STATUS OF THE NIS PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP57-00042A000100180013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 13, 1998
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: July 21, 1950
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR' THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
not
$ The Assistant Director, ORE
SUBJECT Status of the NIS Program
950
1. There are submitted herewith "Annual Report of the NIS Program
Fiscal Year 1950", and tLx copies thereof for the Executive Secretary,
NSC; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; and the
Chiefs of Intelligence of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and
Air Fbrce.
2. During the course of this past year, the original requirements
for NIS production of the equivalent of 15 NIS a year were reduced to
the equivalent of 8 NIS a year in view of the insufAcient capabilities
of the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies. Even this reduced goal was
not attained during Fiscal Year 1950; moreover, the quality of the
contributions was seriously deficient in far too many instances. There
were also many gaps in the basic intelligence which will require
considerable collection effort to fill.
3. Since the end of Fiscal Year 1950, the Armed Forces Intelligence
Agencies have diverted most of their capabilities to meeting the
requirements of the current situation. The Office of Naval Intelligence
has given formal notice that, because of the current situation in the
Far East, work an Navy commitments to the NIS Program will be suspended
until further notice. The NIS representatives from Army and Air Force
have informally indicated similar decisions regarding work on Arm- and
Air Form commitments. Although the Office of Intelligence Research has
not indicated that the current situation will adversely affect work on
Department of State commitments, the action of the Armed Forces Intelli?
gence Agencies will seriously affect progress of the NIS Program.
4. This is not the first occasion When an emergency has interfered
with Armed Forces commitments to the NIS Program. When preparation was
being made to implement the Military Defense Aid Program, demands an the
Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies, while not causing a complete stoppage
of NIS production, were such as to effect drastic curtailment thereof.
Hence judging from this and the current instances, it is valid to.
conclude that, even if the Armed Forces Agencies eventually resune FIS
production, this production will be curtailed or halted again as soon as
the next emergency arises. Document No.
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5. The NIS Program is a long range project undertaken in accordance
with NSCID No. 3 and is designed to produce all basic intelligence needed
by the Government. Such a program, in order to produce adequate basic
intelligence, rcquires special machinery for control and coordinations
extensive analytical research, and intensified collection and collation.
Once these activities are interrupted they are difficult to set in motion
again. Hence, if the program is to cover the high priority countries in
a reasonable time, production must proceed in an orderly and continuous
manner.
6. Basic intelligence is so vital to planning that, if planners
cannot obtain such intelligence from the NIS, they will obtain it by
means of a swollen volume of ia ha requests. The result is a disruption
of the NIS Program, such as we are now experiencing which, if continued,
mill mean the reversion of basic intelligence to its highly unsatisfactory
state of World War II.
7. The Armed Terms Intelligence miss have never, even in
ordinary times, fully met their NIS c tments either quantitatively or
qualitatively. They have been repeatedly urged to realign their effort
so as to remedy this default. This urging has, however, had little
salutary effect. In these agencies, the NIS effort is so intermingled
with other efforts that extrication of the former has been impossible;
and, when the NIS effort has collided with some other efforts the latter
has frequently taken precedence.
8. Because the NIS Program is a joint undertaking, unilateral action
on the part of a major contributor leading to a diminution of his caps,.
bilities has immediate and serious effect upon other contributors, upon
commitments of CIA, and upon an integrated production schedule. It also
vitiates existing commitments under the NIS Program as approved by the
National Security Council. The Armed 'braes Intelligence Agencies,
however, have repeatedly taken such unilateral action in spite of existing
agreements. The continuation of this state of affairs can only mean the
emasculation and eventual demise of the NIS Program.
9. Essentially, there are two conditions which must be satisfied
before the NIS Program is fully consonant with the provisions of NSCID
No. 3:
a. The determination of NIS production quirements which
are necessary to meet the minimum fundamental interests of'
national security.
While the Joint Staff have concurred in the
reciuction of NTS production from 15 NIS to 8 NIS a
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year, they Lave not indicated whether this reduction
ia prejudicial to the national security. In cense.
quelece? IS reqpirements are being determined by
current agency capabilities rather than by fundamental
considerations of national sec zity.
b. The augmentation of agency capabilities necessary to
satisfy on a continning, long-range basis the requirements
of (a) above.
The augmentation of agency capabilities has
been the subject of mucl. correspondence and discussion
between CIA and the IAC Agencies. The intelligence
Agency of the Department of State has net up a
special staff solely for IS wotk, the financial
support of which in borne by CIA. The Armed Foroes
Intelligence Agencies, hovever, have considered
infeasible any direct financial support by CIA.
10. The NIS Program provides a comprehensive and logical zeans for
developing the basic intelligence required by the Government. If this
program is to be effectively implemented, however, the Intelligence
Agencies must consistently suaport it to the extent required by the
national security. This, support cannot be interedttently diverted to
other activities without serious dislocation, unbalance, and marked
impairment of NIS production. Current demands for such NIS end JaNTS
as are available on the Far East, especially Korea, are indicative of
the vital nature of basic intelligence to the national security. Only
seven years ago, the JANIS Program was initiated in the midst of a
Shooting war to produce basic intelligence which should have been
available before hostilities had commnced. The NTS Proaram aas set up
to correct that situation. Yet, the Armed Forces Intelligence Agencies
uPpear to have lost sight of this fundamental consideration. It is
therefore recommended thats
a. reconsideration be given to obtaining stnteetnt from the
Joint Staff as to their minimum requirements for basic interi-
gence contained in the NIS without prejudice to the national
security (Enclosure A);
b. deternination be rade ba the Armed Forces Intelligence
2igencies of the chTabilities whh they and the Technic,71
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Services contributors need to :ace, the r.inLiron require-I:rents
of the Joint Staff;
c. ap ropriate acti n be initiated to obtain the
requisite rands for the continuinfl, suort of these caoa-
bilities;
de pending action on the foregoing, that agreements be
reached with the Arned Forces Intelligence Agencies to
re-aign such capabilities to NIS work as All Iizint:Ari
'NIS production in accordance with existing schedules.
Enclosure (A)
Attached:
7 copies of "Annual Report
of the NIS Program Fiscal
Year 1950"
OBE:D/NIS=)M:thai
cc: Executive
COAPS
AD/ORE (2)
DMS (2)
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