DEPARTMENT OF STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 6, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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Vol. XXI X,' No.,732
July 6, 1953
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EFFECTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S REORGANIZATION
, . _ ..
PLANS ON THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ? s
ment by Under Secretary Lourie ? ? .? ? ; ? - ? ' '?'- ' '?
. . ,
THE ECONOMICS OF U.SFOREIGN POLICY ? Article ;
by Robert E. Asher . . -". . . . - -
AMERICA'S CHANGING RELATIONSHIP WITH
PROBLEMS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
PACIFIC TRUST. TERRITORY ? Statement by Frank
? ?
E. Midkiff . . . . . . . . . . 22
..;,-
THE NORTH ATLANTIC MARINE RESEARCH
Article ? b:3, William 2M. Terry ?19
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li'egeActaternemi
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yea& bulletin
VOL. XXIX, No. 732 ? PUBLICATION 5114
July 6, 1953
The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication compiled and
edited in the Division of Publications,
provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with in-
formation on developments in the
field of foreign relations and on the
work of the Department of State and
the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN
includes selected press releases on
foreign policy issued by the White
House and the Department, and
statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on
various phases of international affairs
and the functions of the Department.
Information, is included concerning
treaties and international agree-
ments to which the United States is
or may become a party and treaties
of general international interest.
Publications of the Department, as
well as legislative material'the field
of international relations, are listed
currently.
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The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy
by Robert E. Asher
The broad objectives of the economic side of
U.S. foreign policy can be stated rather simply:
1. We want economic conditions in the free
world which will attract peoples and governments
toward the democratic system of political free-
dom, as opposed to totalitarian systems like Soviet
communism.
2. We have a special interest in the economic
strength of our partners in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization, and of the countries on the
periphery of Soviet power. In the North Atlantic
Treaty area we want economic conditions which
will enable the NATO countries to devote a sub-
stantial part of their resources to the common
military effort for as long as is necessary, without
preventing improvements in their standards of
living. In countries on the periphery of Soviet
power we want to eliminate economic weaknesses
that threaten political stability and invite Com-
munist subversion.
3. We want economic conditions in the free
world which will promote material well-being and
which will allow employment, production, trade,
and investment to develop in ways that enrich
human life.
4. A free-world economy which would meet
these objectives ought to be one of healthy, stable
expansion. It ought to afford all countries in-
creasing opportunities for economic growth and
improving standards of living. It ought to op-
erate so that economic gains are distributed equita-
bly within countries. It ought to be free of pro-
longed or severe depressions and to be capable of
weathering temporary economic crises without
serious strain.
5. The way in which these goals are pursued
is also, in a sense, a part of the objectives them-
selves. We should try to create an international
community of effort for common purposes, a
process to which each member would make an
equitable contribution. We should try to avoid
July 6, 1953
the extremes of either forcing unwanted pro-
grams and policies on others as a condition of our
help, or of undertaking actions ourselves which
are unmatched by appropriate actions in the coun-
tries which benefit from them.
Let me add promptly that I know of no corre-
sponding 5-point program for achieving the
strong, prosperous, democratic world we would like
to see. .Americans tend to believe that everything
that is desirable is possible, that America can do
anything it sets out to do. Denis Brogan has
referred to this as "the illusion of American om-
nipotence." Not only do we cling to this inspiring
illusion but after allowing it to oversimplify our
problems, we try to shortcut our way to a solution.
One year it's the Bretton Woods agreement that
will solve our postwar economic problems; an-
other year it's the Marshall plan; then it's tech-
nical assistance; today, it's "trade, not aid." We
tend to overwork these slogans and, in doing so,
to blind ourselves to the complexity and the long-
range character of our foreign-economic prob-
lems. To avoid this pitfall, the new administra-
tion is extremely anxious to obtain a careful,
impartial re-examination of our whole foreign-
economic policy. The job in all probability will
be done by a 17-member commission that will in-
clude bipartisan representation from both Houses
of Congress, as well as public members appointed
by the President.1
The administration wants to make sure that we
have a well-rounded, consistent foreign policy
whose economic aspects properly reinforce and
complement its political and military aspects. To-
day, 8 years after the end of World War II, the
economic situation of the free world is still shaky
and still in need of shoring up. Canada and the
Unitect States remain islands in a troubled sea.
