soviets.
in the press don't
any very substa~~~ial peace
-~
move
.~
will be thd~ as~t~t~uestion, sir. Are thl~,re any stand-* y ency p ans
J
(Dulles a her~~rras one uestithat ca~to l~lr. Y~'k a ut political ' o intees
~~??*
,~"~~.q
when the.,j3ora~i'~iist threat _' ~~educed to 'ble proporti _ ?
~- -,~..-
Answer . Ido . When ~t_ time coa:ies, at will ,be ~a ut t;~2~ Basle l~r~...,#~ ~~^:
is the career rna,nagement doing about these "political appointees'?" ThM question
~~, C4~ith . In view of the emphasis on a career service, how do you account
for the large turnover of top CI.A officials who are brought in from the outside?
Answer: Taking the first question, since I have been associated tivith the Agency, and
that means even before I was flirector, as far as I know, nobody has been appointed
to this Agency for political reasons or under political pressure. If there
o doubt whether the person that
has beA~pir1~6~dIFb~~e~Ye'~10~10~: ~ - P55-00 66A000100010001-2
~,. ~QNFIDE
i~TIAL
if I could et hold of it.}
Ques~t,~on: In the past we have seen new and high-ranking operations officers brought
the Sovi,, and I must admithat I haven't read
yet but I'm putting it over
to read over``ie weekend. But terpretations of tha note that the
ry efficient pet~le in GCI have
~.. ~~
seen'' encourage the idea that there ha~been
r peace store on the aft of
or ss~`te~ng of tha~d. That was one~that I wanted track in the ~a~l
aboard who have had no previous interests or experience in language or zn area
~ ~ or intelligence, yet they're set above career officers of l~nown ability That
 Approved For Reles~se 2002/08~~'~IA_RDP55-00166A00`6~0
wrote this question could document arty such assertion.
~uest7,sv~l: In ie past, have s~'Fn~''i'~""~~ran~~ing op~e
previs eerienc~language,
ntely~gence .
~~~~ P1ovr, . I wish the person that wrote that vrould kindly give the Inspector
ueneral, you can do it entirely anorXymously, he or she, but I would like very
much to have those names presented on a sheet of x paper to the Inspector
ueneral and the Inspector ueneral and I vv311 handle that situation entirely
alone and maybe I'll make a report on that the next time I'm here. But I
2 5X1A doubt whether that assertion could be implemented. I donut believe it's true.
it , sp king for everyone here
Approved For Release 2002/08/2?~I~P55-00~66A000100010001-2
 ppr I G ND R COI~D6~QQQ0010001-2
?r ... tii~~..
~
INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet
and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient)
before further routing, This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.
FROM:
No.
Staff
Pla
i
f T
i
i
O
nn
ng
ra
n
ng
ffice o
?A~ 19 November 1953
ROOM
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS
TO
NO.
eec?u
Fwo?o
INITIALS
Admin.
+'
~~ { "
~
25X1
_".
- ..
0
'
+'~
5.
e~J I~-~Q.~+.
7.
~ ~ ~r
8.
~.~~'~-a~V~-i
8.
~,~
10.
e.w.Z,C ~ N'C.av~~
11.
~~ ~ .
12.
fd~~l ~-~aJ e,~,,,,Q,~
25X1
'
~s.
~,~, x ;~ s
3 r
~.c,C ~..
ta.
15.
_,rl
ove or
e e
FORM NO. 51-10 ~~~~ -.
FEB 1950 '
 Approved For F?~elea
CAL ILLICi'~ AtJ~I'~C'!' ~V~~~~~ 1 ~~~
ca~zc~ o~? ~~~
~~ H
~ ~ketal~ar 1453
St~BJ"~s Re~rke ?f Charles P, Cabe
3. I~pttt~ D3.r~tor o~ Centra3 Is~telliga~e,, Charles ~'.
Ca"he11i s to ~3-' personnel at Cher 81e~-nth ~,ge~na~ th~fsn#a-
tion Cr~urst c~ ~. August 1953.
2~ 3t is believaci that t~enerel ~bellre r~rerks anal his
sns~aers to gtxestiane v311 be of general interest throughout t~
,A~e~y a are attatahed hereto for the intoxmeti+c~ and guidancs
of e,3.1 conoea~ed,
3. It is raqueated that thia de+et~ex~ be given as vide cixeu-
latinn amcsag ~~nay e~erersYttol as ie eonsietextt with ita elass3fic~.tion.
~AT'T~EW BAIR1~
~t~3.rector of 'Prsining
,Aunts ~.
i)istribution ~~
A Hwy
?
~.i ~r^:'?t +~.: ;,K. ~ ..~~. t= ;" ?'~~~, ~ '~',t:'-'~ .mss.
... S
a..... >. ~...,.-- ,... o. ~._. !lam ._ _.. - _ __ - ~ ~ 'Fi
#t~il 5~~~
~ ~Q+L~~.~~-,..._.___Ati~~'~S 3i~ 90.3
Approved For Release 2002/08/ :CIA-RDP55-,
5-~ ~-~
t.A1~~x~i.~.
! `,e ?~~,
'i+r
4-
~ ?
-+~
:~ ~~~
25X1
 Approved For t~lea~
-.
ff~$55-00166A~00100010001-2
CEI+~'RAL II~T~LLZGENCE AGE~C'~
f~'FICL ~' TRAIT~ING
T~ I~3II~~ ~U:L,L~' ~ Z?3
~ti31~f8ER
~tober 1953
S~I'L'Jf'C~ s I~emar~s of Allen W, Ihf12e9
1. Z"fie Director of Gentra~. Znte3.3igence, A3.1.en W. I7t~.les:
sake to i'~.~nc~ pareflnnel at the ~'le~rer~th Agenc~* Ch~ientatic~rs
Cea~.rse r~7n 7 .August 1453.
2~ It is ~lieved thmt ~5r. D,il.lear remarks snd h3.s assurers to
c~,tlest~.c~ns uTi~!1 be of ,~~^neral interest thraughnut the ~gex~c~ and: acre
~tt~.ahcc~ hexeta #"or the iz~~'4rm~tic~n and. guidance of ei.i. c~sncerned,
:3. Zt is re~aested that this docent be ~~3ven as wide- circ~~t--
cn a~ncaag ~~~enc~* ~rsr~ran~l ~.s is consistent with its classi~'icatiox~.
~A~T"T~W SAIl~I
Director of Training
.~ttachmertt : 1
~?.stryYn.xtivn AB
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
3 E-R-~
 Next 7 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 (,~f~~~ _ - -- - _---^- security rmation-
~C
DCI~s MESSAGE Eleventh Agency Orientation Course 7.Augu~t 1953
said, "N-o-.~-~e door is open ~c~e at any time to an" e and
I work v~` cry closely together and any especially difficult problems that
you put ~ to him will always come to my attention.
We have been a bit in the spotlight recently--for my money, far too
much. In our farm of government, given the character of the American
people, it is probably essential, probably inevitable2that we should have
There's one advantage of being Director over being Deputy Director.
When I was Deputy Director I was supposed to come here and make a long
speech. I still have to make a speech but it can be shorter and I can
came to get your questions and your ideas and be as helpful as I can in
answering them. I have gained a good deal from ~~~questions in the
past, and I'll do my best to answer any that you have today. As you know,
we have in the Agency the Office of Inspector General with one of
our ablest career men in that Sob. Before I came .here today I asked
him if he had any ob3ection to my advertising his office a bit: and he
more spotlight than a secret intelligence agency .s#s`e~l~l-have. It is right,
in a way, and certainly understandable, that there should be inquiries,
that people should want to know something about what we are doing. I~ve
always felt it was very wise that the authors of the law setting up this
Agency provided us with an umbrella of overt activities under which we
could cover the more secret operations, I hope the fact that I~ve had a
little bit too much spotlight, will not lead others to seek it~~'-- '' a^?'*
I think
we can do our work better ;~ ~:~~fi- t~sL`S1rldV~` tl.
:~ CIA-RDP55`-00166~i4t~0U~1 b0010001-2
 Appro~~d~~~/222 CI~f6A-~i~,Q~1A6100010001-2
1
An~~" certa.in problems these days. There is~as you all
know, and rightly, a strong trend toward economy, Economy in Government
means economy in money; it means economy in personnel. It means, in
effect, that we will have to do a better ~ob~ probably with less money and
with fewer people--and this fs~t means that all of us from the top down
will have to be more highly trained. From now on we will have to put
added emphasis on training, because it may be that in many parts of our
Ageney one man or one woman will have to do the work of two. I don't really
regret this, Over these difficult weeks when our budget has been under
consideration', we have had full and fair consideration by
the members of Congress concerned. They have a pretty hard time of it
because there~fs no Agency of Government for which it is more difficult
to make appropriations, and where it is more difficult for those who are
attempting to prune gyp. budget to know where they can rightfully prune,
'`-'"='-`o =_= ~-ie members of the committees expressed that difficulty
-they left it very largely to us> within the limits they prescribed) to
da our own pruning--to select the wheat from the chaff--to try to do the
things which are most essential and do them most efficiently,
We have for this coming year a budget within .which we can operate and,
I believe, operate effectively. We have, in effect, certain personnel
ceilings which are not going to be easy to keep, but I am confident that
within those ceilings we can do our work.
I remember an experience I had with personnel ceilings when I was
assigned to Switzerland in the days of the OSS in November of 1942. I
arrived in Switzerland as the last American to enter legally before the
curtain came down at the time of the landing in North Africa and the
Approved For Release 2
:CIA-RD~~?~4G6'~(DODY~01~'1~Q0~1-2
 SE Eli
Appro~~~1;~~~~~~~~~8/2z~-cIA~tE9~P~` 'P6~ll?1~9100010001-2
occupat~~ of the southern part of France. imposed a ceiling on my
staff #~mt nothing could be done about ~~since no one could legally get
into Switzerland from that time on and work with me officially.
Well, I was able to search around in other government departments,
and by finding Americans in Switzerland, it was possible to put together
a small, a very small establishment. But for about a year and a half I
had to work without any reinforcements. That ~f~areupon me a great
measure of selectivity, and very fortunately in a way, for I could not write
long dispatches a everything had to be enciphered and sent through
the air. I had to restrain any tendencies toward verbosity. The selectivity
~~`sJF Q '~ J
~.te$r1M~4than I did after the frontier opened up. Seca a of the
r1C~~t
which Switzerland had as a center from which so-called
glamorous operations could be carried out, a flood of people descended upon
me, whereupon I became an administrator rather than an intelligence officer.
And I hope that throughout the Agency, while we need administrators and
must have them, we'll be able to cut down the number of administrators
and really build up ~ixnumber of top intelligence officers--men and women--
on our staff, We can only do it through training, through building up a
Career Service.
The longer I'm in this work the more convinced I am that it is a
highly personalized affair, It's not the amount of money we have; it's not
the number of projects we have; it is the skill and the devotion of the
individual. T consider it my duty to protect and defend the assets that
have been already put together the magnificent work
A
Approved For Release 2002~~E~IA-RDP5~F~6~4N~t~-2
 5EC
Approved For Rase 2002/08/?-: _~D , 5 01~~~90100010001-2
cunty arm
~~~ ~~~ r~-: e
General "Beedle" Smith did in getting this Agency along the way, the
work of his predecessors, the work done by predecessor organizations, and
the work Matt Baird is doing in training the new arrivals. All, this has
meant that we have gathered together in this Agency men and women of
whom I am sincerely proud, e.nd I want you to know that in the performance
of your duty you can always look to me to stand up for you and back you
when you're in the right.
Question 1. How do you evaluate our present intelligence output. Are you
satisfied with it?
Answer: I don't think in intelligence one should ever be satisfied. If
we are, we are lying down on the jobs I am highly satisfied with the
manner in which the subjects are presented to me and the briefings that
are given to me within the limits of the intelligence that we have.
We don't owever have enough intelligence~~on the major targets. I
might just describe a little of our work with the NSC, which is the
highest policy making body in government within the field of national
security and foreign problems. It meets, you know, on Thursday
morning, under the chairmanship of the President, with the Vice Presi-
" dent, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of the Treasury, the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration,
and the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization as regular members.
asp
Then on specific topics of interest to pother department{r of government,
.the head of that particular agency meets with the Councilf ~he Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence
~C~~~~ENTfA~:~
Approved For Release 2002 ~"~"CIA-RDP55-OU16 100010001-2
? ~c~urity !~ rmatior~
 SEC
Approved For Ruse 2002/08/22~CIA-R[~~ u~f0 ~ 66100010001-2
aerv~,as advisors on matters of military policy and. intelligence,
respectively. The usual procedure is for the Director of Central
~w
Intelligence, or. Deputy in my absence, to brief the Council on
the intelligence background of matters that are coming before the
Council or on the agenda for the Council ~ that day; and, in addition,
to raise any urgent matters where an intelligence briefing is deemed
necessary. If there is nothing that has transpired during that
~
particular week which seems to me urgent
to the
attention of the Council, I generally restrict the intelligence brief-
ing to the particular subjects before the Council, occupying ten to
fifteen minutes generally--sometimes, with a very intricate topie~
up to half an hour.
Subject to my own failings and shortcomings, I
think the procedure is working satisfactorily.
Question 2. Does CIA suggest policy?
Answer: I~ve tried to keep the Agency out of_policy. If we espouse~,a
policy, the tendency would be to shape our intelligence to fit the
policy. In my briefings I always keep out of policy. I~ve had this
situation arise, though, at the National Security Council; ~f I
present some situation that is critical, where something should be
done, there is quite a tendency around the ~~to say, "Well, what
should you do about it; what would yplx do about it?" Well, then I
refer to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, whoever it
may be, pass the buck to him--very possibly because I haven~t got the
answer self.
Question 3. We have read much about the possibility of the establishment
security formation
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CI RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 SE ~ ~~
Approved For~Release 2002/08/.x: CIA- r~orma'ficu'~'0100010001-2
of a ,point committee on Central Intelligence something akin to the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy. Do you believe Congress will. set up such
a committee and what do you think of the idea?
Answer: I rarely speculate as to what the Congress will do, and I think
it is probably unwise to do so. This is a matter, however, which I
have discussed with certain of the leaders in Congress, and I propose
to discuss it further when Congress reassembles, presumably next
January. At the present time the practical situation is that we report)
C~~^ 4S+R.
on matters~of concern to ~i 4t Congress, to the Armed Services Comrni.ttee
of the Senate and the House, and on matters relating to the budgets to
the Appropriations Committees, Those arrangements are working satis-
factorily and I would assume that they ~ continue. The problem
of a new committee has, I think, been raised and will be studied in
ho,aia
'~ ~? c~~~a b'-a to report
order possibly to protect the Agency from*~?
-
ou~~
, would be helpful,
to a multiplicity of committees. ~ of c
I am not clear in my mind, however, that a committee of the size now
proposed would be the moat effective way of doing it, but this question
will be approached with an open mind by us here and, I believe, also by
the members of the Congress.
Question 4. What, in your estimation, would happen to our Agency in time
of total war?
Answer: It would probably grow, we'd have new problems, and in areas of
military operations there would come into effect a new relationship
between the Agency and the American Commander-in-Chief in the field.
That has all been worked out in a satisfactory way which would protect
Security In rmatio~
Approved For Release 2002/08/22. CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For F~lease 2002/08/2,'~~ CIA-RCf~~~`b~166~0100010001-2
Seturit nformation
the integrity of the organization but at the same time adapt it to war
conditions in the field.
Question 5. Are you satisfied with the present structure throughout the
Agency or do you contemplate reorganization?
Answer: I do not contemplate any more reorganization at the moment. I
think it is wise to work with the organization we have--to give it a
chance and only reorganize as we see particular needs. I do find
that in certain areas some of the key men are overworked, particularly
with the added assignments that we've had to take ever because of the
activities of the NSC Planning Board, the Psychological Strategy Board
and its proposed successor, That may require certain added personnel
on the top echelon. Apart from this I have no plans for reorganization.
Question 6. Is the possible transfer of #~#e~-~ the Paramilitary function,
to the Department of Defense still under consideration?
Answer: No. There is some consideration being given to_the transfer of
one very limited activist segment of thatywhere we really get out of
the PM field into what is more nearly the functions of Defense, but
that will not involve, in any way, a turnover of that whole function.
That is rightfully, and under NSC directives~a part of the ftxnetion of
this Agency. But~tl~ is being at?~u~gent request of CIA~~ is
`k.
not being wrenched from us. I would like to turnover~~a~ve
tried for about a year to turn over this one particular smal]. segment
of work in th#3. field,
Question 7. This..-~--~epe~#f#~_ ~z^~f`~th~'f;'"'e~~iie~it. of`,C3A -which'
r.+~-e-u
the Care ~ Programs ~o you think it's a good
idea to have rotation between overseas intelligence officers and those
Approved For Release 2002}~fl8s~ ? ATRDP55-00166A000100010001-2
ecuri y ~ orm?tloR
 SEC
Approved For I~eiease 2002/08/22$'CIA~~,
&0100010001-2
from the Washington offices--ORR., .OCI, etc.?
Answer: Yee, I do, and I think it is a very useful thing for those in
ORR, OCI, 05I, and so forth, to have periods of duty on the covert
side and then have duty in the field, and that is being done. -0~' ~tO?~~'
e~ra~, there are certain stations, particularly
2 5X1A
.and others where there are representatives of the overt offices
already--and quite a large number--so that it-rd~e ~ .s~dy`~
~s Wort' ~ctuc~s
mpa~-~~ to go into the overt officesnpreclude~ or exclude the
possibility of working in the foreign field,
Question S. In answer to a question posed at the last Orientation
a ha.s the Inspector General made a report on alleged
discrimination against women?~he Inspector General has, through
,~ _ _
the Career Service Board, ~.y made an official pronouncement
that there shall be no discrimination against women in the Agency.
Program regarding discrimination against women, has anything been done
~.
T ,also, we had a meeting a little while ago
with a selected--lidida~.!..t.-gr~_..in.#~o..._the:::quasytion exe:~ti~ hcrw the?~group~
was:. --3r-~a.?-~er3ee^~ee~ group representing the distaff side,
and Kirkpatrick and I sat down and went into the problem. I was glad
to find that a dozen or fifteen of the ladies ass sitting
around the table,,-did not seem to feel that there was discrimination.
If there is any evidence of discrimination~I want it ~-brought
to Mr. Kirkpatrick's attention and to mine. We are looking into that
problem because I am not clear in my own mind that we have taken full
advantage of the capabilities of women,. i~d
.c""~`s~-s??=oi' -~a-.nlaaan~ I'm going to work nn that some more.
Approved For Release 2002/0872 CTATRDP55-00166A000100010001-2
security form~ti~i
 D~
Approved Fori+~elea~~3't3f~lB~P55-00166 00010001-2
DCI's MESSAGE Eleventh Agency Orientation Course 7 August 1953
-.Matt Baixd and ladies and gentlemen:
There's one advantage of being Director over being Deputy D~rector.`
Ur~~`x
d tp come here ~nd make a~speech.
pgse
I .
Wa.s sup
Dix?eetor
Deputy
wa
s
Whe I
r
d
.
,
,
. }
l
~j
`
~t.a1,-Q ~1.~ Jt~'i.-E.=E.,1.. if ~-.z.?G,~a ?'~ s^. L..~k !?-~E .tt `L..~ 'S ~.Gh'I.,,~.,f~,..~; ,,,.. ~-e'. .
Now,I can come get your questions and your ideas and be as helpful as
I can in answering them. I have gained a good deal from those questions
in the past, and I'll do ~ best to answer any that you have today. As
you know, we also have in the Agency the Office of Inspector General with
one of our ablest career men in that fob. Before I came down here today
I asked him if he had any objection to any advertising his office a bits
and he said, "No. The door is open there at a~ny~t~time to any of yau." He
and I work very closely together and any,,problems (.that you put up to him};
Mess they can Abe... settled easilyy;will always come to my attention.
We've had certain problems these days. There is as you all knows and
rightly a strong trend toward econamy. Economy in Government~~~lmeans
economy in money; it means economy in personnel. It m?ans, in effect, that
we will have to dohbetter, probably with less money and with fewer people.
and -th~at~ means that all of us from the top down have g~ to be fetter wined.
That. is one of the reass~ns _,t~an ,t we will have to put added emphasis on train-
ing~ because -dam---now. c>n it maY be that in many parts of our Agency one man
or one woman wi17. have to do the work of two. I donut really regret this.
In our relations with Congress ~ver these difficult weeks when our budget
has been under conaideration~ we have had, ourselves, full and fair con-
~.ti,.-?F.ek.~_,,rtCrt'~
sideration by the members of ish~-Congress that-have~on~idered our budget.
They have a pretty hard time of it because therers no Agency of Government
Approved For Release ~ ~~~55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R~lease~l~~~f~55-0016600100010001-2
arhere it is more difficult to-get, and where it is more difficult for
those who are attempting to prune a budget to know where they can rightfully
prune. In talking with the members of the committee, they expressed that
difficulty and they left it very largely to us within the limits they pre-
scribed to do our own pruning--to select the wheat from the chaff--to try
to do the things which are most essential and do them most efficiently.
We have for this coming year a budget within which we can operate and,
I believe, operate effectively. ,Wetha~e, ~.n~effect, certain personnel ceil-
ings which are not going to be easy but I am confident that within those
ceilings we can do our work. ~ f ~ ? ; ~..~,.~.
~~~ ~ ~h~~-Y~ ~ L:
I remember an experience~a.# I had ~,n-.this-fieTd-of work when I was
assigned to ~uritzerland in the days of the OSS in November of 1942. I ar-
.~,,..~GQ..
rived in S~ritzerland as the last American to arr #,here legally before
the curtain came down at the time of the landing in North Africa, and the
occupation of the southern part of France, which cut off Switzerland from
the_._nutsid.~a...~rorld. God imposed a ceiling on my staff that nothing could
be done about, since no one could legally get into Switzerland from that
time on and work with me officially.
Well, I was able to aea.rch around in other government departments,
and by finding Americans in Switzerland, it was possible to put together
! - .~-
a small, a very small establishment,.-~rnd for about a year and a half I had
to work without any reinforcements. That forced upon me a great measure
1.;
of selectivity, and very fortunately in a way;AI could not write long dis-
patches because everything had to be enciphered. and sent through the air.
I had to restrain any tendencies toward verbosity. The ~'t=?f'the
selectivity forced upon me -that I personally-did far better work during
Approved For Release 2002IA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
$~C1N1~ ~ti
 Approved FoN~elease}2~ ~55-001661'100100010001-2
those months--about eighteen--than I did aft?r the frontier opened up.
Because of the advertisement which~itzerland had as a oenter from which
so-.called glamorous operations could be carried out, a flood of people de-
scended upon melwhereupon I became an administrator rather than an intelli-
gence officer. And I hope that throughout the Agency, while we need admin-
istrators and must have them, we'll be able to cut down the number of ad-
ministrators and really build up a number of top intelligence officers--
men and women--on our staff.
We CaI1 OA1~ UV 1 V Vcarvaa~,u V1 a,iiiLll6f w +. ~.>g-= .~>-~-->---p r -- ---- - -- - ~"~
and I am~every day deeply grateful. to Matt Baird for what he has dome in
-.~.
We have been a bit in the spot~aght recently for. my money, far too
In our form of goverrnnent,~~~ the character of the American people,
it is probably essential, probably inevitable that we should have more spot-
light than a secret intelligence agency should have. It is right, in a
n }k ~.~4
~ti?
way,f1certa.inly understandable, that there should be inquiries,`\people should
want to know something about what we are doing. Itve always felt it was
~~;, ~,#
very wise,~rhen the authors of the law setting up this Agency provided us
with an umbrella of overt activities under which we could cover the more
secret aetivities.~ The fact that I've had a little bit too much spotlight,
~~
~--hope will not lead others to seek it ~ I donit desire it--and I hop? from
now on we can have less of it because I think we can do our work better
in that way.
The longer Itm in this work the more convinced I am that it is a highly
personalized affair. It~a not the amount of money we have; it's not the
number of projects we have; it is the skill and. the devotion of the individual.
Approved For Release ?rQ02f0~i~7~~1~5-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For~Releasel2Z;#~~~t9P55-0016600100010001-2
c~..~,~.at..c~-t. ~J
I consider it my duty to protect and defend the assets that have been put
~~
together -` ~aneral B~e'~]-e d-ni'th during th~~ pe~~iJod"that; hs' was` here anQ`~`ther-
reorganizations and magnificent work #e did in getting this Agency along
the way, the work of his predecessors, the work done by predecessor organi-
zations~and the work Matt Baird is doing in training the new arrivals. All
this has meant that we hav? gathered together in this Agency men and women
of whom I am sincerely proud) and I want you to know that in the performance
of your duty you can always look to me to stand up for you and back you
when youfre in the right.
_._Thank you vary much.
Question: How do you evaluate our present intelligence output. Are you
satisfied with it?
Answers I donit think;i n intelligence one should ever be satisfied.. If
we are, we are d~ down on the job. I am highly satisfied with the
manner in which the subjects are presented to me and the briefings that
are given to me within th? limits of the intelligence that we have.
rw~ . `1
We don~tf have enough intelligence on the major targets. ~I might just
describe a little of our work with the NSC, which is the highest policy-
making body in government within the field of,~iational security and foreign
problems. It meets, as you know, on Thursday morning, under the chairman-
ship of the President with the Vice President, the Secretary of Mate,
the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director
of the Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of the Office
ne ~,1dY
of Defense Mobilization as members.ahen on specific topics of
interest to o..th~ar departments of government, the head of that particular
agency with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director
Approved For Release 2002/08/2~.~~ ~RDP5t5-00166A000100010001-2
58CUtl~ ~Otg1~
 Approved Forl~lease 2002/0 12 ~ CIA=F~dP55-001660100010001-2
-5- .
