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Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 25X1A 25X1A L.. Ii. housron W, L. Pforahe imedt 25X1A e6& Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/2 : bIA-RDP57-00384RO013000700 - SECRET COPY No. COMMUNISM Clandestine Communist Organization Part One The Communist Party Underground SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S?E C R E T T A B L E O F CONTENTS Page GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS . . , . . . . . . ~.- , ? PART ONE: THE COMMIST PARTY UNDERGROUND ? , , I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEL;T . ? , 9 A. Police and Party ? ? , ? r ? ? ? ? . ? ? ? ? ? 7 1, Geographical Factors ? ? e ? 10 2. Population Density , ? , 10 3. Political Factors ? e r ? 10 4, lviass Support for Police 11 Be Adaptability of Party Organization to Illegal Conditions . . . ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 12 1. Organizational Continuity . . ? , ? . ? 12 Cadre Continuity 3. Discipline and Security . . . . . , . . 14 4, Doctrine as Morale-Builder , . 15 5. Attraction of Doctrine 16 6, Cell System . . . , ? . ? . . . . . . . . 16 7. Backlog of Conspiratorial Experience , . ? 17 C. Organizational Problems: Adjustment to Illegal Conditions ? . . e ? . ? . . . . . ? . 18 1. Reduction of Party Apparatus . . . ? . . . . 18 a. Consolidation of Territorial organizations . . . . . , . , . . . ? 18 be Reduction of staffs . , . . . . , , . 18 2. The Command Function: The Triad System . . . 19 3. Compartmentalization . , . , , ? ? , 20 Party and military branches . be Party and auxiliary (front) organizations . . . ? . . . , . . 21 c. Party and auxiliary illegal organizations 21 d, Internal Party Compartmentalization , . . 21 1) Elimination of horizontal liaison ? , 21 2) Restriction of contacts ? ? . , ? , 21 3) Functional restrictions , , . , ? ? 21 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 i Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 SECR1{,' T Page 4. Election of Party Committees . . . . . , 21 a. Election of Central Committees . 22 b. Territorial Party committees and electoral. commissions . , . . . . 22 c. Co-optation . . . . . . . 22 5. Party Organizations Abroad 22 a. Central Committee and Central Departments . t 23 b. Foreign Bureau . . 23; C. Regional support centers . . . 23 d. Party organizations for emigrants . . . 23 e, Special service organizations D. Operational Problems of the Party Underground, . 24 1. The Cadre Problem . . . . . . . . , . . 24 as Replacement of the cadre . . .. . , . 24 b. An adequate cadre reserve 25 c. Ideological and practical training of the new cadre . . . . , 26 d. The protection of the illegal cadre. . . 26 2. The "Housing"s Problem and Communications . . 27 a, Internal communications 24 27 b. External communications . . . . . . . . 27 c. Reporting points for liaison personnel from abroad . 28 3. Technical Apparatus . . , 28 4. The Security Problem 30 a. Personal security 31 b. Administrative security 31 50 The Financial Problem . . . . . . . . . . 32 6. Mass Support: the Crucial Political Problem . , . . . . . . . . . 33 a. Penetration and control of legal non-Communist parties represent- ing workers and related class elements 34 b. Penetration and control of legal trade unions 34 c. Creation of dummy front organizations or parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 ii Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384RO01300070002-1 E C R E T Page II. CASES OF CO1l-;TJIUI IST PARTIES UNDERGROUND , . . ? 35 A. The Bolshevik Party Underground ? . , ? , 36 1. Organization . o f 38 a. The Moscow Organization . . . 39 b. The Odessa Organization . 40 2, Operational Problems ? ? . 41 a. Security Measures e . ? 41 b. Technical Services 43 C. Finances e e f 47 B. CP France Underground ? ? 48 1. Organization . ? 48 a. The Party Center 49 b. Territorial Levels 50 2. Technical Services ? 52 3. Security , 53 a. Modification of Structure , 53 b, Compartmentalization . . . . ? 54 C, Security Rules . . . ? ? ? r 54 1) Restriction of Contacts . . . . . . 54 2) Security of Meetings . . , 55 3) Safeguarding Party.Records and Materials . . . . . . . . ? . ? . 55 4) Personal Conduct . , . . . . . . . 56 d. Control, off. Cadres ? . . . ? ? . . , . . 57 4. Finances 61 C. CP Germany Underground 63 1. Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 a. Initial Confusion 64 b. The Failure of Centralized Control ? . 64 C? Decentralized Control . . . . . . . . . 67 d. Attempt to Revive Centralized Control . . . , . , . . . . . . .70 2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/08/21 CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 SI?,CRET Page D. CP Greece Underground . . ? 74 1. Organization 74 2. Operational Problems ? . . 78 a. Security . . 78 b. Communications ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 80 1) Couriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 2) Press and Radio . . . . . . . . . . 81 c. Recruitment and Transport . . . . . . . 83 d. Finances . . , . . . 83 1) Sources of Revenue . . . . . . . . 84 2) Expenditures . . . . . . . . . 85 E? CP Spain Underground ? . . ? '. 87 1, The Party Center Abroad . . . . . . . . . . 87 2. Organization within Spain . . . . . ... 89 3. Other Party Organizations Abroad . . . . ? 91 F. CP Portugal Underground 92 1. Organization . 92 2. Security . . . . . . . . . . . ? . . ? . 95 3. Agitprop . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4. Communications Abroad . . . . . . . 99 Approved For Release 2000/08/26r: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S E C R E T GELM,' J COD1STT~,;R 'ITGNS The international Communist movement has not merely survived, but has actually flourished, in the face of difficulties which have ruined political forces with less constancy of purpose and with less practical a technique. It has maintained itself as the "vanguard of the proletariat"" through Tsarist and totalitarian suppression, armed intervention, two world wars, and a decade of general "bourgeois" prosperity. In large measure, Communist suc- cesses can be explained by the organizational adaptability of'the Communist Party and its mastery over a mass of practical techni- ques. The Party knows what it must do and how to go about doing it, in any given circumstance. This competence was responsible in the first place for the success of. the Bolshevik Revolution, and since then, for the endurance of the Party as a continuing threat to all "bourgeois" states.. ?'ihatever the political climate, the Party goes on, working openly and legally where it can, secretly and illegally where it must. It is this latter capabil- ity for "conspiratorial" work which largely accounts for the survival and success of the international Communist movement in the face of adverse conditions. The scope of the "conspiratorial" activities of the Commu- nist Party encompasses defensive and offensive purposes. As an organization of professional and practical revolutionaries bent upon the eventual'achievement of revolution, the Communist Party is.enveloped by an atmosphere of hostility. Realizing this, the international movement has naturally developed a system of defen- sive measures designed to protect the Party against the police, intelligence agencies,?hostilo groups and the hostile public, and has been. normally organized so as to keep knowledge of the most significant aspects of Party activity restricted to a minimum of individuals. For similar reasons, the Party has made it a gener- al practise to conceal as thoroughly as possible the mechanics of the political controls through which it extends its influence be- yond Party confines. Tho Communist Party is generally designed S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/08/2,4:-CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25.: C1A-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 and able to operate under any conditions of opposition, hostility and outright suppression. It is capable of going totally under- ground when outlawed, and it is sufficiently