1For the President's letter to Vice President Nixon and
Speaker of the House Joseph W. Martin, Jr., recommend-
ing the establishment of this commission, see BULLMIN
of May 25, 1953, p. 747.
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Interest Abroad in U.S. Economy
The importance of our foreign-economic policy
has been driven home to me again and again at
international meetings during the past few years.
At these conferences the U.S. delegation has to
listen attentively to what other delegates say be-
cause most of them aim their remarks at the
United States. We have to be even more careful
about what we say. A slight error in emphasis,
a minor bit of carelessness' on the part of one of
our delegates would have the room buzzing and
the press representatives phoning their offices in
no time flat. This is because relatively minor
policy changes on our part?the prospect of a new
tariff rate on garlic, an embargo on imports of
peanuts, little ups and downs in our requirements
for coffee, copper, bananas, or tin?can have major
repercussions in other parts of the world.
Coffee, which I just mentioned, is our leading
imported commodity. We spend more dollars
for coffee than for anything else we buy abroad.
But because our shopping list is big, coffee accounts
for only 11 or 12 percent of the dollar value of our
total imports. A. $100 million increase or de-
crease would have no significant effect on the U.S.
economy.
From the point of view of relations with our
neighbors, the matter is much more serious. There
are at least 6 countries?Brazil, Colombia, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Haiti?
that earn from 50 to 90 percent of all their dollars
from coffee exports. Whether they can maintain
or improve the living standards of their people
depends very largely on the U.S. coffee market
which, in turn, depends primarily on the general
level of U.S. prosperity.
This example may help to explain why other
countries are so deeply concerned about the health
of the U. S. economy. Will we maintain an ex-
panding economy at home? Will we avoid de-
pression or recession? Will we make it harder or
easier for other countries to sell us their goods?
Our foreign policy is thus not something apart
from domestic policy. What we do here at home
to control inflation and avoid deflation, to main-
tain full employment, to protect minorities, to en-
courage freedom of speech and thought has pro-
found effects throughout the world. Foreign
policy is not something that can be left to experts
in the State Department, the Defense Department,
and the Mutual Security Agency. It's a job for
everyone. An effective foreign policy requires an
salert and informed citizenry in the United States,
sensitive to the foreign implications of what some-
times seem to be purely domestic issues.
As Secretary Dulles reminded the House Ways
and Means Committee recently, the United States
accounts for "50 percent of the total produc-
tion of non-Communist countries. We are the
world's largest exporter and the world's largest
importer. %re are the greatest creditor nation in
the world and the most important single source of
4
the free world's capital needs. We lead in the de-
velopment of new inventions and new skills." 2
In spite of the fact that, in absolute terms, we
export and import in such huge quantities, our
economy as a whole is less dependent on foreign
trade than that of almost any other country ex-
cept the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, important
segments of the American economy have a large
stake in export markets. During the last few
years we have exported nearly 1/2 of our wheat, 2/5
of our cotton and rice production, and 1/4 of our
production of tobacco. We also export more than
1/5 of our output of tractors. On the import side,
the United States is heavily dependent on imports
for a number of essentials, including 100 percent
of our supplies of tin and natural rubber, 92 per-
cent of our manganese requirements, and 50 per-
cent of our tungsten.
Trade Pattern Unbalanced
The pattern, however, is extremely unbalanced.
The U.S. exports far more than it imports; most
other countries are unable to export enough to pay
for the imports that they desperately need. This
continues to be true despite the tremendous as-
sistance rendered under the Marshall plan and the
fact that, by the end of 1952, industrial production
in Western Europe was 40 percent above prewar
levels. It continues to be true despite technical
assistance, development loans, and other measures
which have helped some of the underdeveloped
countries make notable advances in recent years.