~-
of Central Intelligence, .~-tixzg-~ri#.h_._.tha.._Couneil as advisory on matters
of military policy-and intelligence, respectively..~d~e usual procedure
is for the Director of Central Intelligence, or his ~eputy in my absence,
to brief the Council on the intelligence background smatters that are
coming before the Council or on the agenda for the Council of that day;
and, in addition, to raise any urgent matters where 1`tl~~ an intelli-
Bence briefing ismnecessary. If there is nothing,~l~ct seems to me urgent and
-#~h~at should be brought to the attention of the Council that has transpired
during that particular week, ~eit"I generally restrict the intelligence
briefing to the particular/subject~t~ ~~ before the Council, occupying
Question:~We have several questions, Mr. Dulles, about reorganization.
One gays,"I~ve been with ORR two years and 3t has had two or three re-
;_ ,_....
failings and shortcomings,-it's working satisfactor
ten to fifteen minutes generally, sometimes with a very intricate topic,
up to half an hour. I think the procedure is working, ~ 3ect to my own
organizations,
Are you satisfied with the. present structure throughout
the Agency or do you contemplate'more'reorganization?"
Answers I do not contemplate any more reorganization at the moment. I think
it is wise to work-r~t~rt we have, with the organization we have,
give it a chance and only reorganize as we see particular needs. I do
find that in certain areas some of the key men are overworked, particularly
W ~" VA. S' Wri~~v~...,r`y
with the added gtQrk that wetve had to take over because of the activities
of the NSC Planning Board, the Psychological Strategy Board and its pro-
posed successor, ~d hat may require certain added personnel on the
.~?~~,.~
top echelon. Apart from #,~iat I have no plans for reorganization.
Approved For Release~p/~C1~~55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Forl~lease ~d~~ ]~~t3t`i!~#5-001660100010001-2
Question: What, in your estimation, would happen to our Agency in time
of total war?
Answer: It would probably grow, we'd have new problems, and in areas of
military operations there would come into effect a new relationship be-
tween the Agency and the American Commander-in-Chief in the field. That
has all been worked out in a satisfactory way which would protect the
integrity of the organization but at the same time adapt it to war con-
ditions in the field.
Question: We have read much about the possibility of the establishment
of a 3oint committee on Central Intelligence something akin to the~oint
~:
5committee on Atomic Energy. Do you believe Congress will set up such
a committee and what do you think of the idea?
Anstirers I rarely speculate as to what the Congress,~in ita wisdom will
dv, and I think it is probably unwise to do so. This is a matter, how-
ever, which I have discussed with certain of the leaders in Congressland
propose to discuss it further when Congress reassembles, presumably,
next January. At the present time the practical situation is that we
report on matters of concern to the Congress~,to the Armed Services
Committee of the Senate and the House, and on matters relating to the
budget, to the Appropriations Ca:ntnittees. Those arrangements are working
satisfactorily and I would assume that they would continue. The problem
of a new co~ai.ttee has, I think, been raised and will be studied,,~f
c~~arse- in order possibly to protect the agency from being responsible
to report to a multiplicity of cornnittees. That, of course, would be
helpful. I am not clear in my mind, however, that a committee of the
s i zee now proposed would be the most effective way of doing it, but this
Approved For Release 20
0~(rl~~
 Approved For~elease 2~l~~~5-0016600100010001-2
question will be approached with an open mind by us here and, I believe,
.from my talks w3.th the members of the Congress, also by the members of
the Congress.
Questions Does CIA suggest policy?
Answer: I've tried to keep the Agency out of gating--~.-ntv-- policy. If we
~t.,
espouse 'policy, the tendency would be to shape our intelligence to
fit-the policy. In my briefings I always keep out of policy. I've had
this situation arise, though, at the National Security Councilrwkere
I present same situation that is critical, where something should be done,
there is quite a tendency around the Board to say, "Well, what should
you do about it; what would y_ou. do about it?" Well, then I refer to
the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, whoever it may be,
pass the buck to him---very possibly because I haven't got the answer
myself .
Question s We have certain questions here from the distaff aide of the
organization.
?n answer to a question posed at the last Orientation
Program regarding discrimination against women, has anything been done;
and another question, has the Inspector General made a report on alleged
discrimination against women? iyhe Inspector General has, through
the top Career Service Board, already made an official pronouncement
that there shall be no discrimination against women in the Agency. ~s~.t_
that ~,_-sir?
Answers That is correct and, also, we had a meeting a little while ago
with a selected--I didn't go into the question exactlg how the group
was selected--but with a selected group representing the distaff side,
Approved For Release 2002/08f
.~
~~5~166A000100010001-2
 $~t~ ~ - {
Approved For Re~tease 20QZ/D8 ? ~_ri~f~-001660100010001-2
and ~we__sat_..down, --Kirkpatrick and I~, and went into
~~~ZIAL
g of seem to tSe =~-~~`~ of that ~artieular
lad to find that mare--slid n
e
ladies~ting around
rapreaentatian-here a about a dozen:~f fifte
,,
the tablet-fey did not seem to feel that there was discrimination. If
there is 'any evidence of discrimination I want it brought outs-brought
to Mr. Kirkpatrick's attention and to mine. We are looking into that
problem because I am not clear in my own mind that we have taken full
advantage of the capabilities, very especially in this field of the dis-
taff aide of the organization. I+m going to work on that some more.
25X1A
t~uestions We still khear it said that because of your previous associations,
Mr. Dulles, with QS, you will emphasize the clandestine activities at
the expease of overt, basic research. Is there anything to this?
Answers I think you w~~l have--io ask the deputies that work on that side,
really. It is perfec~l~':true that I have a very deep interest in the
,.
~,
clandestine side of the'-.work; but recognizing that I have that, I have
tried to eompens~te for it by keeping my fingers out of that work much
more than I should like to dd. And I have, I believe, been devoting
half of ~' time to the intelligence production side--the overt side--
of the work.
Questions This is a specific part of that element of CIA which you have
endorsed already--the Career Program. Do you think it's a good idea
to have rotation between overseas intelligence officers and those from
the Washington offices--ORR, OCI, etc.?
Answer: Yes, I do, and I think it is a very useful thing for those in C?AR,
OCI, QSI, and so forth, to have periods of duty on the covert side and
then have duty in the field, and that is being done. Of course, there
are certain stations, parts arl and others where
Approved For Release 2002/~~:? - - 00010001-2
 Approved For lease 2~1~1'~1+AG-001660100010001-2
'CQNFIDEN'~1A1.
there are representatives of the overt offices already and quite a large
number so that it does not necessarily mean that to go into the overt
offices precludes or excludes the possibility of working in the foreign
abaut the fact that you made a state-
zestions This puts you on the spot
~
:
went of too mu~h paper work at_=f~ie last Orientation Program; are you
still trying to ~liminate iraper work?
Answer: Correct.
the memoranda are too long~~elegrams are generally
too lang. If we' going to cut down on personnel, we'~a got to send
,y what we mean clearly and more concisely and on
one page' , possible.
Question: Is the possible transfer of the PM, the Paramilitary function,
to the Department of Defense still Linder consideration?
Answer: No. There is some consideration being given to the transfer of
one very limited activist segment of that where we really get out of
the PM field into what is more nearly the functions of Defense, but that
will not involve, in any way, a turnover of that whole function. That
is rightfully and under NSC directives a part of the function of this
Ageney. But that is being done at urgent request of CIA and is not being
wrenched from us, I would like to turn it over-and have tried for about
a year to turn over this one particular small segment of work in this field.
Approved For Release 2002/0~~~~6A000100010001-2
 ~~~A~proved ForrR~lease 2~p2/p8/ ?~ : C~~RDP55-0016Q1~,QAQ~'6~`01-2 .
eeur~ n orme e
DDCI's~ MESSAGE
elf' '~~ ~ ~~ F:. ~ ~ l~
Eleventh Agency Orientation Course 4 August 1953
There is something a little unusual about this particular gathering
which may have escaped your immediate attention. Gathered here in this
auditorium today are members of the Agency representing all its parts as
well as members of some of our cooperating agencies in the intelligence
community, I eay this is unusual because in your career with this Agency
you will seldom have the opportunity of sitting down in one body with
fellow CIA workers from the whole operation. If you will look at the
people on your right and on your left, I will lay odds you will see faces
that you will not see again during your entire experience with us. Now
i ~::;~ ~ ~
?
~~~
~
~.~ ~..
~- ~#~1
~~staU~
1~ -
d??~
~ 7tC;
~~~ o
~~
~ ~+~;
~~
~tv' 'r r ~ E.,
~~K~? ~A~
c~ ~_ Q~
cc~ ._ '~' ~ t3
;;;; ~a ~
~~3 ~ ...,
~'~~>
~~~a~
this is an unfortunate thing in a way, because it means that as an ~.gency,
we can not always enjoy that comradeship which comes from continuous contact
and interchange within a group, the size of this one, We are in fact
compartmented, and however unfortunate it may be, this is inevitable in
an essentially covert organization. There are two reasons for this, the
latter of which particularly applies to Central Intelligence,' The first
is the very understandable reason of efficiency. In any extensive and
~'.~ v~ complex process like making automobiles, running a railroad or a univer-
ua ~
~ ~ ~ a U city, governing a great coaanonwealth, or producing intelligence, efficiency
~? ~ ~ ,~ ~ demands a division of ls.botr. We produce so much that we must have many
people on the job. It is far more efficient to have each person become
a specialist so that he does those things he is best capable of doing in
order to make his contribution to the whole. Now the development of this
concept of division of labor is one of the most important contributions
s~ ~~ ;b~~~~b~~~~~-
Approved For Release 200~/08/~ ~I~-~,~P55-00 1-
ecur
 ~,
Approved For'R~2lease 2002/08/~~-' CIA-RI~~ -~016~'~00100
Saeuri 1n orma on
2~~~A~
which the American genius has given to the tlor]:d of industry. It is equally
applicable to the field of government and thus CIA,. We find our-
selves organized into offices, divisions, branches, and desks sa that we
can properly take advantage of this division of labor. Unfortunately,
this means that the individual who works on one small aspect of a piece
of intelligence seldom gets to see the whole picture, and more than that,
he seldom comes into contact with #~S others who contribute to the same
piece of intelligence. This kind of compartmentation, although it keeps us
apart and keeps us from seeing things whale, also helps us to operate
efficiently.
There is another and a special reason why we are compartmented in
this Agency. That is the reason of security. You have all had or will
have security indoctrina.tiona which stress the need to know. As CIA has
grown, it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the sort of security
upon which successful intelligence depends. I mean by that, immunity from
having our secrets known, not only abroad but also across the hall in an
adjacent office, For security reasons, we allow an individual to know
only those portions of our business which he needs to know in order to do
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Sec~,m~/_ Vices
between the different parts of our Agency, s ~c~re~ d Ces which again
are a part of compartmentation.lVow both efficient division of labor
and the maintenance~'of security are important and useful devises. But
they can be dangerous to the ultimate attainment of our objectives if they
are abused because of exclusiveness, jealousy, false pride, or thoughtless-
ness. Then, instead of resulting in boundary lines dictated by considera-
tions of efficiency and security, there will be barriers hampering the
speedy and effective production of intelligence. The only counter-measure
Approved For Release 2002/0
security (nation CONFIDE1~~Iq~,
 SE ETp~+~~
Approved For }C~lease 2002/08/22~..CIA-~~ ~~imaf of t~ 0100010001-2
that I know which can overcome the inherent disadvantages of comparemen
tion is coordination.
Now, coordination is a term of which you may have already heard a great
deal in your experience in government and you will hear a great deal mare
of it as time goes on. 1`4y definition of it means simply taking into account
the responsibilities and the capabilities of all those involved in any
particular decision, operation, or piece of intelligence production. This
has almost come to be a dogma in the intelligence community. You know, for
instance, that the intelligence which CIA produces is the product not alone
of its awn efforts but also of the efforts of intelligence operations in
other departments and agencies of the government. After some experience
in intelligence before coming to CIA, and as Director of the Joint Staff,
I have become convinced that there is no danger of over-emphasizing coordi-
nation. Rather we have got to stress it even more than in the past in
order to achieve an effectively functioning intelligence community. This
would be a community in which the resources of the whole could be geared
through a process of coordination to satisf~y~the highest demands of policy
for sound intelligence' I-don't mean--that~we-anT:st break down the boundaries
which efficiency and security have erected between our agencies. ~vr
example., a~?-~der of battle...-c=ertainly. is not a CIA fie~.of -e,~gIf
coordination is important in intelligence community at large, it is equally
important in the specific part of awn intelligence community in which you
a.re engaged In ~ experience I have seen too many instances where bureau-
cratic subdivisions and false conceptions of security have had the effect of
hampering the smooth operation of the activity, and I am determined that as
rapidly as these come to light here, they will be eliminated. Without in
Approved For Release 2002/(' ~~~A-RDP55-001 ~6~~~(~~0~~-~~
~ecurifiy 1 formation
 s~
Approved For 'R~lease 2002/08/224~CIA~
~~~~01 d~~l~"1
any sense overlooking the importance of either the efficient organization
of a complex operation like ours or the high importance of maintaining
security between its operational units, I still insist that we keep our
eye on the ultimate goal of greater and more effective contributions to
policy makers. After all' that is why we exists and anything which obstructs
our attainment of this objective is to be avoided. there there is a will
for coardination~ it will be rare indeed where a way cannot be found to
affect coordination and still follow the dictates of sound security. In
the final analysis there ma.y be specific occasions when complete coordination
will turn out to be incompatible with security requirements, But the
burden of proof will be on the individual bypassing the particular step in
the coordination process.
There is one more aspect of coordination upon which I want to say a
word, That is the development of adequate coordination between what we
call our customers and ourselves, Our customers, of course, are those whose
policy and operating decisions demand sound intelligence. It is a self-
evident fact which can escape no one in the age of commercials that the
customers wants and needs must be known to the producer and the distributor
if the customer is to be adequately served. The same thing certainly applies
to the field of intelligence. We must know what the policy makers want, and
we must try in every way we can to see that this want is adequately met.
This cannot be done in s vacuum. It can only be done as a result of close
coordination between our policy makers and our intelligence producers, They
must be frank with us as to what they need and we must 'as frankly tell them
what we can do and what we cannot do, This is a two-way street but just
as we must know what the customers want, so also we are obliged in the
i/ZZ'. CIA-~~~q;Q6~Q~~'I(0~~0001-2
nformatio,~ ' y r 1 y ! 1~
 Approved ForRelease 2002/08/28: CIA-RDP~
~6''A~00100010001-2
Secur'
InFormatiori
customer's interest, of course, to do a 7.it~tle bit of advertising. I
mean that we must convince the policy makers that sound decisions require
sound intelligence and that before fundamental decisions are made, recourse
should be had kh the intelligence community, I trust we will always
be ready to come up with a useful answer if not a perfect one. But the
process is not complete, even then, If custom-built intelligence is to
be the most useful, the producer of it needs to be called in by the customer
to sit with him in counsel while that intelligence is being integrated with
other factors to Form a decision. And the fact that the Director of Central
Intelligence regularly sits as an adviser. to the National Security Council
is a recognition of this need and is thus one of the most encouraging features
of the current organizations and practices for national security.
Approved For Release 20C~St~2~c~21~t~DP55-001~6A000100010001-2
 G~N~IDEH3i~-L ,~'
Approved For.~Releasg~#~8~~~1P55-001600100010001-2
DDCI~3 MESSGE AT THE ELEVEN`PH AGENCY ORI:~~ivTTATION COtTIySE 4 August 1953
Ism very happy to welcoLZe you to this Eleventh.-Orientation Course
25X1A
because these courses have come to be very important and,T believe, the most
interesting part of the experience of Agency personnel and really are a
vital part of the development of your service in the agency. The cordial
reception which past classes have given the course, I believe,is the best
t
possible compliment to the Director of Training and his staff, I share
the pride of Colonel Baird and
r even though I am relatively new in the Agency, Ism a kind of dutch uncle
to the whole program. You see, Colonel Baird as Director of Training
reports directly to the Director or to me and, therefore, like a proud
relative, I bask in the satisfaction which he must feel in the continued
value and warm reception which the Orient~~.tion Courses receive.
Although my principal purpose in appearing before you today really i
to introduce the guest speaker, I can't pass up this opportunity before a~ "~~`4"~
captive audience to get a little point of my otan across,'~,''i3~r here is
_S
something a little unusual about this particular gathering which may have
escaped your immediate attention. Gathered here in this auditorium today
are members of the Agency representing all its parts as well: ~ndeed~ as
members of some of our cooperating agencies in the intelligence community.
I say this is unusual hecause(you Trill seldom have~in your career with this
Agency the opportunity. of sitting doi:m in one body with fellow CIA workers
from the whole `Yopenr~ation}. ? Tf you will loot: at the people on your right
and an your left, you iaill see face~~ that ill---.may.-oddu you will not see
T.
again during your entire experience with us. Now this is an unfortunate
COFI ~~~lg~C
Approved For Release ~~Ot2'/08/ CIA RDP55-00166A000100010U01-2.
 _2_
Approved For.Release 20d~~~i~~P55-0016'000100010001-2
Security tnformat`son
thing in a way, because it means that as an agency, we can not always enjoy
-F,hat comradeshi7 which comes from continuous contact and interchange
-tC~.=
within a group:-lam-us say,~`.~--~- size of this one. We are in fact
compartmented, and hotaever unfortunate it may be, this is inevitable i.n
an essentially covert organization. There are two reasons for this, the
latter of which particularly applies to Central Intelligence. The first
is the very understandable reason of efficiency. In any extensive and
complex process like making sutomobiles,dr~?~ running a railroad or a univer-
sity~ governing a great commonwealth~or producing intelligence, efficiency
demands a division of labor. ~Ie produce so much that we must have many
-ceople on the job. It is far more efficient to have each person become
a specialist so that he does those things he is best capable of doing in
order to make his contribution to the whole. Now the development of this
concept of division of labor is one of the most important contributions
Z.rhich the American genius has given to thet~rorld of industry. It is equally
r r_ ~ ,..:: w.,_ ~ ~
applicable to the field of government ~as ou;r?-d3stinguished guest> know and
thus in CIA too. L~Je find ourselves org\\anized into offices, divisions,
branches, and desks so that we can properly take advantage of this division
of labor. Unfortunately, this means that the individual t~rho works on one
small aspect of a piece of intelligence seldom gets to see the whole picture
rind more than that, he seldom comes into contact with the others who con-
tribute to the same piece of intelligence. This kind of compartmentation,
although it keeps us apart and keeps us from seeing things whole, also
helps us to operate efficiently+
There is another and a special reason why we are compartmented in this
Agency. 'c'hat is the reason of security. You have all had or will hs.ve
!_
Approved ForReleasQ- ~r~R.~P55-00166A000100010001-2
.7P,C 0 .~' :,ti
 -3 -
Approved For..G~elease 20 -P55-001600100010001-2
' Securit~r tnfarmatio~
security indocrinations which stress the need to know. As CIA has grown,
it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the sort of security
upon which successful intelligence depends. I mean by that, immunity from
having our secrets known, not only abroad but also across the hall in an
adjacent office. For security reasons, we allow an individual to know on7.y
those portions of our business which he needs to know in order to do his job
effectively. Inevitably this means that we have secured defenses between
the different parts of our Agency, secured defenses which again are a part
of compartmentation. Now both efficient division of labor and the main-
tenances of security are important and useful devices. But they can be
{~
dangerous., the ultimate attainment of our objectives if they are abused
because of exclusiveness~c~ jes.lousy~r~ false pride~or thoughtlessness.
Then, instead of resulting in boundary lines dictated by considerations
of efficiency and security, there will be barriers hampering the speedy and
~ ~~.~~_
effective production of intelligence, The only counter-measure wcl~-I
know ~' which ce.n overcome the inherent disadvantages of compartmentation
f
Now, coordination is a term of which you may haven heard a gres.t deal
~"~y i.n your experience in government and you will hear a great deal
more of it as time goes on. My definition of it means simply taking into
account the responsibilities and the capabilities of all those involved in
any particular decision, operation, or piece of intelligence production.
~,,-
This is almost come to be a dogma in the intelligence community. You know,
for instance, that the intelligence 4rhich CIA produces is the product not
alone of its own efforts but also of the efforts of intelligence operations
in other departments and agencies of the government. After some experience
~~~~~~~~
Approved For Release ~~~~~Cit~9p~55-00166A000100010001-2
 -L~
Approved Fo~.Release 2C~~~~~~P55-001600100010001-2
Security lnformatian
in intelligence before coming to C?A~and as Director of the Joint Staff, I
have become convinced that there is no danger of over emphasizing coordi-
nation. Rather we have got to stress it even more than in the past in order
to achieve an effectively functioning intelligence ~omnmunity. This would
is _t~.yw';.~.,w-kb+i'~-~ Cc.t7-+-.~P~.Y
be ~ in which the resources of the whole s~?nuni:ty man-be geared through
a process of coordination to satisfy the highe,~t demands of policy for
sound intelligence. I donut mean that we must break down the b unds.ries
,S
which efficiency and security have erected between our agences. erly
s ~ ~--
air order of battle~,is not a CIA field of endeavor, ~~ do mean, ha~,re:,rer,
that we must live up to the ~irit of coordination at every-point so that
..,
th~,_final ?utput can be along the liner If coordination is important in
__.
`~{,t
intelligence community at large, it is equally important in`~ specific part
of an intelligence community in which you are engaged, In my experience I
have seen too many instances where bureaucratic subdivisions and false
conceptions of security have had the effect of hampering the smooth opera-
tion of the activity, and I am determined that as rapidly as these come
to light here, they will be eliminated. Without in any sense overlooking
the importance of either the efficient organization of a complex operation
like ours or the high importance of maintaining security between its
ViE'WER
NO. PGS~GRFATIQ*~ DATE -ORG C?IdP~OP ORG CLA55.~
RE'V CLA3S_~EY COORDL - AtJ'!'H: KR 70-3 --
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-1~166A000100010001-2
25X1A
25X1A
25X1
Securifiy 1 rmatio-R
 Approved For lease 20~ ~: CIA-RDP55-00166A0 010001-2
Securit Information e~~~~~E~ ~~
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply vouched by your welcome. This is the
first time I have had the honor of addressing you as the Director of Central
Intelligence. The last time I was here, I was on the verge of its but I had
not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am
here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of
~ time j'--y T '"-` to doing what I can to build up the Agency; bu31d up
its esprit de go_, its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the
Government of the United States.
~.._._.....r__-----.
I have ~rom time to time, received presents from visiting digrye~taries,
very small presents. The other day, I received rather an unusual one from
the head of a friendly service. It was a long package which I opened in his
presence. I was somewhat surprised to find that the present was a boomerang.
I asked him whether he thought I should accept the boomerang as the emblem
of office. He said, "Oh, this boomerang is all right. It only cornea back
5yrn~cR a~`~c
half way." I have adopted theA"boomerang-only-comes-bank-half-way" for the
moment. Occasionally I find the boomerang comes beak all the way. 'Bttt
we're trying to cut down the number of occasions when that happens.
In my e~perience~ intelligence work, I have been impressed with the-
~' ima : one is the character of #i~r personnels
~e+~-~ two ~~?e~
the other is the training that such personnel receive. There is no alterna-
tive tie--~s no substitute for either. Intelligence, above all profes-
sions, is no assembly-line business. It requires unique attributes of mind
and character. I hope to do everything possible to try to find out, with
c~ha and I ho it will be
the help of those working with me, ~ese :among you~~ pe
praatiaally all of you whd have those attributes of mind, ingenuity, re-
sourcefulneas, perseverence, and patience, which are the essence of a good
intelligence officer.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP -00166~~~1
~urity I ormatiori
 Approved For Re~wase 2002/g~ A-RDP55-00166A0vv'100010001-2
security formation CONFIDENTIAL
One of the hardest things in intelligence work, for Americans particu-
laxly, is the question of security. I realize many of your problems in ex-
d o a~sls:A~.Y3 ~t? P e~ ~
plainingRwhat you do--how in your ordinary social life can you~tell what you
~~K tp?
are doing without really dog-w~e~--~=a --and I've been looking
into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that properly. I hope
to get out some f~~ri~' regulations on this subject, as soon as we've ex-
plored it further, because I think there has been a good deal too ~ueh~~y
tySes
rigid ?e~.,,'?+;?~ without the flexibility that is necessary to permit you;
in your ordinary contacts to be natural without giving away any of the se-
r-.~.
crets of your work. In the work Ildid in Switzerland, I found that it was
very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a
little bit near the truth, but it pat the inquirer off on the wrong scent.
If I had hied to pretmnd that I was doing something tatel ly different from
what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it.
I plan to do everything I caa~. to build IA up as a career service. It
is not easy, but it is possible. We've already made real strides in that di-
recto. Intelligence is a kind of career in which satisfaction has to come
largely from the work itself. But I can assure you that in the long run,
out of any career. It's not the
e
greatest satisfaction one gets
that is t
h
s
a
~
~,
?phemeralAadvertisement that one may get. ~ We are working now in the most dif-
ficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was child's play to get in-
telligence during the war compared to getting intelligence today from behind
the Tron Curtain. g'here are new difficulties because some of the most im-
portant targets are in the scientific and technical fields, which mt it
aY~d1~n.
harder and harder for the ----- '~tttr's- individual to be able tea operat?.