security-conscious, even under normal conditions, to conceal many of its "normal" activities. The "conspiratorial" practises of Communist Parties operating in hostile socioties.are largely defensive in nature. They are designed to preserve political and organizational gains made by the Party, rather than to advance, the Party's aims fur- ther. The defensive side of the Party's conspiratorial behavior can be extensively illustrated by its organizational and opera- tional methods when proscribed. Part One of this study deals extensively with this subject -- the general patterns of under- ground organization are presented there, supplemented by de- scriptive analyses of the actual. underground experience of several Communist Parties. Defensive measures are normally adopted also by Parties which function more or less openly and legally. "Legal'' Parties give their program a maximum publication and expose a groat number of functionaries as iwoll as parts of their organ- ization to the public eye. However, even when admitted to the political scene, the Party usually acknowledges the hostility of the society it lives in, and attempts to submerge, auto- matically and by virtue of its organizational principles, the more significant areas of Party work. Every Communist Party is a centralized and centrally- directed mechanism controlled by a comparatively small group of professional, paid and full-time functionaries --,the cadre. )ithin this cadro-hiorarchy the functionaries at national head- quarters occupy the central position and have a monopoly on policy-making and organizational direction. Accustomed to strict semi-military discipline, the lower Party cadre and the rank and file are more instruments of the Party center. By virtue of its leadership function the Party center normally S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/08/~5_: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 SE C R E T guards the professional secrets of the Party, not unlike the management of a business enterprise. The Party center, then, puts the stamp of secrecy on such matters as Party finances, particularly on the origin of funds not derived from normal sources; intra-Party communications of more than normal admin- istrative, significance; relations with other fraternal Parties exceeding the normal interchange of Party literature and other routine communications and relations with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or representatives of the Soviet Government and the Cominform, which are likely to compromise the Party. Experience has further shown that soviet intelligence agencies frequently channel their recruitment of Party members through individual functionaries in national Party headquarters.-- operations which requiro secure and secret handling. Thus, even under normal conditions, highly significant aspects of Party work are managed by a small nucleus of trusted functionaries and are tightly scaled off from the rest of iho Party and the outside world. Further, Communist Parties generally maintain intra-Party police organs, frequently identical with the Cadre Department and the Control Commission. These agencies are organizational corollaries of the cadre principle. As the Party is built upon its cadre, it is essential for the center not only to train, pro- tect and properly assign the professional personnel; but also to preserve constant ideological and security control. Thus, most Parties maintain a confidential corps of Party "detectives" who must often perform counter-espionage duties such as the identi- fication of police agents infiltrated into the ranks of the Party, and "illegal" support functions such as the procurement of false papers and passports for the cadre.. Clearly, the existence of such a Party police force must be concealed, not only for security reasons, but also for ideological reasons. The Party is supposed to be run according to the principle of "democratic centralism", and the centralism exercised through S E C Z E T Approved For Release 2000/08T29 :-CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384ROO1300070002-1 SECRET 'police control methods may be distasteful to the rank-and-file. On the level of "normal" Party operations, secrecy is also unavoidable. Considering the smallest operative Party unit, the individual Party member, it is a well-known fact that many Commu- nists operate without ostensible connection with the Party. This apparent lack of connection may be aimed at personal protection or at safeguarding a particular, often secret, mission. In any case, the secret Party member shows up in almost every Party -- one need only recall the case of the Indonesian Socialist leader and government official, Sjarifoeddin, who, at the time of the Mooso putsch in 1948 admitted that he had been a secret member of the Communist Party of Indonesia since 1935. The Party, hotiw,ever, needs not only secret Party members it is bent upon the manipulation of non-Communist groups and organizations in order to establish "mass support" as a pro- requisite for revolutionary action. The approaches to this or- ganizational problem obviously vary from Party to Party, and the extent of secrecy with which they are handled is determined by the political climate prevailing in the particular country. In general, however, the Party will attempt to surround itself with a solar system of front organizations in order to attract acces- sible groups, and will further direct its fractions into non- Communist mass organizations -- for example, labor unions and political movements in colonial countries -- in order to expand Party control. In all those cases, it will be a problem of con- cealing Party control over fronts and fractions, a problem which becomes increasingly difficult to solve as the manipulative tech- niques of the Party are exposed in public. Clearly, however, as a revolutionary organization, the Party cannot confine'itself to defensive tactics alone. No matter what its status, v~hether legal or proscribed, the Party must at least plan such activities as will weaken the coercive power mechanism of the "capitalist" state, as well as hostile groups and politi- cal parties, in concrete operational, rather than in general S iCRET Approved For Release 2000/08/25-: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 C a E T political,' terms. No matter what its tactical shifts, the Party can never neglect its fundamentally military-revolutionary character and it must attempt to organize support functions di- rectly or indirectly related to future revolutionary action. This concept, which is by no means clear-cut and free from straight political considerations, involves what amounts to the setting up of intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations and/or operations, with all their operational ramifications. The general operational program of the Communist Party provides for the organization of secret Party nuclei in the armed forces, the police, the navy, the government, and occasionally also within opposition groups in order to specialize and concentrate upon a) the procurement of information which would clarify the organ- ization and capabilities of the hostile power mechanism; b) clandestine subversion within "the citadel of the enemy," parti- cularly in the armed forces. The program may also at times in- clude the organization of clandestine nuclei operating in strategic plants and enterprises to provide industrial and eco- nomic information systematically -- the productive capabilities and facilities of the hostile society are clearly related to the problems of revolutionary action. Party security in its widest sense may also require a more aggressive approach, particularly when the physical liquidation of hostile individuals and traitorous or insecure Party members is concerned. Finally, when a revolutionary situation approaches, the Party must provide for a pares-military organization to form the executive core of revolutionary action--action, however, which sets into coordi- nated motion tho ontire,Party mechanism and the social forces