SOVIET UNION MILITARY - ECONOMIC REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP56S00492A000100120004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 70
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: February 2, 1945
• Content Type: REPORT

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communicated only to persons officially indoctrinated
for Special Intelligence.
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100 / 53 /TOPSEC /CIA, D /Z
SC No. 06948
Copy No.
SOVIET UNION MILITARY-ECONOMIC REPORT
Translated from the German Report
Dated; 2 February 1945
/ THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING
THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE
18, U. S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794, SEE ALSO PUBLIC
LAW 513, 81ST CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ITS TRANS-
MISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY
MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
BY LAW, /
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
Strategic Division
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Copy Nos. 1 - 38 _for Dissemination
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During the Second World War the German Signal Intelligence Control
Center of the Staff of the Chief of Army Signal Service (HNW, LNA)
issued a series of reports to show the USSR military-economic
situation as reflectedFQll&.I 39ian internal plain language traffic. A
total of 145 reports, appeared at short, ir-
regular intervals, aix per months for the period October
1942-March 1943. include mostly daily
reports for March 1943 as well as a few monthly reports covering
the latterFAVtba 1942 and the early part of 1943. The last four
reports, summarize Soviet economic
activities for periods of three to nine months in 1943 and 1944.
?t hree of these reports have been translateF ii 11 sued by
FOIAb3a
One hundred reports,
are being translated and issued by Strategic Division of
the Office of Research and ReF011kb iAj. The series will be com-
pleted with the publication of
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Page
6
1.
Personnel Situation
12
2.
Agriculture and Food Situation
1.
Harvest Products, Harvest Deliveries,
12
Grain Shipments and Conservation Measures
II.
Potatoes and Vegetables
26
III.
Livestock Raising
26
IV.
General Supply
28
3. Metal Supply
I. Scrap Collection and Processing
IL General Supply
III. Production at Certain Plants
4. Coal Supply
5. Oil Supply
6. Auxiliary Shipments from the Western Powers
to the Soviet Union via Iran
7. Bolshevization of Estonia
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Military-Economic Report
(Based on domestic radio traffic)
2 February 1945
This report summarizes military-economic information for the
following periods:
For the fourth quarter of 1944:
1) Personnel situation
2) Agriculture and food situation
3) Metal supply
4) Coal supply
For the second half of 1944:
5) Oil Supply
6) Auxiliary shipments from the Western Powers
to the Soviet Union via Iran
In addition, a new chapter has been added covering the
period from 1 November through 31 December on
7) Bolshevization of Estonia.
At this point it should again be emphasized that this report is based
entirely on information intercepted from Soviet internal communications and
therefore makes no claim to completeness. It presents a cross section of
the economy of the Soviet Union. The statistics presented are not to be con-
sidered an absolute maximum, but rather as an indication of economic
development.
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1. Personnel Situation
{1) The last quarter of 1944 produced no important changes in the
overall personnel situation.
A. Resettlement Operations
(2) Resettlement of border populations from the "liberated territories"
observed in the first, second and third quarters was noted continuing. For
example, on 28 November the following message was intercepted:
From Minsk to Rostov/Don, to the Chairman of the Oblast' Executive
Committee:
"In connection with the resettlement in White Russia of
White Russians, Great Russians and Ukrainians from Polish territory,
70 Great Russian farmers have expressed the wish to be allowed to
remain permanently in their present location. I request your
permission.
(Signed) Kiseya (?),
Representative of the Chairman
of the White Russian Council. "
(3) Refugees were expected in the Caucasus also. According to a
message from the Georgian Council of Peoples' Commissars to the NK for
Procurement in Moscow, the arrival of 1, 000 refugee families was announced
for December and January.
(4) Many plants and organizations had sent representatives or
authorized agents into the White Russian and Ukrainian border areas to
recruit volunteers. For example, at the end of October 80 workers were
recruited from the village of Senkevichevka for the Thermal Combine in
Rostov/Don.
(5) Recruitment and resettlement operations by representatives of the
"liberated peoples" such as Poles, Rumanians, Finns, Estonians, Letts and
Bulgarians could not be detected in internal radio traffic.
B. Conscription and Exemptions
(6) During the winter an easing of the manpower shortage was expected
in comparison with the spring, summer and fall because large numbers of
seasonal workers were thrown out of work in agriculture and the River Fleet.
This was not the case, however, because the demands of the front grew on an
increasing scale.
(7) Thus, according to messages from Baku (Transcaucasus),
Rostov/Don (Donbas) and Barnaul (West Siberia), tractor and harvester
combine operators in the class of 1927 were conscripted into the Army.
(8) Conscription had to be carried out also from branches of industry
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important to the war effort. For example, unemployed workers of the Oil'
Combine in Groznyj who were found fit for service at the front by the Medical
Commission, were conscripted. At several industrial enterprises in Rostov/
Don and Stalino exempted workers from the class of 1927 who had reported
voluntarily to the Army were called up. In both cases the respective employers
entered protests.
(9) Some exemptions were also noted. Thus, according to an order of
28 October from the NK for Defense, the following were exempted from military
service: workers in the third and higher categories, including sailors, engine
mechanics and assistants, stokers, machinists and assistants, crane operators
and assistants, electrical engineers, divers, assemblers, riggers, ship
machinists and lathe operators. According to a report in October, officers and
engineers who had formerly been employed at a plant of the CD for Spare Parts
in Erevan, were released from military service to resume employment at that
plant.
C. Labor Conscription
(10) As in the previous year, the lack of housing, bed linen, special
clothing and warm clothing was especially strongly felt during the winter. Some
examples of this situation are as follows=
(11) As of 20 September 6, 000 persons were conscripted in Tbilisi for
the NK for Coal. Included in this number were 4, 555 persons who were trans-
ferred to Georgian coal enterprises. These enterprises were not able to make
necessary preparations for the arrival of these workers and there were shortages
of bed linen, special clothing and mine lamps. As a result of this, 530 workers
illegally left their jobs. The Georgian Central Party Committee therefore had
to consider partial dismissal of the labor conscriptees.
(12) For the Oil Industry 15, 000 workers were conscripted, but they
could not be employed because the necessary quarters and trade schools had
not been prepared.
(13) In general, the labor conscriptions seemed to be progressing
poorly. Thus, in Rostov/Don Oblast' the November-December conscription
plan of 4, 500 persons for the Combine Rostov-Ugol was fulfilled by the con-
scription of only 3, 256 persons. Likewise, labor conscription for the Donbas
Energostroj was not carried out. At a plant of the NK for Coal in Rostov/Don
3, 000 conscriptees were released because they were not needed for production
assignments.
(14) The NK for Iron in Moscow complained that, despite repeated
demands, no workers had arrived at a plant in Gurevsk in Kemerovo Oblast'.
(15) In Stalingrad Oblast' the following workers were to be conscripted
during the fourth quarter:
500 men for enterprises of the NK for Armaments,
1,200 " " " " " the Tank Industry, and
900 " It if it " Construction.
However, as of 13 December these conscriptees had not yet been put to work.
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(16) According to a report from the Azerbajtlzhan Labor Office,
personnel requirements from the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine could not be met.
D. Training Specialized Workers
(17) During the winter months especially strong emphasis was placed
on the training of specialized workers. The following personnel were noted at
technical- and trade schools:
(18) Armenian Republic: (As of 10 Nov 44) Technical Schools
Total: 1, 400 persons
Including: Youths from city areas 1,000
rural areas 400
1, 400;
Men 1,070
Women 330
1, 400;
From educational institutions of
the NKVD 202
From schools of the NK for Education 122
Volunteers 164
Conscriptees 912
1, 400.
(19) Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual
Peoples' Commissariats as follows:
Technical schools of the NK for Nonferrous Metallurgy 350
It it the Timber Industry
150
H H " it Communications
150
if it Aircraft Construction
350
" " " Light Machine "
200
If it " Electric Power Station
s 100
The Plant "Dzerzhinskij" of the NK for Machine Tool
Construction 100
1,400
(20) At the technical school of the Plant "Dzerzhinskij" insufficient
living quarters and instruction space had been provided. The Armenian
Labor Office allowed the plant until 1 December to alleviate these shortages.
If these shortages could not be eliminated by that date, the above-mentioned
100 trainees were to be transferred to other technical schools.
(21)
Trade Schools
Total:
190 persons (from cities)
Including:
Men
106
Women
84
190;
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From educational institutions of the NKVD
55
From schools of the NK for Education
100
Volunteers
25
Conscriptees
10
190.
Further recruiting of technical trainees was in progress.
(22) Azerbajdzhan SSR (As of 1 Nov 44) Technical Schools
Total: 2, 621 persons
Including:
Youths from cities
2,215
Youths from rural areas
406
2, 621;
Men
11900
Women
721
2,
621;
Homeless persons
503
Students from higher educational
institutions
34
Conscriptees
2,
084
2,
621.
(23) Among others, trainees were assigned to technical schools of
individual Peoples' Commissariats and enterprises as follows:
Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine 250
NK for Communications 200
450.
(24)
Total: 925 persons
Railroad and Trade Schools
Including: Youths from cities 925;
Men 576
Women 349
925;
Homeless persons 276
Students from higher
educational institutions 9
Conscriptees 640
925.
Trainees were assigned to railroad and trade schools of individual Peoples'
Commissariats as follows:
Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine
625
NK for Communications
300
925.
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(25) Ordzhonikidze Kraj (As of 25 Nov 44) Technical Schools
Total: 1, 355 persons
Including: Youths from cities 200
Youths from rural areas 1,155
1, 355;
Men
Women
684
671
1, 355;
From educational institutions of
the NKVD 57
From schools of the NK for Education 7
Volunteers 526
Conscriptees 765
1,355.
Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Com-
missariats as follows:
Technical school of the NK for Local Industry
11 Communications
Narkomkhoz
Technical school of the NK for Health
11 tt 11 11 11 II
(26)
Total: 746 persons
Including: Youths from cities
Youths from rural areas
Men
Women
From educational institutions
NK for Education
Volunteers
Cons criptee s
114
659
85
33
Civil Construction 332
the Timber Industry 132
1,355.
Trade Schools
352
394
746;
441
305
746;
33
583
128
746.
Trainees were assigned to trade schools of individual Peoples' Commissariats
as follows:
Trade school of the NK for Armaments
I t 11 it 11 it Agriculture
239
300
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Trade school of the NK for Communications
it 11 it IS it " Health
Volunteers 78
From educational institutions of the NKVD 39
From schools of the NK for Education (?) 36
Conscriptees 347
500;
Workshops of the Labor Office
5
96
92
14
746.
(27) A total of 2, 101 persons including 1, 111 volunteers was employed
in technical and trade schools.
(28) Georgian SSR (As of 1 Nov 44) Technical Schools
Total: 500 persons
Including: Youths from cities 485
Youths from rural areas 15
500;
Men 394
Women 106
500;
Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Com-
missariats as follows:
Technical schools of the NK for Transportation 181
(29)
Transportation
Total: 2, 100 persons
Including: Volunteers 308
From educational institutions of the NKVD 60
Conscriptees 1, 732
2, 100;
Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Com-
missariats as follows:
Trade school of the NK for Transportation 650
It 11 It II II It _-- 300
it It It , It It It Coal 408
It 1' it Shipbuilding 100
it it It the Construction Industry 150
the Aviation Industry 38
the Machine Tool Industry 126
Shipbuilding 39
116
500.
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Trade school of the NK for the Aviation Industry
392
__-
100
2,
100.
(30) Makhachkala Oblast'
According to a report from the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the
Dagestan SSR on 16 Nov 44, technical schools had furnished 502 technical
workers to industrial enterprises of the Republic during 1944. The recruiting
plan was fulfilled with conscription of 1, 178 persons. Of these, 692 were
assigned to technical schools and 486 to trade schools.
(31) Rostov/Don Oblast'
As of 1 Nov 44 the conscription plans for technical schools (4, 400
persons) and for trade schools (300 persons) had been fulfilled in the Oblast'.
4, 500 persons were already in schools and 200 more were on the way. There
were 24 technical schools and 20 trade schools in the Oblast'. Moreover, the
opening of Technical School #13 of the NK for Housing and Civil Construction
as well as of Trade School #13 of the NK for Electric Power Stations was
imminent.
2. Agriculture and Food Situation
1. Harvest Products, Harvest Deliveries, Grain Shipments and Conservation
Measures
A. Harvest Products
(32) Results of the 1944 harvest seemed to be generally satisfactory.
Pronounced harvest failures were noted in only isolated cases. For example,
according to a message in November certain rajons in the Georgian Republic
suffered serious shortages of grain caused by poor harvest yields.
(33) The following harvest results were noted:
Rostov/Don Oblast'
A. Office of "Glavyuzhenergo" as of 10 November:
Total area harvested
Thrashed
Yield 6, 316 dz*
Yield per hectare 11
1, 130 hectares
580 "
The following were delivered to the Government:
917 dz Grain products
1,082 Vegetables
317 Potatoes
Abbreviation for "Doppelzentner", a measure of weight equal to 100
kilograms.
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Totals harvested: 110 hectares, 2, 305 dz Potatoes
174 8, 232 Vegetables
30 2,440 Cabbage.
B. Auxiliary organizations of the Labor Office as of 1 October:
Fruit
33 dz
Vegetables
446
Products of the field
145
Millets
310
Sunflowers
14
Corn
23
971 dz.
(34) Generally, unsatisfactory harvest of sunflowers and castor beans
were noted in Rostov/Don Oblast'.
(35) According to a report 20 November, 60, 000 hectares of sun-
flowers were not harvested in Rostov/Don Oblast' and the seed procurement
plan for this important source of vegetable oil was only 28. 9% fulfilled. The
castor harvest was also below average, and many kolkhozes were forced to
deliver sunflower seed instead of castor seed in a ratio of 2 dz of sunflower
seeds to 1 dz castor seeds. The Office of the NK for Procurement had to
secure special authorization to accept 4, 000 tons of sunflower seeds with a
moisture content of 20%. Authorization was granted on the condition that
these seeds be immediately ground up because storage of this quantity of grain
with such a high moisture content would be impossible.
(36) Above-plan deliveries were nevertheless noted in Rostov/Don
Oblast', with a total of 1, 483 extra tons of grain delivered from the
sovkhozes of the Oblast'.
(37) Ordzhonikidze Kraj
As of 11 November the following were harvested:
Corn
59, 000 hectares
Sunflowers
95,000
Castor
8,000
Potatoes
9, 500.
(38) Dagestan Republic
In addition to their scheduled delivery obligations, the kolkhozes
also fulfilled a voluntary delivery of 1, 440 tons of bread grain for the Red
Army.