But that difSiculty is, and must remain, a challenge to us all.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 CL r ~pP55-00, 0 ,2
~,.. ~ 1
~.
y ~~ rmation
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A0090010001-2
z--~iri~. I can assure you that inte113gence in this government has
come of age; it has found its position; its importance is recagnizeda Each
weak, I give the intelligence briefing for the National Security Council;
that privilege, which I exercise to some extent on behalf of the intelli-
gence community, indicates the importance which the highest officials of
government ple.ce on the intelligence phase of their work. Policy cannot be
established firmly unless it is established on the basis of fact.
~].nally, I want tv say that, as your Director, I propose to see
that the i~d~el~ rights of the individual employee are protected and I
see ~ 'ir
shall ,d+~~tj~as a high privilege and a high duty. Th~~E ~-^?? s?^-~ w^??'^.
I was told that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions
at me. Ill do my best to answer all your questions, but if any of them are
not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to our eW very able In-
o~n+8.
epeetor General fo later answer.
~'QN~IDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~~ ~
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QIIESTIOhT: How do you evaluate the present intelligence support
that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as
good as you would like to hs.ve it?
ANS~vT;R: If we are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage,
then something is wrong, One never has all the facts; all one
can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholly satisfied,
because if I were satisfied, then I would not be urging one those
who are furnishing the information (to even greater efforts No,
I'm not wholly satisfied, but I feel that, given our capabilities,
we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact
an the basis of which t~ firm up policy.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Tease 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTION: In view of the fact that most well-known republicans are
known for their rather conservative viewoints relative to world.
affairs, in your opinion will these conservative leanings have any
effect upon our estimating function;
ATdSWER: If we allow ourselves to be influence by political or other
considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies n our es-
~~
timating~ then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role
in this Agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively
to have any political activity better leavetright away quick,
or P
because I won't tolerate that; I won't allow myself to do it; I
won't allow anybody else to do it while ~ in the Agency. Ob-
viously, you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want poli-
tics coming into this Agency. We're going to keep this Agency cut
of politics, as far as I'm concerned, and we're going to keep poli-
tics out of our estimating.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
.--.
(S;%
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166AOQ(1100010001-2
25X1A
often,~find that Igo to two nle.ces~ t
r~i7ESTICIN: The CIA organization is functional, but 9a~ of our prob-
lems are regional and deal with capabilities ar intentions of particular
Gauntries, ~~to~.zldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional
set-un so that we would go to one place for the answer to the average
~~uestian instead of doing to half a d~bzen functional places at the
p~meent time?
ANSWER: 'dell, I don't think one has to go to ~ half a dozen, 3 do
Let's take a question like
~i. (rr~6~.a~+..
of the person who is studying reports~,.nd looking at '1~,.in the broad
,~spective, ~ I find that if I get those two angles on the subject,
I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is, Now I realize
~t~
that there are many elements that feed un to ~1Y of those twry indi-
61,aSY~
viduals, let us say, in ~~-s,ctizi~a. side of the shop, "H~
Approved For Release 2002/08/2 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~1
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
deb S~ s +~ ~vt #~cw(~
}~.~#,~. I don't think yoiz could wisely p~~t thosentogether,
o.~ p(~.ycYy.~,~t-c~
because the operational fellow tends to have-e~~a view of thin~sF
?nd its well to temper that with
-r:he zTiew of the Aerson 'looks at it from the 3-broad his-
torical and research angle,
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 :CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R'e'Cease 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~~UESTICN: ~dould you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will
be a permanent governmental function, even if the USSR has a modi-
fied change of heart and begins to behave itself?
ANSGtER: I think the CIA is here to stay, I don't think there's
:7ny slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact
during these last few weeks with the Congress and every once in a
while we get a bit of critffcism here end there, but I have never
rrzn into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought to
be abolished or done away with or radically changed, Now, we'vE;
drawn un a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of
the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words
~'~
of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes~of ta.c-
tics;, strategic retreats are permissible, just as permissible ~t
+ as advances, the ba.s_i_c policy remains~s~d I
don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we ;~.ight like :it,
that this peace offensive will change in any way the workload of
this Agency, or its importance.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A0~0100010001-2
~UESTIJN: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in
the Agency?
ANSWER: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through
a lot of organizational.. changes. Those changes were very largely
patterned on a report that three of us prepared and submitted sev-
eral years ago, the Jackso Dulles report, that was 2 5X1A
adopted by the NSC. By and large, the recommendations of that re-
port are carried out in the present organization and I think the
thing to do now is to go ahead with the organization-that we have
end let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments
are necessary.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R~1'ease 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~,UES"iION: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the
press indicates, to sever evert functions from covert functions
in CIA?
ANSWER: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have
probably read in the press about the President's Committee on In-
formational Activities, I believe it is called,, somewhat of a cover
name,, because that Committee, presided aver by Pflr. William Jackson,
will also deal with the relationship in government of our own ac-
tivities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee
throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it.
And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial or-
ganizational changes in so far as the relationship of evert and
covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~'a ,
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTIOPI: Do you feel that in the long run the PM type of opera-
tion belongs in an agency like this?
ANSWER: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry
on covert operations through two different agencies with different
controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus organized
a.nd functioning; in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it,
I think that it would be extremely difficult, The British had this
same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert
operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dic-
tated that they be z~ut together. I'm inclined to think that our ~
operations _ -should remain under one leadership
and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence
from secret, covert operations. 4n the other hand, I do believe that
there are certain Para-military activities which may reach a volume
and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon than with us, and
that 19 a problem which is now under consideration.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
r
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTION: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the
public press which implied that CIA~s clandestine activities im-
periled the orderly development of the U,S, foreign policy?
l
ANSWER: I don't agree with the editorial. I think I know the
one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the
press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not
to het too excited about it, We're going to be attacked from time
to time. If we start to answer attack ~ directly, even false attacks,
I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble. If we answer the
false attacks and don't answer the other attacks, then we might be
deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us, I be-
lieve in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I
think I have very good relations personally with a large number of
people,,, but an't propose to get into any newspaper controversies,
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166AO~T6100010001-2
QUESTIt~N: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA
could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease
in efficiency?
ANSWER: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us soa~eiahat
smaller than we are tcday. But I don't thank that we can do
much on that im~me8.iately, I think as we all get more profes-
sional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I'm a great be-
liever in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we
don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds
to doing the essential thing that is to bs done. Gi~e~-ef--t~re-"
troub ~- 'sii ~cl3lgencem~ toclay~s we have almost too many re-
~..~~r~e; we ~t~i~ate on the essential--elemerrts.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: C~IA~-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
(f'~'`
 Approved For Rei~ase 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTIQN: When do we get a new building?
ANSWER: That's on the very top of the basket. I have canvassed the
situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situ-
ation among the Congressional leaders a~ I find everyone sympathetic,
but the question isywhat to do. There are two possibilities: one
is to find an existing building from which we could. oust the present
occupants on the theory of the higher sensitivity of our work, a.nd
the other is to get the authority and money to build a new building.
We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest pri-
ority that T have, because I realize the conditicns under which ire you
work.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R2'lease 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
25X1A
QUESTION: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a
civilian organization?
ANSWER:
change that in any respect, bJe have very important responsibilities
she percentage of military personnel with us is
relatively low, about 10~. I consider them an extremely valuable
and indispensible addition to our staff. We have some of the ablest
men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't
in the field of intel]igence
iob. No, I don't think we have toe many. 1'he percentage is about
right. I think the caliber is very high.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22~CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
C! '~
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166AOD~100010001-2
QUESTION: (1) Why are women hired at a lower grade than men?
(2) Do you think that women are given sufficient recognition
in the Central Intelligence~yAgency? (3) And as the new Direc-
for of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional
discrimination against women?
ANSWER: That first question I'll refer to the Inspector General
for a report as to whether the facts are true. ~-
~'
,. ) the second question I am inclined to think that they
are not. And the third one,~~~' it exists, I shall. I'll give that
to the Inspector General too, and get a report on it. I'm serious
about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, and
if there is discrimination, we're going to see that it's stopped.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
25X1A
 Approved For RerFease 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A~0100010001-2
~UG'STICN; You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intel-
ligence that you'd. make every effort to meet as many emploZ~ees as
possible on the "working level," How successful have you been?
ANSWER; I ha.ven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to
be. As you know, there was ryuite a long while before General Call
came cn board and took over as Deputy. `ihen with the change of ad-
ministration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The
new officials of government had to be baiefed about our activities.
The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important,
takes a vast amount of time--far more time than it did in the past---
because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain
new activities of the National Security Council, So that during the
last two or three montYls, I can assure you that I've been pretty
busy. Now General Cab~ll is on board and I think we're getting the
administrative organization working more smoothly and I can assure
you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm
going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~~
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AM0100010001-2
Itll do my best to answer what you have*
n intelligence work,.~,ihf-b \bORA
I have been impressed with
: the is the character of the personnel; the
the fact that two s are priz~'Y
~
is the training that " e personnel. receive$. there is no alternative; there
is no substitute for " . Intelligence, above an Professions s, is no assembly-'line
business. It requires que attributes of mind. and character. I hope, +gy'r`k
h #n ?h__.__ e?~r to do everything possible to try to find out) with the help of
those working with me, those among yous and I hope it will be practically all of yo
who have those attributes of mind, ingenuityi reaourcefdnessr perseverence, patience',
a114-
Vhich *e the essence of a good intelligence officer-
of the hardest
Y/ is the question of security. I realize ramy Of
ie 7 in .plaini.
at you do (and Itve been looking into that because 1 (1an:.z
F=
'hin& a r, ;; ? t 'ye h xnd3 ed that prv,-:~rly1 , how in your a
.
r f lout :~ eat ly tell j, at :ou are doing? I bo to r e't
teil -_.hat you. are doing ..
- _Ar
out :-orte further re at1on., on 4& aub jec'
con' a: e've explor
because I this tfit there has been a good deal too Bauch AW rigid rep ulo
Out the 'le ibi.lity that is nece.;'-sai7 to Pert-it YOU { 1z1;oUr ord nary soc:.a1 c ontac &s)
vivin4 any any of the ?-ec'ets of your -ork.e.
t is the -:;ork *;,at I dice in " tz+erland, I soux d that, it wav very desirable
that I ' s
rfeetty legitir ote and natural .story; it
3>rave gotten a.,.
ccu
I never ?ouid
01'irector# to do everything I can to build
as a b^er yea-vice. It J:7 not easy, but it is tocsible. 'efv rode real
+-ider in that
the inquirer
ial 14 fe can yxm
on the wrong (cent. If I tried to 7-?ret
totally :: ifferent fr~ : 13at I vas
oiaip work tself.. But I can as ure you
ion has elease00
38/22R: CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
1
 SECS
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AOf!!'1100010001-2
the long runs that is the greatest satisfaction bd t one gets out of
IV.-, s not in the a advk f tiserent that one
ir-#
chid * play
in_- ~rttze-rlax
the Iron
oan. It v
intelligence during the ware e I t -
ae co .red to lnte li en r, ' ? hi
m"
:--v!-t it rtant targets are in the scientific and t is
which rake
to op te,
zem--m now difficulties because
challenge to th& ue3 all. I think I can assure ,-ou that intelliggenco in his gov.
..
ernrent has cme of
( in the highest place. of government, )rte?- ave, each week n ,the task of giving the
i eiIigenoe briefing or the National curity (wMmcn '3$ th
mba
at
privilege which I evert
imitates the importance
this ? phase of their work.
lichedd on the basis
Directors I r-,
are protected
very much.
e% -tent on behalf of the intelligence c ,- tys
the highest officials of gover n
Policy cannot be' tabli: hed fire ly unless
4'
. And, finally in conclusi n
I unnt to
1
to see that the individual rights of the individt l
_nd I shall do that as a high privi le and a high duty.
Questions Do you ccntes
new organizational changes then Agency?
the iediate future,
that difficulty is and ist xrw-ain 1 a
sae the gone through a lot o. o
The . a changes -ere very largely patterned on a report tI;at
of us prepared and su ultted "several years agog that the Jae k-sonC
?eport
that -a; adopted by the 1>11, I
Approved For Release 202LQ8/2 CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
We are working not/ in
25X1A
 Approved For Release 2002/0
go
4:=ith the organization that we have
or ad ju ments are necessary,
nre-ent intelligence support
is it as good as you i,;ould 1
i- s ave- a- ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage,
n something Is
I won 1 t say that 1 aholely -.atlsfied be ese A f I '? -ere atisfied + =
then I would not be urging on those who are i _hing the
efforts. No, I'm not : hoiely satisfied
capabilitie?, we are givin;
on the basin of which to firir up policy.
Questions Is there a i ove ant
overt function,
Press about the Presi
called
d over
Jack ion/ will also deal with the relationship is government of Our oim activities.
>entatives have appeared befo: a it4 And I could 'cub
have been in very close touch e
acts; all ene can do i{'; appro ate,
'e, the recoa; ti:
feel thatF _,;iven our
good coverage of fact
:e pre ent tie, as the press w n3 ng certa
in maintaining v
get too excited about it. Wetre going to be at.
ously you can exercise your right
eer attacks, s:.irectly.A think f $
-` h
If Yre an-.er t}-,es kvA;ks
tions ..Ie about u0.3. I
he press. X think I have
vary good relation personally with P. large :cam-ber of people, but I don't prope e
to t into any ne,srspaper cont.-rover 3ies.
questions Is the abundance of ri .'tar-r personnel necessary in a civilian organization?
%,,ert "ell.. the percentage of military ptarso el. with u? is la'
about 10%. l ,..id ~r thm an e?ctrer-ely valuable addit and in:'i;
to our staff. 'fie have some of
us anrd with us, And I wo day''t e
Approved For Release
469
ablest men in the armed services working
in any respect. ~e have very is xporta
 25X1
I think the W. iber i
Question I
Approved For Release 2002iOM EIA-RDP55-00166A0 100010001-2
as in this field of intelligence to the Arned errricea.. Th"ke the
:ouidn t t be able to do our job. No, I don't
upon beeoring the Dj
"eat as ran
you been?
there
ty.,
as pozoitUe on the for' i level." Tbw
a l ong while
t. You 'tested
every effort t
cessf . ': ave
, but Ism going, to be. As you Imov,
on board and took over
ti on there was a trerendous a. -oimt of
briefing to do. The new of fioials of ;o rer x ent had to
that d2ring
ti vities. The new work of the !l:ti ona i.. ecurity Council., which is very
of the briefing
=or
nt *2 Intelligence that ` ou' d r
visit tai. ?.y
did in the ~,t# be u jz*wt
activiti.e:
riefed about our ac-
p the tern
a :ICIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/0822 : CIA-RDP55-00166A0004?0010001-2
25X1 C
ss?tion:
functional but 90% of of
pl aeea
intentions of particular countries. Uoulftft we, there ore, be better off with
a regional
question Instead of
views of the r.::
1tive.
prdL:1,
ould go to one plae for the answer to the average
half a dozen functional place
capabilities or
the present ti m?
to go to a half a dozen. I often find
I%Wtto
and loots at
feed up to =odds of those two individuals, let us ,iay., in
their respective sides of the rhaop. By and laze, if I et hold of tw or three .
together, because the operational. fellow tends to have one view of thi s. looks g
at it operatiofsc, and it. wel?
that loo's at it fro. the
say that the Central Intel'? igence Agency will be a 'a z vent
led change of :sue and
I donft think there's any
govern ~ ental
on that pint. fire had a ;?eat daal of contact during these la--t
weeks with the
thflers^.
I -at `;home to angles on the
a to what the situation is. Now I realize the t there
eje
d every area in a wh :e?o' a get aAcri i:,
pproved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RD P -0 1 -
 Approved For Release 20008/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AO 100010001-2
25X1A
to ' e aholiFzhed or dO ay ,,,M or
lot
all Of ti
to the --h--ace offer ive o
of tactics,
is retrea
by
,ar7 adv m~ s the sic policy of the l- in
~:eforea you need e ect, L.ueh as we right like it,
that this PKMOO
in a y t7e w rkk load of the
Approved For Release 2002/0 A,RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 02/08/2: CIA-RDP55-00166A00U100010001-2
.~uLf3 4p1 E;t%orrna% 011
Ladies and Gentlemen, I am deeply touched by your welcome. This is the
first time I have had the honor of addressing you as the Director of Central
Intelligence. The last time I was here, I was on the verge of it, but I had
not yet been confirmed and taken over my office. As far as I know, I am
here from now on until they throw me out. I plan to devote the balance of
the time that I have to doing what I can to build up the Agency; build up
its a "i de corn , its morale, its effectiveness, and its place in the
Government of the United States,
I have, from time to time, received presents from visiting dignitaries,
very small presents. The other day, I received rather an unusual one from
the head of a friendly service. It was a long package which I opened in his
presence, I was somewhat surprised to find that the present was a boomerang.
I asked him whether he thought I should accent the boomerang as the emblem
of office. He said, "Oh, this boomerang is all right. It only comes back
half way," I have adopted the "boomerang-only-comes-back-half-way" for the
moment. occasionally I find the boomerang comes back all the way. Bat
wetre trying to cut down the number of occae.ons when that happens.
In my experience in intell.gence work, I have been impressed with the
fact that two elements are primaryt one is the character of the personnel;
the other 's the training that such personnel receive. There is no alterna-
tive; there is no substitute for either. Intelligence, above all profes-
sions, Is no assembly-line business. It requires anique attributes of mind
and character. I hope to do everything possible to try to find out, with
the help of those working With me, those emong you, and I hope it will be
practically all of you, who have those attributes of mind, in.cenuity, re-
sourcefulness, .ersevererce, and patience, which are the essence of a good
lli
t
o
r
n
e
rov
Release 2002/08/22 iC:FA =55-00166A000100010001-2
eeFo
 Approved For ReIse 20021X2-ZdtNA-RDP55-00166A0c 700010001-2
sane of the hardest things in intelligence work, for Americans rarticu-
larly, is the nuestion of security. I realize many of your problems in ex-
plaining what you do-how in your ordinary social life can you tell what you
are doing without really telling what you are doing?---and I've been looking
into that because I don't think as yet we've handled that prorerly. I hope
to get out some further regulations on this subject, as soon as we've ex-
nlored it further, because I think there has been a good deal too much
rigid regulation without the fled bility that is necessary to permit you,
in your ordinary contacts, to be natural without giving away any of the se-
crets of your work. In the work I did in Switzerland, I found that it was
very desirable to have a perfectly legitimate and natural story; it was a
little bit near the truth, but it nut the ineuirer off on the wrong scent.
If I had hied to nretead that I was doing something totally different from
what I was doing, I never would have gotten away with it.
I plan to do everything I can to build CIA up as a career service. It
is not easy, but it is possible. We've already made real strides in that di-
rector. Intelligence is a kind of career in which satisfaction has to come
largely from the work itself. Put I can assure you that in the long run,
that is the greatest satisfaction one Nets out of any career. It's not the
ephemeral advertisement that one may get. We are working now in the most dif-
ficult era that intelligence has ever known. It was child's play to get in-
telligence during the war compared to getting intelligence today from behind
the Iron Curtain. There are new difficulties because some of the most im-
portant targets are in the scientific and technical fields, which m4es it
harder and harder for the normal and usual individual to be able to operate.
But that difficulty is, and must remain, a challenge to us all.
Approved For Release 200211
2 EfIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
~
Securit
formation
 Approved For Rel a 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000 00010001-2
I think I can assure you that intelligence in this government has
come of age; it has found its position; its importance is ree6gnized. Each
week, I give the intelligence briefing for the National Security Council;
that privilege, which I exercise to some extent on behalf of the intelli-
gence community, indicates the importance which the highest officials of
government place on the intelligence phase of their work. Policy cannot be
established firmly unless it is established on the basis of fact.
And finally, I want to say that, as your Director, I propose to see
that the individual rights of the individual employee are protected and I
shall do that as a high 'arivilege and a high duty. Thank you very much.
I was told that really what you wanted today was to fire some questions
at me. I'll do my bestto answer all your questions, but if any of them are
not answerable, I shall see that they are referred to our ew very able In-
spector General for later answer.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Reftase 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTION: In these days of economy, do you feel that CIA
could stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease
in efficiency?
ANSWER: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us so ewhat
smaller than we are today. But I don't think that we can do
much on that immediately. I think as we all get more profes-
sional, we can possibly reduce our numbers. I'm a great be-
liever in small, efficient, well-knit organizations where we
don't have too much paper work and where we can put our minds
to doing the essential thing that is to be done. One of the
troubles in intelligence today is we have almost too many re-
ports, and we don't concentrate on the essential elements.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
25X1A
QUESTION: Do you contemplate any new organizational changes in
the Agency?
ANSWER: I do not for the immediate future. We've gone through
a lot of organizational changes. Those changes were very largely
patterned on a report that three of us prepared and submitted sev-
eral years ago, the Jackson,
(7), Dulles report, that was
adopted by the NSC. By and large, the recommendations of that re-
port are carried out in the present organization and I think the
thing to do now is to go ahead with the organization that we have
and let time tell us whether any further changes or adjustments
are necessary.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTION: How do you evaluate the present intelligence support
that we are giving to the National Security Council? Is it as
good as you would like to have it?
ANSWER: If we are ever satisfied with our intelligence coverage,
then something is wrong. One never has all the facts; all one
can do is approximate. I won't say that I am wholely satisfied,
because if I were satisfied, then I would not be urging on those
who are furnishing the information to even greater efforts. No.
I'm not wholely satisfied, but I feel that, given our capabilities,
we are giving the National Security Council a good coverage of fact
on the basis'of which tb firm up policy.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTION: Is there a movement afoot at the present time, as the
press indicates, to sever overt functions from covert functions
in CIA?
ANSWER: I do not believe that that is at all likely. You have
probably read in the press about the President's Committee on In-
formational Activities, I believe it is called, somewhat of a cover
name, because that Committee, presiced over by Mr. William Jackson,
will also deal with the relationship in government of our own ac-
tivities. We have been in very close touch with that Committee
throughout its work. Our representatives have appeared before it,
And I would doubt that its report would effect any substantial or-
ganizational changes in so far as the relationship of overt and
covert intelligence is concerned in our Agency.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A00100010001-2
QUESTION: Do you feel that in the long run the PM type of opera-
tion belongs in an agency like this?
ANSWER: It is my view that this government cannot effectively carry
on covert operations through two different agencies with different
controls. It is hard enough to get one covert apparatus organized
and functioning in the foreign field. If we had two trying to do it,
I think that it would be extremely difficult. The British had this
same problem before them when, during the war, they had their covert
operations in two different baskets, and they found that wisdom dic-
tated that they be put together. I'm inclined to think that our
operations-covert operations--should remain under one leadership
and that it would be very difficult to separate secret intelligence
from secret, covert operations. On the other hand, I do believe that
there are certain paramilitary activities which may reach a volume
and scope that they belong rather in the Pentagon than with us, and
that is a problem which is now under consideration.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For RMase 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTION: (1) Why are women hired at a lower grade than men?
(2) Do you think that women are given sufficient recognition
in the Central Intelligence Agency? (3) And as the new Direc-
tor of CIA, are you going to do something about the professional
discrimination against women?
ANSWER: That first question, I'll refer to the Inspector Gem ral
for a report as to whether the facts are true.
right, sir.) The second question; I am inclined to think that they
are not. And the third one; if it exists, I shall. I'll give that
to the Inspector General too, and get a report on it. I'm serious
about this. I think women have a very high place in this work, anel
if there is discrimination, we're going to see that it's stopped.
25X1A
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AU00100010001-2
QUESTION: In these days of eannom , do you feel that CIA could
stand a reduction in force without a marked decrease in efficiency?
ANSWER: In certain areas, yes. I'd like to see us somewhat smaller
than we are today. But I don't think that we can do much on that
immediately. I think as we all get more professional, we can nos-
si.bly reduce our numbers. I recall in Switzerland, during the war,
I arrived in Switzerland to carry on my work there, and the day I
arrived, the frontier closed so that it was then impossible to get
anyone else into Switzerland to add to my force until the frontier
opened about two years later. And I started off there with--let's
see-_I was there, and I had two men and two women, and most of us
had to spend our time ciphering. We were able to recruit a certain
number of people, probably by stealing them from other departments
of government, and since the frontier was closed, those other depart-
ments didn't learn about it until the frontier opened. And in various
ways. But I found I did very much better work with that small force,
with some recruits that I picked up here and there, in Switzerland
itself, than I did after the frontier opened and everybody wanted to
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Re4ease 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A010100010001-2
come to Switzerland to practice the spy game. And I had about
40 or 50 arrive within two or thtee weeks. From that time on,
I was an administrative officer and trying to find ways of keep-
ing people busy without getting into trouble. So that I'm a
great believer in small, efficient, well-knit organizations
where we don't have too much paper work and where we can put our
minds to doing the essential, thing that is to be done. One of
the troubles in intelligence today is we have almost too many
reports, and we don't concentrate on the essential elements.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For ReI'"Xse 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AOOD'f00010001-2
QUESTION: When do we get a new building?
ANSWER: That's on the very top of the basket. I have canvassed the
situation in the Bureau of the Budget; I have canvassed the situ-
ation among the Congressional leaders, and I find everyone sympathetic,
but the question is what to do. There are two possibilities: one
is to find an existing building from which we could oust the present
occupants on the theory of the higher sensitivity of our work, and
the other is to get the authority and money to build a new building.