allied with it. Such and similar clandestine action auxiliaries of the Party have been occasionally observed in operation. Part Two of this paper includes a factual presentation, and a tentative analysis of their significance in detail. These offensive clandestine Party operations probably represent the most significant area of Approved For Release 2000/08125 :-CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25 CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 F,CRE T Party work? They perform 'u1ctiohs which transgress the area of "normal" political action and they may constitute an acute threat to the existing social order. However, it is not yet possible to generalize on the subject. While the normal aspects of Party or- ganization follow a pattern anywhere, it is by no means certain that every Party organizes clandestine action auxiliaries in the same fashion--if at all. On the basis of evidence available at present, it appears that Leninist-Stalinist action theory applies practically to the organization of-clandestine action auxiliaries as it applies to any other aspect of Party work. Thus, the actual organization of clandestine military auxiliaries prior to the all-out revolutionary effort depends not only upon such factors as availability of train- ed manpower, loaders and arms, but also upon the making of a clear- cut policy decision that.a revolutionary situation, which may be successfully exploited by the Party, is at hand. While it may be expected that all Parties include individuals,or even groups who are specialists in military matters, it would be futile to search for a facsimile of the Military Revolutionary Organization of the Bolshevik Party (1917) in the Communist Party of Great Britain at present. Incipient or underdeveloped Parties are more likely to concentrate upon political action in order to achieve mass influ- ence. Parties which have reached a stage of relative mass propor- tions may find it practicable to organize secret military cadres and formations. Again, however, policy considerations and the degree of expectable opposition will affect planning, timing and organization. Similar considerations apply to the organization of counter- intelligence, intelligence, sabotage, liquidation and other clandes- tine action agencies. Materials studied indicate that a stepping- up of such activity and its formalization in special auxiliaries occurs during critical periods considered by the Party favorable to aggressive, revolutionary action in general, such as the middle Twenties and the early Thirties when the "relative stabilization" Approved For Release 2000/Q$//?5L: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 of capitalism was estimated as coming to an end. It is considered, therefore, that a definite relation oxists between the particular phase of the action-philosophy governing the Party at any given time and the incidence of well-defined clandestine action auxiliar- ies. Informally, however, and in a less pronounced fashion, the Party will naturally never pass up any chance for clandestine work in the power apparatus of the State or in hostile groups and or- ganizations. In focussing upon the organization of underground Parties as well as on the organization of clandestine action auxiliaries, this paper attempts to clarify the problem in terms of both past and cur- rent Party experiences. Again however, this paper must be examined against the totality of the Party's work in a given society -- over- estimation, as well as underestimation, of clandestine Party opera- tions may dangerously distort the terms on which each national Party must be appreciated. S E C R E T Approved For Release 2005/087255 :GSA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 PART ONE THE COMMUNIST PA,R,&,Y ?.. N D Approved For Release 200/08125 E CIA-RDP57-00384RO01300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S E R E I. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS A. Police and Party on general principles, the Party prefers to assume the form of a "legal" political party, in order to achieve more easily a mass basis. Under "legal" conditions, the entire propaganda and agita- tion apparatus can be employed overtly; front organizations can be set up at will; the Party's drawing power can, be demonstrated at the polls; Communists can operate with greater case in labor unions, and enter the government by way of "dom.ocratic" processes. The Party will therefore fight desperately and until the last minute to maintain its legal status? It will marshal public opinion with the aid of liberal sympathizers and fellow-travellers. It will employ for its defense sympathetic or crypto-Communist lawyers, who are frequently pooled in international front organiza- tions. It will receive the moral assistance of foreign Parties and the Soviet party-government, making an international propaganda issue of the Party's case, In any case, the Party will seek to delay its transfer to il- legality as long as possible, realizing that its organization and operations will be severely hampered by the loss of legal status. Once driven underground, it will make every effort to become "logal" again. The Party knows that it can be paralyzed by an efficient police. The primary concern of the Party underground, therefore, is with the law enforcement agencies, for these can control the fate of the Party and its leaders. It is often extremely diffi- cult for the Party to protect itself against police penetration, arrests, and searches. Evan in areas whore the police is not particularly efficient, the Party must spend considerable effort and time on defensive measures. The over-all success of the police, however, is conditioned by several factors, some of which may work to the Party's advan- tage. Approved For Release 2000/08/25: -CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 E.CRAT, 1. Geographical Factors. In largo countries and in countries with inaccessible territories (mountains, marshland, jungles, vast forests), the surveillance and border-control problems are difficult for the police. The experience of the Bolshevik Party before 1917 shows how groat distances favor individual, escapes and illegal border traffic. More recent events in Brazil, Greece, the Philip- pines, Malaya, et. al., illustrate the same point. 2. Population Density. Overcrowded metropolitan areas with vast slums, as well as port cities, also enhance chances for sur- vival. It is comparatively easy for the underground Communist to shako off pursuit in highly populated street-mazes and among the wharves. 3. Political Factors. Police action against the Party may be hindered or encouraged by public opinion.. Under a totalitarian anti-Communist government, police persecution of the Party will obviously be far more effective than under the relatively mild, legalistic approach of democratic governments. M11ussolini, for example, took a groat personal interest in police and intelligence operations against the Italian Party, and frequently directed them himself -- a factor which clearly increased the efficiency of the Italian security agencies. On the other hand, a loosely controlled police force may grow lax and sock only to make occasional arrests for publicity pur- poses, without seriously affecting the Party's operations. A pro- cariously balanced political situation, such as obtains particu- larly in countries near the Soviet borders, may also affect police operations. A shaky "liberal" government may be forced by in- creasing pressure from rightist. parties to'soften its attitude to- ward the Party, which might become an ally in case of nood. The individual , polico' official, too, fearful for the future of his position, may fool it unwise to be too strict and choose rather to straddle the fence. S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/08/2S :-CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/RW2 I -RDP57-00384RO01300070002-1 4.. Mass Support f o1' soli, If there is mass support for the regime and its punitive policy, as in Nazi Germany, police opera- tions against