(39) North Ossetia
Information on the condition of the corn harvest is given in the follow-
ing message:
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"As a result of unfavorable summer and autumn weather
in the mountain and forest sections of the Republic, the corn crop
could not ripen and it has a high moisture content. Therefore, ful-
fillment of the grain procurement plan is extremely difficult.
Permission is requested to deliver all the unripened corn, (to be
used to produce alcohol providing it has a moisture content of 37%)
directly to the alcohol factory, disregarding the quota of 1, 000 tons
of corn to be delivered to this factory. "
(40) Azerbajdzhan Republic
Kolkhozes of the Azerbajdzhan SSR pledged themselves to furnish 8, 000
tons of grain above plan for the grain stock of the Red Army.
B. Shortage of Storage Capacity
(41) The shortage of storage space for grain, castor seed and sun-
flower seed was also extremely serious during the period of this report.
For example, only 20, 000 extra tons of wheat could be accepted at the store-
houses of the Armenian Grain Procurement Office in November. And even
this acceptance was dependent on the shipment of 4, 000 tons of beans and 1, 000
tons of barley from the storehouses. The storehouses in Armavir were also
filled to capacity with grain.
(42) During the winter construction of several grain silos and other
storage buildings was noted. For example, the following were constructed.
Taganrog 2 Grain silos, total capacity 4, 500 tons;
Uspenskaya 1 Grain silo, total capacity 2, 000 tons;
Sinsyavskaya 1 Grain silo, total capacity 1, 000 tons.
C. Grain Shipments
(43) One of the most pressing problems was the shipment of grain
from internal regions to storage points at offices of the NK for Procurement
and at railroad stations.
(44) In December the North Ossetian Party Committee received the
following dispatch:
"The State Committee for Defense considers that next to
complete fulfillment of the grain delivery plan the assignment most
essential to the military and economic operation of the country is
the shipment of the grain from internal regions to Grain Procurement
Office collection points on railways and waterways. On the success-
ful fulfillment of this obligation depends the smooth flow of bread to
the Red Army as well as to the civilian population and industrial
centers. There are 2, 000 tons of grain to be shipped from internal
regions by kolkhozes by 1 March 1945. The executive committees
and governments of the republics have received authorization to
enlist all available workers for the period of shipping grain from
internal regions. Top priority is to be given to the shipment of
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unripened or wet grain and to shipment of grain which is stored under
unsuitable conditions in order to avoid loss of these stocks.
"The NK for Sovkhozes is ordered to make use of both trans-
portation facilities belonging to the sovkhozes and also the truck park
belonging to "Sovkhoztrans" in order to transport by 1 March the grain
stored in internal regions at sovkhozes of the North Ossetian ASSR.
Transportation facilities furnished for grain transport are not to be
diverted to other uses. Issuance of motor gasoline and tractor fuel to
the NK for Procurement and to the NK for Sovkhozes for transport of
grain from internal regions is to be given priority over issuance to
all other consumers by order of the NK for Defense. "
(45) The following results and plans for grain shipments have been
noted to date:
Rostov/Don:
The following was to be transported by truck from military units:
Planned
144,
320 tons
Actual fulfillment
217,
991
151%u
Rostov Oblast', planned
94,
490
Actual fulfillment
126,
665
134%
Krasnodar Kraj,
planned
49,
830
Actual fulfillment
91,
326
183%
(46) For the period of September through December transport of
320, 000 tons of grain was planned, In September and October a total of
406, 071 tons was carried out. On 25 November the amount of grain shipped
in Rostov/Don Oblast' reached 505, 252 tons. In the first 27 days of October
14, 422 tons of grain were shipped by water on the Lower Don.
(47) The extent to which the railroads were used in grain shipments
is indicated by the following message:
The Office of Grain Procurement South has large amounts of
oats, millets and barley stored at Tarasovka, Glubokaya and
Chebetovka. Because of insufficient railroad cars the grain cannot
be transported.
In October (?) shipments were as follows:
Cars
Actually
Depot
Planned
Provided
Tarasovka
128
6
Glubokaya
159
8
Chebetovka
126
20.
(48) An additional message in October confirms the difficult trans-
portation conditions:
For October a shipment of 80, 660 tons of grain to the Office
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of Grain Procurement South was planned for the Stalingrad Railroad.
From 1 through 23 October only 33, 787 tons were actually shipped.
This left 46, 873 tons not shipped, including the following stocks:
in Sal'sk
27,
228 tons
Kotel'nikovo
1,
304
Morosovskaya
6,
586.
(49) In the first ten day period of November no cars were furnished.
At the Railroad Station of Blagodarnoe in Rostov Oblast' also, shipments of
grain were especially poor. Instead of 681 railroad cars, only 110 were pro-
vided. 15, 000 tons of grain had to be stored in the open. According to a
December report from the NK for Procurement in Moscow, 100, 000 tons of
wheat and rye had accumulated by 1 December at railroad and waterway
collection points of the Grain Procurement Office. Because of a lack of rail-
road cars the grain could not be shipped.
(50) Kabardino-Balkar Republic
As of 20 November, grain shipments and deliveries were as follows:
Percentage
Planned Fulfillment Fulfillment
64, 388 tons 53, 457 tons 83%.
(51) Azerbajdzhan Republic
The Azerbajdzhan Procurement and Transport Directorate had set up
the following plan for shipments of grain in October:
A
mount
Transport Performance
Baku,
depot with 5 trucks 2,
000 tons
42, 000 ton-km
Pushkino,
It
It
6
11
400
28,000
Evlakh,
it
8
600
40,000
?
34, 000
Kirovabad,
8
6
400
40,000
Z akataly,
Nukha,
it
It
6
1
400
35,000
Khachmass,
"
?
500
6,000
(52) According to a report from Eksportkhleb to the NK for Procure-
ment in Moscow, on 25 November grain shipments from internal regions were
completed. A total of 15, 994 tons were shipped.
(53) Ordzhonikidze Kraj
In December 1944 grain shipments amounting to 27, 000 tons were pre-
scribed. Of this, 20, 000 tons were to be carried by trucks belonging to
Soyuzzagottrans and 7, 000 tons by transportation facilities belonging to the
sovkhozes.
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(54) Stalingrad Oblast'
Offices of the NK for Procurement were to make shipment of 103, 050
tons of grain by 1 March 1945.
(55) Krasnodar Kraj and Ordzhonikidze Kraj
Wheat deliveries from Krasnodar and Ordzhonikidze Krai were not
satisfactory. Instead of a shipment of 45, 000 tons of grain in November, only
7, 000 tons were delivered. The following were required in the entire
Azerbajdzhan SSR:
20, 000 tons of wheat (for civilian supplies)
10, 000 tons of grain (above plan)
40, 000 tons of seed grain.
D. Quantitative Distribution of Bread Grain Deliveries
(56) The table below shows the extent to which Rostov/Don and
Krasnodar Oblasti and Ordzhonikidze Kraj acted as suppliers for other regions
of the Soviet Union:
Grain Amount (tons)
Consignee
Rostov/Done in September
Wheat
5, 000
Pridacha, Voronezh Oblast'
'
Barley
9, 000
Ryazan' Oblast
in October
e
R
250
Yaroslavl' Oblast'
y
It
Wheat
Rye
6
1,347
11
Ivanovo
11
Z,304
Saratov
Wheat
16
It
Millets
1,178
it
11
Barley
4, 456
Kujbyshev
it
"
Rye
Barley
132
1,903
Tatar
Hay
2,398
Penza
"
Corn
569
Ivanovo
Wheat
8,211
Gorkij
Barley
8,565
Kujbyshev
Wheat
50
It
Rye
10
Ryazan'
it
if
561
Tambov
Wheat
7, 751
it
4, 251
Gorkij
16
?
Rye
it
1,477
Saratov
Flour
573
White Russia
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Amount (tons)
827
364
113
150
2, 000
2, 000
2, 000
500
500
200
2, 000
3, 000
4, 000
4, 000
Consignee
Sifted flour
if it
Barley groats
it it
Millets
11
Wheat
Barley
Hay
Barley
Hay
Bread grain
in November
100,000
45, 000
5, 000
20, 000
5, 000
20, 000
Voroshilovgrad Oblast'
Bryansk it
Stalino
Voroshilovgrad
White Russia
Bryansk Oblast'
Crimea
Stalino Oblast'
Voroshilovgrad Oblast'
Kursk "
Penza
Saratov
Ulyanovsk "
Office of Grain Procurement
South in Moscow
Corn
Krasnodar Kraj
5,750
Shipped by military transport
in September
Wheat
Barley
Wheat
7, 000
13, 000
22, 000
Povorino, Voronezh Oblast'
Balashov
5, 000
2, 000
2, 000
Stalino Oblast'
Voroshilovgrad Oblast'
Kujbyshev it
Ordzhonikidze Kraj
in September
12, 500
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E. Estimates and Fulfillment of Agricultural Plans
(57) The following information on estimates and partial fulfillment of
agricultural plans for the year 1945 has been reported:
1.
Kabardino-Balkar Republic (in 1000 hectares)
a. Kolkhozes
To be cultivated in summer 1, 555
To be cultivated in winter 650
2, 205
Including:
Grain 1,
440 Including:
Summer grain 910
Winter grain 530
Technical crops
370
Flax seed 55
Sunflower seed 315
Vegetables
110
Potatoes 40
Fodder grasses
240
Single- year
grasses 100
Perennial
grasses 30
Fodder roots 15
Grasses 20
Grasses from
prey. yrs. 75
Potatoes from
gardens belonging
to kolkhoz
employees
Yield of ---(seeds ?) 30
2, 205
Fallow land plowed
500
Land plowed in autumn for summer grain
700
Fertilizer spread
40, 000 tons
Harvest of the kolkhozes (in dz):
Grain
35
Sunflowers
85
Potatoes
780
(58) b. Yield of vegetable crops:
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Including:
Two-year crops
Root vegetables
Perennial grasses
Single-year grasses
Normal hay mowing
Storage of grasses in silos
47
160
25
20
86
338
40, 000 tons
(59) c. Kolkhoz gardens (garbled)
(60) d. Planned operations of Machine Tractor Stations at kolkhozes
for 1945 (in 1000 hectares)
Spring plowing
Field preparation before spring plowing
Sowing of summer grain
Cultivation of fallow land
Sowing of winter grain
Land plowed in autumn for harvest of
summer grain
83
5
80
17
40
40
35
340.
Grain thrashed at Machine Tractor Stations 20, 000 tons.
(61) 2. Ordzhonikidze Kraj (in 1000 hectares)
a. Kolkhozes
To be cultivated in summer 10, 750 (? )
To be cultivated in winter 8, 000
18, 750
Including:
Grain 15, 000 Including: Summer grain 7, 500
Winter grain 7, 500
Including:
Summer wheat 500
Summer barley 2, 680
Buckwheat 50
Grain-bean
mixture 37
Corn 1,850
Technical 2, 445 Including: Cotton 200
crops Linseed 10
Sunflowers 1, 750
Flax 220
Castor 150
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Soy 20
Mustard 50
Makhorka 0. 15
Volatile oil plants 30
Medicinal plants 10
Vegetables
420 Including:
Potatoes 180
Fodder
grasses 2,585
Potatoes from
gardens belong-
ing to kolkhoz
employees 130
Sowing of---
seed (?) 950
Summer culti-
vation of
potatoes 15
Including:
Single-year grasses 200
Perennial grasses 100
Fodder grains 55
Ensilage grasses 30
Grasses of other
years 2,220
2, 585
Sowing in pri-
vate gardens 0. 5 Including:
Summer grain 0.2
Potatoes 0. 1
Fallow land plowed
Land plowed in autumn for
harvest of summer grain
Fertilizer spread
4, 000
6, 000
150, 000 tons.
Grain
105 dz
Cotton
30
Sunflowers
75
Flax
50
Potatoes
700.
(62) b. Yield of vegetable crops
Total: 933 hectares
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Including: Two-year crops
Root vegetables
Perennial grasses
Single-year grasses
Normal hay mowing
105
400
50
100
80.
(63) c.
Storage of grasses in silos 232, 000 tons.
Kolkhoz gardens
Berry
Vineyards
200 hectares
850
Grape hothouses
17.
(64) d.
Planned operations of Machine Tractor Stations for 1945
(in 1000 hectares):
Spring plowing
Field preparation before
spring plowing
100
Sowing of summer grain
650
Cultivation of fallow fields
600
250
Grain harvested by combines
600
Sowing of winter grain
700
Plowing fields for sowing
of summer grain
420
3, 950.
Grain thrashed by Machine
Tractor Stations 5, 000 tons.
(65) The secretaries of the Party Organizations of Kabardino-Balkar
and Ordzhonikidze Kraj were directed to forward any possible objections or
protests concerning the above plans within three days to the NK for Agriculture.
(66) 3. Krasnodar Kraj
The Kraj Executive Committee submitted the following proposals for
field cultivation for the spring of 1945 (in 1000 hectares):
Total area under cultivation:
14, 000
Including:
Summer grain
9, 087
Including:
Wheat
1,400
Corn
3,000
Bean crops
5
Technical crops
3, 603
Castor
100
Tobacco
115
Vegetables
610
Potatoes
160
Fodder plants
11900
Hay
250
Fodder beets
100
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(67) 4. Georgian Republic
The Georgian Central Committee of the Party submitted to the NK for
Agriculture the following proposals for 1945:
Summer sowing: 5, 050 hectares
Including:
Grain
Summer wheat
Summer barley
Corn
Millets
Rice
Beans
4, 097
430
626
2, 950
10
10
20
Winter sowing: 2, 500 hectares
Plowing fallow land in autumn: 75, 000 hectares
b. Seed plantations
Perennial grasses
Single-year grasses
c. Vineyard kolkhozes
1, 700
1, 600
200
(Plus the assignment to guarantee 2, 000, 000 grapevine
cuttings)
d. Machine Tractor Stations
Spring plowing
Summer sowing
Winter sowing
75, 000
25, 000
45, 000
(68) 5. Dagestan Republic
On 1 December the following condition of agricultural operations
announced:
Area to be plowed for autumn cultivation
Plowed
Other operations
Harrowed
Unplowed fallow land
Plowed in preparation for spring planting
3, 286 hectares
31, 981
7, 013
183, 903
13, 587
7,409.
(?)
Hectare figures have been taken directly from Russian communications,
and in some cases contradictions occur. For example, for Krasnodar Kraj
the total seeded area is given as 14 million hectares, or 140, 000 square kilo-
meters, but the total field area of the Kraj amounts to only 81, 000 square
kilometers. The same numerical relationship applies for all other figures
given for total field area.
