IS OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM RELIABLE?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 82
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R 00 2D00O082-3
,16-7
IS OUR INTELLIGENCE
SYSTEM RELIABLE?
by
George Fielding Eliot
A reprint from
U.S.A., the Magazine of World Affairs, June 1952
Permission has been given CIA for the reproduction
and distribution to employees of the following piece.
Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384ROO0200090082-
ORI/CDF
 " NOTIIER INTELLIGENCE BLUN-
DER!" DER!" That was the instant ac-
cusation hurled by a pack of fright-
ened congressmen in June, 1950,
upon hearing that the Korean
bombshell had burst. For three
years they had put up with the new
Central Intelligence Agency and its
growing pains. Now the CIA had
failed to warn Congress of a major
military threat.
There was, of course, an investi-
gation. Facing a semicircle of anx-
ious, angry Senators, CIA's direc-
tor, Rear Admiral Roscoe II. Ilil-
lenkoettcr, calmly produced piece
by piece the documentary evidence
Iich proved beyond all argument
tl)at CIA had warned the policy-
akers well in advance of the
orth Korean troop concentrations
above the 38th parallel, and had
ade what proved a very shrewd
timatc of the Red numbers, or-
nization, and armament-and
cir offensive intentions.
The Senators sat for a moment
stunned silence when Ilillen-
S[nator spoke his mind:
"But, Admiral," he cried, "why
didn't you see that something was
dime about this information?"
"Senator," said Ilillenkoetter,
he duty of an intelligence agency
to present facts, not to make
Hey."
26
Approved For Release 2006/07/27: IA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
 is
our
intelligence system
reliable?
American Intelligence Is coming of
age fast. The big problem is to read
the meaning of facts with accuracy!
He did not say what must have
been painfully apparent-that the
facts had been presented, but had
not been acted upon because the
policy-makers did not want to be-
lieve them.
To put it bluntly, a junior rear
admiral did not have the weight of
authority himself-and his new-
born agency had not acquired an
accumulated weight of its own-
sufficient to compel Secretaries of
State and Defense and Chiefs of
Staff to accept unpleasant facts
which ran contrary to their own
expressed and intrenched beliefs.
This question of authority had
been hamstringing American intel-
ligence activities for years. Back in
the 'thirties, the Chief of Naval
11arri, & Ewing
General Walter Bedell Smith brings to CIA
the needed prestige of rank and experience
27
Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
 Approved For Release 2006/07/27 :
Operations once explained how de-
partmental preconceptions and in-
terests and the personal "hugs" of
secretaries and military chiefs were
coloring the assumptions drawn
from the intelligence agencies of
the State, War, and Navy Depart-
ments. There was little or no co-
ordination of intelligence. There-
fore there existed no sifted, agreed
body of fact on which a national
policy could be based.
That same year, a congressional
committee refused the Director of
Naval Intelligence-who came per-
sonally to beg for it-a modest ap-
propriation of $15,000 to buy
mimeograph machines and paper
so that he could distribute intelli-
gence reports and summaries to
fleet and naval district command-
ers. IIe was rebuked for having sug-
gested the spending of public
money to disseminate "Navy prop-
aganda." There was even a mutter
of "gumshoe business," of "trying
to set up a Gestapo." There
seemed something vaguely un-
American about the very words "in-
telligence service." And being de-
tailed to intelligence did no offi-
cer's career-Army or Navy-any
good. It was regarded as being a
little on the fancy side, even as sug-
gesting incompetence for com-
mand duties. General of the Army
Omar N. Bradley remarks on this
point: "I recall how scrupulously I
avoided the branding that came
with an intelligence assignment in
my own career."
Then came 1941 and Pearl Har-
bor, blasting us into belated reali-
zation of the dangers of trying to
get along without an organized na-
tional intelligence service. Many of
the same congressmen who had
d nied money for simple needs
n w loudly denounced the "failure
o our intelligence." In fact, even
t ough starved for money and
anpowcr, the intelligence services
bid dredged up enough morsels of
i formation which could have en-
2 Ied the U.S. to foresee and fore-
s ll the Japanese attack-had there
b .-en any means by which these
orsels could have been co-ordi-
n ted and evaluated, and their re-
sult brought forcefully to the no-
t 'c of those in the seats of de-
e lion. There wasn't.
Pearl Harbor made that need
c car-but Pearl Harbor also landed
u in the midst of the biggest war
c have ever fought. The attempt
t meet the need for organized in-
t Iligence through the creation of
c Office of Strategic Services
I June, 1942, was under military
c ntrol and directed (naturally
e rough) toward the immediate
e d of victory. The moment the
ar was over, OSS (which had ac-
c emulated its share of jealousies
a id frictions) was dissolved and its
functions distributed to the State
a id War Departments, amid a bar-
rage of lurid tales which tended to
scure its very real service.