the Party may prove extremely effective.. Under such conditions, the police are able to procure a great number of infor- mers and penetration agents, as well as disaffected Party members who remain in the Party as police agents. Large-scale cultivation of disaffected elements and the development of penetration opportu- nities have boon favorite police tactics since the early days of the Bolshevik Party. YT~enover it has been feasible to-put these methods into practice, they have produced astonishing results. The Tsarist police, for oxample, were able to recruit Malinovsky, who for a time was second in importance. only to Lenin in the Bolshevik wing of the underground Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, In Germany, mass support for National Socialism provided the security,authoritios with a wealth of informers and penetration agents. The Italian OVA (originally the CECA) is estimated to have controlled the greater part of the Italian underground Party, exploiting the breakdown in morale tiihich follows vigorous punitive action. The Greek dictator Iletaxas greatly com- plicated the operations of the underground Greek Party by setting up a parallel police-controlled underground Party. More recently, CP Malaya discovered that its Secretary General had been a police agent for many years. The greatest danger which the Party underground must face is often not the police itself but the psychological impact of the anti- Communist movement upon the population and upon the morale of the Party members themselves. Novertheloss, various Parties which have undergone this persecution, such as the Bolshevik Party,and the European Parties in the Fascist period, have managed, in one form or othor, to survive, 17hilo the drawing- power of Communist ideology may partially account for the Party's durability, the adaptability of Party organization to illegal conditions is an important additional factor in the struggle between Party and police. - 11 - 0 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 E C R E 2 -B. Adaptability _of Party Organizatioa~ to Ill a 1 Conditions The model pattern of Party organization, developed by the Bolshevik Party during more than a decade of illegality, was grafted, through the Comintern, upon all foreign Parties. Thus, the basic forms of Party organization, as encountered today, have been pro- tested under illegal conditions. Consequently, when a Party is do- clarod illegal, there is no need to alter its basic structure. All that is necessary is an adaptation of organization to illegal condi- tions. The specific advantages inherent in "normal" Communist Party organization, may be summed up as follows: (a) The Party preserves its continuity in terms of organi- zation and personnel. (b) The Party emphasizes discipline and security even in legal periods. (c) Communist doctrine acts as a morale-buildor in illegal periods, and may become attractive to the non-Communist leftist in times of general supprossion...of all "progressive" movements. (d) The basic coil organization of the Party, practiced at a]1 times, facilitates underground operations. (c) More than any other "normal" political party, the Com- munist Party has acquired a"backlog of "illegals" experience, even under legal conditions. 1. Organizational Continuity By its nature as a revolutionary organization, the Communist Party -Will operate under any conditions, legal or illegal. On the basis of its theory, it considers the transition to illegality an extremely undesirable but otherwise stnormal,r consequence of the class struggle. This advantage is not enjoyed by the evolutionary Marxist par- ties (Social'Democrats) which operate strictly by legal, parlia.rnen- tart'-democratic methods. non ostracized and suppressed, such parties often undergo severe morale and organizational crises. -Because of their fundamental inability (so often attacked by the Communists) to conceive of a revolutionary approach, they interpret their ostracism as "failure of the leadership".. "failure of doctrinott, and begin to disassociate themselves, psychologically and organizationally, from their past. "In all Fascist countries," states a loading Social Domocrat, referring to events in the thirties, "there grows this idea within the illegal (Socialist) cadro: We are something now; lb arc not a more continuation of the old party', ... The old is dead -- something entirely now must develop now. Approved For Release 2000/08/21: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S T C R L, T Behind the secu#ty of its prefabricated doctrine, the Communist Party does not, as a rule, need to scrutinize its basic philosophy or raison d'etre under illegal conditions. 'Party continuity is taken for granted by the Communists. i:1on the Party is outlawed it does not waste precious time and energies wrangling over basic theory and metaphysical issues. It does not have one form of organization for legal and another for illegal conditions. The underground PParty is the Party underground. 2. Cadre Continuity. A further guarantee of continuity is the .fact that the Party is at all times a "cadre Party", As many execu- tive and administrative positions as possible are occupied by trained, experienced, full-time and salaried functionaries or,"professional revolutionaries". Vlhile the size, reliability and capabilities of the cadre obviously vary from country to country, the Party habitually, and as a matter of principle, creates a caste of func- tionarics who are entirely dependent upon the Party center in finan- cial, personal and ideological terms, and who can therefore be depended upon to follow the center undergro~tnd., The extent to which the individual cadre-~:ia.n is tied to the Party by personal' interest is ably described by A? Rossi (:'h; si^olo?gy of the French Communist Party, Paris, 1948). IlThe role played by personal interest in this faithful adherence to the Party is greater than one might think... The Party functionary cannot become a functionary without quitting his factory, his office, his profession -- he takes on now habits and lives differently. He sheds his roots, ho becomes a 'sort of outcast.,. He has'ontorod a new social class, a class sui goneris it is true, but still'elovated as only the salaried class of industry and commerce... To quit (this'class) moans to bo thrown back into the limbo from whore he came..'/ As an added incentive for its cadre, the Party also dispenses power, which Rossi describes as frequently greater than that of high- level government officials. Having tasted this sense of power, the functionary is reluctant to give it up. A party run both at the center and at the periphery by a well- .trained and disciplined cadre-bureaucracy has the advantage of a con- crete and specific approach to the problem of going underground. It S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/08/2" CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25 :, CIA-RDP57-00384RO01300070002-1 . SECEIT .can prepare and provide for the event i. Lrms of cado protection and replacement. ?:lhatover action potential,a Party may salvage in illegality depends less on the extent to which it can protect its .rank and file from arrest, than on the success it achieves in sal- vaging or replacing its entire cadre. The disadvantage of the system, however, is that if the cadre fails, the Party fails. The Party under round is the cadre underground, 3.. Discipline and Security. The stress on strict discipline which is required under illegal conditions constitutes no problem for the Party. The cadre will have boon trained already and condi- tioned to depend on the instructions of the center in any circum- stance. The center will therefore encounter little resistance in strengthening its control over the cadre, and will be able to dis- pense with those features of "democratic centralism" which permitted the rank and file to participate in the selection of the cadre during legal periods. Instructions issued by the illegal CP France of 1940, for example, stated specifically that the election of functionaries was out of the question, and that only Centralism was to be conserved. 