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(69) 6. Rostov Oblast'
Plowing assigned for sowing summer grain at sovkhozes of the
Sovkhoztrust was carried out unsatisfactorily. In the period from 11 through
15 November only 2, 495 hectares were plowed. The Sovkhoztrust was directed
to intensify the work because ample fuel was available.
(70) 7. Ordzhonikidze Kraj
In order to establish improved supplies of seed, the following measures
were ordered by the Kraj Executive Committee on authority of the Council of
Peoples' Commissars of the Union:
1. Only especially high-quality grain and leguminous plant areas
should be sowed. In 1945 these areas should make up 75% of
the fields under cultivation.
2. During 1946 there must be a seed plantation available in every
administrative rajon. In 1945 an additional 20 new seed
plantations are to be established.
3. In 1945 high-quality seed.should be collected from 675, 000 hectares
of land.
4. During 1945, 12, 000 tons of high-quality seed grain are to be
furnished to the Government seed stockpile.
5. In order to administer cultivation of seed grains in the rajons, 40
persons are to be trained in 6-month courses.
(71) 8. kzerba jdzhan Republic
The winter crop seemed to be beset with difficulties. Over 40, 000
hectares of winter crop land were destroyed by fieldmice.
F. Conservation Measures
(72) As already reported in above messages, an intensive campaign
was undertaken to set up reserve stocks. Thus, the following was determined:
Rostov/Don Oblast' - the following were stored in October and November:
19, 500 tons Rye
53, 100 Wheat
9,400 Barley
3, 000 Millets;
The following were stored in December:
5, 000 tons Rye
15,000 Wheat
10, 000 Barley, plus an additional 15, 000 tons
of unspecified bread grains.
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(73) Storage of sunflower seed and seed potatoes, as well as that of
fodder grasses, appeared to be progressing poorly. As of 10 December the
following had been stored by kolkhozes of the Oblast':
Sunflower seed
40% of plan
Seed potatoes
18
Fodder grasses
24
Summer grain seed
69.
(74) In December bread grain was to be stored at Government Emergency
Reserve bases as follows:
Peredovaya
2, 080 tons
Rasshevatskaya
240
Karamykskaya
6,110
Petrovskij
1,690
Georgevskij
2,
080
Blagodarnenskaya
3,
900
Spitsevskaya
2,
600
Izobilenskaya
910
Cherkassk
2,
600
Mineral'nye Vody
210
Budennovsk
4,
030
Divensk
2,
080
Stavropol
2,
080
1,
560
33,
770 tons.
(75) An additional supplementary storage of 4, 600 tons was planned for
by the end of December. In addition to the amounts above, at the end of December
storage of 50, 000 tons of wheat was reported.
(76) Georgian Republic
In November 40, 000 tons of bread grain were stored and 19, 000 tons
were stored in December.
(77) Armenian Republic
In December 20, 000 tons of grain were to be stored for the government
stockpile.
(78) Groznyj Oblast'
According to a report from the Oblast' Party Committee to the Central
Committee of the Party in Moscow, through 25 December 1944 the kolkhozes of
Groznyj Oblast' had prepared 89% of planned collection of seed products for
spring sowing. In detail the following were prepared:
3, 500 tons grain seed products
373 " vegetable oil plant seeds
3, 008 " seed potatoes
or 89% of plan,
11 120% 11 fl
" 80% "
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II. Potatoes and Vegetables
(79) On 1 December the Oblast' Party Committee of Rostov/Don
Oblast' issued the following report:
On 1 December the vegetable delivery plan established by the
Government at 82, 230 tons for the Oblast' was 100% fulfilled.
(80) The potato procurement plan was fulfilled as follows:
Planned
Actual
Kolkhozes
11,
847 tons
4, 032 tons =
38%
Individual farms
5,
310
1,232
23%
Auxiliary farms
300
141
47%.
(81) From many other messages it could be determined that a serious
shortage of potatoes prevailed in Rostov/Don Oblast'.
(82) A poor potato harvest was also reported in the Azerbajdzhan
Republic
(83) It was reported on 4 December from Ordzhonikidze Kraj that the
delivery plan for fresh vegetables had been completely fulfilled. The 1, 000 tons
of dried and preserved vegetables were expected to be delivered in the near
future.
(84) The Turkmen Republic was to procure 4, 056 tons of potatoes and
12, 874 tons of vegetables according to plan in 1944. Actually, 825 tons of
potatoes and 12, 810 tons of vegetables were procured. The potatoes procured
were completely consumed by 25 December. The vegetables were to be salted
or dried in small quantities. Storage of the preserved vegetables was con-
sidered satisfactory.
(85) Few messages were noted which referred to results of the fruit
harvest. There appears to have been a poor fruit harvest in the Turkmen
Republic. Only 18% of the planned amount of dried fruit could be produced.
III. Livestock Raising
(86) The extremely few messages referring to livestock raising
intercepted in the fourth quarter make it impossible either to form a comparison
with the three preceding quarters or to compile information for a survey of the
industry.
(87) A. Livestock Breeding
Plan fulfillment in Rostov/Don Oblast' by percent:
Horses
61%
Cattle
110
Sheep
98
Hogs
94
Cows
103
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Breeding sheep 97%
Sows 86
Oxen (older than 96
two years)
Calves (castrated), 187
to be raised for
draft oxen
Plan fulfillment of young livestock reared:
Foals 85%
Calves 91
Lambs 88
Suckling pigs 89
Purchased (from other regions?):
Lambs 109 000
Hogs 900
(88) Milk production amounted to 88% of plan.
(89) In kolkhozes of the Oblast' breeding houses were established
during 1944 for:
1, 748 head Cattle
1,546 Sheep
1,253 Hogs.
(90) The following were procured for fodder:
462, 000 tons Hay
748, 000 Straw.
(91) Data on shelters for livestock are as follows:
Stalls for horses
Large cattle
Sheep
Hogs
Repaired On hand Required
32,000 38,000 28,000
270,000 335,000 31,000
467, 000 608, 000 645, 000
55, 000 67, 000 52, 000
required
General custodian personnel
3,371
3, 732
Horse tenders and herdsmen
3,507
3,996
Milkmaids
4,792
5,611
Tenders for young livestock
274
(?)
3,823
Cattle tenders
4,269
(?)
532
(?)
Ox drivers
4,820
5, 5-3
(?)
Shepherds
3, 662
4, 006
Hog tenders
2, 162
2,409.
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(92) By the end of 1945 the following results of the livestock raising
program in the Oblast' were to have been achieved: In the kolkhozes a total of
60, 000 hogs including 16, 000 breeders were to be on hand. 40, 000 of the hogs
were to be sta-ll-fattened. The hogs were to weigh at least 80 kilograms each.
(93) Armenian Republic
By the end of 1944 the following stock of livestock was to exist:
Oxen 292, 000 head
Sheep and goats 700, 000
Hogs 26, 000.
(94) The livestock raising plan for 1945 was as follows:
Cattle 308, 000 head including 55, 000 cows and 116, 000 oxen
Sheep and goats 850, 000 460, 000 breeders
Hogs 32,000 10, 000 breeders (? )
(95) B. Fodder Production
Exactly as in the first, second and third quarters, a bottleneck in
fodder procurement was also noted in the fourth quarter. This was partly the
result of transportation difficulties and partly the result of low fodder stocks.
Thus, for example, during September and October, the Meat Trust in Rostov/
Don could dispatch only 720 tons of cattle fodder to the cattle fodder bases in-
stead of the authorized 900 tons because of a shortage of stocks. Likewise,
the Cattle Procurement Office could provide only 854 tons of hay for cattle in
shipment during the same period instead of the 1, 100 tons planned. The latter
example resulted from insufficient shipping capacity on the Lower Don.
(96) According to reports from Dagestan, no hay was on hand because
of drought. Other types of rough fodder were not sufficient to cover the period
when the cattle would be in stalls.
IV. General Supply
(97) A. Bread Supply
Potatoes were used in the production of bread in larger and larger
proportions. The Chief Bread Supply Office in Ordzhonikidze Kraj issued
the order that up to 10% potatoes was to be used in the production of bread.
The potatoes were first to be cooked, then mashed and then added to the bread.
In Rostov/Don Oblast' the Oblast' Trade Department received the following
authorization containing data on the admixture of potatoes in bread production:
Grain flour
9, 010 tons
Potatoes for bread production
1, 320
Barley
60
Macaroni products
210
Potatoes
1,
350 as substitute for barley.
(98) Macaroni factories received the following plans:
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Macaroni factory
Period
Amount
Krasnodar
Fourth quarter
170 tons
November
60
Rostov/Don
Fourth quarter
450
November
160
Taganrog
Fourth quarter
290
November
90
(99) B. Supply of Meat and Dairy Products
Exactly as in the first, second and third quarters of 1944, it was also
determined in the fourth quarter that the meat supply was generally satisfactory.
Some offices overfulfilled their plans.
(100) The Meat Procurement Office in Salsk had fulfilled their fourth
quarter plan by 108% as early as 15 November. 745 dz of meat were to be pro-
cured, and 809 dz were actually delivered.
(101) In Makhachkala the Meat Combine pledged itself to produce 550
tons of meat, 100 tons of sausage and 285 tons of processed meat in the period
from 1 September to 7 November over and above the 500 tons of meat and 50 tons
of sausage planned.
(102) There were cases of nonfulfillment of plan, as, for example,
at the Meat Combine in Nal'chik. Here, in the period from 1 through 10
September only 28 tons of cattle were slaughtered.
(103) Technical difficulties were also noted. The refrigeration
stations of the Georgian Meat Combine were not working, so cattle slaughtering
operations could not be carried out.
(104) At the Meat Combine in Semipalatinsk not enough packing
material could be produced because of deficient timber deliveries, and delivery
obligations could not be met.
(105) Poor results were noted at dairies. For example, the Azer-
bajdzhan NK for Trade received only 460 tons of dairy products in October and
November instead of the 1, 600 tons planned. Georgian dairies could provide
expectant and nursing mothers with only half of the planned full-milk products
during the fourth quarter.
(106) Plan fulfillment could be noted at one location only, at
Krasnodar. The dairies of the Kra, reported the following plan fulfillment for
October:
Milk products
100%
Butter
71
Eggs
100
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(107) C. Fish Supply
The Offices of the NK for Fishing in Rostov/Don issued the following
report for the third quarter: 3, 491 persons were employed including 753 women
and 537 youths.
(108) In the first ten-day period of November 3, 700 dz of fish were
caught; since the beginning of the fourth quarter 15, 143 dz.
(109) In Rostov/Don Oblast' and in the Dagestan SSR a serious shortage
of fish prevailed. This was caused, on one hand, by not especially successful
fishing and, on the other, by poor transportation facilities.
(110) The Dagestan Fish Trust in Makhachkala could not meet its
delivery obligations to the Transcaucasus Front.
(111) According to a report of 18 November, at the Combine "Rostov-
Ugol" in Shakhty consumers received only 97 tons of fish in the fourth quarter
instead of the 455 tons planned.
( 112) According to a report from the Chief Directorate for Fish Sales
in Moscow, an extraordinarily poor fish catch occurred in the entire Soviet
Union.
(113) The following message presents information on transportation
conditions on the Caspian Sea:
In November an office of the Chief Directorate for Fish Sales was
to receive 400 tons of fish from the Fish Trust in Kislyar and
1, 400 tons from the Dagestan Fish Trust. However, only 60 tons
of fish were received from the former, and only 120 tons from the
latter .
(114) In Rostov/Don deliveries of fish products in the fourth quarter
amounted to only 30% of those in the third quarter.
(115) D. Salt Supply
The following salt extraction results were achieved:
Baksol (Baku) in September 8, 040 tons salt
in October 8, 400
1-20 November 3, 750
Nakhichevan -~~- 3,465.
(116) The Salt Extraction Office in Nakhichevan reported the follow-
ing shipments:
Date Ordered Shipped
Consignee
19 Nov 15 cars 9 cars including Armenian villages 4 cars
"Sovpren" 3
Azerbajdzhan villages 2
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Date
Ordered
Shipped
Consignee
20 Nov
15 cars
9 (sic)
Georgian Republic
1 car
"Sovpren"
6
21 Nov
No shipments because of nondelivery of railroad cars
22 Nov
15
9
"Sovpren"
2
Storage Base #4 (?)
7
23 Nov
15
7
"Sovpren"
6
Azerbajdzhan villages
1.
(117) E.
Supply of Vegetable Fats and Oils
Very good results were achieved by the Vegetable Oil Sales Office in
Groznyj. By 20 September 1, 774 tons of vegetable oil had been produced, thus
fulfilling the plan for the year. Results at the Vegetable Fats and Oils Sales
Office in Tbilisi were also satisfactory. On 16 September 14 tons of refined palm
oil were produced, and 8 tons were produced on 21 September. By 1 October the
Azerbajdzhan Vegetable Fat and Oil Directorate had made the following deliveries:
For Special Trade
18.1 tons
Military Canteens
28.4
Railroad Restaurant Directorate
3. 5
Fishery Consumers Union
8. 1
Oil Industry
38.0
Chemical Industry
12. 3
Maritime Shipping Industry
85, 3
Inland Shipping Industry
9.9
NK for Textiles
16.o
NK for Construction Materials
2. 1
NK for Light Industry
2.1
NK for Transportation
40. 9
Chief Directorate for Oil Supply
3.0
(118) In addition, 336 tons of vegetable fats were issued to the follow-
ing organizations in non-public trade:
Central Asia Military Okrug
165 tons
Organizations of the NKVD
47
Cotton ...
75
NK for the Food Industry
27
Fisheries of the Turkmen SSR
13.
(119) F. Supply of Luxury Items
In the Soviet Alcohol Industry certain difficulties occurred because of
insufficient shipments of grain necessary for the production of alcohol. Thus,
the Alcohol Plant in Groznyj could not bring in 1, 527 tons of grain because of a
lack of gasoline. Nevertheless, there was an urgent contract to produce
100, 000 liters of alcoholic beverages.
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(120) The Alcohol Plant in Krasnodar was forced to cease operations
because of a lack of mazut and coal.
(121) The Cigarette Industry suffered great difficulties because of a
shortage of special paper.
(122) G. Delivery Results from Individual Trade Offices
Georgian Republic
In the third quarter the delivery quota of the NK for Trade was ful-
filled 100% as follows:
1, 251 tons Meat products
296 Animal fat
220 Cheese.
(123) Azerbajdzhan Republic
In neither the third nor the fourth quarter was the delivery quota of
the Azerbajdzhan NK for Trade completely fulfilled. Deliveries were as follows:
(in the third quarter)
Fish 864 tons a 56% of the third quarter quota
Meat products 1, 277 81
Animal fat 291 88
(in the fourth quarter)
Fish products
520 tons =
52% of all authorizations
Meat products
1,540
55
Animal fat
231
95
Cheese
64
53
Milk
830
2
Vegetable fat
440
44
Sugar
256
126
Sugar goods
453
67.