We're working along both of those lines, and it is the highest pri-
ority that I have, because I realize the conditions under which wo you
work.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166Adf0100010001-2
QUESTION: In view of the fact that most well-known republicans are
known for their rather conservative view points relative to world
affairs, in your opinion will these conservative leanings have any
effect upon our estimating function?
ANSWER: If we allow ourselves to be influenced by political or other
considerations such as right-wing or left-wing tendencies in our es-
timating, then we are failing in our work. Politics plays no role
in this Agency. Anybody that wants to get into politics actively
or to have any political activity, better leave right away quick,
because I won't tolerate that; I won't allow nrself to do it; I
won't allow anybody else to do it while they're in the Agency. Ob-
viously, you can exercise your right to vote, but I don't want poli-
tics coming into this Agency. We're going to keep this Agency out
of politics, as far as I'm concerned, and we're going to keep poli-
tics out of our estimating.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AM0100010001-2
QUESTION: Would you please comment upon a recent editorial in the
public press which implied that CIA's clandestine activities im-
periled the orderly development of the U.S. foreign policy?
ANSWER: I don't agree with the editorial, I think I know the
one you refer to. We have quite a problem in dealing with the
press. It's more or less my policy to take it in my stride, not
to get too excited about it. We're going to be attacked from time
to time. If we start to answer attacks, directly, even false attacks,
I think we'll get ourselves into a lot of trouble. If we answer the
false attacks and don't answer the other attacks, then we might be
deemed to be confirming certain allegations made about us. I be-
lieve in maintaining very friendly relations with the press. I
think I have very good relations personally with a large number of
people, but I don't propose to get into any newspaper controversies.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A00!'!t`100010001-2
QUESTION: Is the abundance of military personnel necessary in a
civilian organization?
ANSWER: Well, the percentage of military personnel with us is
relatively low, about 10%. I consider them an extremely valuable
and indispensible addition to our staff. We have some of the ablest
men in the armed services working for us and with us. And I wouldn't
change that in any respect. We have very important responsibilities
in the field of intelligence to the Armed Services. Take the situa.-
25X1A
job. No. I don't think we have too many. The percentage is about
right. I think the caliber is very high.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
QUESTION: You stated upon becoming the Director of Central Intel-
ligence that you'd make every effort to meet as many employees as
possible on the "working level." How successful have you been?
ANSWER: I haven't been very successful so far, but I'm going to
be. As you know, there we.s quite a long while before General Ca
came on board and took over as Deputy. Then with the change of ad-
ministration there was a tremendous amount of briefing to do. The
new officials of government had to be b*iefed about our activities.
The new work of the National Security Council, which is very important,
takes a vast amount of time-far more time than it did in the past--
because of the briefing that I referred to and because of certain
new activities of the National Security Council. So that during the
last two or three months, I can assure you that I've been pretty
busy. Now General Cabell is on board and I think we're getting.the
administrative organization working more smoothly and I can assure
you that before the temperature gets to 110 in your buildings I'm
going to visit them. Try to keep the temperature down.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Relgase 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166AOOb100010001-2
QUESTION: The CIA organization is functional, but 90% of our prob-
lems are regional and deal with capabilities or intentions of particular
'countries. Wouldn't we, therefore, be better off with a regional
set-up so that we would go to one place for the answer to the average
question instead of going to half a dthzen functional places at the
present time?
ANSWER: Well, I don't think one has to go to a half a dozen. I do
oftenffind that I go to two places; that is, I'll want to get the
ideas aIae4# of the operational fellow. Let's take a question like
25X1A
prospective. But I find that if I get those two angles on the subject,
I am pretty well advised as to what the situation is, Now I realize
that there are many elements that reed up to both of those two indi-
viduals, let us say, in their respetive sides of the shop. By and
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A0 100010001-2
large, if I get hold of two or three, I think I can get a pretty
good slant. I don't think you could wisely put those together,
because the operational fellow tends to have one view of things
looking at it from operations, and its well to temper that with
the zriew of the person that looks at it from the long broad his-
torical and research. angle.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: fa-M4100010001-2
 Approved For Relea' 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A000140010001-2
QUESTION: Would you say that the Central Intelligence Agency will
be a permanent governmental function, even If the USSR has a modi-
fied change of heart and begins to behave itself?
ANSWER: I think the CIA is here to stay. I don't think there's
any slight doubt on that point. I've had a great deal of contact
during these last few weeks with the Congress and every once in a
while we get a bit of criticism here and there, but I have never
run into anybody in Congress who indicates that the CIA ought to
be abolished or done away with or radically changed. Now, we've
drawn up a lot of estimates with regard to the peace offensive of
the Soviet leaders. In all of them, we have gone back to the words
of Lenin, repeated many times by Stalin, that while changes of tac-
tics, strategic retreats are permissible, just as permissible in that
theory as advances, the basic policy of the Kremlin remains and I
don't think, therefore, you need expect, much as we might like it,
that this peace offensive will change in any way the workload of
this Agency, or its importance.
DRSS-n 00010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: C
WNFID
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AOM00010001-2
QUESTION: We have combined these three questions, Mr. Dulles,
and you've been asked this kind of question before. (Dulles:
It doesn't relate to coffee, does it?) Do you want that one
first? It says would it be possible to have the food at K
Building as high in quality as in price? Then it goes on to a
parenthetical question: Our work is seasoned but our food is
not.
ANSWER: Shane, will you fix a day that I can go down and try
this myself? May I say that the food down below in our little
shun where we have it comes up just about as bad as it can be.
100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA- hi i
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For F ase 2002
DP55-00166A 100010001-2
?11HULN I IAL
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 6
4 June 1953
SUBJECT: Remarks of Lt. General Charles P. Cabell, USAF
1. General Charles P. Cabell, at the Tenth Agency Orientation
Course, on 5 May 1953, spoke to Agency personnel for the first time
as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
2. It is believed that General Cabell's remarks will be of
general interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for
the information and guidance of all concerned.
3. It is requested that this document be given as wide circu-
lation among Agency personnel as is consistent with its classification.
BAIRD
Director of Training
JOB NO. 3 L O ._IT'11)NO.-__ DOC. N O CHANGE
IN CLASS/ IDS L CH GED TO: TS S W . JUST.ZZ
NEXT REV D . TEa`'1_JJu AT A EVIEWE. TYPE DC-C. ~o
NO. PC SLr EATIO14 DATE ORG COMPJLOPI ORG CLA
REV CLASS 11EV COORD. RUTH: HR 70-9
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2002
25X1A
25X1
 Approved For Rbk'asitig
~y5-00166A6100010001-2
REMARKS OF
LT. GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL, USAF
AT THE
TENTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE
5 May 1953
*#**"
Col. Baird and fellow members of CIA: You know that "fellow members
of CIA" business sounds pretty good to me, a little strange, but still pret-
ty good. This is my first speech since assuming the Office of Deputy Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, and I am pleased that the occasion is a training
program of our own. The strength of the Central Intelligence Agency, or any
organization for that matter, depends to a large degree upon the brand and
amount of training given to the men and women doing the various tasks. Maybe
you notice my using the words "our own," which I have done with deliberate
pride, because this is one method of driving home to myself the fact that I
am now part of that Agency with which I've worked for a good number of years.
I have always acknowledged this Agency as possessing a unique responsibility
in the field of intelligence. Not only is the Director of Central Intelli-
gence the leader in coordinating all efforts to produce the best national
intelligence, but the whole Agency shares that leadership responsibility.
Now, I find myself with you, as an integral part of this leadership function,
and in the position of having to "put up or shut up." My intention is to
"put up."
Many of you know that I have spent considerable time during the past few
months going from office to office in the Agency, to be thoroughly briefed on
organization and functions and current problems. I assure you that I could
have spent much more time to very good advantage on these subjects that were
covered with a degree of thoroughness which I appreciate. Since I have heard
and read so much about our Agency, perhaps you would be interested in some of
my impressions.
First, it is generally easy for any of us to distinguish between a "staged
event" put on to impress, and the telling of a genuine story. I think that I
heard genuine stories. Thus, as the personnel of the various offices explained
their responsibilities and described their functions, I acquired a conviction
of competence and dedication to their work. In every segment of the Agency I
found men and women who did not appear to have attributes of "clock watchers,"
merely filling-in their time. Rather, they appeared to have a profound appre-
ciation of why they were performing certain duties in this complex pattern of
national intelligence. They seemed to know full well that in this intelligence
business, there is no limit to the amount of time one can devote to it. An
intelligence worker can always "dig a little deeper."
Approved For Release 2002/i IEIA RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Raleag@
9 Mi 55-00166A 100010001-2
When I considered that little over a decade ago no such structure as
this existed, I was given a sense of confidence by the thoroughness of the
continuing development of the Agency. I met collectors, linguists, couriers,
coordinators, producers of estimates, administrative officials, clerical and.
secretarial personnel, lawyers, training officers, scientists, economists,
operators, area specialists, machine experts, librarians, and a host of other
categories that comprise the units of teamwork we call the CIA. It is obvi-
ous that one coach, whether he be Director or Deputy Director, cannot call
all the signals to make the moves of national intelligence click with effici-
ency, which they must do in the vital interest of the security of our nation.
Hence, my feeling of confidence was indeed great when I noted the assumption
of individual responsibility by each one in the several offices organi-
zation. Working in this fashion, under the policies and regulations promul-
gated throughout the Agency, brings assurance of success in attaining our
goals.
Besides the attitude of sincerity toward one's task, whatever it might
be, I was also impressed by the efficiency of the product. Systems have been
designed on the job, and adopted, to sift through the multitude and variety
of material collected by the Departments and by CIA. Production machinery now
works well to render support to the estimating function, both in CIA and the
Departments. These are but two examples of worthwhile performances.
As I went through these pleasant experiences, I could not but feel that
attitudes were outstandingly good, efficiency was of high calibre, and that
all shared a conviction that our work here is of vital importance.
I noticed some other things too:
First, the Agency has had its share of organizational changes in the
past few years. Having known the Agency for quite a long time with a certain
degree of intimacy, I feel that the pattern of changes was needed to bring
How-
that strength of operation which now exists in our several functions.
ever,, regardless of the benefits achieved by the alteration and modification
of functions, I am very conscious of the human element which might be lost
and receive no sympathetic consideration or explanation in the flux of change.
From my observation, I believe that most of you must have had knowledge of
the weaknesses, and a clear conviction of the reasons for adopting the new
methods and procedures, because you now speak and act with assurances of
strength.
A second thing I noticed was that the Agency has achieved stature, and
you carry on with a unity of purpose even though you are scattered all over
town and in a variety of buildings. Many of these buildings are hardly sound-
proof enough to shelter a noisy argument. Though my old Alma Mater, the
Pentagon, has been the butt of many jokes--some good--I must admit that the
massive structure, by providing space for most military intelligence activi-
ties, does ease many problems which unfortunately we must continue to live
with--at least for the time being-in CIA. The time consumed between
Approved For Release 2002/Ol P55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For RascQgv+y -00166A0100010001-2
buildings, the difficulties of security which increase in direct proportion
to the number of locations, the human lethargy generated by distance which
discourages persons getting together on items that could benefit by the "per-
sonal" touch, all these and many more problems will continue as long as we
are housed in the bit and piece fashion.
Now that I've told you how I feel about you, you'll have to figure out
for yourselves what to expect from me. Here are some indicators. Basically,
you should know that I consider this a most important assignment, and that
I come into it with enthusiasm. Having spent my entire adult life in the
military service.. I might be expected to consider this as merely another
change of duty for me. Such is not the case. Let me assure you that I
burned many bridges in the Air Force and, with a freedom of decision, cast
my lot with you. I did so because I consider these functions, of producing
national intelligence estimates and of coordinating the total intelligence
effort of our Federal Government, of essential and prime importance if our
policies are to possess the strength and accuracy to save civilization.
Furthermore, instead of hastening into the job, I was doubly pleased to
wait and to study the Agency, until the legislation covering my position
was fully clarified, because I hope to be here a good long time.
Many persons too often jump to the conclusion that the arrival of a
new official means inevitable drastic change in organization. Rest assured,
however, that I. for one, come with no bias for alteration, and my words of
sincere congratulations to you should assure you that what I saw and heard
gave me confidence in present procedures. However, while I do not favor
radical, revolutionary changes in the activities of any agency, I am a firm
believer in evolutionary modifications which are made with temperate and
thoughtful steps.
Therefore, I hope that we will never just tread water to keep ourselves
abreast of events, but will always be alert to the necessity for developing
and improving our methods. Without this approach, we could easily stagnate
in mediocrity.
CIA is a tremendous challenge to all of us as individuals--and to all
of us as members of a collective team.
All tasks to a degree are challenges, of course. Let me explain why I
feel that this, as I see it, is something of a unique challenge.
CIA is engaged in a variety of intelligence activities and special opera-
tions, which have been housed in a single agency. The very job of conducting
our work without disclosing our hand presents a tremendous obstacle.
Our intelligence work is carried on at a time when we are in greater need
of good intelligence than at any time in the history of this nation. Sound
National Policy and the success of our Armed Forces may be determined to a
large extent, as well as those of the service intelligence agencies, by the
Approved For Release 2002/0 : lA DP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rase
lP6fi-00166A0100010001-2
success or failure of CIA effort. With this tremendous responsibility rest-
ing on our shoulders, we naturally would expect to look to the "old hands"--
to the veterans of O SS and CIA. When we do this, we find that our Agency is
so new that few men have more than six years of service--only rarely do we
find one with ten years of service. There are few "old timers." The mantle
of our great responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the very fine
group of competent young men and women who now occupy the key positions in
CIA. I might add that I served in England for a time in World War II and was
in close touch with British Intelligence. That service has been in existence
for generations. Yet today, as America assumes its heavy if not fundamental
responsibilities in world affairs, we have little tradition in strategic in-
telligence. And so the very newness of our service, when related to the
scope of its task, presents one of our great challenges.
We work, as I am sure you have already noticed, in a highly specialized
atmosphere. It is certainly not an atmosphere for the faint of heart and
those who are discouraged easily. To the conscientious and able, I believe
it offers a wonderful opportunity.
Each day brings new tasks to CIA, which in some respects are unique.
It is challenging to play a part in helping to solve these problems.
As we progress or as we encounter obstacles in our work, I believe we
might profitably read again the history of the United States to refresh our-
selves on the tremendous obstacles that our Forebears overcame. For, in the
final analysis, the development of this Agency is a part of the growing ma-
turity of America as a nation. While we do not travel as rough a road as
the pioneers, there will be times when it appears as rough. It certainly is
not always smooth. I am proud to have a part in this development, just as
I know you are. One of the reasons that our intelligence service is so new
is that we were.reluctant for years to admit that participation in intelli-
gence was a nationally permissible activity. Even today, as a nation, we
tend to be very conservative regarding our political and psychological roles.
As for this Agency, it is important for us to understand that in many
respects we are here to provide certain intelligence to the military-services.
It is likewise important that the military services understand our general
objectives and capabilities. Effectiveness cannot be achieved unless the ef-
forts of CIA and the efforts of the Department of Defense are brought into
complete harmony. There is nothing more useless than highly organized mili-
tary force lacking in intelligence. Perhaps one thing is more useless--a
carefully documented intelligence report which is confined in its distribu-
tion and not made available to the military commanders. The two--intelli-
gence and military power--are completely interdependent. To help bring
them into correct relationship and to keep them there, is one of our con-
stant challenges.
Because of my experience with Air Intelligence and with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, I hope to be helpful in continuing the marked improvement in mutual
-4-
Approved For Release 2002/08/2 A-RD P55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Fasg
g{5-00166A100010001-2
understanding between CIA and the Department, which has taken place during
the past two years. Along this line, I like to insist on the thought that
"Departments" and "Agencies" as such do not exist, for these are just gen-
eral words covering a lot of people. Hence, the lessening and elimination
of problems can be done by bringing persons together. This personal ap-
proach begets confidence and efficient results.
With the growth in size of organization and the development of complexi-
ties, we are compelled to allot functions and to divide tasks because of the
pressure of time and the need for expert advice. This trend toward categories
of "experts" creates the real but inevitable danger' of putting blinkers over
our vision of the total task to be done. The overemphasis of the segmentdis-
torts the whole product. This very human trait is augmented by the physical
arrangement of our offices where distance might easily lend a false independ-
ence to what is being performed. Accordingly, I would like to remind you
that while we must ever strive to get the best information on any pertinent
subject and be able to refine and distill the products in minute fashion, we
must never lose our focus on the total job to be done. In most positive man-
ner, each person must do his or her task with the ever present recognition
that said task is a piece of a jigsaw, which will have usefulness only when
properly aligned with many other pieces to form a picture.
I shall conclude my remarks with a reminder that the most important fac-
tor for our success is the proper handling of people, at all levels through-
out the Agency. This job cannot be left to chance. It must ever be done with
education which comes from full knowledge and appreciation of duties. Our
strength of the present and our advance for the future depends wholly on get-
ting the best candidates, and on preparing them to assume their duties with
zeal and competency. Experience has shown that we cannot go to the outside
and get from academic institutions or from industry persons who can immedi-
ately be classed as "intelligence officers." Therefore, I am glad that we
have developed under General Smith and our new Director, Mr. Dulles, the
framework of a competent career system. This career service program and the
various mechanisms which are to make it work comprise the very backbone for
strength in the long-term approach of all our tasks. Its aim is to assure
that we always get the best equipped person in the most appropriate spot, so
that he can turn out the best product. That is the best way I know of for
assuring good morale.
This reminds us that when individuals are selected to come into such a
system, they should never overlook the fundamental point that throughout their
career in intelligence the selectivity factor is recurring constantly as per-
sons are being considered for certain jobs. Thus competency is continually
being evaluated. This is where the ever-present task of training is conspicu-
ous, to equip our people with the needed skills.
Throughout my remarks this morning I stressed the importance of the per-
sonal element in all we do. Therefore, I hope that I can live up to my own
resolution to visit with you often and keep close to what you are doing.
Approved For Release 2002/08/2 ? C -RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
RE TRI D
 Approved For Rvidase 8/22 : CIA DP55-00166Ab 100010001-2
Lt. General Charles P. Cabell, USAF
Col. Baird and fellow rs of CIA* You know that
"fellow members of CIA" business sounds pretty good to me, a little strange,
but still pretty good. This is my first speech since assuming the Office of
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, and I am pleased that the occasion
is a training program of our own. The strength of the Central Intelligence
Agency, or any organization for that matter, depends to a large degree upon
the brand and amount of training given to the men and women doing the various
tasks. Mey be you notice my using the words "our own",,which I have done with
deliberate pride, bedause this is one method of driving home to myself the
fact that I am now part of that Agency with which I've worked for a good
numbet of years. I have always acknowledged this Agency as possessing a
unique responsibility in the field of intelligence. Not only is the Director
of Central Intelligence the leader in coordinatif all efforts to produce the
best national intelligence, but the whole Agency shares that leadership
responsibility. Now, I find mf elf with you, as an integral part of this
leadership function, and in the position of having to "put up or shut up".
My intention is to "put up".
Many of you know that I have spent considerable time during the 10a.st few
monthsX going from office to office in the Agency, to be thoroughly briefed
on organization and functions and current problems. I assure you, that I could
have spent much more time to very good advantage on these subjects that were
covered with a degree of thoroughness which I appreciate. Since I have-boom
heard and read so much about our Agency, perhaps you would be interested in
some of my impressions. Approved For Release 2 2# C~.4-FPP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2
DP55-00166AOCW0001 0001 -2
First, it is generally easy for any of us to distinguish between a "staged
event" put on to impress, and the telling of a genuine story. I think that
I heard genuine stories. Thus, as the perscamel of the various offices explained
their responsibilities and described their functions.. I acquired a conviction
of competence and dedication to their work. In every segment of the Agency)( I
found men and women who did not appear 6 have attributes of"clock watchers",
merely filling-in their time. Rather, they appeared to have a profound appre-
ciation of why they were performing certalin duties in this complex pd#ern of
national intelligence. They seemed to know full well, that in this Intelligence
business, there is no limit to the amount of time one can devote to it. An
Intelligence worker can always "dig a little deeper".
When I considered that little over a decade agog no such structure as
this existed, I was given a sense of confidence by the thoroughness of the
continting development of the Agency. I met collectors, linguists, couriers,
coordinators, producers of estimates, administrative officials, clerical and
secretarial personnel, lawyers, training officers, sdzientists, economists,
operators, area specialists, machine experts, librarians, and a host of other
categories that comprise the unit'of teamwork we call"-the CIA. It is obvious
that one coach, whether he be Director Deputy Director, cannot call all
the signals to make the moves of national intelligence click with efficiencyy-
which they mint do in the vital interest of the security of our nation. Hence,
my feeling of confidence was indeed great' when I noted the assumption of
individual respounsibilityx by each one in the several offices of the organ-
ization. Working in this fashion, under the policies and regulations promulgated
throughout the Agency, brings assurance of success-in attaining our.goals.
Approved For Release 2 00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Ryas
E-RDP55-00166AbM100010001-2
Besides the attitude of sincerity toward one's task, whatever it might
be, I was also impressed by the efficiency of the product. Systems have been
designed on the job, and adopted, to sift through the multitude and variety
of material collected by the Departments e)d by CIA. Production machinery
now works well to render support to the estimating function, both in CIA and
the Departments. These are but two examples of worthwhile performances.
As I went through these pleasant experiences, I could not but feel that
attitudes were outstandingly good, efficiency was of high calibre, and that
all shared a conviction that our work here is of vital importance.
I noticed some other things too:
First, the Agency has had its share of organizational changes in the past
few years. Having known the Agency for quite a long time with a certain degree
of intimacy, I feel that the pattern of changes was needed to bring that strength
of operation)( which now exists in our several functions. However, regardless
of the benefits achieved by the alteration and modification of functions, I
am very conscious of the human element which might be lost and receive no
sympathetic consideration or explanation in the flux of change. From my
observation, I believe that most of you must have had knowledge of the weaknesses,
and a clear conviction of the reasons for adopting the new methods and procedures,
because you now speak and act with assurances of strength.
A,$econd thing I noticed was that the Agency has achieved stature, and
you carry on with a unity of punpose even though you are scattered all over town
and in a variety of buildings. Many of these buildings are hardly soundproof
enough to shelter a noisy argument. Though my old Alma }ter, the Pentagon, has
been the butt of many jokes -- some good -- I must admit that the massive
structure, by providing space(cr most military intelligence activiipes, does
ease many problems which unfortunately we must continure to live with --
Approved For Release 2002 S _CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
ES EO
 pptt#l ~
Approved For Ruse 20Q lz P55-00166A0`e100010001 2
at least for the time being -- in CIA. The time consumed betweenbuildings,
the difficulties of security which increase in direct proportion to the number
of locations, the human lethargy generated by distance which discourages persons
getting together on items that could benefit by the "personal" touch, all these
and many more problems will continue as long as we are housed in the bit and
r
piece fashion.
I
Now that I've told you how/#* feel about you, you'll have to figure out
for yourselves what to expect from me. Here are some indicators. Basically,
you should know that I consider this a most important assignment, and that
I come into it with enthusiasm. Having spent my entire adult life in the
military service.. I might be expected to consider this as merely another change
of duty for me. Such is not the case. I)et me assure your( that I burned many
bridges in the Air ForceX and, with a freedom of decision, cast my lot with you'..
I did so because I consider these functionstof producing national intelligence
estimates* and of coordinating'tal intelligence effort of our Federal
Government, es of essential and prime importance if our policies are to possess
the strength and accuracy to save civilization. Furthermore, instead of
hastening into the job, I was doubly pleased to wait and to study the Agency,
until the legislation covering my position was fully clarified, because I hope
to be here a good long time.
I .ny persons too often jump to the conlusion that the arrival of anew
official means inevitable drastic change in organization. Rest assured,
however, that I, for one, come with no bias for alteration, and my words of
sincere congratulations to you should assure you)( that what I saw and heard
gave me confidence in present procedures, However, while I do not favor
radical, revolutionary changes in the activities of any agency, I am a firm
believet in evolutionary modifications which are made with temperate and
thoughtful steps.
Approved For Release 2002408/22 : CIA-RD?p55-00166A000100010001-2
C1E
 Approved For Rese 200 U "Therefore, I hope that we will never just tread water to keep ourselves
abreast of events, but will always be alert to the necessity for developing
and improving our methods. Without this approach, we could easily stagnate
in mediocrity.
CIA is a tremendous challenge to all of us as individuals - and to all
of us as members of a collective team.
All tasks to a degree are challenges, of courses Let me explain why I
feel that this, as I see it, is something of a unique challenge.
CIA is engaged in a variety of intelligence activities and special
operations, which have been housed in a single agency. The very job of conduc-
ting our work without disclosing our handle presents a tremendous obstacle.
Our intelligence work, is carried on at a time when we are in greater
need of good intelligence* than at any time in the history of this nation.
Sound National Policy and the success of our Armed Forces may be determined
to a large extent, as well as those of the service Intelligence agencies,
by theAsuccess, or failure of CIA effort. With this tremendous responsibility
resting on our shoulders, we naturally would expect to look to the "old hands,"
- to the veterans of 0S3 and CIA. When we do this, we find that our Agency is
so navy) (that, few men have more than six years of service)( - only rarely do
we find one with ten years of service. There are few "old timers." The mantle
of our great responsibility rests squarely on the shoulders of the very fine
group of competent young men and women who now occupy the key positions in CIA.