The need for centralized intelli-
nec remained. It was given lip
s ?rvice by the creation of the Na-
t onal Intelligence Authority in
nuary, 1946, under a presidential
irective to "coordinate" the in-
t lligcnce procured by the Army,
avy, State Department and other
)vernment agencies. It limped
long as best it could while the bit-
r unification struggle raged in the
Jentaggon and most Americans
ioug}It wistfully of a world of
cace and justice under the bencv-
28
Approved For Release 2006/07/27 :
 Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
olent aegis of the United Nations.
But it soon became clear that
makeshift policy and pious hopes
would not do in the face of the
Soviet power bloc. We had not for-
gotten Pearl Harbor. There was a
rising demand for effective policy-
making machinery, for effective de-
fense organization. And it followed
as the night the day that we could
have neither unless we began with
a fact-finding agency to provide the
body of knowledge on which to
base policies and military plans.
The National Security Act of
1947-largely the result of the pa-
tient, tireless efforts of the late
James Forrestal-tried to provide
answers to these problems. It estab-
lished our first top planning
agency, the National Security
Council, and it gave the NSC as
its fact-finder the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. When that act be-
came law in July, 1947, the United
States for the first time acquired a
national intelligence service with a
statutory foundation.
Chiefly, the new organization,
under the terms of the act, was to
provide the much-needed clearing-
house for the information obtained
by others: by the far-flung net of
State Department activities, by the
Army's G-2, by the Office of Naval
Intelligence, by the Air Force In-
telligence, and by other govern-
ment departments. CIA was sup-
posed to "correlate" and "evaluate"
this mass of information-that is,
to sift out fact from conjecture,
reconcile contradictions, eliminate
duplication, produce an end prod-
uct which policy-makers could rely
upon, and see that this product was
distributed to those who needed it.
CIA was also required to advise the
National Security Council as to all
intelligence activities relating to
the national security and make ap-
propriate recommendations for the
coordination of such activities.
CIA was not given direct authority
to coordinate; but, considering that
the members of the NSC are the
President of the United States as
chairman, the Vice President, the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, and the chairman of the
National Security Resources Board,
a statute-backed right to advise and
recommend to such a body ac-
quires a formidable character.
Finally, CIA was empowered to
"perform, for the benefit of the ex-
isting intelligence agencies, such
additional services of common con-
cern as the National Security
Council determines can be more
efficiently accomplished centrally,"
and "which other functions and
duties related to intelligence affect-
ing the national security as the Na-
tional Security Council may from
time to time direct." In other
words, CIA was not to be merely a
coordinator; it could operate on its
own if there were gaps to be filled.
But ancient suspicions and jealous-
ies die hard, and the law as drawn
was amended by Congress in two
respects: first, to deny specifically
to CIA any internal security or po-
lice powers; and, second, to pre-
serve to the several departments
their existing intelligence processes.
On the whole, it was a good law
-a great step forward. But, like
every other law that has ever been
printed on paper, it did not pro-
duce miracles immediately. The
first need of the new agency was
for capable, experienced men and
women. This was a need not easily
29
Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
 Approved For Release 2006/07/27 :
filled, as the newly appointed di-
rector, Rear Admiral I Iillenkocttcr,
quickly discovered. A few good
people had been inherited from
OSS. But where were the others to
come from? The body of experi-
ence was not great, since intelli-
gence on a national scale was a
new thing in America. Career offi-
cers of the services were still shy of
the "intelligence" brand. Capable
civilians of standing and merit were
reluctant to give up established ca-
reers for the uncertainty of this
new venture-and IIillenkoetter's
attempts to found a career intelli-
gence service by enlisting young
people straight out of college met
with the same reluctance. "Can
you promise me a secure future?"
was the question which Ilillenkoct-
ter could not yet answer honestly
in the affirmative. CIA represented
a new idea on trial. It had yet to
come of age, to establish itself as a
permanent governmental unit.
In those early days, there were
not lacking voices prophesying
CIA's early demise, voices saying-
"That outfit won't last through the
next .Congress, or certainly not af-
ter the first stupid blunder that's
sure to come." A new agency al-
ways has trouble, as Hanson Bald-
win remarks, "in establishing itself
in politically jealous, power-con-
scious Washington." This was a
heavy burden to lay on the shoul-
ders of a young rear admiral of less
than a year's seniority in grade. The
older intelligence agencies fought
tooth and nail against any "inva-
sion" of their prerogatives. Army
G-2 quarrelled with CIA over who
was to do what abroad; the State
Department worried for months
over the question of whctlrer its
nbassadors and Ministers should
h ve authority over CIA personnel
i various countries; the FBI took
a dim view of CIA's taking over
c Lain activities in Latin America
w ich FBI had been performing.