(124) As a result of nonfulfillment of the fishing program by the NK
for Fishing, the market presumably could not be completely supplied with fish
products. In October the fishing program was fulfilled by 31% and in November
by 43%.
(125) In order to assure a complete supply of meat products, substitutes
were resorted to. The 74 tons of dried eggs which were sent did not cover exist-
ing requirements, and a supplementary allocation of 120 tons was needed.
Supplies to the market of vegetable fat were delayed because the question of
release of 420 tons of "shorting" (preserved fish?) had not as yet been definitely
decided. As a result of insufficient supplies of dried milk, by the end of the
quarter a deficiency of 170 tons of milk could not be avoided.
(126) According to a report from the Azerbajdzhan NK for Trade,
the requirements of medical institutions for animal and vegetable fat could not
once be met.
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(127) Rostov/Don Oblast'
In October the following discrepancies arose in the Oblast': The
following were required to supply the civilian population on the basis of food
authorizations:
9, 836 tons Flour
11000 Barley.
For this period the following were allocated:
9, 010 tons Flour
270
Barley
2,
470
Potatoes (instead of 330 tons of flour
and 270 tons of barley).
(128) As there were no potatoes in the Oblast', reduction of the flour
and barley allotments for civilian supply resulted in an extremely serious situation.
The Oblast' Executive Committee, therefore, requested an additional allotment
for October of 826 tons of flour and 260 tons of barley, and also sought authoriza-
tion to use barley instead of potatoes as an admixture in the manufacture of bread.
(129) The supply situation at Rostov medical institutions also left
much to be desired: during the fourth quarter, food for only 3, 000 patients was
issued instead of for 7, 400 as was required.
(130) Ordzhonikidze Kraj
In the Kraj the NKVD Prison Directorate complained that too little
food had been allotted to prisoners.
(131) The following prices for potatoes and vegetables in the Kabardino-
Balkar Republic were noted on 24 October:
1 kilogram Potatoes
0.65 rubles
Fresh cabbage
0.40
Preserved cabbage
1.20
Leeks
Z.__
Beets
1.30
Carrots
0. 50
Fresh cucumbers
0. 50
Salted cucumbers
1. a-.
(132) Food Rationing
Just as in the first, second and third quarters, a definite division of
the different levels of supply could not be established in the fourth quarter.
Rations noted for the last quarter of 1944 are as follows:
At coal enterprises
On the basis of a decree of the "GOKO" on 24 December 1944, the
following increased ration schedule was set up for workers at plants of the NK
for Coal who worked under especially unhealthy conditions:
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Bread
1, 000 grams per day
Meat or fish
3, 200 monthly
Fat
900
Barley or macaroni
2, 000
Sugar or sweets
5, 000.
(133) On the basis of another decree of the "GOKO" in October 1944,
beginning with October, all day workers in the coal mines were to receive a daily
cold breakfast ration in addition to normal rations as follows:
100 grams Bread
50 Pork grease
10 Sugar.
Workers and other employees who fulfilled their working norms and delivery
quotas by less than 80% were not to be issued the cold breakfast ration. Issuance
of the breakfast ration was dependent on production from the previous day.
(134) At enterprises of the NK for the Merchant Fleet
(per man per month)
? grams Meat
200 Fish (?)
600 Fat
1,500 Barley and macaroni
500 Sugar and sweets
700 Bread (daily).
(135) At enterprises of the NK for Aircraft Construction
(per man per month)
500 grams Fish or meat
200 Fat
600 Barley and macaroni
200 (?) Pastry goods.
(136) At Trade Schools
(per man per month)
3. 7 kilograms Meat or fish
0.9 Fat
3. 0 Barley and macaroni
0. 5 Sugar and sweets
0.03 Tea
4.5 Milk.
(137) At a Sanatorium of the Red Army
(per man per day)
200 grams Meat
50 Fish
30 Caviar, preserved fish or salmon
100 Butter
100 Sugar
200 Fresh fruits or 310 grams of
preserved fruits
35 Sour cream
25 White cheese
10 Rice
20 Wheat grits.
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3. Metal Su ly
I. Scrap Collection and Processing
(138) In the last quarter the same intense activity in scrap collection
and delivery was observed as that which prevailed in the three preceding quarters.
According to intercepted messages, plans seemed generally to be fulfilled.
(139) In detail, the following could be determined:
. Azerbajdzhan Republic: from 1 through 15 October, scrap metal was
Planned 2, 633 tons
Shipped Processed
2, 633 tons 2, 323 tons
Actual fulfillment 2, 665 2,851 2,207
(140) Armenian Republic: In the fourth quarter the Republic had pro-
cured and shipped the following:
300 tons Steel scrap
100 Cast iron scrap
100 Metal shavings.
(141) Ordzhonikidze Kraj: The plan assigned for the fourth quarter was
fulfilled as follows:
Shipped
3, 000 tons
5, 750 tons 2, 900 tons.
(142) Rostov/Don Oblast': Through 6 December 20, 638 tons of scrap
were collected and 17, 850 tons shipped in the Oblast'. Collection and shipment
in the fourth quarter were as follows:
Actual Fulfillment Shipped
4, 000 tons 5, 066 tons 4, 151 tons.
(143) In the first ten-day period of December the Non-ferrous Metal
Scrap Collection Points had procured the following:
Copper 20 tons
Brass 14
Lead 5
Aluminum Z Z
Others 2
Shipped 95.
(144) Turkmen Republic: In the fourth quarter the Republic was to pro-
cure and ship the following:
2, 200 tons Steel scrap
400 Cast iron scrap
400 Metal shavings.
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II. General Supply Situation
(145) In the last quarter a serious shortage of cast iron was generally
noted. In detail the following was determined:
October:
In general, a serious shortage of iron, steel and cast iron scrap prevailed during
the month of October. The shortages were partly caused by strained trans-
portation facilities, as indicated, for example, in the following message:
"At the Stalin Plant in Taganrog over 5, 000 tons of metal
shavings have been collected. The North Caucasus Railroad
refuses to furnish railroad cars even though they were already
authorized. As a result, shipment of metal shavings to the
Enakievo Plant has been disrupted for three months.
(146) The shortages were also partly the result of an actual lack of
iron and steel scrap. During the fourth quarter only 6, 300 tons of scrap could
be authorized for the Plant "Grant" in Baku instead of 8, 100 tons.
(147) The shortage of cast iron was especially serious in various
branches of industry. Examples of this follow.
(148) Novocherkassk: The Plant "Nikol'skij" contracted for 60 tons
of cast iron from "Gora" at Tula. The lack of cast iron prevented the fulfillment
of a Government contract for reconstruction of mines in the Donbass.
(149) Voroshilovsk: The Plant "Stall" was to expedite shipment of 20
tons of cast iron to the Technical Oil Industry Supply Office in Groznyj. Because
of a lack of cast iron, production of spare parts for machines for the Oil
Industry was halted.
(150) Taganrog: "Trubostal" urgently required cast iron. Delivery
of 1, 500 tons of cast iron from Konstantinovka was not carried out as planned.
(151) Groznyj The plant of the Technical Oil Supply Office could
not manage with the 100 tons of cast iron scrap allocated. The plant in Makeevka
was to deliver an additional 200 tons.
(152) Taganrog: According to a message from "Trubostal" to the
Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar for Transportation in Moscow (copies to the
Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar for Iron and to "Glavtrubostal"), the 1, 500
tons of cast iron which were contracted for shipment in October from the
"Frunze" Plant in Konstantinovka to the "Andreev" Plant, could not be delivered
because of a lack of railway cars. Permission was requested to procure railway
cars in excess of plan from the South Donets Railway.
(153) A lack of semi-finished goods was likewise noted. Thus, at
Plant No. 765 packing of ammunition had to be halted because of a lack of iron
strip, and the "Andreev" Plant could deliver only 643 tons of tin plate in
October instead of 920 tons because of a lack of rolled metal.
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(154) November:
In November, a shortage of ferro-manganese and metal scraps was
added to the shortage of cast iron noted in October. The Plant in Krasnyj Sulin
was forced to halt production of steel products because of a lack of ferro-
manganese. The Plant "Trubostal" received only 631 tons of metal scrap by
15 November instead of the 2, 750 tons required. Production of articles to meet
daily requirements was likewise greatly limited because of a lack of iron scraps
in Rostov/Don Oblast'. As a result of the cast iron shortage, difficulties arose
at the "Andreev" Plant in Taganrog, at agricultural repair shops in Pyatigorsk
and Cherkassk, at the metal processing plants of the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine
and at the Oil Combines in Groznyj and Krasnodar. At Plant No. 613 (location
not specified) munition production had to be halted, and at the Plant "Krasnyj
Molot" in Groznyj manufacture of tractors and pumps had to be halted. Unsatis-
factory deliveries of tin affected production at the plants of "Trubostal" in
Taganrog and at the Railroad Car Plant in Kalinin. A serious shortage of tubing
arose at the Plants "Instrument" and "Kotelshchik" in Taganrog. Shortages of
rolled iron, mine rails and metal alloys, particularly at plants of the NK for
Armaments, were also noted.
(155) The Technical Oil Supply Office in Azerbajdzhan could not make
delivery of the required amount of bronze to a subordinate plant.
(156) December:
During December a continuance of the cast iron shortage was not con-
firmed, but a shortage of steel was noted. For example, because of a lack of
steel in Lyubertsy at the Plant "Avangard" production of agricultural machines
had to be interrupted, and at.the Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog punching
operations had to be halted. Reconstruction of cokeries at the Oil Enterprises
in Groznyj had to be halted for the same reason.
(157) At a steel working plant in Baku production of special products
had to be halted because of a shortage of round steel, and at the Repair Shops of
the NK for Agriculture the repair of tractors during the autumn and winter
months had to be interrupted also.
III. Production at Certain Plants
(158) The following data present figures on production results, ore
and fuel turnover, and conclusions as to the possible capacities of certain plants:
Foundry in Stalino: Turnover of ore and heating material on 1 October -
Iron Ore Manganese Ore
Scrap Iron
Arrived 1, 093 tons a tons
Consumed 1,492 88
On Hand 56,927 581
34 tons
34
8 02
Ferro-silicon Ferro-manganese Limestone
103 tons
103
13, 443.
Metal shavings
Arrived - tons - tons 235 tons 165 tons
Consumed 3 4 654 165
On hand 88 23 324 -.
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Gas Coal Low Quality Coal Anthracite Coke Heating Mazut
Arrived 16 tons 28 tons
Consumed 46 78
On hand 38 638
- tons 979 tons 199 tons
1, 167 149
1,022 6, 121 504.
(159) Foundry in Krasn j Sulin: Stocks and turnover -
On 21 October the following turnover of heating material was noted:
Arrived Consumed
Anthracite 51 tons 159 tons
Mazut 91 24,
On 16 November
On 1 December
On 3 December
3, 320 tons Iron ore
1, 202 Manganese ore
1, 32 0 Lime stone
1,002 Quartzite
1, 300 tons Iron ore
11090 Manganese ore
1,200 Limestone
1,000 Quartzite
1, 695 tons Cast iron
50 Basic slag
12 Ferromanganese.
(160) Plant of "Trubostal" in Taganrog: In November 750 railroad
cars of iron were to be shipped. In December the following shipments were to be
received:
Consignor
100 tons
Iron ore
Krivoj Rog
800
Manganese ore
Chiatura
198
Limestone
Kara-Kab
1 railroad car
Fluorspar
Arkhangel'sk.
(161) On 1 December the plant received an order from the NK for
Iron to complete by 5 December fulfillment of all contracts from October and
November, i. e. , to produce the following:
356 tons Sheeting
162 Gas piping
100 Oil pipeline sections
1, 130 Feed pipes.
Moreover, the plant was ordered to complete and ship by 25 December all
orders for the NK for Oil as follows:
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144 tons Sheeting
170 Rolled tubing
30 Oil pipeline sections
1,100 . Feed pipes.
Shipments to the NK for Oil were to be given the same priority as shipments to
the Armaments Industry.
(162) Plant "Ilich" in Mariupol': In the third ten-day period.of
November the Plant "Ilich" was to ship 18, 000 tons of metal products, but
actually only 9, 855 tons were shipped. Nonfulfillment of the plan was a result
of the cessation of operations at the rolling mill because of the fuel shortage.
(163) Plant of the Mortar Industry in Krasnodar: From 11 through 16
October the plant had the following turnover of metals:
Intake:
Consumption:
On hand:
Cast Iron
20 t
8t
17 t
Iron Sheet lmm
34 t
5t
38 t
Iron Sheet 2mm
20 t
5t
15 t
(164) Plant "Bolt" in Khabarovsk: For the first quarter of 1945 the
following scrap processing plan was established for the plant:
Processing 80 t
Deliveries to
"Vtorchermet" 150 t
(165) In November the copper rolling mill in Tbilisi produced 28 tons
of copper products.
4. Coal Supply
(166) A. Transportation Difficulties:
In domestic radio traffic information was intercepted only concerning
the Rostov-Ugol Combine in Shakhty. The intercepted messages presented a
clear picture of the scope of transportation difficulties which were especially
serious with respect to the coal supply situation. We may assume that these
difficulties did not pertain only to the Rostov-Ugol Combine, but to the trans-
portation situation at all other large coal supply centers.
(167) Some examples of transportation difficulties follow:
During 20 days of October too few railroad cars were provided as follows:
North Caucasus Railway
5, 321 railroad cars
Southeast Railway
143 "
If
North Donets Railway
551 "
if
Stalingrad Railway
716 "
it
Half of the empty cars which arrived were not suitable for the transportation
of coal.
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(168) In order to assure coal shipments the following measures were
considered necessary:
1. The NK for Transportation was to see to it that the North
Caucasas Railway provided usable empty railroad cars.
2. At the places where coal trains were assembled, special
attention was to be given that no damaged cars were sent to the
North Caucasas Railway.
3. In order that railroad car walls might be repaired by employees
of the North Caucasas Railway a considerable quantity of wood
was provided monthly because the construction of walls from
reeds and bushes consumed an extraordinarily long time.
4, The other railway lines were to provide empty coal cars to the
North Caucasas Railway precisely according to the plan of
the NK for Transportation.