I might add)( that I served in England for a t1ite in World War_IIy and was in
close touch with British Intelligence. That service has been in existence
for generations. Yet today, as America assumes its heavyX'if not fundamental
responsibilities in world affairs, we have little tradition in strategic
intelligence. And so the very newness of our service when related to the scope
of its task, presents one of our great challenges.
Approved For Release 20(@, M * &5-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Reledse 20 IA P55-00166A0 1'00010001-2
We work, as I am sure you have already notices inAhighly specialized
atmosphere. It is certainly not an atmosphere for the aint of hearty and those
who are disdouraged easily. To the conscientious and able, I believe it offers
a wonderful opportunity.
Each day brings new tasks to CIA, which in some respects are unique.
It is challenging to play 7art in helping to solve these problems.
As we progresa'or as we encounter obstacles in our work, I believe we
might profitably read again the history of th United States to refresh
ourselves on the tremendous obstacles that our Forebears overcame. For,rthe
final analysis, the development of this Agency is a part of the growing maturit
of America as a nation. While we do not travel as rough a road as. the pioneers,
there will be times when it appears as rough. It certainly is not always smooth.
I am proud to have rt in this development, just as I know you are. One
of the reasons that our intelligence service is so new,# is that we were
reluctant for years to admit that participation in intelligence, Uas a nationally
permissible activity. Even today, as a nation, we tend to be very conservative
regarding our political and psychological roles.
As for this Agency, it is important for us to underst azd' that in many
respects we are here to provide certain intelligence to the military services.
It is likewise important that the military services understand our general
objectives and capabilities. Effectiveness cannot be achieved unless the
efforts of CIAX and the dfort$ of the Department of Defense are brought into
complete harmohy. There is nothing more useless than highly organized.
military force lacking in Intelligence. Perhaps one thing is more useless -
a carefully documented intelligence reporfi,* which is confined in its distribu-
tioix and not made available to the military commanders. The two: intelligence
and military power - are completely interdependent. To help bring them into
correct relationshi and to keep them there, is one of our constant challenges.
Approved Foelease 2002/08/22_C155-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R ease 200
55-00166A0100010001-2
Because of my experience with Air Intelligence and with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, I hope to be helpful in continuing the marked improvement in mutual
understanding between CIA and the Department, which has taken place during
the past two years. Along this line, I like to insist on the thought that
"Departments" and "Agencieff as such do not exist, for these are just general
a
words covering/lot of people. Hence, the lessening and elimination of problems
can be done by bringing persons together. This personal approach begets
confidence and efficient results.
With the growth in size of organization and. the development of complexities,
we are Compelled to allot functions and to divide tasks; bedause of the pressure
of time and the need for expert advice. This trend towarddcategories of "experts"
creates the real but inevitable danger of putting blinkers over our vision of
the total task to be done. The overemphasis of the segment distorts. the
whole: product. This very human trait is augmented by the physical arrangement
of our offices where distance might easily lend a false independence,X to what
is being performed. Accordingly, I would like to remind you' that while we
must ever strife to get the best information on any pertinent subject, and be
able to refine and distill the products in minute fashion, we must never lose our
focus on the total job to 4#0 done. In most positive manner, each person must
odo $his or her task with the ever present recognition that said task is a
piece of a jigsaw, which will have usefulness only when properly aligned with
many other pieces)( to form a picture.
I shall conclude my remarks with a reminderXthat the most important
factor for our success is the proper handling of people, at all levels through-
out the Agency. This job cannot be left to chance. It must ever be done with
education which comes from full knowledge and appreciation jj- duties,,
Approved For Release 20
UP55-00166A0001 00010001 -2
 Approved For RJase 20 P55-00166410100010001-2
Qur strength of the presents(and our advance for the futurej(depend$ wholly
on getting the best candidates, and on preparing them to assume their dutiesK
with zeal and competency. Experience has shown that we cannot go to the outw
side and get from academic institutionsJK or from industry)(persons who can
immediately be classed as"intelligence officers." Therefore, I am glad th at
we have developed under General Smith and our new Director, Mr. Dulles, the
framework of a competent career system. This career service program)/ and the
various mechanisms which are to make it work,( comprise the very backbone for
strength in the long-teem approach of all our tasks. Its aim is to assure that
we always get the best equipped persons in the most appropriate spot, so that
he can turn out the best product. That is the best way I know ofb(for assuring
good morale.
This reminds usA'that when individuals are selected to cede into such
a system, they should never overlook the fundamental point that throughout
their career in intelligences the selectivity factor is recurring constantly
as persons are being considered for certain jobs. Thus competency is continually
being evaluated. This is where the ever-present task of training is conspicuous,
to equip our people with the needed skills.
Throughout my remarks this morning I stressed the importance of the
personal element in all we do. Therefore, I hope that I can live up to my own
resolution to visit with you often and keep close to what you are doing.
# # * * #
-8-
Approved For Release 20Q2 2 0166A000100010001-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For RIeaEe
SE- -E-T
_M9o W55-00166AMb100010001-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 5
31 March 1953
coNF'pENrIAL
SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles
1. Mr. Allen W. Dulles, at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course,
on 13 February 1953, spoke to Agency personnel for the first time as
the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. It is believed that Mr. Dullest remarks will be of general
interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the infor-
mation and guidance of all concerned.
3. Branch Chiefs are requested to circulate this document, as
appropriate, and ensure its return for retention and security control
in their respective Offices.
25X1A
M&TTHKW BAIRD
Attachment: 1
Distribution No. 4
Director of Training
5NO CHANGE
ORG Gt&SS._.!~x
-:, - i- i? I
.
V!
CL SS_- t.V G)O13+t +f--~~~ 3 70-3
Approved For Release 2002/0L/?.
gP55-00166A000100010001-2
25X1
 Approved For RQ ea M
S-E ^ M. E-T
-ftQ855-00
REMARKS OF
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
NINTH ORIENTATION COURSE
13 February 1953
IDENTIAL
I had a rather pragmatic introduction to intelligence in World
War I, and from then on I have had a taste for it that I never have
seemed to be able to get out of my system; and it looks as though now
far
I have it in my system for good and all. I look upon
to
I am concerned, as a continuing job. That, behavior , i s and some
to
the pleasure of the President, and reasonably good performance on my part.
Some years ago, Bill Jackson and I sat down and spent a good
bit of a year, with such experience as we had behind us, in outlin-
ing the kind of organization that we felt should
produce intelligence,
provided you could get the key thing you need,
That general blueprint is, I believe, sound. General Smith and Bill
Jackson, and to some extent myself, during the past twohye rs, with
ht
the able help of many others, have been trying put
into effect. Naturally we have changed it here and there, butte
and large, we have today, I believe, a working organization.
have a pattern which can produce intelligence.. That is why the work
that Matt Baird in the Office of Training and those that work with
him is so important, because no blueprint of this kind is of any
value whatsoever unless we have trained people to carry it out.
What I think has been accomplished over the past few years, as
far as this Agency is concerned, is the gaining of the cooperation
and confidence of other intelligence agencies throughout this govern-
ment. We are now a team. We are working as a team. When we find
there are problems, we have the machinery to work them out. We can
start from today with that, I believe, as an assured and solid basis.
I think, too, we have a workable organization, dividing our own func-
tions up as they reasonably should be divided, between the covert and
the overt, between the production of intelligence, ending up in the
finished product of the National Estimates, and what is done on the
covert side on the collection of intelligence.
Very largely thanks to General Smith, we have, I believe, a se-
cure position--no,. secure is too strong a word--we have a respectable
position insofar as public opinion is concerned. But we can never
rest on that. It is only by performance that we can maintain our
Approved For Release 2002/O8 .Q
E 'AL
 Approved For Release 200$/ IQZ 14RDP55-00166AD'A'W100010001-2
Security ormation
CONFIDENTIAL
position. We are going to make mistakes, and those mistakes will
find their ways into editorials and columns of the press. That we
can take, if we have a solid performance to counter-balance it. I
wouldn't want to believe in an organization or be a part of an or-
ganization of this kind that was afraid to make mistakes, because
if you're afraid of that, you're afraid of doing things. And we are
in a dangerous game. The only thing that we have to do is to put
our best judgment into each thing that we attempt.
And further, I think we have reached a point where intelligence
is no longer a stepchild. Intelligence has really now found stature
throughout this government. One of the most encouraging evidences
of this is the willingness and desire of General Cabell, whom I con-
sider one of our most outstanding officers in intelligence, to come
with us and make intelligence a career.
Now, that is where we stand today. It is a very, very fine
heritage and we must carry it on. We can only do that if we de-
velop the highest professional standards. I'm not interested in
numbers. I hope we can cut down on numbers, and maybe that is not
only a hope, maybe we'll be forced to; the pressure in government
now is to out down, and I think it is a proper pressure. I hope
this Agency will be known as the hardest agency of government to
get into. And I hope that we will be able to build up the reputa-
tion that we have one of the lowest turnovers in government.
We want to build this as a career service. You know our plans
for that. We don't want people here that only come for a few years
of training and experience, because they think it may be a glamorous
occupation. It is, I think, the most exciting occupation and the
most exciting career that one can have. But it is a career, and
you must face it very frankly, in which anonymity is important. The
satisfaction has largely got to be in the fact that you are accomp-
lishing something vital for the government and that.in doing that
you will have also some of the most interesting types of work that
any people can have. It's rather against American traits, you know,
not to tell what you're doing, not to be able to boast of accomplish-
ments, and for that reason, I think, in some ways it is harder in
this country, because of our background and training, to build an in-
telligence service than in some of the countries in Europe. But we
are learning and must learn, and I am gratified by the extent to
which so many of you throughout the Agency are devoting yourselves
to this, selflessly, knowing what the work entails.
I think I can say that I haven't in my head at the moment any
great new plans of reorganization. Don't worry about that. Let's
go ahead on the blueprint that we have and only as time proves that
changes are wise put them into effect.
~ NFiDENTIAi~
Approved For Release 2002/66 gI ~P55-001'000100010001-2
 Approved For ReJ s&MCQ~ti2 6 P P95-00166A0%V00010001-2
It is an unwritten rule that one does not quote the President but
I think I'd be justified in breaking that rule on this point. Presi-
dent Eisenhower said to General Cabell and me the other day, very earn-
estly: "Your agency has the largest amount of unvouchered funds of amy
agency in government. I realize that it is necessary that you have them.
But those unvouchered funds must be a sacred trust; and you must see to
it that there is no abuse of the confidence and privilege which is re-
posed in you and in the Agency in handling those funds." I want that
word to go right through this Agency. I'm going to watch the use of
unvouchered funds with the greatest care and see that they can be jus-
tified in their expenditure just as much as other funds, even though
we have the privilege of not advertising how we spend them.
In our work, anybody can make mistakes, that I realize. But the
one unpardonable sin and where we have gotten into difficulty sometimes
in the past is to try to cover up as among ourselves mistakes that are
made. And that is one thing I want to impress on you. If you make a
mistake, that will probably be forgiven. If you try to hide mistakes,
so that proper and prompt action cannot be taken to correct them, there
is no real excuse for that. And anyone in this Agency, too, has the
right to be heard. General Smith, as you know, has established the
Office of the Inspector General. While frivolous appeals over the
heads'of one's immediate superiors are a bad practice, there is there
an appeal open to anyone in the Agency, if he has suggestions to mekke,
or if he feels that injustices are being done.
I hope, personally, to try to establish personal relations with
as many as possible in the Agency. One of the first things I want to
do is to go around and travel among our far-flung buildings, mmcb too
far-flung and much too numerous, and get to know everyone as far as I
can personally. Among the first things I'm going to work on is the im-
provement of the conditions under which we work and the provisidn of a
new building so that we can add greatly to our efficiency and to the
security of the Agency as a whole.
We have today, in the field of intelligence, the greatest chal-
lenge that intelligence has ever faced. I've often talked to you
about some of my experiences in World War II when I was in Switzer-
land, working into the enemy countries, Germany and Italy. That was
child's play in comparison with the task of getting intelligence with
respect to our present main target, Soviet Russia. We've got to be a
lot better than we were. We've got to be a lot wiser. We've got to
develop new techniques. That is one of the reasons why training is so
essential. It is one of the parts of the Agency that I will back to
the hilt. The Iron Curtain is a real curtain against intelligence and
it's being increased and improved every day. Berlin is really bring
cut in half. Satellite countries are being protected from contact with
the-west by every means, mechanical and technical and otherwise. That
is the challenge, and it's up to us to make the response. We have in
this country the men and women with the ability and courage to do_,it,
and I consider it a great privilege to be wi th you in trying to loo
that it is done. Thank you very much.
-4-
Approved For Release 2002/082 CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
=-E-T_
 Approved For Rase 2002 1R A-RDP55-001661 0100010001-2
security 1 rmat oii
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 5
16 March 1953
SUBJECT: Remarks of Allen W. Dulles
1. Mr. Allen W. Dulles, at the Ninth Agency Orientation Course,
on 13 February 1953, spoke to Agency personnel for the first time as
the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. It is believed that Mr. Dulles' remarks will be of general
interest throughout the Agency and are attached hereto for the inform
mation and guidance of all concerned.
34 Branch Chiefs are requested to circulate this document, as
appropriate, and ensure its return for retention and security control
in their respective Offices.
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Attachment: 1
Distribution #I
S RET,
Approved For Release 2002/08/21- 0166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R ease 201
gJd, &r RDP55-00166A
REMARKS OF
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
AT THE
NINTH ORIENTATION COURSE
13 February 1953
I had a rathexj pragmatic introduction to intellig nce in World War I,
and from then on I had a taste W it that I never hav seemed to be able to
get out of my system; and it looks as though now I *gt it in my system for
good and all. I look upon this, as far as I am concerned, as a continuing
job. That, of course, is subject to the pleasure of the President, and rea-
sonably good behavior and some performance on my part.
Some years ago, Bill Jackson and I sat down and spent a good bit of a
year, with such experience as we had behind us, in outlining the kind of or-
ganization that we felt should produce intelligence, provided you could get
the key thing you need, trained personnel. That general blueprint is, I be-
lieve, sound. General Smith and Bill Jackson, and to some extent myself,
during the past two years, with the able help of many others, have been try-
ing to put that blueprint into effect. Naturally we have changed it here and
there, but by and large, we have today, I believe,
a working organization. We have a pattern which can produce intelligence1aed
'iat is why the work that Matt Baird in the Office of Training and those that
work with him is so important, because no blueprint of this kind is of any
value whatsoever unless we have trained people to carry it out.
What I think has been accomplished over the past few years, as far as this
Agency is concerned, is the gaining of the cooperation and the confidence of
other intelligence agencies throughout this government. We are now a team. We
are working as a team. When we find there are problems, we have the machinery
to work them out.&TA Vs can start from today with that, I believe, as an assured
and solid basis. I think, too, we have a workable organization, dividing our
own functions up as they reasonably should be divided, between the covert and
the overt, between the production of intelligence, ending up in the finished
product of the National Estimates, and what is done on the covert side on the
collection of intelligence.
Very largely thanks to General Smith, we have, I believe, a secure posi-
tion--no, secure is too strong a word--we have a respectable position insofar
as public opinion is concerned. Butt, we can never rest on that.
tt is only by performance that we can maintain our\
position. We are going to make mistakes, and those mistakes will find their
ways into editorials and columns of the press. That we can take, if we have a
solid performance to counter-balance it. I wouldn't want to believe in an or-
ganization or be a part of an organization of this kind that was afraid to
-2-
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : C -RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
S REr,
Security In .-..e__
 Approved For Reuse 2002/08 RDP55-00166A( 100010001-2
Security t rmat1orf
make mistakes, because if you're afraid of that, you're afraid of doing things.
And we are in a dangerous game. The only thing that we have to do is to put
our best judgment into each thing that we attempt. ?rQeMWs ~?c
And further, I think we have reached a point where i elligence is no
longer a stepchild. Intelligence has really now founds ture throughout this
the willingness and desire of General CabOW whom I consider one of most
outstanding officers in intelligence of thi i a -e-* to come with us and
make intelligence a career.
Now, that is where we stand today. It is a very, very fine heritage and
we must carry it on. We can only do that if we develop the highest professional
standards. I'm not interested in numbers. I hope Abe we can cut down on
numbers, and maybe that is not only a hope, maybe we'll be forced to; bseause-
the pressure in government now is to out down, and I think it is a proper pres-
sure. I hope this Agency will be known as the hardest agency of government
to get into. And I hope that we will be able to build up the reputation that
we have one of the lowest turnovers in government.
We want to build this as a career service. You know our plans for that.
We don't want people here that only come for a few years of training and ex-
perience, because they think it may be a glamorous occupation. It is, I think,
the most exciting occupation and the most exciting career that one can have.
But it is a career, and you must face it very frankly, in which anonymity is
important. The satisfaction has largely got to be in the fact that you are
accomplishing something vital for the government and that in doing that you
will have also some of the most interesting types of work that any people can
have. It's rather against American traits, you know, not to tell what you're
doing, not to be able to boast of accomplishments, and for that reason, I think,
in some ways it is harder in this country, because of our background and train-
ing, to build an Intelligence service than in some of the countries in Europe.
But we are learning *ha*.. and-ire must learn i * and I am-gratified by the ex-
tent to which so many of ybu~.throughout the Agency are devoting irhemn yavv-
selves to this, selflessly, 4. knowing what the work entails. .I think -I: can
bay that I haven't in my head at the moment any great new plans of reorganization.
Don't worry about that. Let's go ahead on the blueprint that we have and only
as time proves that changes are wise put them into effect./
It is an unwritten rule that one does not quote the President but I think
I'd be justifie in breaking that rule on this point. President Eisenhower said
to General Cabtand me the other day, very earnestly: "Your agency has the
largest amount of unvouchered funds of any agency in government. I realize that
it is necessary that you have them. But those unvouchered funds must be a sacred
trust; and you must see to it that there is no abuse of the confidence and privi-
lege which is reposed in you and in the Agency in handling those funds." I want
that word to go right through this Agency. I'm going to watch the use of unvou-
chered funds with the greatest care and see that they can be justified in their
expenditure just as much as other funds, even though we have the privilege of
not advertising how we spend them.
In our work, anybody can make mistakes, that I realize. But the one un-
pardonable sin and where we have gotten into difficulty sometimes in the past
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 P55-00166A000100010001-2
-3- S ~
Security I ormatrcw
 Approved For Railwase 200
.TCIA-RDP55-00166A0ii 100010001-2
Security 1
ormati6A
is to try to cover up as among ourselves mistakes that are made. And that is one
thing I want to impress on you. If you make a mistake, that will probably be
forgiven. If you try to hide mistakes, so that proper and prompt action can
not be taken to correct them, there is no real excuse for that. And. anyone in
this Agency, too, has the right to be heard. General Smith, as you know, has
established the Office of the Inspector General,ft. ile frivolous
appeals over the heads of one's immediate superiors a bad practice, there
is there an appeal open to anyone in the Agenc if he has suggestions to make,
or if he feels that injustices are being done.%Wl hope, personally, to try to
establish personal relations with as many as possible in the Agency. One of
the first things I want to do is to go around and travel among our far-flung
buildings, much too far-flung an much too numerous, and get to know everyone
as far as i can erso 1 . the first things I' oin jto.Iork on iv -be y-#se- improvetse conditions under which we work an new
building so that we can add greatly to our efficiency and to the security of
the Agency as a whole.
We have today, in the field of intelligence, the greatest challenge that
intelligence has ever f ed. I've often talked to you about some of my exper-
iences in World Waren I was in Switzerland, working into the enemy coun-
tries, Germany and Italy. That wa ld's.~lay in comparison with the task of
getting intelligence with respect fo in target, Soviet Russia. We've got
to be a lot better than we were. We've got to be a lot wiser. We've got to de-
velop new techniques. That is one of the reasons whir training is so essential.
It is one of the parts of the Agency that I will back to the hilt. The Iron
Curtain is a real curtain against intelligence and it's being increased and im-
proved every day. Berlin is really being cut in half. Satellite countries are
being protected,-s''kneu,. from contact with the west by every means,
mechanical and technical and otherwise. That is the challenge, and it's up to
us to make the response. We have in this country the men and women with the
ability and courage to do it, and I consider it a great privilege to be with
you in trying to see that it is done. Thank you very much.
Approved For Release 2002/08
P55-00166A000100010001-2
,
Security Infor
[oli
 SEC
Approved For Reea~(2539R0166A0'f00010001-2,
25X1A
rrr. Allen Dulles
Director of Central Intelligence
Matt, thank you very much for that introduction. I feel a good deal
of modesty standing here for a good many reasons but one of the principal
reasons for that is that I haven't really been through your course of
training. Somewhat like Bill Jackson, I had a rather pragmatic introduction
to intelligence in World War I and from then on I had a taste of it thdt
I'e never ,,seemed tome- era able to get out of my system and it looks though
now like I had it in my system for good and all.
When Matt were preparing this program today, that
came out in thi form, possibly because they knew this was going to be
Valentine's day, they had quite a little difficulty because they didn't
quite know where anybody was going to be when the program saw the light
of day. They didn't quite know whether Gen. Bedle Smith would be
in the State Department or here or where I would be or maybe even where
that now
Bill Jackson would be. So I see xmodduct I'm sailing under slightly false
colors when I am put down as Director--at the moment I am only Acting
Director, subject to action by the Senate next week, when they come back,
those on the Republican side anyway, from the spate of speeches on Abraham
Lincoln. They tell me that they don't know of any great opposition but
you never can tell what they may find out over the weekend. I have been
rapidly selling three of four series of stock and I have been asking
Administration for a list of all the companies with whom we have dealt
covertly or overtly so as to be sure there is no taint there; and I will
present myself before the Armed Services Committee some day next week
relatively pure as far as that is concerned. And may I say it wasn't any
great qpMMMfiJ*&9r Release 2002/08/22
55-00166A000100010001-2
Security f
rmatTj
 SEC
Approved For ReIse 20ft59$-620QWrDP55-00166AOW00010001-2
-2-
As General Smith has indicated and as Matt Baird has said, I look upon
this, as far as I am concerned, if I am confirmed in this position, as a
continuing job. That, of course, is subject to the pleasure of the President,
and reasonably good behavior and some Xzmd performance on my part.
I rather thought that Bill Jackson was going to talk about the CIA 22
in retrospect and that would give me sort of a key for my talk to you, that
I could boldly talk about the CIA in prospect. But he has, in a way, given.A-
CIA, or intelligence, in retrospect, in giving his own experiences which are
the experiences, I think, of the many that went into intelligence in the past.
One of the things we are trying to do to see that experience in
exactly that form is not repeated, although I may say that if that type of
experience produces urmt kind of product it produced in this case, I think
it is probably pretty good and maybe we ought not to make so many changes.
In any event, for the future as I see it, I think we can build pretty well
on the background that Gen. Smith and Bill Jackson and others have prepared
for us.
that are
I am one of these fellows, you know, always told that I don't know
anything about administration. Bill Jackson is one of the fellows ~
a great
told that he iaL/ax expert in Administration. Well, I think, probably in some
ways, both are true; but having a certain amount of modesty as far as admin-
istration is concerned and having been told for a long -fie, as a lawyer and
so forth and so on, I'm not much of an administrator. At least I'm a little
bit on my mettle on that and I propose to gather around me,,to take care of
these defects,the best in the field of administration; and I can assure you
I think we kml have on board now those who know that field.
Approved For Release 2002/08/Sf
9P55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R~se 2002kkW A-RDP55-00166A0O 00010001-2
-3-
Further, I think I can say that I haven't in my head at the moment any
great new plans of reorganization. And I think we have a basis on which we 25X1A
can proceed. Some years ago, Bill Jackson
spent the a good bit of a year,with such experience as we had behind us.in
outlining the kind of organization that we felt should produce intelligence,,
provided you could get the key thing you need-the trained personnel. That
general blueprint is, I believe, sound. Gen. Smith 41
Bill Jackson, and to
some extent myself, during the past two years, with the able help of many others
have been trying to put that blueprint into effect. Naturlally we have changed
it here and there but by and large we have done that so that today, I believe,
we have a working organization, we have a pattern which can produce intelligence
and that is w4ty the work that Matt Baird and
and those that worked with 25X1 A
him is so important because no blueprint of this time is of any value whatsoever(
unless we have the trained people to carry it out.
Now, what I think has been accomplished over the past few yearsas far as
this Agency is concerned, is to gain the cooperation and the confidence of other
agencies' intelligence throughout this government., We are now a team. We have
divided up the field. I don't know today of any points of serious friction be-
of the
tween this agency and any/other intelligence agencies in government?--the State,
the Armed Services, the FBI,or wherever it may be. We are working as a team;
VAI- & 0,-14
when we find A IRwe-problems., we have the machinery to work them out and we
can start from today with that, I believe, as an assured and solid basis. I
think, as I have said before)too, we have a workable organization, dividing
our own functions up as they reasonably should be divided between the covert
and the overt , between the production of intelligence that you have heard about,
ending up in the finished product of the National Estimates and what is done
do the co owk&FOrtR MasoX g;2pf Q4iUi$V 38I66A000100010001-2
 Approved For Re1se 2002/
f BECK A-RDP55-00166A00i 00010001-2
Very largely thanks to Gen. Bedle Smith, we have, I believe, a secure
positions no4secure is too strong a wordy we have a respectable position insofar
as public opinion is concerned. But, we can never rest on that. We have to
watch that all the time and it is only by performance-and we are going to make
mistakes, and those mistakes will find their ways into the editorials and columns
of the press. That we can take, if we have a solid performance to counter ba'ance
it. I wouldn't c want to believe in an organization or be a part of an organiza-
tion of this kind that was afraid to make mistakes, because if you're afraid of
that you're afraid of doing things. And we are in a dangerous game. The only
thing that we have to do is to try to see that each thing that we attempt to put
our best judgment into it when we start.