B it the big trouble was-and re-
ins-the old, old problem of de-
rtmental interpretation.
CIA was there to get at the facts,
r k-bottom facts, impartially de-
t mined in the light of the best
a% ~iilable evidence, and filled in by
e ucated guesses and careful de-
di ction only where absolutely es-
s itial and with guess and deduc-
ti n duly labelled as such. It is
n tural that each departmental in-
ligencc service will look at the
fits from the point of view of its
o wn interests. In any over-all Bur-
y of Soviet military strength, for
e ample, one would expect Naval
I telligcnce to lay chief emphasis
o Soviet submarine activities, the
A r Force to give first priority to
Soviet air power, and the Army to
p cscnt the mass of Soviet divisions
a the chief menace. But when it
comes to presenting the final con-
s idated report, it isn't always easy
t -get agreement as to how this re-
p rt should be weighted. Cries of
ill the umpire!"-or their equiv-
ct nference rooms.
Yet somehow the CIA took form
wing pains. The numerous criti-
ci ms-some well-founded, others
f less so-brought about in the
Summer of 1948 the appointment
o a committee of distinguished
civilians with wartime intelligence
c pcricnce (Allen W. Dulles, Wil-
li m II. Jackson and Mathias F.
Irrca) to make recommendations
30
Approved For Release 2006/07/27 :
 Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
IS OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM RELIABLE?
for improvements and necessary
changes. The committee did a
helpful job. But much credit is due
to the courage, good temper and
quiet self-effacement with which
Rear Admiral Hillenkoetter strug-
gled along, eliminating chair-warm-
ers and "empire builders," bring-
ing in a trickle of new personnel
when he could get good people, do-
ing the best he could with second-
raters when he had to, and on occa-
sion jeopardizing his own naval ca-
reer by remaining impartial in the
face of some naval preconception.
Hillenkoetter was scheduled to
return to the Navy, however, and
was longing for sea duty. So he
went to command a cruiser division
in Korean waters, and in October,
1950, CIA had a new director,
Lieutenant General (now Gen-
eral) Walter Bedell Smith, USA.
Smith brought to CIA his great
gifts of command and of persua-
sion, his three years of experience
in the Moscow embassy and as a
participant in every international
conference during that period, and
the prestige of high rank and of
distinguished war service as Eisen-
bower's Chief of Staff.
He came to CIA, moreover, at a
time when the Korean war was
stepping up appropriations and
when men of substance could be
called upon for service with some
assurance of favorable reactions.
It is no injustice to Hillenkoctter
to say that with the appointment
of Bedell Smith CIA came of age.
It acquired a chief who could not
be disregarded by anyone in the
Government, however high in au-
thority. It had won through its pe-
riod of growing pains. It had
weathered the Korean storm with
credit, and it came well out of the
later uproar over the Chinese inter-
vention in North Korea, again well
able to prove that whatever had
gone wrong, CIA had been there
with the information. Its prestige
as an impartial, reliable source of
vital knowledge was established.
Not easily would its warnings be
.set aside again.
Now Smith could start building
a permanent structure with some
assurance for the future. The basic
truth upon which CIA was found-
ed at last had been accepted as
established gospel: that national in-
telligence was a task far beyond the
scope of any single agency.
Not only is the field of its re-
search world-wide from the geo-
graphical viewpoint, but today it
must produce far more than a mere
list of regiments or air wings or
fortified places. The sources of na-
tional power cover the whole range
of human activity-military, politi-
cal, economic, and psychological.
As a young officer, the writer
was told: "Military intelligence is
not the sun illumining the world,
but a searchlight poking into dark
corners." But today, with one-
fourth of the whole land surface of
the globe deliberately blacked out
to the rest of mankind, with all
normal sources of information de-
nied and the most elaborate pre-
cautions taken to preserve secrecy
as to every detail, something more
than an intermittent searchlight
survey is required.