(169) Interminable delays resulted in loading operations because of
the lack of mechanical loading equipment and during night work because of a
shortage of sufficient electric lighting.
(170) From 1 through 11 October loading operations proceeded as
follows - only 64% of the plan was fulfilled:
6, 596 railroad cars with 138, 516 tons of coal were ordered but only 4, 258 cars
with 88,790 tons of coal were provided and dispatched.
(171) At the end of October it was reported that about 400, 000 tons of
coal had accumulated at the mine pits of the Rostov-Ugol Combine. Of this,
about 247, 000 tons were on the loading ramps of the railway. On 29 October the
situation seemed to become unbearable and the following message was intercepted:
"To Moscow, NK for Transportation, Comrade Kaganovich, copy
to Moscow, NK for Coal, Comrade Vakhrushchev.
"Coal shipments are proceeding especially poorly. For three
months the Combine has repeatedly reported work arrears. This
is the fault of the North Caucasas Railway which furnishes from
200 to 300 railroad cars too few every day. As a result, the
Combine can fulfill the shipping plan only by 60 to 65%. The mines
are overflowing with coal. On the railroad spur lines of the
Combine are stored over 100, 000 tons of coal. As a result of a
shortage of shipping, some mines will have to cease operations
in the near future. This condition has prevailed for three months.
If the North Caucasas Railway does not improve the delivery of
railroad cars, the Combine can never fulfill the assigned plans. I
urgently request that you meet the Combine half way in this matter.
We have coal and transport workers; only cars are lacking. For
three months the Combine has been blamed for not having fulfilled
plans. I request that you assume responsibility for this situation.
I repeat: the blame for non-fulfillment of shipping plans falls
solely on the North Caucasas Railway and its chief, Kalabukhov.
Rostov-Ugol, Chief of the Combine, Kartashev. "
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(172) On 31 October 1944 the following answer to the above message
was received:
"Rostov/Don to the Chief of the Comline "Rostov-Ugol. " Points
1, 4, and 9 of Decree No. 6832 of 29 October 1944 from the GOKO
are hereby reported. The State Committee for Defense has noted
non-fulfillment of the coal shipping plan in October. An intolerable
situation has arisen. The limited coal stocks which were for needs
of the railroads and industry during the winter months are already
being consumed. The State Committee for Defense charges to the
Chief of the North Donets Railway, Krivonosov, the Chief of the
South Donets Railway, Larionov, the Chief of the North Caucasas
Railway, Kalabukhov, as well as to the chiefs of the coal combines,
"Stalino-Ugol, " Zaryad'ko, "Voroshilov-Ugol, " Voruchenko,
"Rostov-Ugol, " Kartashev, and the first Secretaries of the Oblast'
Party Committees of Stalino Oblast', Melnikov, Voroshilovgrad
Oblast', Graev, and Rostov Oblast', Aleksandryuk, for nonfulfill-
ment of the plan for shipping Donets coal which is of prime
importance for supplying railways near the front. The State Com-
mittee for Defense considers fulfillment of the coal shipping plan
one of the most important military-economic assignments and
orders the following:
Point 1: The People's Commissar for Transportation, Kaganovich,
for Coal, Vakhrushev, the Representative of the Chief Directorate
for Coal Supply on the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union,
Kurgashev, the chiefs of the Southeast, Stalingrad, North Caucasas
and North Donets Railways, and the chief of the Coal Supply Office
at Rostov are charged with the assignment to increase coal shipments
from the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine. The following quantities are to be
shipped daily:
Southeast Railway:
from 30 to 31 October 65 railroad cars 1, 360 tons
from 1 to 8 November 48 " 1, 010 "
Stalingrad Railway:
from 30 to 31 October 95 railroad cars 2, 000 tons
from 1 to 8 November 92 " _ 1, 930 "
North Caucasas Railway:
from 30 to 31 October 680 railroad cars e 14, 280 tons
from 1 to 8 November 734 11 = 15, 414 "
North Donets Railway:
from 30 to 31 October
from 1 to 8 November
116 railroad cars 2,440 tons
121 11 2, 550 "
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Point 4: The First Secretary of the Oblast' Party Committee of
Rostov Oblast', Aleksandryuk, is to conscript 1, 000 persons for
work at the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine by 1 January 1945, Moreover,
the necessary loading machines, trucks, and horse-drawn trans-
port facilities are to be procured.
Point 9: The chiefs of the railways servin
the coal combines, the
chiefs of the coal supply offices, and thest secretaries of the
fir
oblast' party committees are hereby informed that they have been
personally charged by the State Committee for Defense for the respon-
sibility for exact fulfillment of the coal shipping contracts in the above
amounts. In event of non-fulfillment of the contract, absolutely no
excuse will be tolerated. Progress reports are to be submitted at
the beginning of November to the State Committee for Defense.
Signed: Chairman of the State Committee for Defense, J. Stalin.
(173) According to this order, daily planned shipments from 30 to 31
October were to amount to 956 railroad cars of 20, 080 tons of coal, and from 1
to 8 November to 995 railroad cars or 20, 904 tons of coal. During the first,
second, and third quarters of 1944 the highest daily shipping plan for the "Rostov-
Ugol" Combine amounted to 8, 597 tons and that of the Coal Supply Office in
Rostov 8, 640 tons, a total of 17, 237 tons. The highest totals actually shipped
were 5, 882 and 8, 666 tons of coal respectively, a total of 14, 548 tons.
(174) The signature of Stalin seems to have had its effect because the
next reports on shipments presented an improved picture. The following
results were achieved:
North Caucasas Railway:
Planned:
680 railroad cars _
14,
280 tons
Ordered:
700
14,
700 tons
Furnished and shipped:
? " m
11,
046 tons
Southeast Railway:
Planned:
65 railroad cars
1,
360 tons
Ordered:
65
1,
360 tons
Furnished and shipped:
48
1,
050 tons
North Donets Railway:
Planned:
116 railroad cars m
2,
440 tons
Ordered:
74
1,
555 tons
Furnished and shipped:
64
1,
332 tons
Stalingrad Railway:
Planned-
95 railroad cars
2, 000 tons
Ordered-
95 a
2, 000 tons
Furnished and shipped:
? of e
1, 226 tons
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(175) In total the Combine had to ship 20, 080 tons - 956 railroad cars.
940 railroad cars for 19, 746 tons were ordered and 687 railroad cars giving a
capacity to ship 14, 654 tons were provided and shipped. Responsibility for in-
sufficient delivery of railroad cars was assumed by the North Caucasas Railway.
On 31 October 700 railroad cars for 14, 700 tons of coal were ordered from the
North Caucasas Railway. However, only 577 railroad cars for 12, 000 tons of
coal were provided.
(176) 1st ten-day period in November:
Railway: Planned: Ordered:
Shipped:
North Caucasas 7, 340 rr cars 7, 422 rr cars 6, 153 rr cars
5, 676 rr cars
Railway = 154, 200 t _ 156, 132 t _ 129, 018 t
- 119,
Southeast 480 rr cars 532 rr cars 461 rr cars
452 rr cars
Railway = 10, loot = 11, 220 t 10, 008 t
9, 833 t
North Donets 1, 210 rr cars 1, 033 rr cars
857 rr cars
Railway = 25, 500 t . 21, 630 t = 18, 619 t
18, 003 t
Stalingrad 920 rr cars 934 rr cars 689 rr cars
686 rr cars
Railway = 19, 320 t 19, 908 t _ 14, 480 t
14, 423 t
9, 950 rr cars 9, 918 rr cars 8, 190 rr cars 7, 671 rr cars
= 209, 120 t _ 208, 890 t = 172, 225 t = 161, 505 t
(177) On 27 November:
Ordered
North Caucasas Railway 746 rr cars
Southeast Railway 44
North Donets Railway 90
Stalingrad Railway 85
599 rr cars 499 rr
17 15
65
75
cars 10, 868 t
374 t
1, 216 t
1,124t
(178) The role of truck shipments in the coal situation is indicated by
the following order from the Peoples' Commissar for Coal, Vakhrushev, and the
Chief of the Chief Directorate of Motorized Troops of the Red Army, Lt. Gen.
Tyagunov:
Requisition for trucks to transport coal from mines to shipping points:
1. Regiment Cmdr. Col. Nabokov, is directed to divide up the trucks
and dispatch them to the individual mines of the Combines
"Stalin-Ugol", "Voroshilovgrad- Ugol", and "Rostov- Ugol".
Division of the trucks according to the coal shipping plans at the
individual combines is to be determined by the representative of
the Peoples' Commissars, Comrade Savchenko.
2. Regiment Cmdr. Col. Nabokov, is held fully responsible for the
fulfillment of the coal shipping plans at the individual battalions,
as well as for organizing the proper utilization, repair and up-
keep of the trucks.
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3. In order to assure smooth execution of the work of the entire
regiment, the following are to serve as representatives of the
chiefs of the combines in the coal transportation negotiations:
For the "Voroshilovgrad-Ugol" Combine, the Regiment Cmdr.
Col. Nabokov, headquarters located together with the regiment
headquarters in Voroshilovgrad. For the "Stalin-Ugol" Combine,
deputy Rgt. Cmdr. Major Antonov, headquarters at the Stalino
Combine. For the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine, Battalion Cmdr.
Capt. Radchenko, headquarters at battalion headquarters in
Shakhty.
4. In carrying out the coal shipping -plan and in order to improve
utilization of the trucks, and in carrying out the loading and un-
loading operations, all orders. from the chiefs of the combines
for the regiment commander and his representatives as well as
for the battalion commander are to be carried out unquestioningly.
5. Deputy Peoples' Commissar of the Coal Industry, Comrade
Savchenko, is charged with the responsibility of representing the
chiefs of the combines in coal shipping negotiations.
The Peoples' Commissar for Coal
Signed: Vakhrushev
Chief of the Chief Directorate for
Motorized Troops of the Red Army
Signed: Lt. Gen. Tyagunov
(179) B. Coal Production
Messages were also intercepted indicating that not only the difficult
transportation situation but also low production of coal contributed to the poor
coal supply picture. For example, Mine #7 of the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine pro-
duced 100 tons of coal per day in October less than in September. Mine #20 in
the first 8 days of October was 840 tons behind schedule. At the Coal Trust in
Rostov, as well as at the mines in Novoshakhtinsk of the "Rostov.Ugol" Combine
daily extraction dropped from 120 tons to 96 tons.
(180) The following message refers to the coal production situation:
"From Moscow to Gundorovka, Rostov Oblast', "Gundorov.Ugol",
to Kudrin and Sinitsin.
"In November the Trust operated very poorly. For 21 days the
daily plan was fulfilled by only 75. 6%. The contract for making
miners available has not been fulfilled. 230 too few men have been
made available. For this reason, coal deliveries to the foundries
of the South and to the railroads are endangered. I order you to take
immediate steps to fulfill the November plan. Give the mines
detailed operational contracts. I remind you that you are charged with
personal responsibility for carrying out the coal extraction plan in
November. Report measures taken.
Signed: Vakhrushev "
-44-
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General Supply
(181) Supply was especially strained. Many branches of the economy
had been very poorly supplied, above all, the Food Industry.
(182) The mills in Millerovo and Tarasovka had to cease operations
because of the lack of coal.
(183) The preserves factory in Simferopol received only 600 tons of
coal instead of the 800 tons needed.
(184) The Bread Combine in Taganrog was suffering great difficulties
as a result of the coal shortage.
(185) In the generating stations in Kamenskaya, Shakhty, and Rostov,
there was no coal.
(186) At the "Andreev" Plant the blast furnaces and the turbo-
generator were operating only sporadically because of the coal shortage.
(187) The Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in Taganrog had no supplies
of coal. The chemical plant in Kirovakan was to consume only 1, 350 tons of
coal in October. Any consumption in excess of that amount was prohibited.
(188) The leather factory in Taganrog had ceased operations because
of a lack of coal. At the Don Steamship Agency considerable difficulties had
arisen- - 5, 000 tons of coal were required there immediately.
(189) In Dnepropetrovsk the Meat Combine had to cease operations as
a result of the coal shortage.
(190) In Dzaudzhikau the brewery had to cease operations because of
the same reason and in Millerovo, local mills also had to cease operations.
(191) In Voronezh Oblast' there was no coal for blacksmiths. Repairs
on tractors and agricultural equipment had to be halted.
(192) A plant of "Trubostal" in Taganrog and a plant of
"Glavtrubostal" in the Donbas received only 372 tons and 330 tons of coal
respectively instead of the 2, 000 tons and 2, 500 tons respectively required.
(193) The Plant "Instrument" of the NK for Munitions in Taganrog had
to halt operations completely at the middle of November because of a lack of
coal.
(194) The Plant of the NK for the Heavy Machine Industry in Lyudinovo
was to receive 380 tons of coal in November. By 27 November Stalino-Ugol had
not shipped anything.
(195) Plant 221 of the NK for Armaments was to receive 500 tons of
coal from Shakhty "Rostov-Ugol" in November. By 26 November only 60 tons had
arrived.
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(196) The North Caucasian Hospital Administration had to halt heating
of hospitals because of the coal shortage.
(197) The Trust "Rosglavkhleb" in Voronezh reported that the pro-
duction of bread as well as the supplying of units of the Red Army had to be halted
because of the lack of coal.
(198) At the Food Institute in Poltava neither courses in instruction nor
laboratory work could be carried on because of the lack of coal.
(199) The administration of the Fat Combine in Rostov/Don had not re-
ceived any coal for two months. Operations had to be halted at soap and lard
factories.
(200) The Plant of "Grom" in Kharkov could not manufacture products
important to the war effort because of the lack of coal.
(201) Plant 81 of the NK for Munitions in Taganrog had received only
40 tons of coal in the first 3 days of December instead of the 4, 200 tons required.
(202) In a message to the Central Committee of the Party in Moscow,
the Rolling Department at a plant in Makeevka had to cease operations at the end
of November and the beginning of December because of the lack of heating material.
From 1 through 11 December, 9, 000 tons of coal were to be delivered. However,
only 2, 311 tons arrived.
(203) In the first 10-day period of December the chemical plant in
Konstantinovka was to receive 800 tons of coal. In the first 4 days, however,
only 128 tons arrived.
(204) Coal of low quality was delivered so that "Dontranstop" refused
acceptance of coal with a high ash content from a number of mines of the
"Rostov-Ugol" Combine for the use of the railroads. On 1 December coal stocks
were on hand at the mines of the combine as follows:
Mine
Quantity
Ash Content
Mine 47
6, 730 tons
37.
5%
31
6, 978
33.
5
(?)
"Popovka"
3,.858
41.
9
"Tatsinskaya"
2, 642
46.