And, further, I think we have reached a point where intelligence is no
longer a stepchild. Intelligence has really now found stature throughout this
government. Cne of the most encouraging things that has occurred to me was the
willingness and desire of Gen. Cabal, whom I consider one of the outstanding
officers in intelligence of this government)to come with us and make intelligence
a career, and I hope he will soon be on board.
Now, that is where we stand today. It is a very, very fine heritage and we
must carry it on. We can only do that if we develop the highest professional
standards. I'm not interested in numbers---I hope maybe we can cut down
the numbers;--and maybe that is not only a hope, maybe we'll be forced toybecause
the pressure in government now is to cut down, and I think it is a proper pressure.
rt?Y
I hope this Agency will be known as the hardest agency government to get
build
into. And I hope that we h will be able to Jamqq up the reputation that we have
one of the lowest turnovers in government. I'm somewhat alarmed by the figures .'
h.tt Baird gave of the numbers of us who are trying to desert CIA for the Jackson
Committee,Approve~U Fo~r"e
Re ease 2002/08 DP55 00166A00010 010001-2 steps in
 SEC
Approved For Rele 2DU2ArMMlC)55-0166AOQfi00010001-2
-5-
cooperation with us to see that doesntt become a stampede.
We want to build this as a career service. You know our plans for that.
We don't want people here that only come for a few years of training and ex-
perience,because they think it may be a glamorous zatgaxbc occupation. It is'
I think, the most exciting occupation and the most exciting career that one can
have. But it is a career, and you must face it very frankly' in which anonymity
is importantp-can't advertise what you do. The satisfaction has largely got to
be in the fact that you are accomplishing something vital for the government and
that in doing that you will have also some of the most interesting types of work
that any people can have. It's rather against the American traits, you know,
not to tell what you're doing, not to be able to boast of accomplishments, and
for that reason, I think, in some ways it is harder in this country because of
our background and training~to build an intelligence service than in some ofthe
countries in Europe. But we are learning that, and we must learn that and I am
gratified to the extent to which xmc so many of you, so many throughout the
Agency lare devoting themselves to this,selflessly,and knowing what the work en-
tails. We have as you know, recently, under Presidential order, we have now
decorations that can be given but not advertised for performance of your work.
forsee
As I said before I don't any revolutionary reorganizations--don't worry about
that. Letts go ahead on the blueprint that we have and only as time proves that
Ix changes are wise put them in to effect.
I think
It is an unwritten rule that one does not quite the President but/I+d be
justified in breaking that rule on this point. When I talked with him the other
day,when he said he was going to send my name to the Senate for this new jobs
(General Cabal was with me). He spoke to us both very ernestly on this *Mmb point.
He said, "Your Agency has the largest amount of unvouchered funds of any agency
in government. I realize that it is necessary that you have them. But those
Approved For Release 2002/08/ kl fDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Security to atioti ~, r t ?~ "
 Approved For RelMse 20021299IA-RDP55-00166A09WF'00010001-2
security Information
-b-
unvouchered funds must be a sacred trust; and you must see to it that there is
no abuse of the confidence and privilege which is reposed in you and in
that
the Agency in handling those funds." And I want ftia word to go right through
this Agency. I'm going to watch of unvouchered funds with the greatest care and
see that they can be justified in their expenditure just as much ashther funds
not
even though we have the privilege of/advertising hou we spend them.
In our work, anybody can make mistakes--that I realize. But the one un-
pardonable sin and where we have gotten into difficulty sometimes in the past
is to try to cover up as among ourselves and between you and your superiors mis-
takes that are made. And that is one thing I want to impress on you. If you
make a mistake, that will probably be forgiven. If you try to hide mistakes so
that the proper and prompt action can be taken to correct them, there is no real
excuse for that. And anyone in this agency, too, will have the right to be heard.
Gren. Smith, as you know, has established the office of the Inspector General-that
office remains; it is vacant at the moment. It will be filled shortly. And while
frivilous appeals over the heads of one's immediate superiors is a bad practice,
ktHXRX there isthere, an appeal open to anyone in the Agency,, if he has suggestions
to make, or if he feels that injustices are being done. I hope, personally, to t3r
to establish personal relations with as many as possible in the Agency. One of
the first things I want to do is to go around and travel among our far-flung build-
ings, much too far flung and much to numerous, and get to know everyone as far as
I can personally. And one of the first things I'm going to work on is to try to
improve the conditions under which we work
try to get a new building so that
we can add greatly to our efficiency and to the security of the Agency as a whole.
We have, today, in the field of intelligence, the greatest challenge that
intelligence has ever faced. I've often talked to you some of my experiences
in the Worlt%P vvt1eb&MWeada M> Mn(tJAAM))*VOQ*&?Atb? 1emY countries,
SECRET,
 SE ET
Approved For RelE se 20021'6 * !nEoE,PQP55-00166A06iiN00010001-2
coNnDENrIA
Germany and Italy. That was child's play in comparison with the task of really
getting intelligence with respect to the in target-Soviet Russia. We've got
to be a lot better than we were. We've got to be a lot wiser. We've got to
ve]iop new techniques. That is one of the reasons why the training is so es-
sential. It is one of the parts of the Agency that I will back to the
hilt. The Iron Curtain is a real curtain against intelligence and it's being
increased and improved every day. Berlin is really being cut in half. Satellite
cctries are being protected, as you know, from contact with the west by every
means mechanic and technical and otherwise. That is the challenge 1and it's up
the
to us to make the response. We have in this country,1men and women with the
ability and 3urage to do its and I consider it a great privi]Q;e to be with you
in trying to see that it is done. Thank you very much.
r
L
Approved For Release 2002/01 600 -RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Reel ase 2002/08/22 : C DP55-00166 '0100010001-2
S -E -T
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER /;
13 March 1953
CONFIDENTIAL
SUBJECT: Remarks of General Walter Bedell Smith
General Walter Bedell Smith, at the Ninth Agency Orientation
Course, on 10 February 1953, spoke for the last time to personnel
of the Agency as the Director of Central Intelligence, prior to
assuming his new duties as Under Secretary of State.
It is believed that General Smith's remarks will be of univer-
sal interest throughout the Agency, and are attached hereto for the
information of all concerned.
Branch Chiefs are requested to circulate this document, as ap-
propriate, and ensure its return for retention and security control
in their respective Offices.
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Distribution #4
10++ FO cZ ANGM
.i..f
IN CLt , ~',1 f r ';:. I S Cr ',~Os I'zi S C E1'. 1UST,
NEXT REV D 3"ESM :....s .F-T ' a' L"VAE D ..
NO. PCS., ,.,.CR ";A i ION D'ATE._._ORG COUP:,, CP CrfG CLAS
RV CLASS-Ca-REV C00RD._,_.AUth RR 704
S- R E T
2/08/22: A-
1D t T LL
25X1
Approved For Release 200 RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rage 20G /: L-TX-RDP55-00166AW0100010001-2
ecurity Information
REMARKS OF
GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH
AT THE
NINTH ORIENTATION COURSE
10 February 1953
Since this is the last time that I will be with you in my old capacity,
I consider it appropriate to review some of our accomplishments.
This Agency is a highly selective one. It would be well if you knew
the figures to illustrate this selectivity. Out of every hundred applicants
for employment in this Agency, all but fourteen are screened out by Person-
nel before they ever get to Security. Another four or five are eliminated
by Security, usually for reasons. that reflect in no way on the character of
the individuals. The small residue comes to our Agency as part of a career
service. Now, this selectivity process is being rapidly reflected in the
stature of our personnel.
We now have our own decoration, just approved by the President, which
will be given rarely but will mean a great deal to the recipient. During
the past year, I have given two such decorations to officers of this Agency
for outstanding accomplishments involving great personal risk. The standard
of discipline here is high and it is refreshing to realize that we do not
have disgruntled employees speaking about the "inefficiency" and the "inade-
quacy" of their respective services, services to which they owe basic loy-
alty. Let's always remember that loyalty works both ways and will continue
to work both ways in this organization as long as it is headed by the people
who are now going to head it. That is the type of discipline,' the kind of
loyalty, and the calibre of devotion to duty that is necessary in a career
service of this kind.
We have, of course, given to the personnel of this Agency adequate fa-
cilitids for expressing their views, for indicating weaknesses in the organ-
ization., and for suggesting improvements. The Inspector General's office is
open to everyone, on a highly confidential basis, for suggestions or com-
plaints. As you well know, meritorious suggestions are rewarded with cash
or with other recognition. During the past two years, a number of our per-
sonnel have given their lives to their service. Regrettably, the facts can-
not be published at once nor can the recognition in the form of awards and
decorations be acknowledged immediately. That is one of the penalties you
pay for serving in a highly classified organization of this kind. The reward
lies largely in your sense of accomplishment.
Approved For Release 200W0 /? C f\ RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rase 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166AW100010001-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
When President Truman left office, he wrote a letter to the Director, in
which he said: "Truly, no President has ever, in the history of the United
States, been so well informed and so thoroughly and completely advised in the
field of intelligence and foreign developments as I have, due primarily to
the efficiency and the accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency."
In due time that fact will be more widely recognized. It is widely recog-
nized now in Government circles. Now, those things are due entirely toyou.
The other day, President Eisenhower asked me to say to the personnel of this
Agency that he expected, and realized he would receive, the same degree of
efficient and loyal support as had been accorded his predecessor. Well, of
course he will.
Our service is to the United States and it is a devoted and a dedicated
and a loyal service. I have to thank you, individually and collectively, for
the support you have given me. Nobody leaves this organization willingly.
You may ask why I did. The reason is very simple. The length of time I can
devote from now on to Government service is strictly limited for various
reasons. We have reached a point in our development where continuity of
leadership is essential. Our organization is good and sound. Our person-
nel are highly qualified and carefully selected. Now, what we need is a
Director who will spend the rest of his active life at the head of this Agency.
Furthermore, we need development in depth so that his deputy, another care-
fully selected and extremely able man, will be able to succeed him. In this
way, the personnel of this fine organization will have a long period of con-
tinuity of leadership. You are going to have that, and it is that fact, and
that fact alone, which reconciles me in leaving. Thank you very much.
Approved For Release 2001x0 T 2 ti#ATRDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 CONFIrINTIAL
Approved For R e . W a s e 2 1jR*-00166AQV10Q~2
OPEN-UM RT ' TX by 3 3 -- Z?
THE DIRECTOR OF TRAINING NINTH ORI NTATION COCK 10 February 1953
. . * will be old hat to you because it is our attempt to show membere of CIA
the workings of the l.G. To some membera of CIA# h of the course nay also be
old hat. It is gyred to the incoming employee, It is a training co .rae,
spite of the galaxy of stars an this morning's program, I'd like you always to
keep in mind that the purpose of these Orientation Courses is that of training.
One of# not the least of, General mirth' a contributions. in the last two years has
wing insistence upon selection in the choosing of employees for
the Agency
in process doesn't begin with initiaal choice. The selection pro-
continues for each assignment that you will take. Selection menne qualifi-
cation for a Jab. For some of you, this is the first approach that you have had
toward qualifying you to be an intelligence officer. Many of you still believe
that you are employed by CIA as auditors, as budget and fiscal officers, as per.
sonnel officers, as architects, as Doctors of Medicine or %Ictors of Science.,
as mincers. Your effectiveness in your Job will depend upon how quickly you
be cr>e aware of the fact that you must be intelligence olfficers,
e first time that mmy of have had the opportunity to attend
CIA. In spite of the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency enjoys
greater opportunity for training under Public Law 110 than any other agency of
rnment, it is always surprising to those of us who a" to CIA fran the mill.
tary, where we have spent most of our lives in training. as a matter of fact, all
of you who have cores from the military (and many of you are in civilian alothee
in the audience) realize--that there are probably only two time in your miUtary
an you're not in training. One when you're in oombat and one when you
a hitch in the Pentagon.
Approved For Release fO11sFEME IRARDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Security lnformetton
 CO FIDENTIAL
Approved For Release +f@kfjnk5-00166AQ100010001-2
The accentuation on training is recd,
zed for qualificetiran to your. Job.
It is only recently that we in CIA are becoming "training conscious,," AnA we
have the next speaker to thank for that on his insistence on selection.
* w e
W. Dull.ea, General Smith has always given me short shrift when I attempt
uce him,, but would you like to say a few words in introduction?
Approved For Release '2 22.N P55-00166A000100010001-2
Seauility tnformatioi
 Approved For Re, se 2002/08/22: CIA-RD&55-00166A0QW00010001-2
Ninth Orientation Course
10 February 1953
Since this is the last time that I will be with you in my old capacity
I consider it appropriate to review some of our accomplishments. Col. Baird
has just spoken to you about the "selectivity" of this organization. It would
be well if you knew the figures to illustrate that selectivity. I learned them
myself only a few months ago. Out of every hundred applicants for employment
in this Agency, all but fourteen are screened out by Personnel before they
ever get to Security. Another four or five are eliminated by the Security people,
usually for reasons that reflect in no way on the character of the individuals.
The small residue comes to our Agency as part of a career service. Now, that
selectivity process is being rapidly reflected in the stature of our personnel.
We now have our own decoration, just approved by the President, one of
which will be given rarely but will mean a great deal to the recipient. During
the past year I have given two such decorations to officers of this Agency for
outstanding accomplishments involving great personal risk. The standard of dis-
cipline here is high and it is refreshing to realize that we do not have dis-
gruntled employees speaking about the "inefficiency" and the "inadequacy" of their
respective services-services to which they owe basic loyalty. Let's always
remember that loyalty works both ways and will continue to work both ways in this
organization as long as it is headed by the people who are now going to head it.
That is the type of discipline, the kind of loyalty, and the calibre of devotion
to duty that is necessary in a career service of this kind.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rele 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A00Q&00010001-2
We have, of course, given to the personnel of this Agency adequate facil-
ities for expressing their views, for indicating weaknesses in the organization,
and for suggesting improvements. The Inspector General's office is open to every-
one in the organization, on a highly confidential basis, for suggestions or for
complaints. As you well know, meritorious suggestions are rewarded with cash or
with other recognition. During the past two years a number of our personnel have
given their lives to their service. Regrettably, the facts cannot be published
at once nor can the recognition in the form of awards and decorations be acknowl-
edged immediately. That is one of the penalties you pay for serving in a highly
classified organization of this kind. The reward lies largely in your sense of
accomplishment.
When President Truman left office, he wrote a letter to the Director, in
which he said: "Truly, no President has ever, in the history of the United
States, been so well informed and so thoroughly and completely advised in the
field of intelligence and foreign developments as I have, due primarily to the
efficiency and the accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency." In due
time that fact will be more widely recognized. It is widely recognized now in
Government circles. Now, those things are due entirely to you. In talking with
President Eisenhower the other day he asked me to say to the personnel of this
Agency that he expected, and realized he would receive, the same degree of effi-
cient and loyal support as had been accorded his predecessor. Well, of course
he will.
Our service is to the United States and it is a devoted and a dedicated
and a loyal service. I have to thank you, individually and collectively, for
the support you have given me. Nobody leaves this organization willingly. You
may ask why I did. The reason is very simple. The length of time I can devote
from now on to government service is strictly limited for various reasons.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 _CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
AW We had reached a point in our development where continuIWAW
ity of leadership
was essential. Our organization is good and sound. Our personnel is
highly qualified and carefully selected. Now, what we need is a Director
who will spend the rest of his life at the head of this Agency--certainly
the rest of his active life. Furthermore, we need that development in depth
so that his deputy, another carefully selected and extremely able man, will
be able to succeed him. In this way the personnel of this fine organization
will have a long period of continuity of leadership. You're going to have
such, and it is that fact and that fact alone which reconciles me in leaving.
Thank you very much.
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Fo ttle@s ?QqZ/f9 2R.;f,1 '55-001666Yt000100010001-2
Security Information
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 3
6 March 1953
SUBJECT: Address of the Vice President of the United States, the
Honorable Richard Nixon
1. The Vice President, the Honorable Richard Nixon, at the Ninth
Agency Orientation Course, on 10 February 1953 presented an address
on the current world situation.
2. The Vice President pointed out that he was presenting his
subject from a Congressional point of view, and as representing
Congressional opinion. His address should not, therefore, be in-
terpreted in its entirety as representing current national policy.
3. Some of the subjects on which the Vice President commented
are, of course, controversial, but it is believed that his speech
and his point of view will be of universal interest throughout the
Agency.
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Distribution No. It with
routing to all employees
JOB NO _ vr ' .._~'x.7 ; 0,____ DOC. V-0265110 C1NGE
~ ! (~$ $i "r. j .;.ASS `C %IcG # "Y ;y
IN +
IWW F. 4.
'
REV '" " I :~ 'V DA TE~ a( ' :
G~ ' ~-RG CL L i
0. PAS CREAT1 14 DATZ:. __Of 10
cuisJ
C-O-N-F--tI--D-IEE--fN-T-I A-L
Approved For Release ~D2108/22 . CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
25X1A
25X1
 Approved FofOele se 2~QO /R8 ?N_FI14 D~55-0016'fi~D00100010001-2
Security Information
ADDRESS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
THE HONORABLE RICHARD NIXON
AT THE
NINTH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE
10 February 1953
When Mr. Dulles invited me to talk before this group, I had very
grave doubts as to what I might be able to contribute to this program.
That you are all experts or potential experts in a very specialized
field was clear to me when I read the contents of the printed program
showing both the coverage of subject matter and the biographic sketches
of the participants. I. therefore, know that I would. be out of my
depth were I to attempt to compete with intelligence experts in talking
to you. Thus, it appeared that my most appropriate contribution to
this training course should come from a recognition of your interest
in gathering and analyzing facts which are then used as the basis for
forming. National Intelligence Estimates for the National Security
Council of which I am a statutory member. Further, realizing that
whatever is done in the formulation of foreign policy must in the final
analysis receive the support and approval of the Congress, I felt I
would attempt something which is rather unusual--namely, analyze the
current situation with which we are confronted in the world as seen
through the eyes of an average U.S. Congressman or Senator. This I
can do because I have been an average Congressman and Senator. This
I would like to do because much misunderstanding exists in the Executive
Departments and Agencies regarding the Congress, both House and Senate,
much of which is attributable to a tendency to be overly fearful of
what the Congressman or Senator is going to think or do and, hence,
what must be done to make him act in "proper fashion."
I came to the House in 1947 just at the beginning of the period
when we were developing the programs which you are working with and
under today. That was the year of CIA's creation in the National
Security Act of 194.7. Naturally, what I say will be colored to a
great extent by my own background and experiences. However, in working
up my thoughts today I have attempted to make them representative of
the thoughts of most of the Senators and Congressmen, both Republican
and Democrats--probably more Republicans--who believe that some changes
in the direction and attitudes of our foreign, military and security
policies need to be made.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Relea?Ls`tf8&YP 55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved FceCleaasN F OI2/8?N_, Igi_ARDT55-0019iK000100010001-2
Security Information
First, I believe it is appropriate to start with an analysis of
our foreign policy as inherited from the past administration. The
first question we have to ask ourselves Is whether this policy ought
to be continued as is--intact--or modified to-some degree. Fairness
demands that we pose the query as to whether or not that policy has
been successful. To answer this question we must go back at least to
the end of World War II--the most costly war in the history of the
world. That was the time when the people of the United States had
great hopes for the future, with our complete military superiority,
based justifiably on the possession of the best Army, Navy and Air
Force plus the monopoly of the atomic bomb. In scanning the peoples
of the world we felt that all were on our side with the exception of
possibly 180 million to 200 million in the USSR and the satellites.
Such was the situation at the end of World War II.
Since that time the Congress has appropriated approximately 100
billion dollars for military purposes and about 33 to 35 billion for
foreign aid, most of which has gone to Europe.
We also developed certain plans and programs--the Greek-Turkish
Aid Program, the Marshall Plan, and others which were designed to stop
the march of aggressive Communism throughout the world and to roll
back that tide. But as we analyze the results of that policy today
and after all, people in political life think usually in terms of
results and not in terms of causes and excuses, no matter how good
those excuses may be, I believe that most of us get somewhat of a shock
in finding that we have lost our military supremacy--though not com-
pletely, certainly to a great degree. For example, we are stronger in
strategic air power but we are definitely weaker in tactical air. Even
though we are more powerful on the sea, I think even good Navy men, and
I happen to be one, will admit that we are probably weaker under the
sea. We no longer have a monopoly on the atomic bomb although, of
course, we derive consolation from our conviction that we have many more
and better ones than our enemy.
As far as peoples in the world are concerned, and that, of course,
is the most dramatic part of this analysis, we find that we have lost
600 million people to Communist control, for various reasons, some of
them probably pretty good.
Now those are the facts--the facts which concern the average U.S.
Congressman, the average U.S. Senator, and accordingly the average
American. Since this policy seems to have failed. in some instances, the
question arises as to how this did happen.
At this point I reject two extremes that probably you will find
today in the Congress of the United States and through our country.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Fa 8Ie01f f092ft2 'TC f %P55-0010 000100010001-2
Security Information
One extreme contends that the only reason this happened is because the
people that made the policy intended it that way. This morning I do
not intend to go into any detail on the question of disloyalty in the
Government. But without minimizing the importance of this problem, I
think any reasonable person rejects the idea that the failures we have
had in foreign policy since World War II have to any considerable extent
been caused because-those who made the policies deliberately intended
that they fail.
At the other extreme is the fatalistic view of those who say that
the results were inevitable because of the cleverness and aggressiveness
of imperialistic Russian Communism. Proponents of this view conclude
that the chicanery and subversive methods of the Soviets in their use of
means that we would never adopt brought results which gave them their
great successes and gains and that nothing we could or would have done
would have changed the results.
I repeat that both of these extreme viewpoints must be rejected
because I think that there is another ground which represents better the
thinking of the great majority of the members of the House and the
Senate and which I believe is representative of the American viewpoint.
Frankly, it doesn't make a great deal of difference why it happened,
except, perhaps, from the academic standpoint we may avoid the errors
of tomorrow by examining the mistakes of yesterday. Today it doesn't
make a great deal of difference to stable, current, national security
whether those who made the policies intended them to fail or whether
the failures were due to bad judgment. The important fact of the
moment is that we are confronted with current errors in policy and
recognizing the mistakes we must develop new policies that will not
contain in them the seeds of error which caused the failures of our
present policies.
At this point I believe some general conclusions can be drawn.
in the first. place I think the great basic error which has caused our
present difficulties is that we misjudged the character of the world
Communist conspiracy. It was, perhaps, quite easy to do that. All of
us who served in World War II welcomed the participation of the Russians
in that war. We recognized the great contribution that they made and
we were happy in the realization that the assistance of Russia cut down
the contributions'and sacrifices that would have to be made by American
men and American women. But as a result of this and because of very
clever propaganda in the United States by persons whom we have since
learned to recognize as actually serving the conspiracy of international
Communism, an idea grew up even in high places in the United States
that the Communist movement, the Communists, themselves, the power
center of the Soviet Union, were all segments of a great peace-loving
democracy and that you could therefore, trust the men in the Kremlin
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved F elease 2002/08/22 : CIA-RL P55-001b 000100010001-2
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
and believe what they said at the conference table. Yalta and Potsdam
were primarily the results of that mistaken concept. Though some of
those who attended the conferences had serious doubts about the sin-
cerity of Soviet expressions, we know that these doubts were not
ventilated in the open and removed. If they were made known at all, it
was not until after the conferences took place. Thus, we must reach the
conclusion that one of the basic reasons for the difficulties that exist
today goes back to the concessions that were made at these conferences
and that such concessions were granted because of a fundamental error
in judging the character of the men in the Kremlin who run the Communist
conspiracy.
Even after we began to recognize the fact that the men in the
Kremlin could not be trusted at the conference table, we note a second
fundamental error which, of course, is related to the first, viz., that
we failed to realize that the Soviets were engaged in a conspiracy--a
revolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the free nations. Even when we
did realize this fact, we failed to appreciate fully the global
character of that conspiracy. There was a theory, which, incidentally,
is still prevalent in some places and can be sustained by fairly
effective argument, holding that what we are confronted with in the
world today is not World Communism but simply Russian imperialism which
has taken the form of Communism. Hence, as we look over the past seven
years, we find that in too many places there were people.who said
Communism was a danger within Russia. Some people of this kind would
go even further and say that Communism was dangerous in Germany and
possibly in Greece, in Turkey, in France, in Italy, but that Communism
in Asia, and specifically Communism in China and in the United States
was a different kind altogether. Such oversimplification, I remind
you, is an effort to give you the average thinking of those in the
national legislature which is representative of the country at large.
The result of that line of thinking is quite obvious because it was
the basis for what happened in China and, of course, what happened in
China caused what happened in Korea. From my own experience I give
you an example which I think points up the falsity of that approach
and which, at the same time, proves the point that Communism is a global
conspiracy, as President Eisenhower said in his State-of-the-Union
message.
I was in Europe in 1947 with the Herter Committee. Allen Dulles
was one of our advisers, without pay as I recall, and he did an excellent
job. I am sure he will agree with me when I make the observation that
if more members of the House and Senate could go on such trip.$, we,---
would experience less difficulty in getting programs through the House
and the Senate which are needed for the security of the country. The
Herter Committee, as you recall, was making studies as to the needs of
-5-
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Foelease 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-0016000100010001-2
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
the various countries of Europe for Marshall Plan funds. Our recommenda-
tions to the House were in large part accepted and resulted in the
adoption of the ECA program in the House and, of course, its counter-
part, in the Senate. On that European trip some of us made it a point
not only to talk to the heads of the governments which were anti-
Communist in the countries which we visited, but whenever and wherever
we could we got an audience or an interview with the Communist leaders.