It isn't easy for Americans to un-
derstand the grave difficulties im-
posed by this handicap. It isn't
only the police precautions which
prevent or restrict all entry and
movement of foreigners in the Sov-
31
Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
 Approved For Release 2006/07/27 :
let domain. It is the drying up of
every source of information such as
is freely -available -about our own
and other free countries-the usual
channels of news, trade and credit
information, production figures,
the exchange of scientific and edu-
cational data, maps, books, maga-
zines, all the means by which facts
and thoughts flow freely across na-
tional boundaries. At least half of
the fact-items in the Soviet esti-
mates prepared by CIA with pain-
ful, piece-meal effort could be
culled as to our own country from
the World Almanac, the Census
Bureau's "Statistical Abstract of
the United States," a set of con-
toured maps, and a file of any good
daily newspaper.
These "national estimates" are
the final end product of CIA's la-
bors. There's one for every develop-
ing situation-it's as important to
understand an ally as to penetrate
an enemy's secrets-but the Soviet
estimate has No. I priority. The
estimates are never static. As soon
as one is completed, revision be-
gins. They are the result of day-by-
day effort which never ceases. CIA
can't afford rest periods.
The process of putting a national
estimate together has been com-
pared to solving a jig-saw puzzle.
You might imagine a huge incom-
plete jig-saw puzzle-with many
pieces missing and large irregular
blank spaces all through it-laid
out on the floor of a room. Every
day come men from Army, Navy,
Air Force, State and other activi-
ties, each bringing a new piece or
perhaps a handful of pieces. It is
immediately clear where some of
the new pieces fit. Others don't
seem to fit at all. They may belong
in the middle of some of the blank
s ces. They have to be set aside
until other pieces which match
ti em are obtained. Or some pieces
al .early fitted in may now seem not
t fit quite precisely-one of the
w pieces fits more evenly. A
whole section of the puzzle thus
y have to be readjusted. The
ture disclosed may be wholly
ered in character by this change.
acre will be lively argument be-
ccn those who were proud of the
original arrangement and those
w to insist that the change is more
n arly accurate. Finally the time
w 11 come when the picture is as
nearly complete as seems likely for
tl time being. Then the blank
s ices have to be filled in by guess
a d deduction from the general
for and form of the picture as
sown by the pieces already assem-
b ?d. The result is a national esti-
te, as of right then. The search
fjr new pieces and the replacement
o old pieces continue..
What CIA strives to produce in
ese national estimates is a firm
ide upon which policy-makers
and planners can rely. When each
e timate (or rather each edition of
each estimate) approaches complc-
ti n, there is a meeting of the In-
t ligcnce Advisory Committee,
csided over by the director of
ntral Intelligence, and including
irjtelligencc representatives of the
ilitary services, the joint Chiefs
Staff, the State Department, the
omic Energy Commission, and
e Federal Bureau of Investiga-
n (which handles domestic as-
cts of intelligence work). There
usually a brisk discussion on
ints as to which full agreement
his not yet been reached. Here, as
32
Approved For Release 2006/07/27 :
 Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3
IS OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM RELIABLE?
already observed, the director of
Central Intelligence must be the
impartial umpire.
Not the least of General Smith's
contributions to CIA is his suc-
cess in this delicate and trouble-
some task. He never consents to
"compromise for the sake of com-
promise." He will not permit an
estimate to be watered down.
Political influence has never suc-
ceeded-so far, anyway, but keep
your fingers crossed-in filtering
into the CIA. Facts, as Dulles re-
marks, are neither Republican nor
Democratic: which itself is a fact
that may arise to haunt some can-
didates in the current election.
Presidential candidates might well
reflect soberly on the embarrass-
ment of being elected on the basis
of vigorous assertions which-when
the candidate becomes President
and is duly briefed by the CIA-
may turn out to be all hogwash.
While-as already observed-
CIA's growing prestige plus the
Korean crisis have enabled General
Smith to obtain the services of
many distinguished civilians with
special competence for intelligence
work, this is only a stop-gap. The
agency must develop its own career
intelligence corps. It is better able
to do so today because it can now
say to young men and women: "In-
telligence is a serious and honor-
able profession which offers you a
lifetime job in the service of your
country." Plans are well advanced
for the start of such a career serv-
ice for CIA personnel.
The big difficulty-the closed
mind in high places-is still here.
It is not as dangerous as it was,
largely due to the vigor of some of
General Smith's presentations and
the fact that CIA generally has
turned out a lot nearer right than
any who have questioned its find-
ings. But since General Smith will
not always be director of CIA, it is
of vital importance that the agency
itself should acquire, as it is acquir-
ing, the confidence and prestige
which in the future will give the
country the assurance that facts,
however unpleasant or distasteful,
will be looked squarely in the eye
by those who must make the de-
cisions of policy or of action.
We are building a good intelli-
gence service for the first time in
our history. When we have learned
to use it, we can all breathe more
easily.
Approved For Release 2006/07/27: CIA-RDP57-00384R000200090082-3