11hile this relationship has the definite opera- tional advantage of permitting co-ordinatod action even under,haz- ardous conditions, the dependence of the cadre on the center can choke the initiative of the individual cadre-man and impede the efficiency of the Party. Discipliae under ille al conditions moans not only strict ad- herence to the political and organizational direction of the center, but also rigorous conformity with underground security rules govern- ing the conspiratorial behavior of cadre and militants, A function- ary who has "betrayed" Party secrets under severe police pressure is punished by the competent organs of the Party for a "breach of discipline", pith no regard for the circumstances in which the be- trayal occurred. The maintenance of discipline and security by special Party organs (Control Commission, Cadre Commission, and other specialized sections) is a traditional feature of Party organization which can . Approved For Release 2000/08/2514C1A-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S E C R E T be conveniently adapted to underground conditions. The main factor,, however, which endangers the successful preservation of discipline and security in the Party underground is that, in the course of extremely severe police action, morale may disintegrate and result in factionalism, mass defections and penetrations. 4. Doctrine as Morale-Builder. Efficient underground organiza- tion and conspiratorial skill are, of course, the decisive elements in the Party's struggle to maintain itself when illegal. The demands of underground life on the underground Party worker, however, are frequently extremely taxing, and good morale becomes an opera- tional necessity. No matter how much opportunism, adventurism, or lust for power go into the make-up of'tho individual functionary or activist, a willingness to sacrifice everything for the sake of the Party demands a stronger motive than these. This motivation is furnished by the Party, ready-made, in the form of its doctrine, the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology. As a morale-building element, doctrine stands in the first line of defense of the Party underground. Thorough indoctrination (which is, of course, a continuous and well- organized process in legal as well as illegal periods) appears to induce the following psychological habits in Communists: a. Superiority Complex, The doctrine is dispensed as "absolute truth", providing the believer with a set of answers for every political,'social and philosophical-problem, The sincere individual Communist, in possession of "absolute truth", consi- ders himself a crusader, a fighter for a ''now world". The longer he stays in the Party, the loss he is able to think in un-Communist terms. He fools eternally. misunderstood by non- Communists and, when ostracized, feels victimized. In brief, his indoctrination produces the conviction that he is fighting for a just cause -- a definite morale asset. b. Hostility. Based upon the idea of class struggle, the doctrine systematizes and cultivates hastility'generated by social conflict, frustration and maladjustmont; The doctrine is one of hatred directed at the."class enemy", the latter be- ing anyone who does not share the Party's point of view. Such indoctrination, required by the revolutionary-military nature of the Party, pays off during periods of illegality. Hostility glows with the increasing pressure exerted by the "class enemy'' and added to the instinct for self-preservation, loads to vigor- ous resistance. c. Optimism. Communist doctrine has a strong morale- building element in its "sciontific" certainty of the inevitable doom of capitalist society. Defeat can be rationalized as a temporary setback, a deficiency in organization, or the result of the work of tral ors. But it can never be accepted as definite Approved For Release 2000/0.8/? .CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S E C R E T i. .r ~ 4 r rr and final. Optimism is prescribed as the Communist's basic attitude, and pessimism boccmes a heresy'. In this outlook there is a modicum of religious strength, an asset not'to be underestimated during a period of underground activity. 5. Attraction of Doctrine. In situations where repressive measures are applied to the non-~ormunist evolutionary T:1arxist, liberal and progressive parties, as well as to the Communist Party, Communist doctrine may actually extend beyond its defensive,func- tion and further the growth of the illegal Party.' When repression becomes total, as under the Fascist regimes, the peaceful evolution- ists and liberal democrats may lose their faith in modexato tactics and join the Communists, who always maintain that socialism cannot be established by legal methods alone. Under Nazi control, the Austrian working class felt that the Socialists' democratic methods had brought about their defeat and began to place their hope in Com- munist objectives. CP Austria became a significant orgnnizat,iorx ror the first time in its history during the term of Nazi suppression; it declined when suppression was lifted. 6. Call System. Under illegal conditions, when security consi dcrations.demand the atomization of Party organization, the Party need only adjust its cell system, through which basic operations are effected. The grouping of the rank and file into small nuclei at the place of work, at the place of residence, and in non-Communist parties and organizations ensures the systematic exploitation of the cell member's normal outside contacts for propaganda and recruitment purposes. This is an all-important task in the underground when other Party activities may be curtailed. The importance of.illegal cell activity is intensified by the fact that intermediate echelons arc usually reduced to skeletons; hence, for practical purposes the Party underground often consists only of the center and the numerous "front line" cell organizations. There is inherent in this system, however advantageous, a considerable risk of isolation. When communi- cations break clown, as they frequently do, the basic Party organiza- tions become ineffective or detached front the Party line. If the breakdown is prolonged, as it was in Germany under Hitler, the Party S E C R E T Approved For Release' 2000/08/2A: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 is reduced to a multitude of isolated nuclei, which can do little more than maintain their clandestine existence for the day when the Party may be revived. It is at this point that the extent to which the Party has accumulated and transmitted lessons learned from con- spiratorial experience becomes effective, 7.. &acklo of Conspiratorial Expcrienee. Through the Comintern, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has shaped the organizational policy of all foreign Parties, and has passed on its own considerable experience in underground work. Throughout the years of its exist- once, the Comintern exhorted and obliged its sections to prepare ade- quately for periods of illegality. By means of its Organization Bureau, headed until about 1936 by Piatnitzky, a leading organizer of the Russian underground, the Comintern furnished specific advice on underground operations and problems. Terms used in the Russian under- ground, such as "technical apparatus" for illegal printing and distri- bution facilities, have consistently found their way into the nomen- clature of foreign Parties. The Greek Party, for example, currently uses a Russian word, "'Yavka", meaning a clandestine reporting center. The "groups of three" upon which illegal Party organization appears to be based so frequently, have their equivalent in the Russian under- ground term, "troika" (team of three). The fundamental problems of illegal activity are now widely understood by the various Parties. The practical experiences of many Parties, accumulated during underground periods and pooled by the Comintern prior to 1943, have increased the conspiratorial com- petence of the movement. There is hardly a significant Party which has not. Bono through illegal or semi-legal phases. 