"Severnaya"
373
28.
5. Oil Supply
(205) Oil supply in the Soviet Union is not a problem of oil extraction,
but a pronounced transportation problem. Oil extraction generally seems to be
sufficient. At any rate, there are sufficient stocks of oil on hand to protect the
Soviet Union against any shortage. The technical side of the extraction, in
contrast to that of coal production, seems to be satisfactory. During the last
2 years, technical shortages were noted relatively rarely in domestic radio
traffic. All the difficulties which arose in this period were transportation
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difficulties. The seriousness and extent to which they affected all branches of
the economy will be repeated again in this report.
(206) A. Effect of Transportation Difficulties in Oil Supply
On 27 November the following message was intercepted:
"From Makhachkala, 5 copies to (1) Moscow Chief Directorate for Oil
Supply, Vovchenko
(2) USGKA (Lubrication and Fuel
Directorate of the Red Army),
_K ormilitsin
(3) Voenmortop (Naval Fuel Directorate ? )
(4) . . . . . of the Party, Golikov
(5) NK for Transportation, Langukhin
"As a result of poor procurement of tank cars the November trans-
portation plan for oil products was carried out very unsatisfactorily. As of 25
November the monthly' plan for railroad transportation was fulfilled by only 32
percent. Delivery obligations were fulfilled as follows:
Defense
47%
Navy
20
Agriculture
55
Transportation
27
"The percentage of fulfillment of lubricant deliveries was especially
low. . . . . As a result of poor plan fulfillment on the part of railway trans-
portation, further deliveries from Baku could not be accepted in Makhachkala
because the storage capacity at the latter city was completely jammed.
"The Azerbajdzhan Oil Supply Office and "Kasptanker" sent cargoes to
Makhachkala although they knew that the tankers would have a long storage time in
Makhachkala. They do it in order to fulfill their monthly plans. In Makhachkala,
as early as November, a very serious situation has arisen even though the harbor
of Astrakhan has not yet been closed by ice. I urgently request assistance.
"First of all regular delivery of tank cars must be arranged; secondly,
shipping on the waterways from Baku must be regulated.
Signed: Kashlaev "
(207) Especially remarkable is the statement that as a result of poor
plan fulfillment of railway shipments, no further deliveries could be accepted
from Baku in Makhachkala, because storage capacity there was jammed.
(208) In December also many similar messages were intercepted.
For example, during the first ten days of December, instead of 2, 000 tank cars
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of avtol and industrial oils, only 150 were filled by the Oil Supply Office in
Makhachkala. This amounted to only about 7. 5 percent of the plan. Shipment of
winter lubricants for the NK for Transportation in the same period had been
carried out considerably better, but nevertheless the plan was fulfilled by only
81 percent. This low shipping plan fulfillment was as a result of a poor delivery
of empty tank cars and a lack of manpower.
(209) According to a message from the NK for the Tank Industry,
"Neftesnab" in Groznyj was ordered by a government decree to deliver the
following to plants of the NK for the Tank Industry:
13, 950 tons of mazut
6 tank cars of aircraft gasoline
14 tank cars of motor gasoline
Of this 7, 150 tons of mazut and 3 tank cars of motor gasoline were delivered.
Because of non-fulfillment of this government contract a very serious situation
arose at the plants.
(210) At the oil supply center in Krasnovodsk also, the transportation
situation was no better. Diesel oil deliyery obligations could not be met.
(211) In spite of this especially serious situation, messages were inter-
cepted according to which plans were even over-fulfilled. For example, in June
the following quantities of oil products, which amounted to 120% of the plan arrived
in Krasnovodsk:
Motor oil
4,
902 tons
Summer mazut
12,
902
Petroleum
17,
985
Gasoline for Special Purposes
6,
333
Ligroin
5,
246
Diesel oil
6,
172
Solar oil
206
Avtol
3,
562
It
6,
405
Nigrol
1,104
Spindel oil
3,279
Machine oil
1,
986
Turbine oil
1,
020
71,
102 tons
(212) On 23 November oil stocks of 114, 000 tons were reported.
(213) In October the Oil Supply Office in Makhachkala fulfilled its
delivery plan for oil products by 221%. Deliveries were as follows:
86, 000 tons oil products "1"
45, 000 tons "Ambarnaya" oil
948, 000 tons (?) "Artemovskaya" oil
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C. Pumping Capacity of the Oil Lines
(214) The following table presents information on the capacity of the
pump lines:
Date
Line Makhachkala--Groznyj
Line Groznyj--Armavir
17 Aug.
1 (?)
177 tons
2, 307 tons
25 it
2,318
2,219
11 Sep.
1,200
21 "
1,144
23 It
2,232
4,308
2 Oct.
2, 181
6 "
2, 135
956
7 Nov.
2,072
8 It
1,959
20 It
2, 145
1,650
16 Dec.
2,065
(215) In spite of these relatively large amounts delivered, complaints
were often registered on unsatisfactory fulfillment of pumping plans. This was
partially because of the shortage of pump motors and also partially a result of the
shortage of workers or poor shipping conditions, because necessary amounts of
oil could not be readily brought to their destinations. Reports were also intercepted
concerning the pipeline Dzhamard (not located) and Krasnovodsk. It was to be put
in operation on 1 July with a pumping capacity by 1 September of a total of 763, 934
tons. That would be a daily pumping capacity of about 12, 320 tons.
D. Oil Prospecting
(216) In the second half year of 1944 an intensive oil prospecting
program was instituted, according to which the Azerbajdzhan Oil Industry received
the following assignment in a message of 4 August:
1. To intensify geological exploration,
2. To put in operation inoperative borings.
(217) According to a radio report, oil prospecting was undertaken in
the Caspian Sea with the aid of artificial earthquakes produced by underground
explosions.
E. General Supply Situation
July:
(218) At the beginning of July a large number of orders to individual
oil supply centers was placed by the sovkhozes and Machine and Tractor Stations
of the Ukrainian Republic. These large amounts of oil were required for harvest
and autumn procurement operations in the third quarter of 1944. They were as
follows:
174, 000 tons petroleum
25,000 ligroin
4,000 diesel fuel
16, 000 gasoline
12, 000 motor oil
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(219) Since in May the Ukraine had received 35, 000 tons of petroleum
less than had been planned in the second quarter, a considerable part of the
tractors had to halt ope-rations. As a result, 'Machine Tractor Stations and sovkhozes
would not have had sufficient stocks of oil for the harvest operations even
assuming complete delivery of the June plan. In order to assure smooth carry-
ing out of harvest operations- it was necessary to increase intake of oil for the
Ukraine particularly in the first half of the month. The Ukraine Republic was to
be allotted in the third: quarter therefore the following:
157, 000 tons Petroleum
12,000 Ligroin
3, 000 Diesel fuel
10,000 Gasoline
10, 000 Motor oil
The following allotment of lubricants was unconditionally ordered for generators,
tractors and threshers, as well as for other agricultural machinery:
1, 300 tons of avtol
160 of solidol
110 of nigrol
325 of machine oil
2) The following were
required by the Ukrainian NK for Sovkhozes:
12, 000 tons Petroleum
6, 000 Ligroin
4, 000 Gasoline
3) Fulfillment of the oil delivery plans for agriculture was to be carried out
delivery of the following (in tank cars):
6, 000 tank
600 "
150 tons
300
600
120
40
cars
11
of petroleum
" ligroin
diesel oil
motor oil
avtol
nigrol
solidol
(220) At least 60 percent of the shipments were to be made in the
first half of June.
(221) In the various branches of the economy a serious shortage of
oil products was noted. A cross-section of July messages gives the following
picture:
As a result of the gasoline shortage, large quantities of threshers
and trucks in Groznyj Oblast' were immobilized. Ashkhabad re-
ported the following on 21 July:
1. The brewery in Ashkhabad had to cease production of carbonic
acid as a result of the mazut shortage.
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2. As a result of the gasoline shortage "Yagmani-Ugol" could not
ship any additional coal.
3. Gathering in the grapes began on 1 August. The Food Industry
in Ashkhabad required 200 tons of mazut and 10 tons of gasoline
for transportation purposes as otherwise it would be impossible
to collect the grapes.
(222) In Labinskaya the dairy had to cease operations because of a
lack of solar oil.
(223) The macaroni factory in Groznyj had to cease operations because
of the lack of mazut.
(224) At many ball-bearing plants, as for example at Sverdlovsk,
Tomsk, and Kujbyshev, a serious shortage of lubricants was noted.
August
:
(225) In August, on the basis of an order from the Council of Peoples"
Commissars of the Union from the Council of the NK of Azerbajdzhan, the trucks
of the following officials and enterprises were seized as an economy measure-,
Chairman of the NK for Communications
Chief Directorate of Railway Transportation
Caucasian Power Plant Construction Directorate
NK for Local Industry
State Construction Trust of Azerbajdzhan
Baku Port Directorate
Aluminum Plant
NK for Fisheries
NK for Kolkhozes
Caspian Steamship Agency
(226) As a result of the reduction in the gasoline allotment after the
requisitioning of their trucks, enterprises subordinate to the Council of the NK
of Azerbajdzhan as well as those subordinate to the Union in Azerbajdzhan had
to cease transportation activity.
(227) The -NK for Agriculture in Azerbajdzhan was to receive 200 tons
of gasoline for the third quarter; according to a report from 26 July only 26 tons
remained on hand for August. There was also a lack of ligroin so that a large
number of threshers had to be immobilized.
(228) At the Azerbajdzhan NK for Trade the minimum requirement of
the Republic was reduced from 4, 000 tons of petroleum to 2, 000 tons. Enter-
prises of the NK for Coal were to receive 81 tank cars of industrial oil as
follows-
of spindel oil
motor oil
cylinder oil 2
turbine oil
cylinder oil 6
viscosin
transformer oil
nigrol
compressor oil
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gasoline.
(229) In 20 days of August 64 tank cars were shipped as follows:
(230) At the "Ferro" Plant in Zestafoni there was likewise a lack of
3 tank cars Spindel oil
5 Motor oil
20 Cylinder oil 2
2 Turbine oil
6 Cylinder oil 6
3 Viscosin
17 Transformer oil
8 Nigrol
(231) In Kiev Oblast' there was an extraordinarily serious shortage
of gasoline.
(232) In Voronezh Oblast' reconstruction operations had to be sus-
pended because of the lack of transformer oil.
September:
(233) In general, the total picture is not greatly changed compared to
the previous month.
(234) In the grain transportation situation, as has already been
mentioned in this report in the chapter entitled Agriculture and Food Situation,
the fuel shortage was especially serious.
(235) In Ordzhonikidze Kra, a truck battalion arrived to carry out
grain shipments. To meet a need of 525 tons of gasoline, only 24 tons were
authorized.
(236) The Oil Supply Office in Makhachkala was to ship 484 tank cars
of ligroin for enterprises of the NK for Agriculture. As of 18 July not a single
tank car had yet been shipped and even the necessary amount for the above-
mentioned enterprises had not yet arrived from Baku.
(237) Enterprises of the NK for the Food Industry, as has been
mentioned in all previous reports, were especially poorly supplied. Thus, the
bread factory in Kizil Arvat had not received any mazut for 2 months. They were
forced to cease operations and there was no supply of bread for the civilian
population.
(238) In Ordzhonikidze a large number of plants of the NK for the
Food Industry had ceased operations because of the mazut shortage. Meat
combines of the NK for Procurement in Baku suspended work for the same
reason.
(239) In Dzaudzhikau the preserves factory could produce no dried
vegetables because of a shortage of mazut and gasoline.
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(240) The following plants suspended operations because of the
shortage of heating material-
Alcohol Factory of Ossetia on 31 August
If in Kotlyarevskaya on 2 September
it in Ordzhonikidze on 11 September
(241) In order to assure fulfillment of government contracts and to safe-
guard from loss the already seriously endangered stocks of raw materials, the
following were contracted for:
For the Alcohol Factory in Kotlyarevskaya
250 tons of mazut
" it it
"
"
Ossetia
250
it
" It
if
if
Ordzhonikidze
250
It
11 " "
If
It
Pervenets
350
" It "
of
if
Groznyj
200
If
if
if
(242) The Foundry in Zestafoni also had no gasoline in September. In
Batajsk 200 tank cars of petroleum were to arrive during the month. By 23
September only 32 tank cars had arrived. Agricultural operations had to be
suspended.
(243) The Steam Power Plant of Plant 182 of the NK for Shipbuilding in
Makhachkala was supplying the following enterprises with electrical current:
Plant #182
Industry of the Oil Trust in Dagestan
Weaving Mill of the NK for Light Industry
The Oil Transshipment and Storage Base and Port
The Ship Machine Factory of the NK for the Merchant Fleet
The Railway Directorate at Makhachkala
Ship Repair Workshops of the Caspian Fleet
Enterprises of the Fishing Trust of Dagestan
Industrial Cooperatives
Oblast' Directorate Offices, etc.
(244) For production of electric current the Steam Power Plant re-
quired 3, 800 tons of mazut monthly. For July of 1944 the following contributed
mazut allocations to the power plant:
The NK for Shipbuilding 1, 400 tons
The NK for the Oil Industry in Dagestan 1, 000
The other enterprises mentioned above received no authorizations for mazut
and thus were forced with a shut down in operations because the steam power
plant could not deliver any electric current to them. The Oblast' Party Com-
mittee of Makhachkala requested a supplementary authorization of 1, 400 tons of
heating mazut.
(245) In October a similar picture was presented. In the Food Industry,
combines, bread factories, alcohol factories, etc. were inoperative primarily
because of a lack of mazut.
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(246) At the Tractor Plant in Stalingrad no tractors could be produced
because of a lack of motor and aviation gasoline.
(247) The Martin furnaces at the foundry in Krasnyj Sulin had to be
shut down because of a lack of mazut.
(248) At individual plants of the NK for the Chemical Industry production
of items important to the war effort had to be stopped because of unsatisfactory
delivery of white alcohol.
(249) In Ukrainian Oblast' agricultural work had to be halted because of
a lack of petroleum.
(250) In Ashkhabad no grain could be shipped. In Dzaudzhikau, Baku
and Makhachkala mills had to cease operation as did agricultural enterprises.
(251) At the canneries in Adygejsk, Ejsk, Khatulajsk and Sochi short-
ages of mazut caused interruptions in production.
(252) Supplies to the electrical generating stations were especially poor.
"Azenergo" required 53, 950 tons of heating mazut in November. Only 46, 870 tons
were authorized.
(253) In Makhachkala, enterprises, educational institutes and dwellings
in the city were without electric current because of the mazut shortage.
