TECHNICAL TRAINING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP57-00012A000200090006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2001
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 3, 1948
• Content Type: MEMO

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3 August 1948
25X1A9A
TO: COPS
FROM: TRS
SUBJECT: Technical Training
'3 z 3
1. Recent conversations with OPSO and SES have led Mr Mr. 25X1A9A
and me to review our present programs and future plans for Technical
Training. It is obvious that some of our training duplicates what is being
done by CCD and CDD, equally obvious that much closer integration of Technical
Training, by whomever done, with Intelligence Training is necessary.
2. Over the past year and a half, most of our efforts in TRS have been
devoted to the development of a logical and effective program of intelligence
training, both Staff and Covert. Though we intend to improve further this
phase of training, we feel that we now have the kind of program of which we--
and OS0--can be fairly. proud. Our efforts during this coming year--subject
to the world situation will be shifted to. working out better training in
administration, in language and area studies, and, particularly, in the
application of technical aids to operations--defensively and offensively. We
therefore welcome the current concern over the status of Technical Training.
3. Discussion of Technical Training is sometimes difficult because no
solid definition of what we mean by "Technical" has yet been agreed upon,
however, I think I can describe our approach to "technical" matters in train-
ing and, thereby, perhaps. arrive at a working understanding of what it is and
what it is not.
4. In order to describe more accurately our approach to the technical
aspects of our business, we in TRS have decided to call the training previously
titled "Technical" "Counter-intelligence Training." Perhaps a title such as
"Police Methods" or "Investigative Methods" would be as accurate. In any case
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our approach has been and will be based on the premise that all 0S0 staff
and covert personnel going overseas must live and operate on the assumption
that all the techniques of modern investigative science will be thrown
against them. Also, we must train some of our people either to use or to
instruct others in these techniques. Within this group there are also
those who need thorough familiarity with counter-intelligence techniques--
namely, our CE man who will have close working relationships with the
Security Agencies of other powers and, therefore, must be able to speak
the investigative language and cement the liaison by operational advice
and supply.
S. If the above principles are sound than it is obvious that we are
dealing with a complex of integrated techniques--not merely with individual
gadgets. To illustrate what this means for defensive purposes: the 0S0
man overseas may be investigated. If so, he will be put under surveillance,
and the planting of CI people in the household of our man. It is our
contention in TRS that all OSO people going overseas--and probably all
in Washington assignments--should be sufficiently familiar with what we
call the "pitfalls of security" to protect themselves-and OSO--from these
CI techniques. We also believe that this defensive training should
be given by men who understand the wjr in which these techniques are integrated
and nApW cRatei U 11d21- LA-8r FBfi1E#IJ OO2NO%% %g~ fiords,
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knowledge of the hazards of our trade is as much a part of intelligence
training as positive-or offensive techniques.
6. If we apply this same principle of integrated techniques to the
next level--those who need all-round familiarity for liaison or operational
purposes, it is plain that auch instruction should be handled by men
who know the intelligence game and who also understand the complexity of
counter-intelligence or investigative techniques. We believe that a proper
training program for Intelligence Officers going overseas and for Division
Chiefs and Case Officers in Washington should include thorough knowledge
of the offensive capabilities of CI techniques, including the necessary
tools or gadgets. Therefore we have been attempting increasingly to
present lectures and devise problems to bring out these techniques--including
technical surveillance.
7. A further level of knowledge of techniques properly falls within
the province of SES and the technical divisions of 050.. If a particular
instrument is to be used for a particular operation, obviously the
technician who developed the item should instruct in its workings and
maintenance. Or, if high security is involved--as in certain secret writing
methods-then again the instruction should be by the expert who knows the
method,
8. If the above principles are accepted, no radical change in our
present developing training program need be made; however, we should attempt
to settle certain points where duplication seems to exist. There are
certain types of instruction about which there is no question. TIRS, for
example, does not touch instruction in codes, ciphers, or W/T. For such
training., T tS simply acts as the middle-man between the Foreign Branches
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and Communications. Similarly,, we do not--except with express permission of
-instruct in SAP or in Document Intelligence. It should also be
noted that and a representative of Communications deliver
lectures in our Advanced Intelligence Course to explain their functions
and possible support to operations. However, we do appear to be duplicating
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or briefing has been completed by CCD or CDD, an evaluation
of his proficiency will be forwarded through TRS, Similarly,
TRS will inform CCD or CDD of the level of proficiency
achieved by any student turned over to CCD or CDD for
advanced training or briefing in items of special equipment.
10. I believe that adoption of the above proposals will eliminate
present duplication of effort in the counter-intelligence training
program. However, because it has not yet been discussed, I should
like to mention the fact that TRS has been giving instruction in
self-defense - including weapons - and in These
do not fall precisely within the technical field, yet I would like
some assurance that they belong under TRS. (As a matter of fact,
TRS appears to have the only instructors who have a working knowledge
of self-defense, weapons, and
11. Since we are currently attempting to revise the organization
of TRS, as well as to plan future courses, I should like to have
clarification on the functions of TRS in the "Technicalt'*field as
soon as possible. In order to
achieve this, I suggest that this
paper be routed to OPSO, DOPC, SES,\DD, and CCD Then, I believe
we should all get together and reach an agreement satisfactory to
all of us.
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