'While first-hand experience probably remains the best task-master, it is evident that a pattern at least exists in general outlines, and that a Party'-faced with illegality acts on it. To what degree this pattern has been created by a centralized effort, or by the appearance of identical problems treated in a similar fashion by different Parties, is a minor point. It is more important to recognize and understand the Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 SE CRET basic Communist approach to the organizational and operational pro- blems of the Party underground, C. Organizational Problems: Adj.1strtent to Tllchal Conditions The fundamental organizational problem faced by the Party going underground is this: How to combine maximal security with maximal activity -- how to expose its, agencies and functionaries to the police as little as possible. Therefore, the primary concern is with a realistic and practicable streamlining of the bureaucratic apparatus, 1. Reduction of Party Apparatus. The extent of the streamlining process is determined by the size of the legal Party, the severity of repressive action upon it, and general policy considerations. A small or underdeveloped Party apparatus cannot be drastically reduced; a mass Party may find it necessary to run the risk of preserving an extensive organization. Within the limits of such considerations, action may be taken along the following lines: a. Consolidation of territorial organizations. The terri- torial organization of the Party, particularly in a largo country, can be conveniently consolidated and reduced. This makes it pos- sible to utilize staff personnel with greater economy, and to concentrate communications with the Party center. All levels of territorial organization (region, district, subdistrict and sec- tion)-may be reduced simply by unifying the various staff*com- mands, and combining their original areas of jurisdiction. The twenty-eight regional organizations (Bezirke) of the German Com- munist Party before 1933, for example, were consolidated after the advent of Nazi suppression into eight inter-regional. organi- zations (Oberbezirke); other territorial organizations were apparently also reduced in number while their jurisdiction was extended. The Party center itself may be loss affected by the pro- cess of consolidation: a large Party may need a large central organization.. On the cell level; however, consolidation is not practical. For security reasons, ce11s must be broken up into small units if they are to escape police attention. Hence, at the same time that territorial- organizations may decrease in number or disappear altogether, the cell organizations in the Party underground may be atomized and grow in number. b. Reduction of staffs. In addition to the consolidation of territorial organizations, the number of staff positions through- out the Party is. normally reduced in the underground. The terri- torial Party committees are apparently strongly affected in this respect. According to-a Comintern instruction, the committees of illegal Parties should, as a rule, consist of no more than five people, and a secretary should take the place of the executive bureau. In practise, the composition.of illegal Party committees appears to be more elastic, depending on prevailing conditions. The extent to which the membership of the Central Committee maybe ,reduced is also determined by the actual situation. Members of the Central Committee are elected at the national Party Congress or Party Conference, and their tenure of office is valid for both Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 -18- Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 loLal and illegal periods. Over and above: the losses sustained by a Central Committee through arrests and other operational mishaps, there is, however, no 1genoral indication'of how numeri- cal composition is affected by illegal conditions. It may be as large or as small as conditions warrant. There seems to be a general tendency to eliminate Party Com- mittees during illegal periods, and to assign actual organiza- tional and political work to the exocutivc-administrative appara- tus of the Party. CP Chile, for example, simply eliminated all Corun,ittoos and transferred the direction of the Party to its executive, a8encies, as follows: CONTROL OI S C t MI SION POLITICAL C01111 . LSSIO N .__~. SECRETARY GENERAL I REGIONAL ` SECRETARY LOCAL SECRETARY REGIONAL SECRETARY LOCAL SECRETARY CELLS ' .) Insofar as the executive-adr~.inistrative apparatus of a Central Committee is concerned, practical security'reasons obviously re- commend the paring down of staff personncl. If the actual work- load is too heavy to permit reduction, the Secretariat and the various Departments or'Commissions of the Central Committee (such as Cadre, Organization., Youth, Agit-Prop, etc.) may continue, while now corunissions may be created for-technical services, ro- lief for interned comrcc'.os, and the like. In"some Parties, the personnel of those Departments may be reduced? In others, the staff may continue or be roplacod, One Central Committee may dissolve its Politburo and transfer its functions to the National Secretariat. Another may enlarge its m_cmbership in order to make up for expected losses in executive positions. More is no gen- oral rule except adaptability to the situation at hand. 2.:' The Cor_mand Function: _ The Triad SZstoEj,_, Consolidation of torritori^.1 organizations and reduction of staff personnel can, in some cases, be combined with a special organization of the command function observable only in underground Parties. According to this Approved For Release 2000/08/2519 CJA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S E C R E T system, at all echelons, from the national down to the cell level, groups of three functionaries may be established with two-fold re- sponsibilities: the over-all direction and supervision of Party work at their level, and maintenance of vertical liaison.with each other. In the latter capacity these'triads represent the live chain of command in the illegal Party. Whenever observed, these triads have consisted of a) a specialist for political work, b) a specialist for organizational problems, and c) a specialist for agitation and propaganda, or for labor union work. The triads, however, do not necessarily replace whatever other Party organizations may remain effective. They are sometimes mere- ly superimposed on the illegal Party machinery in order to monopo- lize direction. Triads at national and territorial levels have been known to direct, the work of the various administrative and exeotitive departments and commissions of the Party. However, it cannot be clearly determined at present to what extent the nation- al triad may combine executive command with policy-making functions. Theoretically it remains responsible to the Po'?itburo, but in fact it may well become the actual loaclership of the Party. The triad principle may even be applied to cell organization. Cells can be constituted as three-man groups, each member recruiting and direct- ing another Croup of three who are not cell members and who comprise sub-cell basic umitso The triad represents an effective concentration of the command function in the hands of a comparatively few individuals. It per- mits greater centralization and compartmentalization, 3. Co m2 rtmentalization. Tight compartmentalization is an organization and security problem of the first order, since it is necessary to prevent the police from learning too much when Party members or functionaries are arrested. Compartmentalization i s ap- plied to Party operations as follows: a. Party and military.branch. Whenever an underground Party' is in the position to create a military organization, the latterts staff comrrosition is kept distinct from-the Party's political mechanism. The two structures merely coordinate on policy and re- ,cruitment problems at their highest echelons. Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 -20- Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S E C R E T b. P^rtSr anc' auxiliary (front or, ii?ations. As in legal periods, various Party auxiliaries (youth or; anizations, women's organizations, sport clubs, otc.,) remain connected with the Party thruu-_h iriterlockin,.; staff porsonnol` only. They function on their own, as inclcpendontly as possible, c. Party and auxiliary illo,,nl or,aniza.ti-ons. Party or; ani- zations, or teams for the performance of such spoci. Ali zee, tasks as cspion,a;e, sabotage, clandestine penotration of police anu other ;;ovcrnr;lont a-oncies, liquidr:tion and terror rou )s, etc., arc ost^hlishod as lai" ely indo,,ondent and self-conta.inod groups even in lof al Dcriod-s. They are maintained on this basis in times of illegality. d. Internal Party--?comart lienta iation, Within the polit- ical nochardsm of the F,:Lrty propcr 'thc clesi_ro(l effect can be n ~. Y i(ic,~.~lly achicved by + ~Yar, 1) EliminWItic,r of hor 1_7cnt ~,l 1ialson, No cell and no territorial c? -, m za tion :L _ ert)t r-,tcc1T to maintain contact with any other Party or';an opor ti: ,; on the same level. Liaison may only be conducted vertically with the designated functionary of the super=ior Party ort;anization, whose task it is to direct the lowor organizations under his jurisdiction. 2) Restriction of contacts., The fewer comrades a funs-' tionnry or activist knows and meets in the course of his work, the better, This principle is sound if applied realistically. It can, ho,,wrcver, be formalized to an extreme degree. CP France in 1941, for oxa.mplo, applied the triad system not only to the organization of the command function, but apparently also, as a security measure, to all Party activities. No com- rade was to know more than two other Party workers. It is questicnablc whether tho French principle can be put into practice r' 4,4idly. Even CP France frequently had to threaten disciplinary action in order to push its compartmentalization program to the oxtror: e , 3) Functa.onal restrictions. "The comrades of a group of three must not knovr .nythin but (what refers to) their work proper:, " -status an instruction of CI' (1941). :?ore than over, it is inctunbont upon the c.Iirectors of illegal Party work to clefino the job of each functionary and activist clearly, so that he may not stray bcyond security limits, It is not always possible,, hovaover,, for the ind victual function- ary to "stick to his guns". Nothing is less 1) rmanent than an underf roue l or"anization, and shifts front one job to another occur oft-en, a rosult,, a functionary may learn. more than is good for the Party. 4,, Election of Party Ca,rittoes, The strcallinin process ap- plied to tlao iiloE ai Party organization may not always be extensive, and the direction of the Party may actually lie in the hands of the national and torritori.al committees and their rc1mi.nistrative organs. When this is the case, the illegal election of Party committees re- prosonts an organizational. problem. The Comintorn advised its member Parties that in an underground situation illegal Party elections were possible, though they must take place in restricted conferences and thelelections themselves handled in such a way that even the confer- once members would not know who was elected. It is not certain whother S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 21 - Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 S E C 2. E T this advice has been generally heeded., as the problems of illegal '.rti.cs are never identical. a, Election of Central Committees. Electing a Central Coin- mittce at a conference abroad is one way of circumventing secur- ity'restrictions at home when the Party is underground. In this way, the Bolshovik'under..round elected its Central Committee at conferences abroad, attended by delegates who travelled illegally- from the interior of Russia. Currently, the Party conferences of CP`Greece are held abroad for practical purposcs (in the rebel arsoa). This is also true of CP Spain at present. On the other hand, conditions prevailing in < . particular country may permit the holding of large illegal meotin,r;s at home. For example, the i11e^.al Central Committee (35 members). of CF Yugoslavia was elect- ed in that country at'a national conference of more than 100 dole- Cates in October 1940. ? The Party may not be able to hold' a national Party Con- Cress for the election of the Central Coios;-they orient themselves with the first information received, to discover and round up the -whole organization. 3) Safeguardin Party Zecords and Materials. The location of Party records should be a closely guarded secret, restricted to the smallest possible number of persons, -warned the tract, genforcons la surveillance: "Two comrades only should know where SECi3ET Approved For Release 2000/08I2S5 CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 SECaT the materials and presses are kept." The keeping of records was discouraged, but when this was unavoidable, it was required that lists of names and locations of Party units and other details of organization should be encyphored: "The compiling of lists in free text is rigorously prohibited by the Party and should be con- sidered an act of provocation." Material of this nature should never be kept in the regular residence of a Party member. Provi- Sion must be made for quick and easy destruction of all records. 4) Personal Conduct. In addition to scrupulous observance of the rules which have already been outlined, the militant was con- stantly admonished to preserve t he security of. the Party organiza- tion by keepinrg himself inconspicuous and refusing, to answer any. questions which might compromise the Party or other comrades it any wady, in case of arrest. Vie du Parti denounced those militants who, "although little known before the war, instead of preserving a strict anonymity with persons with whom they came in con- tact, behaved like pretentious, irresponsible bourgeois." Other publications carried those instructions: "An illegal militant should never describe his work, -either to his wife, or liis friends, onto anyone. Still less should he make known his meeting places or where he works. Never tell anyone any more than he must know to carry out his work. " "Militants have no choice between family and Party, " one phamphlct declared. At the first sign of clan or, he must change his residence and give up seeing his family, who are likely to be under police surveillance? Inconspicuous disguises, such as modifying the style of onets dross or coiffure, affecting a different gait, otd., were recom- mondod in case of necessity, and even more elaborate disguises in certain instances. "It is better to err by an excess of vigiian~.e than by imprudence," militants were told. However, tine best do- meanor w.s to be natural, "to resemble the rest of the crowd." Communists .fore warned against drawing attention to thomEolvos by too conspiratorial a manner: "Don't slink. Be natural." The conduct which a militant should follow in case of arr.st was described in detail in the Party press during 1941. The burden S E C i T Approved For Release 2000/08125: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 C 11 T Of these instructions.Was that nothing should be revealed which would lead to further arrests. First of all, the militant should keep his head: 'tDonlt be panicky. Every militant knows that he may some day be arrested. The event should not surprise him." He must reveal nothing which could help the police in any way. Until brought before a court, he should preserve a strict silence. Like Georgi Dimitrov at Leipzig, the PCF member on trial should take advantage of the'opportunity to turn the proceedings into a "veritable indictment of capitalist society." He should not attempt to 'defend himself against specific charges, leaving that "delicate" function to his lawyer,. The lawyer should be chosen from among those recommended by the Party, and under no circum- stances should-he be permitted to argue the case in such