(254) The electrical generating station in Tbilisi received from Batumi
only 2, 875 tons of coal instead of the 8, 000 tons required and from Baku only 710
tons instead of the 2, 000 tons required.
(255) Moreover, in Tbilisi all leather plants, large sewing establish-
ments, and other enterprises of the NK for Light Industry ceased operations on
22 November for the same reason.
(256) The following message confirms the assumption that not only
transportation difficulties but also poor organization in the shipments produced
the critical oil supply situation in the Soviet Union:
From Stalingrad..2 copies: (1) Moscow, the Deputy Chairman of
the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union, Comrade Beriya,
(2) the Peoples' Commissar for Ferrous Metals, Comrade Tevosyan.
"The Chief Directorate for Oil Supply has not carried out order number
63580 of the State Committee for Defense. By 1 December the Plant
"Krasnyj Oktyabr" was to receive 20, 000 tons of mazut by water. This
delivery has not been made. As a result, the plant has no winter
stocks whatsoever and shortly must cease operations. Mazut stocks
are sufficient for only the next two days. Rail shipments of mazut
expected from Groznyj will in no way satisfy requirements. More-
over, because of low steam production in the plant the tank cars of
mazut arriving from Groznyj can only be warmed up if all other
shops cease operations. This would lead to complete disorganization
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of the enterprise. In connection with the cessation of shipping on the
Volga, "Volgatanker" has anchored at the plant's anchorage t h e
tow barge "Don" with 5, 600 tons of mazut (primary distallation), the
tow barge "Chulym" with 8, 000 tons of mazut (partially primary
distallation), and a tow barge loaded with ligroin. I request, there-
fore, that in view of the especially serious situation at the plant and
in consideration of the urgency of individual contracts, particularly of
contracts No. 7 and 2, the mazut in the tow barges "Don" and "Chulym"
in our anchorage be transferred to us. I should like to note that the
mazut could not be used under any circumstances until the beginning
of 1945. I request your assistance.
Signed: Matevosyan. "
(257) In Ordzhonikidze Kraj there was neither ligroin nor gasoline for
transport of grain.
(258) For agricultural requirements only 32 tank cars of oil product
No. 10 was authorized instead of the 100 tank cars required.
(259) The preserves factory in Ordzhonikidze was forced to cease
operations on 1 December because of the lack of mazut.
(260) Plants Nos. 573, 248, and 604 of the NK for Munitions were in an
extraordinarily difficult situation because of a lack of oil.
(261) At "Aztekhsnabneft" in Baku new compressor equipment could
not be put into operation because of a lack of cylinder oil.
(262) The Azerbajdzhan Peoples' Commissar for Light Industry,
Magiev, complained to his superior office in Moscow about the insufficient
delivery of mazut during the fourth quarter. In the fourth quarter 3, 000 tons of
mazut shipments behind schedule were authorized to be made up. These ship-
ments could not be made, however, because insufficient stocks were available.
A request for delivery of the same amount of mazut was refused. For the fourth
quarter at least 3, 000 tons of heating mazut were required. Disruption of
operations throughout the entire Textile Industry threatened.
(263) An emergency message from the Caspian Fleet:
"Ships of the Caspian Fleet have been frozen in at Krasnovodsk Harbor.
The lack of an allotment of fuel from Baku is especially detrimental.
Shipments of heating material from Groznyj will be considerably
delayed because of stormy weather near Makhachkala. The heating
mazut shipped from Groznyj will have a very high viscosity because
of the cold weather and ice conditions and aboard the ships will be
useless as a heating material unless first warmed. In order to
bring the ships into ice-free water an allotment of 1, 000 tons of
heating mazut is required for the Caspian Fleet. Non-authorization
of this required quantity of heating mazut could result in destruction
of the ships. Requests to the NK for the Merchant Fleet have been
fruitless to date. "
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(264) At the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine also a serious shortage of
diesel oil was felt in December. As a result of the expansion of technical tasks
an additional delivery of 1, 000 tons of diesel oil was required.
(265) The following table presents information on the individual
deliveries, authorizations and requirements and their quantitative breakdown by
individual oil supply office. In order to eliminate duplication in the following
tables, deliveries from the Oil Supply Offices at Baku and Groznyj to other oil
supply offices have not been included. Only shipments from the individual oil
supply offices to consumers are included. The following deliveries, authorizations
and requirements have been established:
Month
Requirements
Authorizations
July
August
September
October
November
2, 053 tons
4, 355
170
22, 729
11,831
12, 369 tons 46, 185 tons
6, 658 60, 868
19, 263 14, 798
37, 139 60, 687
69, 490 24, 978
December
6, 078
75, 229 60, 066
47, 216
220, 148 267, 582
(266) Breakdown by individual oil supply offices:
Oil Supply Office:
Requirements
Baku
26, 419 tons
67,
519 tons
100,262 tons
Batumi
9,
404
4, 991
Groznyj
10, 733
77,
587
100, 105
Krasnodar
900
17,
092
503
Krasnovodsk
2, 343
4,
826
11,960
Makhachkala
1, 533
13,
831
28, 015
Rostov Don
29
2,
179
2, 300
Other Suppliers
5, 259
27,
660
19, 446
47, 216
220,
148
267, 582
(267) Individual fuels and lubricants as well as other oil products are
divided into requirements, authorizations and deliveries for the entire half year
as follows:
Oil products (unidentified)
Ma zut
Diesel fuel
Petroleum
Gasoline
Benzol
Ligroin
Motor oil
Requirement
1, 319 tons
34, 177
4, 154
1, 536
1,494
155
185
3, 523 tons
144, 638
11, 909
8, 639
17, 950
6,571
1,744
Delivery
3, 765 tons
207, 513
6, 890
5, 302
8, 420
2, 737
5, 496
1, 778
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Fuel and Lubricant
Requirement
Authorization
Delivery
1, 130 tons
640 tons
149 tons
Motor oil
772
1,828
Spindle oil
24
877
1,119
Machine oil
2,474
785
Solar oil
46
1,427
467
Cylinder oil
30
560
252
Viscosin
130
40
Turbine oil
620
91
A vtol
857
3, 146
Compressor
160
20
Green oil
36
-
Ni
rol
g
20
60
Aviation oil
12
53
Lubrication oil
84
6,638
Lubrication mazut
726
740
Xylol
-
65
S
lid
l
o
o
192
5
Assidol
30
-
Oil product No. 6
60
-
9
20
-
10
1,700
2,188
1,804
12
400
2,860
44
14
90
80
15 (?)
100
18
480
270
21
860
23
890
27
16
29
1,643
3, 456
70
3, 000
3, 994
100
40
Paraffin
2, 320
Transformer oil
1,286
699
Tar oil
30
25
47,216
220, 148
NOTE: The unusual relationship between requirements, authorizations, and
deliveries is explained by the fact that generally only messages con-
cerning additional requirements were intercepted.
6. Auxiliary Deliveries from the Western Powers to the
Soviet Union via Iran
(268) The most important data concerning the execution of deliveries
from the West to the Soviet Union via Iran is included in Appendix No. 2 to
"Military-Economic Report" 2/8 of 16 August 1944.
(269) During the second half year no changes or additional information
on this subject could be determined.
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A. Transshipment at certain points
(270) According to messages concerning individual deliveries via Iran
during the second half year, the following data is presented and compared with the
first half year:
Transshipment Point
1st Half Year
1944
2nd Half Year
1944
Percent above or below
First Half Year
Baku
69, 300 tons
56, 966 tons
- 17.8%
Makhachkala
40, 100
57, 138
+ 42.5
Krasnovodsk
28, 600
37, 103
+ 29. 7
Dzhulfa
19, 990
5,326
- 73.2
Astara (?)
19, 440
4,336
- 77.7
Ashkhabad
11,800
2,961
- 74.9
Batumi.
11,472
A strakhan
6, 183
Tbilisi
3,100
2, 353
- 24.1
Erevan
2, 300
18
- 99.2
Ordzhonikidze
1,400
2, 685
+ 91.8
Leninakan
1,100
3, 875
+ 25.2
Other cities
4, 500
2, 596
- 42.3
193, 012 tons
- 4.20/6
(271) As seen in the above table the total tonnage of imports in the
second half year of 1944 remained approximately the same as in the first half
year.
(272) Exactly as in the first half year. in the second transport
conditions were especially poor for regular distribution of imported goods. The
following message gives a clear picture of conditions which prevailed for a long
time in Baku Harbor:
Baku, to the Chief of the Transcaucasus Railroad in Tbilisi and to
the NK for Foreign Trade in Moscow on 16 September: From 1
through 15 September only 438 railroad cars were furnished instead
of 920. From 10 to 15 September no railroad cars were provided
with the exception of 4 refrigerator cars. Transportation of goods by
shuttle train between Baku and Astrakhan has not yet been organized.
Warehouses and other enclosed storage points are jammed with
cargo. Preserves, sugar and military cargoes have been of
necessity stored in the open. Preservation of cargoes such as sugar,
milk, dried eggs, fabric, etc. in an undamaged condition cannot be
guaranteed by only covering them with tarpaulins as the rainy season
has now begun. Railroad cars have not been provided and the fulfill-
ment of the September plan for shipping imported goods cannot be
assured. Assistance is requested. Cargoes are piling up in Baku
Harbor because the economic organizations do not promptly appoint
recipients. They should be directed to issue well before the first of
the month the distribution plan for all import cargoes from Iranian
ports.
(273) Another message describes the same situation in December:
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During the last three months there has been a deficiency of 13, 036
railroad cars provided by the Railway Directorate in Tbilisi for trans-
portation?,of imported cargoes. In Baku Harbor large quantities of
chemicals, foods and industrial cargoes have accumulated which are
stored in the open and are in particular danger of being lost. With
the beginning of the period of poor weather it is beginning to rain in
Baku. The situation is regarded as catastrophic. In order to avoid
loss of the valuable chemicals and foods, expedited delivery of
covered railroad cars is urgently required.
B. Total turnover by month
(274) In the individual months there was reported the following turn-
over of imported cargoes:
July
30, 301 tons
August
20,636
September
78, 756
October
23,315
November
20,
108
December
19,
896
193,
012 tons
(275) At this point "Military Economic Report" 2/8 of 16 August 1944
mentioned above must again be referred to. At that time a comparison of radio
messages concerning delivery of railroad cars for imported goods with messages
intercepted concerning shipments for a definite period of time indicated that
reports on one quarter to one fifth of the actual total deliveries were intercepted.
This assumption was confirmed by other information: for instance, from the
total shipping space required by the Caspian Steamship Agency. Deliveries in
intercepted traffic for the month of September at Baku amounted to about 14, 177
tons. According to a message at the beginning of September, the September
import plan for Baku was increased by 75, 000 tons. The plan total is not known.
We may assume, however, that it was fulfilled by about 2/3. This would give
support to the above assumption that messages on one quarter to one fifth of total
deliveries are intercepted. We may thus estimate total imports via Iran in the
second half year of 1944 at about one million tons and in the entire year at about
2 million tons. According to radio reports, about one quarter of all assistance
rendered by the West is routed via Iran. The total quantity of goods delivered
from the West during 1944, therefore, would be about 8 to 10 million tons.
C. Details of Imports:
(276) Large quantities of foods, metals and metal products, chemicals,
textiles, leather and oil products were imported. The following tables represent
a quantitative breakdown of these categories by month from intercepted traffic:
Chemicals
Leather
July
24,
141 tons
6, 027 tons
16 tons
24 tons
August
2,
801
2, 028
712
352
September
50,
389
11,299
192
October
13,
941
5, 402
736
250
November
1,539
2, 762
20
December
8, 520
5, 055
35
101, 331 tons
32, 573 tons
1, 519 tons
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Other
No Specified
July
- tons
tons
93 tons
- tons
August
1,049
264
1, 471
11,959
September
258
254
16, 364
October
334
416
2, 236
November
228
-
579
14, 980
December
4, 508
376
338
1,064
6,377 tons
1,
056 tons
4, 971 tons
44, 367 tons
(277) Imports not specified by weight
Metal Products
7 Machine Tools
13 Transformers
6, 850 sets of automobile tires
8, 000 meters of steel cable
1 drum of cable
10 electric motors
Textiles
26, 000 meters uniform material
160, 000 yards material
150, 000 meters gabardine
7, 000 meters cotton material
14, 000 meters khaki
13, 700 meters special khaki
11, 000 meters woven cotton fabric
11, 000 rolls yarn
30, 280 shirts
330, 810 stockings
50, 000 rolls of yarn, each of 2, 000 yards
102, 000 meters tarpaulin
497, 000 sacks
100, 000 yards sack linen
10, 000 meters material
10, 000 pairs military shoes
20, 165 pairs shoes
30, 000 liters vodka
10, 000 liters alcohol
, 000 uniform buttons
16, 000 stocking clasps
700 containers of meat and
vegetable preserves.
(278) Percentage breakdown of imported goods by tonnage.
2nd Half Year
1944
(For comparison)
1st Half Year - 1944
Foods
51.4%
51.0%
Metals
17.1
27. 3
Chemicals
0.8
7. 6
Leather
0.4
1.0
Textiles
3.3
0. 4
Oil
0.5
0. 2
Other
2.5
2. 8
Not specified
23. 0
9. 7
100. 0%
100.0%
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(279) Tonnage and percentage breakdown of food, metal and chemical
imports are given in the following tables:
Foods:
2nd Half Year
1944
(For comparison)
1st Half Year - 1944
Flour
266 tons
0. 2%
Preserved meat
22, 899
22. 5
Rice
10, 724
10.6
Sugar
22, 472
22.2
Fat
3, 793
3.8
Leguminous Plants
378
0. 5
Other
16, 519
16.4
Unspecified food cargoes
24, 280
23. 8
Ferrous Metals:
101, 331 tons
100.070
Steel
5, 562 tons
17.3%
Steel sheet
1,801
5. 5
Steel wire
82
0.3
Steel strip
782
2. 4
Iron sheet
3, 543
10. 8
Tubing
1,259
3. 9
Iron wire
441
1.3
Nails
180
0. 5
Railroad material
11,027
34. 2
Other
167
0. 5
Nonferrous metals:
24, 928 tons
76. 7%
Tungsten
420 tons
1. 3%
Copper
1,045
3. 2
Copper wire
68
0. 2
Rolled metals
4, 000
12.2
White metal
42
0. 1
Zinc
280
0. 9
Zinc sheets
365
0. 1
Cable
1, 425
4. 3
7, 645 tons
23. 3%
24, 828
76. 7
32, 573 tons
100.0%
Chemicals:
Potash
30 tons
1. 9%
Acetone
28
1.8
Phenol
45
2. 9
Caustic Soda
1,011
66. 4
Koloksilin
305
20. 1
Camphor
16
1.2
Sulfate
12
0.8
Casein
14
0. 9
Ferrosilicium
20
1.4
Phosphor-Catalyst
8
0. 5
Glycerine
20
1.4
Ammonium sulfate
10
0. 7
1,
519 tons
100.0%
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(280) An analysis of the imports clearly indicates certain deficiencies
in the supply picture in the Soviet economy. Especially remarkable is the fact
that Russia, in its own right a land rich in oil, imports oil products. These
imports are probably high quality lubrication oil-and high quality gasoline, as
several messages- indicated that foreign motive equipment, electric motors and
other machines could not be serviced with Soviet oil products. The principal
food items imported are sugar and preserved meat.