This was of particular interest to me because I wanted to see what made
them tick.
I remember on one occasion a very interesting conversation I had
with Togliatti, the leader of the Communist party in Italy. One segment
I remember quite vividly. I informed him that I was a member of the
Labor Committee of the United States House of Representatives and that,
consequently, I was interested in his thinking on labor problems. I
said, "Mr. Togliatti: In the event that the Communists take over in
Italy (the Italian elections were coming up within a few months) what
kind of a program would you favor as far as labor is concerned? Do
you believe, for example, that labor unions should be free of govern-
ment control, and that the right to strike should be protected and
guaranteed?"
A translation was made-he thought a moment, and his answer to
these questions was "Yes." Obviously, he had to answer in this fashion
because he was not in power at that time. After the answer was given I
told him I was very glad to hear his reply because that was the kind of
policy we had in the United States.
Then I added, "Labor unions are free in the United States and, of
course, strikes are going on right now. Of course, you realize, Mr.
Togliatti, that in the Soviet Union such is not the case because the
labor unions there are completely dominated and controlled by the
government and the right to strike is denied."
The translation was made and he looked at me in a not-too-friendly
manner and said: "Well.. I don't think that the Congressman and I under-
stand each other. The reason why the right to strike has to be
guaranteed in the United States or in any capitalist country is that
there the labor policy is dominated by employers, reactionaries and
capitalists. Therefore, the workers must have score protection against
such exploiters. But in the Soviet Union we have no employers,
reactionaries or capitalists and, hence, the right to strike need not
be guaranteed in the USSR."
I said: "That is very interesting. Now let me ask you another
question. In our conversation up to this point you have been ex-
tremely critical of the foreign policy of the United States. Certainly,
you cannot contend that all of what you call 'aggressive intent,
aggressive actions and imperialism' is on the side of the United States.
-6-
Approved For RAeiei q ktf b Ar;P55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Fot4ReJeVs% 2p012/&8~2?N_ Ii_F DE55-0016 00100010001-2
Security Information
Do you have any criticism whatever of the foreign policy of the Soviet
Union on the ground that it is imperialistic? After all, you are an
Italian, and sitting here in the middle you,pertainly cannot put all
of the blame on our side when there are two great powers apparently
involved in this conflict. In other words, is the policy of the Soviet
Union imperialistic in any respect?"
Again the translation was made. I received the same rather un-
friendly glance and then a very interesting answer. Said Mr. Togliatti,
"Again the Congressman and I are not speaking or understanding quite
the same language. The reason why the foreign policy of the United
States is imperialistic is that it is dominated by employers, re-
actionaries and capitalists. In the Soviet Union we have no employers,
reactionaries or capitalists. Therefore, it is Impossible for the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union to be imperialistic. It is a
people's policy, it is always right and is never subject to any
criticism whatever."
I asked the same series of questions of Arthur Horner, the head of
the miners' union in Britain and received the same answers cloaked in
a British accent. I have asked the same series of questions of William Z.
Foster, in a little different way, of course, because he happens to be
an American citizen. Very pertinent for our purposes is the testimony
of Foster before the Judiciary Committee in 1948 which was considering
legislation to control the Communist Party in the United States.
Senator Ferguson of Michigan questioned him at length as to whether
members of the Communist Party of the United States would fight on the
side of the United States in the event of an aggressive war begun by
the Soviet Union. For approximately thirty minutes, Foster, in a very
able display of mental footwork and gymnastics, side stepping, twisting,
and turning, contended over and over again that the question was
hypothetical because he said it was impossible for him to conceive of an
aggressive war by a people's government, to wit, the Soviet Union.
Therefore, in his estimation it was not necessary for him to determine
whether or not he, or other members of the Communist Party would fight
in such a war because it was impossible that such a war could occur.
These examples are sufficient to show the global character of the
Communist threat.
Accordingly, it seems to me that we made a basic mistake in failing
to realize this fact. The Communist, wherever he exists, whether in
Moscow, China, Korea or in the United States is essentially the same--
owing his loyalty not to his own country, in the event that he is not
a citizen of the Soviet Union or a satellite country, but to the power
center, the Soviet Union, and to others who control the world Communist
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
`%O" C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L w4w
Security Information
conspiracy. Yugoslavia, of course, is the present exception which
proves the rule. Thus, I conclude that our mistaken evaluation of the
global nature of the Communist strategy had much to do with the failure
of our policy in China.
Compare, for example, the policy that we adopted in Greece with
what we adopted in China. Though the terrain was much smaller and the
complexity of the Grecian problem not at all as great, we could have
applied to China some of the recognition of the Communist threat which
motivated our actions in Greece in 1947. Over and over again we re-
peated the theme that the Chinese Nationalist Government was corrupt, that
it was unstable and for those reasons that the support we had given was
no good and no further help was justified. I was in Greece in 1947 and
if there was any more corrupt or unstable government in the world than
what Greece had in 1947, I would like to have seen it. It changed twice
in two weeks while I was there and, yet, what did we do? We went in
there and General Van Fleet did a magnificent job of training the Greeks
so that they could defend themselves. As a result of our positive
action, the Greeks met the Communist threat and met it effectively and
at the present time, with our continued support, Greece is still on
our side. Thus, as we look at the situation in Asia, it would seem
that some of the same medicine possibly might have made the difference.
All of these, of course, are problems and mistakes which have been
made in the past and the question is: Where do we go from here? As
we analyze the problem of the immediate and distant future, may I say
again that the only reason we discussed the past today is to make sure
that we do not make those same mistakes tomorrow. As we determine
where we go from here, I consider it proper that we look at some basic
factors. The first basic one is: What do we want? Well, we want
peace, not peace at any price, of course, but certainly peace at as
high a price as we can pay without losing the honor of our nation.
Secondly, the United States will never use war as an instrument of
policy. Our Secretary of State underscored in a very effective manner
this point before he went to Europe. However, the Kremlin, when con-
fronted by a potential enemy, will use war as an instrument of policy,
and so the key to peace is to see what actions or failures to act on
our part will cause the Kremlin to act or fail to act at a critical
time. Accordingly, it is appropriate that we analyze from all view-
points the enemy with whom we are dealing--the man in the Kremlin, the
man who is trained and brought up on the bibles which the Communists
read and follow, viz., Marx, Lenin, Stalin. Without prying too deeply
we are confronted with certain conclusions which are inescapable.
First, the men in the Kremlin are realists. Hence, though they are
bent on world revolution, though they will use war as an instrument of
policy, they will not begin a world war until they are convinced they
can win it. Second, they have a sense of history in that they are
willing to wait not only through their own lifetimes but even longer
than that, if it takes such time to reach the point where they can
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N T-I-A-L
Approved For Relea 21TOX8Tf ?55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
C-0-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
win the world conflict. Therefore, if we want peace, we must do
several things. First, we must exert every effort to make sure that
in the world the balance of power, from a military standpoint, is
actually in our favor so that the Kremlin could not win a war if it
began one. By the words, "in our favor," I do not mean quantity as
much as I stress quality of arms and adequate training. Secondly,
we must make the men in the Kremlin believe that the military balance,
to which we have just referred, is in our favor because if they
actually miscalculate by arriving at erroneous conclusions by reason
of something we have done or failed to do, then, regardless of the
power balance, war will come. Thus, I cannot overstress the importance
of making sure that the military balance of power is actually on our
side and to underscore our responsibility to make sure that we do
nothing which will cause the men in the Kremlin to miscalculate our
strength and begin a major world war, which, in a sense, no one will
win. Thirdly, we must acknowledge that besides our military strength
at home, we need allies abroad, because 150 million people obviously
cannot stand up against 800 million people. Not only do we need
allies but we need as many as we can get.
And so, the policies of the next few years, in large measure,
will have to continue the policies which have developed during the
past seven years, particularly with regard to Europe. If we keep the
United States militarily strong at home, we must strive to get as many
militarily strong allies as we can abroad.
But military strength alone is not enough. In this struggle for
the world we are confronted with men who are very pragmatic about what
they need to achieve their goals of conquest. Thus, they have developed
new tactics of aggression with which you are familiar and which have
proved themselves successful. Let's face the stark fact that by such
tactics 600 million people have been won by the Soviets in seven years
without the loss of a single Russian soldier in combat--at least none
admittedly lost in combat. These new tactics of aggression developed
by the Soviets do not contemplate the use of armed force involving
the armies of the power center, itself--the Soviet Union. What are
such techniques? Some of them, of course, are quite obvious.
a. The use of internal subversion, employing not only the
traditional foreign agents but also agents who are nationals of
the countries involved. Czechoslovakia is, perhaps, the most
striking example of how a nation can be taken over through a
coup d'etat in which the principals were Czechs and, yet, they
owed their allegiance to a foreign power,
b. Next is the fomenting of revolution. This tactic used
in various parts of the world, in Asia particularly, has been
C-O-N-F- I- D-E-N-T - I-A- L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L VO*
Security Information
quite obviously employed in China. And again we note the in-
stances in which the involuntary forces are made up of nationals
of the countries involved and in which the forces of the USSR
power center are not committed.
c. Extremely important is the great new weapon of economic,
political, and psychological warfare.
Our answer, to some extent, is quite obvious. First, on the
economic side, we must be as sound at home as we can possibly be--
that means balance. There are times, undoubtedly, when you may
wonder why the Congress hesitates to approve appropriation requests
for funds which you feel are needed for adequate military purposes
or for foreign aid programs. I can assure you that this is not
negativism on the part of the Congress but rather a sober attitude
to be convinced of the necessity for the expenditures, because the
greatest asset the free world has in the present struggle, and the
importance of this point was emphasized in President Eisenhower's
State-of-the-Union message, is a sound, free, productive, American
economy. Thus the total program of the nation must be in balance,
and I am sure that the policies recommended to the President by the
National Security Council will always aim at achieving this result,
namely, that we give as much support as we can to the development
and maintenance of needed military strength for ourselves and the
free world without destroying the basic economy which is our greatest
asset and advantage in the battle for civilization in which we are
engaged. This will demand of us that, while we maintain a sound
economy at home in realistic fashion, we must shore up the economy of
nations abroad so that they, themselves, may be militarily strong and, also,
that they may develop a strong economy, because in such a climate, there
is less likelihood that the Communist conspirator will be able to appeal
to the masses of the people and sell his doctrines.
This last point compels me to inject a word of warning. I do not
subscribe to the views of those who say that the answer to Communism,
whether in the United States or abroad, is solely economic well being.
Any of you who analyze this point will reach the same conclusion which
is already expressed in the Bible that man does not live by bread
alone. Economic strength is, of course, a definite factor entering
into the present struggle. Certainly, where economic unrest prevails
and hunger exists, you have a fertile field in which the Communist
ideas can grow and prosper. But economic strength alone is not the
complete answer, and I use again the classic example of Czechoslovakia.
There was probably a no more advanced country in Europe at the time
of the coup d'etat than that nation, and, yet, the Communist movement
flourished and in a most effective manner.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Felease 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-0018000100010001-2
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Info nnation
In addition to economic soundness, we must have internal security
at home. I won't belabor that point because I believe it is in good
hands at the present time. This is a most difficult problem, and I
can imagine that some of you who have followed the work of some of us,
as we have investigated subversive activities in the United States,
are concerned about these investigations and the trend that they take
in this country. I think, perhaps, that some concern is justified,
because a very delicate balance must be maintained in this field be-
tween security on the one side and freedom on the other. This is not
always easy to maintain.
I am sure that if you took a vote of the Congress of the United
States--a secret vote, or perhaps, a public one--they would support
a movement to put all the Communists in this country in one boat and
ship them to the USSR, even though, of course, that might be technically
impossible. That, however, gives you an idea of the temper of the
Congress on this problem. This is somewhat symbolic of other easy
solutions which are offered: for example, the outlawing of the
Communist Party in the United States. This sounds laudable and easy
but; unfortunately, as indicated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
this is an unworkable solution. Therefore, we must be constantly on our
guard that we do not resort to totalitarian police methods in dealing
with the conspiracy in this country and, thus, adopt within our own
borders the methods which we have criticized in our enemies abroad for
dealing with dissidents in their countries. I leave with you the con-
viction that those of us who have been in the Congressional investigative
field and others who are presently engaged in this activity have a
realization of how constant care must be exerted not to kill the patient
we are attempting to cure.
Finally, I believe we will all agree that the bolstering of our
national defense in the development of political and psychological
counterattack is essential. For example, I think that President
Eisenhower's announcement that the Seventh Fleet would no longer be
used to blockade the Chinese Communist coast from raids from Formosa,
and his statement that a request would be made on the Congress for a
resolution to repudiate secret agreements are worthwhile examples of
taking the offensive in psychological warfare, besides the fact that,
from other standpoints, these steps should have a great effect.- Such
steps as these mean only two things when they are interpreted to the
world. One is that we back our friends and the other that we will not
write off the captive peoples. So much for analyzing the Congressional
mind--assuming that any Congressman or Senator has a mind. That, I
admit, is a debatable pointL
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved Fopelease 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-0016SWfb00100010001-2
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Now, what is our new policy to be? First of all, I believe that
the general outlines of that policy have been set forth in President
Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union message and in the recent speech by
Secretary of State, Dulles. I do think that a summary of that policy,
as I see it, might be appropriate and of interest at this time.
Basically, the new policy represents a. change in attitude--a change in
emphasis. I am sure that we are not going to see too many evidences
of drastic moves which would indicate to the people of this country,
or to the peoples of the world, that the policy is of a radically
new type. The action regarding the Seventh Fleet, the pronouncement
regarding secret agreements are good examples of this appreciation.
In this analysis we inevitably grapple with the word "containment".
Even though the policy concepts underlying "containment" may have
served some useful purpose up to the present time, which I rather
doubt, still, I believe that we have arrived at the point where the
word "containment" means a static policy--a draw in the conflict in
which we are engaged. In fact, it means victory for neither side.
What we have failed to realize is that the alternative to "containment"
is not all-out, total war but rather the winning of the cold war. As
President Eisenhower indicated, only by winning the cold war can we
avoid the hot war. To achieve this goal of tangible victory, some
immediate objectives come to mind:
First. The most difficult goal of all is the winning of
the war in Korea. Victory in Korea is of prime concern to our
nation. I know that some peculiar arguments can be made, but
always in quiet fashion -- never in the open, because you could
never convince the American people of this -- contending that
the continuance of the war in Korea is a good thing for the
United States. Supporting this spurious position are statements
to the effect that we should look at the casualty ratio in
Korea--five to one in our favor. Now, this position is untenable
because it is political dynamite which the people of the United
States would never buy, and, furthermore, approaching it from
just the standpoint of a layman, it would seem to me that all we
have to do is realize that in the past two years or so of the
Korean war, we have suffered 130 thousand casualties and'the
Soviet Union hasn't had any. Again, it is the old problem of
keeping our eye on the main target, and winning the current
war in Korea must be the first objective of such a policy.
Second. Our second objective, which is, of course, re-
lated to our past policy, is to allow no further solidification
of Soviet holdings in satellite countries and no extension of
their boundaries, because it is obvious that if they forge
strength within their dynasty and bring further terrain under
their command, they may calculate that they can begin a war--
a World War--and win it.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Approved For Releas%92O02M8/2 c 'A55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved F ele&tei0p2 / ficII& P55-00161 `000100010001-2
Security Information
Third. de must avoid trouble at home and keep under
control the inevitable problems which we will have.with the
nations which we consider to be on our side. without this
approach, the strength which we develop will be sapped of its
potency.
Finally, and this is the most important ingredient in what
we mean by "dynamic" policy, is to roll back the enemy strength
if we possibly can. Even though some consideration of this
factor existed in past policy, I am convinced that we are going
to see a stepping up of attitude and emphasis to reduce Soviet
gains, to puncture the Communist conspiracy and to stir up just
as much trouble as we possibly can in the satellite countries
and in the Soviet Union proper.
This is a big order--a very big order. The objectives we have
outlined certainly have been in the minds of our policy makers during
the past two or three years. They are in our minds today, and we
are hopeful that we will be able to translate these concepts into
appropriate actions. Regardless of our thinking in wishful manner
for easy answers, we must constantly admonish ourselves that in this
field of foreign policy there are none.
The objectives for an affirmative foreign policy can be attained
only by the support which policy makers must receive from you. I speak
now as a member of the Administration and as a member of the National
Security Council, which is the greatest consumer of your product, to
emphasize that knowledge of the facts is essential if we are to make
the right decisions. Essentially, that is why we have to have in-
telligence. Perhaps the best proof of this point is the rather obvious
truth that with better intelligence support our nation might have
avoided most of our present difficulties. Better intelligence might
have put our leaders on notice as to the true character of the Communists,
the men in the Kremlin, the men we were dealing with across the table at
Yalta, Potsdam and Teheran. Better intelligence might have given us a
greater appreciation of the overall global character of the Communist
movement. For example, if we had better intelligence, we might not
have made, what I think was, a fatal error in judgment as to the character
of the Chinese Communist movement in the early days of its development.
de would have known that the Chinese Communist was no different,
essentially, than his counterpart in the satellite countries in eastern
Europe and that, therefore, the choice in China was not between a
Nationalist Government and something better but between the Nationalist
Government and something far, far worse. This, therefore, is your job,
to gather and analyze in impartial manner all the facts and to make the
findings available to those who have to make the policy.
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
I recognize that this is a tough job. I know that some of your
assignments will be dangerous and, simultaneously, interesting. I
realize, also, that many of you have already served well in difficult
undertakings. In an organization of this type, which must be a kind of
silent shock absorber, I can imagine that there are times when your
tasks seem boring and maybe completely meaningless, because you may
not be in a position to see the entire picture. Hence, when you are
tempted to ask yourselves such questions as: "Why do we get this?"
"Why do we have to spend precious time in such tasks as these?" I
admonish you to have confidence in those who direct your activities,
and without allowing your efforts to be neutralized, that you do
the job which has been assigned to you, because, I say this advisedly,
there is no job in our present government which, I think, is more
important than the task which you ladies and gentlemen will be doing
in the years ahead.
In my experiences as a Congressional investigator of Communist
activities in the United States, I have been impressed by a number of
things, but particularly, by the kind of people who have become
Communists in our country. Though most of you are knowledgeable in
this field, my own conclusions may interest you. What kind of men
were Alger Hiss, John Apt, Nathan Witt, Lee Pressman, Victor Perlo
and, I will add, incidentally, the atomic scientists and others who
came before our committee and refused to answer questions on the
grounds of incrimination? What kind of people were they? First of
all, they were all born in the United States and, secondly, they were
sensitive, intelligent, able people. Almost without exception, they
were the graduates of the best colleges and universities of this
country. Not one of them acted just for monetary gain but was motivated
by fanatical belief and devotion in the cause in which he was working.
Each believed so deeply that he was willing to do anything for the
cause--a boring job, if need be. He was also willing,to do a very
dangerous job--one that would run the danger of a jail sentence and of,
holding himself and his family up to disgrace in his community and
among his friends. Often have I thought, during the past three to four
years, as I have seen these people parade before us--these young, in-
telligent, able people--of the need for people on our side as devoted
to our cause as Communists are devoted to theirs.
When I was in Europe in 19b7 and again in 1951, I had the opportunity
to talk privately with three or four individuals who were members of this
Agency. I saw in those individuals what is certainly the answer I have
been looking for--the answer to the devotion which the Communists have
on their side. I know that it takes a devoted and dedicated man or
woman to do the job that you are doing. This may sound like flag waving
to you, but most sincerely do I conclude on this note: The conflict in
which we are engaged in the world is great and complex. It is military
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2 Now
C-C-N-F- I-D-E-N-T- I-A-L
Security Information
in character, economic in character, political in character. But,
over all, it is a conflict for the minds and the hearts and the souls
of men. Our enemies are dedicated to their cause. 1e need dedicated
people on our side. General Smith, to you and to Mr. Dulles do I say,
as a member of this Administration, and I know that I represent the views
of the Commander-in-Chief, the President, we are very proud to have
serving the United States a group of dedicated men and women--the people
who are members of this Agency. Good luck and Godspeed:
C-O-N-F- I-D-E-N-T -I-A-L
Security Information
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R*6fog0.e 155-00166A08'100010001-2
and Colleges
REFERENCE : CIA Regulations
C O~f~~~?r ~yyTj CENTRAL
OFFICE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 2
4 March 1953
SUBJECT : Training of CIA Personnel at Department of Defense Schools
1. It is the policy of the Director of Central Intelligence that any in-
dividual in the Agency who meets the required qualifications shall have the
opportunity to apply for training in the various Department of Defense schools
and colleges.
2. Agency quotas for training in the various schools and colleges have
been established, and selection of applicants to fill quotas is made by the
Director of"Central Intelligence and by Selection Boards acting under the
chairmanship of the Director of Training.
3. Information with respect to the various schools and colleges, the
qualifications required for training in each, and the procedure for applies-
9 tion may be found in CIA Regulations
4. Suspense dates for the receipt of applications in the Office of
1 April: National War College
5 April: Strategic Intelligence School
Counter Intelligence Corps School
Army War College
Naval War College
Air War College
2/ Apr l: Armed Forces Staff College
Intelligence Staff Officers Course,
Air Command and Staff School
Naval Intelligence School
C M V ~ 5. Further information ma be obtained from
25X1 LM 1303 I Building.
Director of Training
;.,Training are as follows:
Distribution #5
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-0( i
E-T
,vv~YrlUCI
A~.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
 OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 2
3 March 1953
SUBJECT . Training of CIA Personnel at Department of Defense Schools
and Colleges
REFERENCE : CIA Regulations
I
1. It is the policy of the Director of Central Intelligence that any
individual in the Agency who meets the required qualifications shall have
the opportunity to apply for training Z the various Department of Defense
schools and colleges.
2. Agency quotas for training in the various schools and colleges
have been established, and selection of applicants to fill quotas is made
by the Director of Central Intelligence and by Selection Boards acting un-
der the chairmanship of the Director of Training.
3. Information with respect to the various schools and colleges, the
qualifications required for training in each, and the procedure for applica- 25X1A
tion may be found in CIA Regulations
~. Suspense dates for the receipt of applications in the Office of
Training are as follows:
1 April: National War College
5 A il: Strategic Intelligence School
Counter Intelligence Corps School
10 April: Industrial College of the Armed Forces
Army War College
Naval War College
Air War College
24 Armed Forces Staff College
Intelligence Staff Officers Course, Air Command and
Staff School
Naval Intelligence School
5. Further information may be obtained from
Room 1303 I Building,
25X1A
25X1A
MATTHEW BAIRD
Distributionp oved For Release 2002/08/22 ? CIA-RE -$~1gtA;0001-2
5E~~ET
~~ET.
Approved For R ~e 2L INTELLIGENCE DG NC-Y00166AOQ 00010001-2
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rase 28 X8/2D.kW55-00166A 0100010001-2
SECURITY INFORMATION
6 March 1953
Director of Training
Deputy Director of Training (General)
SUBJECT : The R..erks of William H. Jackson at
the Ninth Agency Orientation Course
1. After a thorough reading, it is the view of the Plans and
Policy Staff' that M;r. : ackson's rem rks, while most interesting do
tion to meritheublic ion
not contain sufficient intelligence information
as s. Training Bulletin for general
2. It is, therefore, recc mrended that Mr. 3ackeon's remarks
not be the subject of a Training Bulletin as originally planned.
25X1A
Chief, nian & Policy Staff
TO$ tits. _.TOC NO. FLD NO._..___DOC. NO. ,,,KO CHANCE
IK CLA S IDECL " { .? 'F, HAI4GED TOr TS S C 13ET. JUST .?2
)IEX'I`REV J~: " iV /' : EVIEi 'E~TYPEUCC..QZ..
Ko. PGSJ_CEExTIOH DATA E C?aMP1LOp 0RG CLSS5 .'.
IV CLASS . `. 11E'V COOaD AUTJh HR
Approved For Release 2002/08/22^:
KA000100010001-2
25X1
 STAT Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For E ase 2002/08I2R_ IQ~-RDP55-00166A0'QU1(Y0010001-2
Security Information
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
TRAINING BULLETIN
NUMBER 1
11 February 1953
The Director of Central Intelligence, at the 8th Orientation
Course, on 21 November 1952, commented upon subjects of universal
interest throughout the Agency. The questions to which he responded
and his answers are attached hereto for the information and guidance
of all concerned.
Branch Chiefs are requested to circulate this document, as ap-
propriate, and ensure its return for retention and security control
in their respective Offices.
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Attachment: 1
Distribution No. 4
rj,
JOB NO.___.__,___~__ NO.__ U) NO._DOC. NO.2.$_NO CHANGE
IN CI,ABS :{ ; - t iCLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C RET. JUST.2,Z.
NEXT REV DATE?I LIEV DATI 4 REVIEWE E DOC._. -.IQ-
NO. PGSZ..~' CREATION DATE ORG CG .1L..O ORG CLAS&5' -
REV CLASS S_REV COORD.. _ ___,._AUTH HR 70.3
S-E-C-R-E-T
25X1A
25X1
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
i
 Approved For F ase 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-001661 100010001-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
COMMENTS
OF
GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH
AND HIS ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS
SUBMITTED AT THE 8TH AGENCY ORIENTATION COURSE
21 November 1952
GENERAL SMITH: (Opening Remarks) I want to remind you that the service of
national intelligence and of national security has become a permanent,
honorable career. It is in effect a fourth service as compared with the
three military services, and its operation will be continuous and accel-
erated in time of war, under its own command and under its own organiza-
tion. Since the passage of the National Security Act, intelligence is
able to offer you permanent, secure and honorable careers and it is to
your credit and to our advantage that you have accepted intelligence
ever
reers earnestly and seriously. I do not think that many you
feel that you have made a mistake.