a way as to throw discredit on the Party or to compromise any of its members. d. Control of Cadres,, New, organizational forms imposed by il- legality worked in the Partyts favor in the development of new cadres and in their control. Decentralization of structure, based on the Triad system and correspondingly smaller superior units, stimulated the development of previously untrained militants who emerged to assume command of the many now units, Centralization of direction ensure(.', rigorously close supervision of their work by experienced superiors, an immediately personal surveillance which entailed con- tinuous investigation and verification of character and of qualifica- tio_)rns. There was an endless search for talents and patient training; a constant reshuffling of functionaries and refinement of technique. Finally, illegality forced a. close attention to detail and to planning, as well as a clear recognition of the necessity for strict discipline, for personal safety, as well as for Party security. It is testimonial enough to the flexibility of structure, to the ability of individuals, and to the effectiveness of principles followed, that the Party was able, within a few months, to reconstitute a strong, disciplined cadre structure from what had been badly de- moralized elements. SEC -tE T Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 -57-- Approved For Release 2000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 The task of controlling the cadre and its activities fell immediately to the Cadre Section in the PCF Center, which exercised this control throu,=h the Cadre Responsibles at all Party levels. These were charged with the selection and supervision of functionaries, with checking their work, and with the vital task of verification. The constant threat of police infiltration was too great and the im- portance of the selection of cadres on Party morale too profound to trust to chance. The. Cadre Res onsibles themselves could not be expected to carry on the work alone. The Political iesponsible at each level was specifically charg,ed with double-chocking his Responsible for Cadrev: "The problem of the cadres is infinitely large. It is the problem ol the whole party, Each Responsible muet know the com- rades who work directly under his supervision.... A Regional Responsible should be acquainted with his co-workers in the Sec- tors and Sections, but with discretion. He should seek out the "reserve! who will replace him should he fall, or become sick. He must help'tho ResL)onsibies who work under him to select their replacements., The Cadre Ros;.~onsible seconds him in this task and accomplishes the myriad particular tasks of selection and verifi- cation," Cahiors du bolchevisme, lst Quarter 1941) Cadre esponsibles also kept close tabs on the political ap- paratus, The Cadre ics~onsible for one of the Paris Inter-Reiions attended some of the meetings of the "Triangle Directcur" of that Inter-Zegion, reporting on those to the National Political Responsible. Presumably, the reports dealt with the efficiency and ideological security of the leaders of the political mechanism. The Party Center was in this way given a double chock on the caliber and integrity, of its middle and lower cadres. Of the devices at the command of the Cadre Rosponsiblos in, the execution of this work, not the least important were the card files and statistical surveys which they compiled from autobiographical reports and periodic organizational reports. From these, it was. easy to deter- mine the status and condition of the Party organization at any given time.. It was also possible, by having on hand a militant's sworn statement as to his family and his personal and political background, to check those statements with confidential reports by other comrades and with facts of public record. Thus, the Cadre Commission and lower Approved For Release 2000/08/25$ : CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2.000/08/25: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Cadre iosponsibles came close to performing functions of counter ospiona,:;e, such as were set aside by CP Germany during this period to its Abwehr i.ossort of the illegal "Apparat. "- xamples of the Autobiographical Report and periodic OrF_;ani- zational Zeport follow. ADTOBIOG, LAPHICAL SCHEMA Family Status 1. Data (year only) and department of birth. Do not give name or address. 2. That education do you have? ;'here did you study? 3. What is your occupation? ;'here have you worked since leaving school? 4. What is the occupation of your parents, brothers, sisters, uncles? Have they en,~;a;od in political activities and do they belong to any orgg,aniz ations? 5. Are you married? ghat is the occupation and nationality of your wife? Of her parents? :That are their opinions? 6. Have you any children? How many? Their ages? Do they belong to any organizations? 7; In,your family or in that of your wife arc there any Nazis, Socialists, or Trotskyitos? 8. In your family or in that of your viife, are there any policemen, nendarmos, or police informants? Persons with ques- tionable means of existence? if so, what arc your relations with them? Political Background 9. How die; you become a Communist? At what date? 10. Havo you been a member of any other party or organization? 11. Hnvc you over boon a Free-TTason? How and when did you quit that organization? The Abwehr was reportedly transferred to the Control Commission after the disbanding of the "Apiarat," which apparently took place in 1935. Thus came to an end a particular sep.nration of a normal Party function under to independent Party mechanism. The KPD was. the only-. CP in our knowledge to have made this precise separation. CP France, like other CPts in'similar circumstances, delegated the normal, con- tinuin; work of verification, .alon` with such counter-espionage pur- suits as this involved, to its Cadre Commission. It is recognized that this account, containing references to th unique KPD organization is somewhat out of place here. However, it would seem worthwhile to clear up confusion which appears to exist in certain quarters over the pro- blem of veri.fica.tion as a normal function of all CP ' s, whether legal or xllo;al. Approved For Release 2000/08/ :CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 Approved For Release 2000/08125: CIA-RDP57-00384R001300070002-1 LI F,, T, 12. VIhat have boon your successive Party functions? What is the nature of your current Party work? 13._ Did you militate actively during the war? Vlhere? 14. Have there been any interruptions in your Party or syn- dical activity? When and why,? 15. Have you attended Party schools? -Which ones? VIhat books have you read of Marx, Engels,. Lenin, Stalin? Have you studied the History of the Bolshevik Party? Do you read the pamphlets and books of the Party? .16. Have you had contact with Trotskyites? With the Barbe- Color group? Have you had any relations with Doriot, with Gitton, or any other excluded person? Have you any acquaintances in their camps? Of what kind? 17. What disciplinary measures have been taker against you in the Party or in other organizations? When and why? ` 18. Do you have a police record? Have you been sentenced under the common law? When and why? 19. Have you been subjected to political repression? Have . you been, arrested? Condemned? When? After how long and how were you liberated? 20. Have you ever boon to the colonies or abroad? When and why? 21. Have you previously filled in a biography? Do not pre- serve the duplicate copy of this. Do not sign it. A note accompanying the form forbade its reproduction or retention and warned that false answers to the questions would render the offen- der liable to action by the Control Commission. Party organizations wore required. to return weekly reports on their activities and the general conditions under w hich they worked. A model report circulated in'February 1941 suggested the following as worthy of filing: Situation: current public temper; signs of unrest; demonstrations; movements, etc.; Pro;Da;;anda:, litor