(281) The need for metal products is apparent from the following
Baku reports on 5 July that in the storehouses of the Industrial
Raw Material Import Office there were shortages of tubes,
girders and electric welding wire. They are needed by the NK's
for Water Transport and Agriculture. There were absolutely no
steel alloys on hand. There is an urgent need for rolled steel,
profile steel, steel sheeting, carbon-containing steel, boiler
plate, black and white sheeting, as well as special steel for agri-
cultural purposes.
(282) The import of explosives noted in the previous half year was
completely lacking in this half year.
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7. Bolshevization of Estonia
(283) In the period from 1 November through 31 December messages
were intercepted which bore the character of domestic radio traffic but which
were handled over a former guerrilla network. These messages concerned the
Bolshevization of Estonia. They were all signed by a certain KAROTAMM, who
before the war played an important role in the Communist Party in Estonia and
later, in the years 1943 and 1944, was a major general in charge--of the direction
of Estonian guerrilla bands. His principal assignment is to make Estonia as
adaptable as possible to Communism and according to intercepted traffic this
consisted of (1) Bolshevization of the country and (2) plundering the Estonian
economy.
(284) Carrying out these two tasks together met great difficulties be-
cause Communization presupposes an at least tolerant attitude on the part of the
majority of the Estonian population. This was made extremely difficult by the
economic stripping of the land. Karotamm had no chance to deceive the Estonian
people for any great length of time on the consequences of Communization. In
detail, the following was determined:
1. Political penetration of the cities and countryside
(285) The Estonian Press was immediately taken over by the Communist
Party. Its principal task was to kindle an artificial hate against the "Hitler
Fascists". To support this campaign in the press the following methods were
used:
1. Political lectures consisting, among other things, of extensive
playup of German atrocities;
2. Establishment of special commissions to uncover and summarize
all war damage as well as atrocities which could be charged to
the German conduct of the war;
3. Measures such as the leveling of German military graves and the
establishment of "Heroes' Peace Homes" for members of the
Red Army and the Estonian resistance movement.
(286) There was then an attempt to influence the attitude of the
population by Soviet victory reports and prophecies of future conduct of the war.
The heroism of the Red Army was emphasized as was the might of the Red
Artillery.. In all cities and towns flags were displayed, meetings were held and
resolutions made.
(287): An especially noisy fanfare was made in the victory report on
the capture of Sarema, achieving thereby the final "liberation" of Estonia.
(288) As an example one message will be repeated which is particularly
indicative of all these methods:
Message of 22 November to the Secretaries of the Okrug and city
committees. Organize in the next few days a series of meetings to
consider the article on the burial of Fascist victims in Tartu. This
article will be printed in the 25 November issue of the newspaper
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"Rachvateataya". Reprint this article, make short resolutions concern-
ing it at the meetings and send them to us.
Whip up hate by the population for the Germans and their supporters,
for the bourgeois nationalities, for traitors and hangmen, for those
who disseminate provoking rumors, for those who terrorize the
population on all sides, etc. Call on the people to exterminate the
agents of the Germans and the enemies of the people. Pay particular
attention to the question of verbal propaganda. All this will be helpful
to you in carrying out an economic and political reorganization of the
country. The land reform is to be completed especially rapidly in
order to fulfill agricultural deliveries. Inform me immediately about
the progress and results of the meetings.
Signed: Karotamm
(289) In connection with this "political reeducation", the political
system and observance of individual persons were also organized as in Russia.
Registration of the population was carried out. Citizens of cities and villages
received identification cards which were issued for certain reasons but not
further clarified.
(290) The method of Socialist competitions often used in Russia was
also practiced here to a large extent. The following message serves as an
example:
Message of 24 November
To the Secretaries of the Okrug and city committees
I suggest that in all undertakings competitions be organized following
the example of the plant "Krasnyj Krul". The example of the workers
in the "Krasnyj Krul" plant is printed in the 23 November issue of the
newspapers. Prepare these actions well and carry them out. Send
me the text of your directives for the republic press. Report what
action has been taken on this question.
Signed: Karotamm
(291) Karotamm, who is himself an Estonian, lays particular stress
that no national differences between Russia and Estonia might arise.. This is
shown by the selection of his immediate subordinates from the Estonian people
as may be determined from the names of the personnel to whom and from whom
messages are sent. Likewise, the local party organs were under no circumstances
to be composed of Russians, but only of Estonians. Some of his orders to the
secretaries of Okrug and city committees of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Estonia concerning the carrying out of educational courses to
train new political leaders and party workers follow:
Message of 17 December
Organize a 3-month course of instruction for the Soviet party coworkers
and not for agricultural co-workers as was reported by you incorrectly.
Recruit a total of 5 to 10 persons from the party organs (chairmen of
the Oblast' Executive Committees, their deputies, the best members
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of the Agricultural Reconstruction Commission, workers in enterprises,
workers on the Oblasto Executive Committees, etc. ). The material may
be obtained from the Central Committee through 22 December. I charge
you with personal responsibility for fulfillment of this plan.
Signed: Karotamm
Message of 10 December
Not later than 15 December submit a report on the persons selected for
the instruction courses for party functionaries according to the letter
from the Department for Personnel Affairs of 24 November. In select-
ing them consider their political reliability, and their thoroughness at
work. Fulfillment is to be reported.
Signed: Karotamm
(292) Personnel were also conscripted for NKVD schools. Karotamm
ordered that shock troops be trained in all enterprises, cities, towns, branches
of the economy, etc. The organization and working methods of these shock troops
are given in the following message:
Message of 8 December to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees
In the next few days organize extensive meetings of party members and
nonparty members of the Okrug and of the city after the regular
Oblast' Party meetings. Speakers for these two meetings will be pro-
vided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia.
Immediately after these meetings, carry out meetings of the workers
in all villages, enterprises, etc. , concerning current problems and our
tasks. Detailed instructions for these meetings will be received from
the Central Committee speakers. Submit a report as soon as possible.
Signed: Karotamm
Message of 15 November to Comrade Weinberg
I repeat the essence of telegram No. 1204 from Comrade Karotamm
containing 313 word groups. The shock troops in the village population
are to be trained in the Soviet spirit. Therefore, you are to analyze:
my theme--Velikij Prazdnik" /Great holiday/. Submit the material
before the assigned deadline. You are personally charged with
responsibility for fulfillment. Prepare yourself for participation in
the joint meeting to discuss this matter. You will be informed of the
date of the joint meeting.
Signed: Vesev
2. The land reform program
(293) Many messages indicated that an extensive land reform was
underway. The extent to which this is a collectivization of Estonian peasantry
has not yet been determined. At any rate, the removal of peasants sympathetic
to the Germans or nationalist in sentiment will be carried out on a large scale.
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The following messages give some information on the land reform program:
Message of 15 December to the Secretary of the Okrug Committee
Until 1 January factory workers are not to be considered in the carry-
ing out of land reforms and procurement operations. Instructions con-
cerning the correct fulfillment of these operations do not include factory
workers.
Signed: Karotamm
Message of 26 November to the Secretary of the Okrug Committee
1. Do not forget to provide recipients of land with cattle and other
livestock..... Do this simultaneously with the return of the land;
politically this is extremely important.
2. Be especially observant that the law prohibiting the grinding of
grain until complete fulfillment of the prescribed norms is adhered
to.
3. With the exception of Walgamaa, results are poor and reports on the
progress of the land reforms and the procurement operations have
been sent irregularly. I demand that exact reports be sent.
Signed: Karotamm
Message of 27 November to the Secretary of the Okrug Committee
I demand that land be issued to those who do not possess it. The
auxiliary farms are not to be divided among farmers. Auxiliary farms
will be divided only by the NK for Agriculture and not by the Okrug Com-
mittees. The Okrugs may, however, submit proposals to the NK for
Agriculture.
(294) A further message shows clearly the measures taken against
peasants sympathetic to the Germans or nationalistically minded:
Message of 8 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees
By 15 December organize a renewed examination of the extent to which
government deliveries have been fulfilled. Take measures against
those who deliberately did not fulfill the requirements. Pay particular
attention to farmers possessing large farms and to those sympathetic
to the Germans.
Signed: Karotamm
(295) The two following messages give a further survey:
Message of 22 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees
Be especially careful that from the holdings of wealthy farmers good
land, fields, meadows, etc. are split off for peasants who do not have
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any land or who have poor land, and that no poor land is thus handed
over. Split land off from the holdings of supporters of the Germans
with all severity. Do not permit misinterpretation of the law in favor
of the enemy. It is necessary that the oblast' organs and commissions
perform certain functions for the Soviet power as required in the
Agrarian Law.
Signed: Karotamm
Message of 11 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees
Return of the land to the peasants is going very poorly. Devote all
your energies to this operation. Do not wait for requests from the
peasants.' All peasants who received land in 1940 automatically receive
this land back, if they were not agents of the Germans. Requests must
be received from those wishing land who did not receive land in? 1940.
The commissions evaluating damage and atrocities are working unsatis-
factorily. In the next few days we are sending a man to investigate this
work. It will go badly for you if you do not take suitable measures.
Signed: Karotamm
(296) In true Soviet form, many motor tractor stations were set up and
large "emergency deliveries" were made.
3. Agricultural Stripping of Estonia
(297) Simultaneously with the establishment of Communism in Estonia
an intensive program to strip the land was carried out. For example large
deliveries of potatoes were demanded:
Message of 19 November to Comrade Tamm
On the basis of a decision by the bureau of the Central Committee of
the Party, you were to guarantee shipment of 450 tons of potatoes to
Tallinn. On 15 November only 86 tons of potatoes had actually been
shipped. The plan for preparations for potato shipments has been ful-
filled by only 31%. Take immediate steps to carry out the plan for pro-
curement and shipment of the potatoes to Tallinn. Report by telegraph
the quantity of potatoes which are stored at locations near railroad
stations.
Signed: Karotamm
(298) Apparatus was set up whereby whoever did not fulfill the delivery
quota would be prevented from purchasing necessary consumer goods. The follow-
ing message explains these methods:
Message of 27 November to Comrade Abori
I repeat: Horseshoes and nails may be purchased only by those who
completely fulfilled government delivery quotas. The land reform in
your sector is progressing very badly. Dispatch workers from the
Okrug Committee, a representative of the Executive Committee and
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others into the individual oblasti and villages to help out. Visit the
points yourself by air.
Signed: Karotamm
(299) Also the so-called "over delivery" line from "poor" peasants
was carried into the field. The following message is considered a poor fabrication
Message of 14 December to all secretaries of the Okrug Committees,
the Party and the Authorities of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party of Communist Estonia.
On 14 December all newspapers published my telegram to the (land)-
poor peasant Puussild.in Parnumaa who delivered 80 times more than
the government quota required. He also fulfilled all other delivery
obligations. Execute in the local. press a well-prepared and extensive
the effect that that patriotic achievement should serve as an
incentive for all working peasants. Utilize this as a basis for the most
rapid possible fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan for government
delivery.
Signed: Karotamm
(300) Some percentage results of the planned deliveries of grain,
potatoes, meat and milk up through 15 December (from the beginning of December
for the December plan) have been intercepted in the following message:
Message of 17 December to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees
of the Party and to the Authorities of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Communist Estonia.
According to previous information from the Okrug Committee, the
plan for government deliveries of grain, potatoes, meat and milk
through 15 December have been fulfilled as follows:
Grains
Potatoes
Meat
Milk
Virumaa Okrug
74%
89%
73%
30%
Laanemaa Okrug
69
105
76
23
Saaremaa Okrug
53
88
50
3
Jarnemaa Okrug
38
40
30
81
Hiiumaa (?) Okrug
37
58
143
64
Viljandimaa Okrug
32
74
79
66
Harjumaa Okrug
35
36
79
89
Parnumaa Okrug
28
41
49
48
Tartumaa Okrug
22
49
66
49
Valgamaa Okrug
15
52
80
17
The picture is varied and shows poor fulfillment. Many okrugs are
shamefully behind schedule and have delivered very little with respect
to compliance with the conclusions adapted at the 5th meeting of the
Central Committee of the Council of Peoples' Commissars. I charge
you with the responsibility of taking definite measures in order to ful-
fill the government delivery plan completely by the first of January.
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An exception is permissible only here and there with respect to deliveries
of milk. -i
Signed: Karotamm
(301)!i It was emphasized in every way that the deliveries must be ful-
filled and if everything did not go smoothly the "saboteurs" would be punished.
(302)I, Exact reports were to be made almost daily on the progress of
meat, potato arnld grain deliveries from the individual okrugs.
(303) ~ The Estonian population reacted instinctively against lies such as
mentioned abovi with respect to farmer Puussild and his 80-fold over-delivery.
The following telegram presents information on this subject:
Message of 18 December to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees
and the authorities of the Central Committee of Communist Estonia.
Report within 3 days what you have done to urge the peasants to emulate
the p.triotic achievement of Puussild, (See to it) that a mass movement
arises to overfulfill food deliveries. Convince the peasants in every
oblast' that this must be done as quickly as possible. Immediately submit
to us',all usable facts so that we may print them in the press. Utilize
these' facts on the spot in order to spur on the other farmers.
Signed-. Karotamm
(304)'' German counter-propaganda seems to have had a fairly strong
effect, particularly in the rural areas. According to the two following messages
Karotamm seers to have encountered great difficulties-.
Message of 6 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees
The supporters and agents of the German occupiers are operating
particularly in the villages; there they are trying to sabotage the land
reforims........ The fight against these enemies is to be intensified
in a olitical direction. Take reprisals. The working people demand
it... .. Report to us what you have done in this direction.
Signed: Karotamm
Message of 20 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committee
Intensify with all means at your disposal the common political task of
land reforms and of government deliveries. Performance is still
unsatisfactory. Enemy agitation makes the farmers unsure of them-
selves. In the press; you must be much more decisive.
Signed: Karotamm
- 69 -
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