QUESTION: Is the national intelligence which we are now making a good sup-
port for the national policy?
GENERAL SMITH: We think it is. We think that the product of national intel-
ligence has been steadily increasing in quality and that it has now at-
tained a standard of excellence which. justifies its acceptance as the ba-
sis for national planning. A good deal remains to'be desired. We have
consistently been confronted with the impossibility of making certain es-
timates in the absence of military assumptions. Only recently the entire
intelligence community was asked to participate in the preparation of an
estimate of Soviet capabilities for defense against air attack. Obviously,
it is quite impossible to estimate the capabilities of the Soviet Union to
defend itself against an attack if there is no knowledge of our own capacity
for attack. When a requisition for this type of estimate is made, and in
the absence of definite assumptions as to the scope, caliber and materiel
to be used in an attack, it is only possible for the intelligence community
to prepare a sort of a bill of materials of Soviet assets and let it go at
that. The time will come when those who are charged with formulating in-
telligence estimates will be provided at least with basic assumptions on
which to prepare their counter-estimates.
QUESTION: To what extent is the intelligence product actually used by those
who formulate national policy?
Approved For Release 2002-.-DP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rase 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A100010001-2
S E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
GENERAL SMITH: We have a good deal to learn in methods of using intelligence
to get the best value out of it. This is a situation which will correct
itself in time as the intellagrencertainuintelligenceoestimatesronrthea.
na-
As it now works out, we prep
tional or strategic level which are based on a schedule for production de-
pendent largely on the problems which will confront the staff echelon which
supports the National Security Council. When those estimates are prepared
and are turned over to the members of the National Security Council and
their subordinates on the staff, they become, or at least they should be-
come, what in military parlance is called the G-2 annex on which operational
plans are based, and they are more and more being used in that way. Regret-
tably, the demand for intelligence estimates exceeds our ability to supppplyn
them. Consequently, we are having a little difficulty getting s
in'a timely way so that the staff officers who do the work for the Security
Council will have them well in advance of their own job, which is the prep-
aration of draft policy papers. In some cases, we have been a little be-
hind the policy papers, but more and more we are keeping up to date and a
little bit ahead of the parade.
QUESTION: It has been said that the military commanders didn't have reliance
or confidence in the intelligence people and, therefore, much was known to
them which was not to the intelligence men, and that that had an effect on
the estimates. Would you comment on this?
GENERAL SMITH: I don't think that reliance or confidence has anything to do
with the problem. It is simply the acute realization of the necessity for
security in connection with military plans and operations which haslbeen
driven home to the personnel involved in exercising command. By a
series of tragic events over a period of years, the inescapable conclusion
has been arrived at that the more people who know about these things, the
more insecure are plans and operations. Consequently, the tendency always
is to hold on to information as tightly and closely as possible and not to
Ac-
give it out. It's the "need to know" theory raised to the nth power.
tually, we do disseminate information much too widely; that's inherent in
our bureaucratic system. Everybody wants to know; a lot of people who want
to know and who don't really need to know are able to establish their right
to know regardless of what the intelligence chap or the operational chap
feels about it. Where military or other knowledge is required for the pro-
duction of an intelligence estimate, the solution, in my opinion, lies in
providing the intelligence producer with a series of assumptions which need
not reveal the plan, or which need not be entirely accurate, or which may
even be fictitious, because it is possible with such assumptions to produce
an intelligence estimate which the operational commander himself may scale
down. I don't think that anything better will ever be produced until we
set up on the highest level some machinery for coordinated G-2 and G-3 es-
timates; and whether that is possible or not, I don't know.
S E-C-R E-T
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rase 20%2/Pi8F: _ 1~-RDP55-00166ANt100010001-2
Security Information
QUESTION: Do you feel that unanimity reduces the strength of many of the es-
timates?
GENERAL SMITH: We rarely have unanimity, and we don't strive for it. We
don't make any effort to obtain it, so that itself is an academic question.
As a matter of fact, the dissenting opinion is encouraged if it's a valid
one; and if the dissenter is easily argued out of his position, then prob-
ably his dissent isn't worth very much.
QUESTION: Regarding the stability of the Agency, will the change in the Ad-
ministration have any effect on the Agency?
GENERAL SMITH: Since this is a statutory Agency supported by a career service,
there will be no change with changes in the Administration. The Director
and his principal Deputies and Assistants are non-political appointees and,
while the Director himself must undoubtedly be a man whom the Chief Execu-
tive is willing to accept, and to whom he will give a certain measure of
confidence, it is unlikely that you will ever have a Director whose status
will change with changes in the Administration.
QUESTION: What changes would take place as a consequence of a hot war?
GENERAL SMITH: There would be no change in wartime, except that, in theatres
of active operations, our personnel under the senior representative present
would automatically report to and carry out the orders of the senior mili-
tary commander in the theatre of operations, just as they are now doing in
Korea. In addition, our personnel would have missions targeted outside but
based on a military theatre of operations. These missions would be trans-
mitted to them from headquarters with the concurrence and knowledge of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they would be supported by the Theatre Commander
concerned.
QUESTION: Are the Senior Representatives overseas your alter egos?
GENERAL SMITH: Yes. With relation to myself or to any future Director, they
occupy the same position that the commander of a theatre of operations, in
a military sense, would occupy with respect to the military heads in Wash-
ington.
QUESTION: If a "real" peace is achieved, what effect would this have upon the
offices under DD/P?
GENERAL SMITH: Well, I'm afraid that the question is academic insofar as the
lifetime of most of us is concerned, and while I would have to answer that
I don't know exactly, I don't think that that is anything that you need to
worry about in the immediately foreseeable future. Let's reserve that one
for, let us say, the 28th or 38th or 58th Orientation Course.
-4
S-E-C-R E-T
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R otse 2002/08/22: CIA-RDP55-00166A6W100010001-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
QUESTION: With regard to the official ceiling on T/O's, do you anticipate
that there will be further cuts in the organization?
GENERAL SMITH: No. We'll have to increase a little bit for training purposes.
It's a simple fact that while we have budgeted for a rather large personnel
ceiling, we can't get qualified people to fill that personnel ceiling. They
just simply don't exist. We've gone about the limit. Occasionally one may
get from the outside very highly qualified men or women, tempt them in,
twist their arms and get them to sign up on a career basis. But they are
becoming fewer and fewer, so we must depend on theyounger people that we
are bringing up through the ranks. Of course these people are, in any tech-
nical service like our own, the heart and soul of a career organization.
Unless every private carries the baton of a field marshal in his knapsack,
he hasn't very much to look forward to. Unless every junior officer has
the right to expect promotion through the grades and ultimately the oppor-
tunity to occupy the highest post in the career of his choice, there is very
little to hold him in his job. So, my intention is to keep our numbers down,
to be selective instead of expansive, and to look more and more to the ju-
niors to fill the senior posts.
QUESTION: Is the policy of rotation of individuals in key spots in keeping
with the career concept?
GENERAL SMITH: Well, since I've ordered the rotation policy, I'm obviously
in favor of it. In the first place, one cannot conduct global operations,
as we conduct them, exclusively and entirely controlled by a desk in Wash-
ington. In the second place, our people in the field believe, and unfor-
tunately in some cases they've had grounds to feel, that the men who are
telling them what to do have never been on the sharp end of the stick.
There is a third and very impelling reason. An Agency of this kind, like
a military agency, is extremely ill-advised if it keeps its best talent at
home. It should get the best people that it can, get the most experienced
people it has, the most reliable people that it has, out to the point of
impact. Then, when you issue an order to a man in the field, knowing him,
knowing his capability and his reliability, you have every assurance that
the order will be properly carried out and that the duty will be well per-
formed. Accordingly, it is desirable to get the people occupying key po-
sitions, who have demonstrated their fitness for trust and competence, as
rapidly as possible to the critical places outside of the United States
which are the key to our effective operations.
QUESTION: Is there enough working level cooperation between CIA Offices today,
within the limits, of course, of security?
GENERAL SMITH: Yes, I think so. You have to try to arrive at a happy medium
between the necessity of knowing and the actual need of knowing. The desire,
to provide cooperation exists, although the machinery, from time to time,
has not been as effective as one would like. I hope to increase cooperation
by the gradual transfer of qualified personnel from one Division of the
Approved For Release 200 11 2 Rj2A QTRDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rase 200 18q~_ l -RDP55-00166AW100010001-2
Security Information
Agency to another, to a greater extent than has heretofore obtained, so
that each officer will have a broader perspective than that given him by
work within one particular Division in which he may well specialize. But
he should have one or two alternate specialties, particularly when he goes
out into the field.
QUESTION: Does the fact that a CIA employee has reserve status hinder his
career or help it in CIA?
GENERAL SMITH: In my opinion, reserve status is an asset because it increases
the scope of the usefulness of a CIA officer. There are many jobs that we
do in which past military training or military experience is an essential
quality. There are also many jobs that we have to do where it might be de-
sirable to have a person actually identified with the military service, in
which case we can have him ordered to active duty and assigned to us.
QUESTION: Are you concerned about personnel turnover and are you taking steps
to minimize it?
GENERAL SMITH: Very much so. Our personnel turnover is by comparison rela-
tively small, but it's still much too large. That's one of the reasons why
I brought an Inspector General down here and made him available to anybody
in the Agency who had any complaint of any kind. As you know, you all have
opportunity also for a direct appeal to myself or Mr. Dulles if you feel
that you have been a victim of injustice. So there is no excuse for any-
body going unheard if they have a complaint or a legitimate question to
raise with regard to their official or personal lives within the Agency.
I will not, however, tolerate anybody going outside the Agency. I had a
case about six months ago. Since it was a special one, I have decided to
ignore it. One of our employees wrote a letter to the President. Of course,
he handed it to me. But we have an Inspector General for that.
QUESTION: Since we can not tolerate mediocrity in CIA, what does an employee
do when he finds it on the job?
GENERAL SMITH: If he is an executive, who is responsible for eliminating medi-
ocrity, he should promotly eliminate it. On the other hand, no one likes
to be a talebearer, and no one likes a talebearer. In dealing with your
subordinates, be completely cold-blooded in eliminating mediocrity. When
you encounter it among your colleagues on the same level, just grit your
teeth and hope that your immediate sur>.rior will be as quick to recognize
it as you are.
QUESTION: Are we ever going to get our own building?
GENERAL SMITH: We have one authorized, but. we are torn two ways. At the pres-
ent time, the very fact that we are scattered and living and working in
shacks, while it militates against working conditions, at the same time it
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For R%Wase 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166AW100010001-2
S-E-C-R-E-T
Security Information
contributes indirectly to our security in that nobody knows just exactly
where we are, or how many people work for us, or what they do. On the
other hand, it poses security hazards because in our scattered condition
it's pretty hard to guard us. We want a building badly, but on the other
hand, as soon as we put one up.it will be bigger than most people think
and we will undoubtedly attract attention. The answer will probably be
that we will use half measures and put up something of a permanent nature
for certain of our operations and make "several bites of the cherry."
QUESTION: Shouldn't we be proud of the fact that there is a CIA in the United
States coordinating intelligence and, therefore, do more to win a better
understanding of what we do and why we do it on the part of the press and
the American people?
GENERAL SMITH: There's a great deal to be said for that idea, but the United
States needs one silent service and I think that it would be all to the
good if we could so qualify. We can't, of course. Under our laws and un-
der the rights of Congress, there are necessities for discussion. We could
not, for instance, get the money that we need if we didn't tell a good deal
about our operations; and as their scope increases and as their cost in-
creases, the necessity increases for telling more people about it - in Con-
gress, for example. So the only happy medium that we can draw is to say as
little as possible consistent with the necessity for safeguarding our sources
and our methods of operation. The American press generally, at least those
who are deserving of consideration, who know something about the problems of
securing and utilizing information because that's their business too, are
basically respectful of an institution that talks as little as possible.
QUESTION: Are our relationships with Congress good?
GENERAL SMITH: Yes, although they are extremely limited, and that, of course,
in itself is all to the good. In our actual dealings with Congress, our
discussions have been limited to only two or three people on the appropriate
committee in each of the two Houses, and they are fully alive to the neces-
sity of security. During the time that I've been here, there has never been
any, even the slightest, breach of security from those members of the two
Houses with whom we have dealt. As a matter of fact, they are extremely re-
luctant to have it known that it is they who look into our little business
because they fear, and quite justly, that there would be a demand from
others to be permitted to know.
S-E-C-R E-T
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For (ease 2002/RFTA-RP55-00166AW0100010001-2
Security information
11 February 1953
25X1A
25X9
SUBJECT: Training Bulletin (General Smith's Comments to the 8th Ori-
entation Course)
1. Regulations Control Staff of DD/A, ad-
vises that distribution of the Bulletin, to Branch Chiefs with rout-
ing to all personnel with appropriate security clearances will require
approximately I I.
25X1A 2. Training Aids Branch, after checking with
the reproduction facilities at Alexandria, advises that the cost of pro-
25X9 ducing this Bulletin of 7 pages in will cost about $50.00.
On the basis of an estimated 4 Bulletins per year, the cost would amount
to $200.00.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
3. If, as the Director of Training has suggested, the comments of the
DDCI and the Vice President, at the 9th Orientation Course, be made the
subjects of further Bulletins, the cost for this fiscal year would not
exceed $150.00.
4. Chief, Budget and Fiscal Division, advises that these
costs can be slotted to the Trainin Aids Branch, OTR, and that funds are
there available for this purpose. II Chief, Service and Supply
Section, will write up a requisition for the production of the Bulletin,
charging the cost to Training Aids Branch, 1503-10 (Support Staff). This
requisition will request that the,production and distribution of the Bul-
letin be expedited (72 hours).
5. The Bulletin was cleared through
icy questions were involved:
of DD/A. Two pol-
a. Whether format as Training Notice required certification by
a representative of the DCI, and centralized control under the DD/A.
b. Whether there should be centralized control of the use of re-
production facilities.
a. That the Bulletin. did not properly fit into the regulatory
system of the Agency and that, with a slight change of format, it could
appropriately be issued under the D/TR's signature (without status as
a Notice and without certification by representative of DCI).
b. That OTR then should arrange for reproduction, as required.
:SECRET
Approved For Release 2002/08/2~2ecunfit -RDP5a 00166A000100010001-2
 SECRET
Approved For Tease 2082,Eo-RDP55-0016640100010001-2
6. The format of the Bulletin has been changed in line with Col.
White's recommendations,=approved by the Director of Training, and it
is on the way.
25X1A
Chief, Plans and Policy Staff
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : 9R6F55-00166A000100010001-2
ecurity Information
 Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For faase 2002/0%CRff -RDP55-00166A1W100010001-2
Security information
6 February 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training -
THROUGH : Deputy Director of Training (General)
SUBJECT : Training Bulletin - Volume I, No. 1
1. The attached document has been coordinated with Q of the
Policy Staff, I&SO. As a result of this coordination, it was concluded
that the document should be classified "Secret." An effort was made to de-
termine if it was at all possible to hold it to "Confidential." In view of
the General's comments on the hot war,quettion and the discussion of our
overseas activities, we both agreed that "Secret" was the lowest safe
classification which should be applied to the General's remarks.
2. The second point which was considered was that of distribution.
Distribution No. 5 goes to all employees of the Agency regardless of their
security clearance status. This means that people with provisional clear-
ances would not only have access to the document, but under distribution
No. 5 would be entrusted with its custody. We agreed, therefore, that dis-
tribution No. 4 was appropriate; distribution No. 4 goes to Branch Chiefs.
A paragraph has been added to the main body of the Bulletin which places
responsibility on the Branch Chiefs for circulation to their personnel
cleared to receive Secret material, and which places on them responsibil-
ity for appropriate security control and retention of the document after
circulation.
3. After you have signed the Notice, and in accordance with I&SO
procedure in processing their Security Bulletin, the document is subject
to review and approval of the DD/A as an Agency issuance.
4. Upon approval by the DD/A, OTR must then arrange through repro-
duction facilities in Alexandria for the printing, collation, and distri-
bution. The most economical way of reproduction is a photographic one in
which the type script is photographed and multilith prints are made from
the photograph negative. This is the procedure employed by I&SO for the
Security Bulletin.
5. After you have signed the document, this staff will hand-process
the Bulletin through the DD/A and to the reproduction
Ghief, Plans and Policy a
Approved For Release 2002/08/22: CIA E0166A000100010001-2
Security Informatiotl
25X1A
25X1A
25X1A
 Approved For $,ple
P55-00166PEJ0010001000 -
NOTICE
NO. T-1-53 5 February 1953
SUBJECT: Training Bulletin - Volume I, No. 1
The Director of Central Intelligence, at the l:'th Or-
ientation Course, on 21 November 1952, commented upon sub-
jects of universal interest throughout the Agency. The
questions to which he responded and his answers are attached
hereto for the information and guidance of all concerned.
ora. w~s~.9r~
Branch Chiefs she circulate this document, as appro-
priate, and SUMt its return for retention and security
control in their respective Offices.
MATTHEW BAIRD
Director of Training
Distribution No. 4
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Reieese 2002/08/2Z:, lA I P55-00166A0 100010001-2
Remarks of Geneses t.r L Smith
25X1 B
and his answers to questions submitted
at the t th Agency Orientation Course, 21 November 1952
GENERAL SMITH: ning Remarks - I want to remind you that the service of
national intelligence and of national security has become a permanent,
honorable career. It is in effect a fourth service as compared with the
three military services, and its operation will be continuous and accel-
erated in time of war, under its own command and under its own organiza-
tion. Since the passage cf the National Security Act, intelligence is
able to offer you permanent, secure and honorable careers and it is to
your credit and to our advantage that you have accepted intelligence
careers earnestly and seriously. I do not think that many of you will
ever feel that you have made a mistake.
QUESTION: Js the national intelligence which we are now making a good
support for the national policy?
QUESTION: To what extent is the intelligence product actually used by
those who formulate national policy?
GENERAL SMITH: We have a good deal to learn in methods of using intelli-
gence to get the best value out of it. This is a situation which will
aorrectitself in time as the intelligence product becomes more and more
reliable. As it now works out, we prepare certain intelligence esti-
tes on the national or strategic level which are based on a schedule
for production dependent largely on the problems which will confront
Approved For Release 2002/0812 `CI*'- 2DP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Rgsbease 2002/0C;4 -RDP55-00166A9i0100010001-2
? r~tyY 1nt I ormatioro'
the4 helon which supports the C~~0ticnal Security Council. When those
estimates are prepared and are turned ever to the nembers of the Nation-
al Security Council and their subordinates on the staff, they become,
or at least they should become, what in military parlance is called the
G-2 annex on which operational plans are based, and they are more and
re being used in that t .y. CRegretably, the demand for intelligence
estimates exceeds our ability to supply them. Consequently, we are
having a little difficulty getting estimates id''h timely way so that the
well in advance of their own sob, which is the prepraraticon of a draft
papers, but more and more are we keeping up to date and a little bit
ahead of the parade
I QUESTION: It has been said that the military commanders, didn't have re-
liance or confidence in the intelligence people, and, therefore, much
was known to them which was not to the intelligence men, and that that
had an effect on the estimates. Would you comment on this?
TH: I don't think that reliance or confidence has anything to
the problem, It Is simply the acute realization of the necessi-
security in connection with military plans and operations which
en driven home to the personnel involved in exercising command.
long series of tragic events over a period of years, the inescapa-
ble conclusion has been arrived at that the more people who know about
these things, the more insecure are plans and operations. Consequently,
the tendency always is to hold on to information as tightly and closely
as possible and not to give it out. It's the "need to know" theory
raised to the power. Actually, we do disseminate information much
too widely; that's inherent in our bureaucratic system. Everybody wants
to know; a lot of the people who want to know and who don't really need
to know are able to establish their right to know regardless of what
the intelligence chap or the operational chap feels about it. Where
military or other knowledge is required for the production of an Intel-
ligence estimate, the solation, in my opinion, lies in providing the
intelligence producer with a series of assumptions which need not re-
veal the plan, or which need not be entirely accurate, or which may even
be fictitious, because it-is nossible with such assumptions to produce
an intelligence estimate which the operational commander hiTself may
scale down. I don't think that anything better will ever be produced
until we set up on the highest level some machinery for coordinated G-2
and G-3 estimates; and whether that is possible or not, I don't know.
QUESTION: Do you feel that unanimity reduces the strength of many of the
estimates?
GENERAL SMITH: We rarely have unanimity, and we don't strive for it. We
don't make any effort to obtain it, so that itself is an academic question.
, t 3s ormatio'
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For Re4ease 2002/01-l 4-RDP55-00166A"0100010001-2
,
Se ity Intor et'ot"
As a matter of fact, the dissenting opln on is encc?uraged If its a valid
one; and if the dissenter is easily argued out of his position, then
probably his dissentisn't worth very much.
QUESTION: Regarding the st=bility of the Agency, will the c.-ia?tge in the
Administration have any effect on the Agency?
SMITH: Since this is a statutory Agency supported by a career ser-
vice, there will be no change s ith changes in the Administration. The
Director and his principal Denutles and Assistants are non-political ap-
pointees and, while the Director himself must undoubtedly be a man whom
the Chief Executive is willing to accept, and to whom he will give a cer-
tain measure of confidence, it is unlikely that you will ever have a Di-
rector whose status will change with changes in the Administration.
UESTION: What changes would take place as a consequence of a hot war?
GENERAL SMITH: There would be no change in wartime, except that, in thea-
tres of active operations, our nersonnel under the senior representative
present would automatically report to and carry out the orders of the
senior military commander in the theatre of operations, just as they are
now 'doing in Korea. In addition, our personnel would have missions tar-
geted outside but based on a military theatre of operations. These mis-
sions would be transmitted to them from headquarters with the concur-
rence and knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and they would be sup-
ported by the Theatre Commander concerned.
QUESTION: Are the Senior Representatives overseas your alter egos?
GENERAL SMITH: Yea. With relation to myself or to any future Director,
they occupy the same position that the commander of a theatre of opera-
tions, in a military sense, would occupy with respect to the military
ads in Washington.
QUESTION: If a "real" peace is achieved, what effect would this have upon
the offices under DD/P?
GENERAL SMITH: Well, I'm afraid that the question Is academic insofar as
the lifetime of most of as is concerned, and while I would have to answer
that I don't know exactly, I don't think that that is anything that you
need to worry about in the immediately foreseeable future. Let's reserve
that one for, let us say, the 28th or 38th or 5Fth Orientation Course.
QUESTION: With regard to the official ceiling on T/O's, deg you anticipa
that there will be further cuts in the organization?
GENERAL SMITH: No. We'll have to increase a little bit for training purposes.
It's a simple fact that while we have budgeted for a rather large personnel
ceiling, we cap't get the qualified people to fill that personnel ceiling.
-3-
vecurlty Informat+on
Approved For Release 2002/08/22 : CIA-RDP55-00166A000100010001-2
 Approved For RWease 2002/08/2fE,1R%P55-00166AmMO100010001-2
Security Information
They just simply don't exist. We've gone about the limit. Occasion-
allyone may get from the outside very highly qualified men or women,
tempt them in, twist their arms and get them to sign up on a career
basis.. But they are becoming fewer and fewer, so we must depend on
the younger people that we are'bringing up through the ranks. Of course
these people are, in any technical service li..ke our own, the heart and
soul of a career organization. Unless every private carries the baton
of a field marshall in his knapsack, he hasn't very much to look for-
ward to. Unless every junior isfficer has the right to expect promotion
through the. grades and ultimately the opportunity to occupy the highest
post In the career of his choice, there is very little to hold him in
h!s job. So, intention is to keep our numbers down, to be selective
instead of expansive, and to look more and more to the juniors to fill
the senior tests.
QUESTION: Is the -policy of rotation of individuals In key snots in keeping
with the career concept?
GENERAL S14ITH: Well, since I've ordered the rotation policy, I'm obviously
In favor of it. In the first place, one cannot conduct global operations,
as we conduct them, exclusively and entirely controlled by a desk in Wash-
ington. In the second place, our people In the field believe, and unfor-
tunately in some cases they've had grounds to feel, that the men who are
telling them what to do have never been on the sharp end of the stick.
There is a third and very impelling reason. An Agency of this kind, like
a military agency, is extremely ill-advised .if it keeps its best talent
at home. It should get the best people that it can, get the most exrer-
ienced people it has, the most reliable people that it has, out to the
point of I=-Act. Then, when you issue an order to a man in the field,
knowing him, knowing his capability and his reliability, you have every
assurance that the order will be properly carried out and that the duty
will be well ? erfccrmed.,, f ccordi.ngly, it is desirable to Cet the aeople
occupying key positions, who have demonstrated their fitness for trust
and competence, as rapidly as possible to the critical places outside of
the United States which are the key to our effective operation
Is there enough working level cooperation between CIA Offices to-
day, within the limits, of course, of security?
Ti; Yes, I think so. You have to try to arrive at a hap,~y med-
ium between the necesrity of knowing and the actual need of knowing. The
desire to provide cooperation exists, although the machinery, from time
to time, has not been as effective as one would like. I hope to increase
cooperation by the gradual tr