The imbalance is more persistent and deeper
rooted than any of us realized a few short years
ago. 7ft is attributable only in small part to the
fact that rearmament has required resources which
might otherwise have been used to increase Euro-
pean exports or civilian consumption in Europe.
Western Europe has had difficulty in obtaining
dependable markets in the United States for its
exports, and in competing with American export-
ers in Latin America and Asia. Theoretically,
Western Europe could restrict its imports still
further to correspond with its relatively lower
earning power in world markets. In practice, this
policy would threaten European living standards
to the point where political stability would be
imperiled, and it might jeopardize the economic
health of non-European nations. For Western
Europe, increased production and productivity
within Europe, the further development of Asia
and Africa as sources of supply and as markets for
European products, as well as increased European
exports to the United States and the dollar area,
are essential.
Similarly, the economic future of Japan hinges
on her ability to develop expanding trade with
the rest of the free world. On the one hand,
Japan is cut off almost completely from tradi-
a Ibid., May 25, 1953, p. 743.
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tional markets and sources of supply on the main--
land of China. At the same time, she faces sub-.
stantial barriers to the export of goods to free-
world countries. In the United States the tariff
rates on Japanese goods are still at the high levels
imposed by the Tariff Act of 1930. Japan is able
to sustain her economy today only because of the
very large purchases being made there by the
United States for the support of U.N. forces in
Korea. Sooner or later such purchases are sure to
be cut drastically.
The reduction of barriers to world trade has
been and continues to be a major economic objec-
tive of the United States. The Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act adopted in 1934 authorizes reduc-
tions of tariffs and other barriers to trade in re-
turn for comparable concessions from other coun-
tries. It has been renewed every 2 or 3 years. In
1951 it was extended until June 12, 1953, and at
the same time it was substantially amended.3
There are vocal groups in the United States who
want greater protection against foreign competi-
tion. They may extoll "competition" among
American industries ; preface the word "competi-
tion" with the word "foreign," however, and it im-
mediately becomes something sinister. People
who would reject out-of-hand the notion that
the Government should tax the television industry
for the purpose of protecting the motion-picture
industry, or tax nylon producers to protect wool-
growers, or put a quota on cigarette production
to avoid injury to cigarmakers and pipemakers,
see nothing inconsistent in demanding protection
for some of these same industries from the lesser
threat of foreign competition.
Can highly paid American workers compete
with lower-paid foreign workers? The thing to
compare is not the daily or weekly wage of the
American and the foreign worker, but the wage
cost per unit of output. If a gadget taking 25
man-hours to produce in some other country can
be produced here in 10 man-hours, the wage cost
will be lower here than abroad, even though the
hourly earnings here are twice as high as in the
foreign country. If the American wage is $2 an
hour, the labor cost of the gadget will be $20.
If the wage in the foreign country is half the
American level, or $1 an hour, the labor cost of
the imported gadget would be $25, and the chances
are that the American product could undersell the
foreign one.
Our high wage levels are possible because such
factors as up-to-date machinery, good organiza-
tion, mass markets, and eagerness to adopt im-
proved methods have resulted in a phenomenally
For the President's message to Congress recom-
mending the further extension of this act for 1 year, see
ibid., Apr. 27, 1953, p. 634. For statements by Secretary
Dulles and the Director for Mutual Security, Harold E.
Stassen, in support of its extension, see ibid., May 25,
1953, pp. 743 and 746, respectively.
July 6, 1953
high output per worker. One of our major prob-
lems is to restore international balance by en-
couraging a stepping up of productivity in other
parts of the free world so that their output per
man or per acre will be less lopsided in relation
to ours. They must get themselves into a better
position both to satisfy their own needs and to
market their products throughout the world, in-
cluding the rich North American market.
Alternatives to increasing imports
The plain fact is that unless we are prepared
to import more, or to continue foreign aid in-
definitely on a massive scale, we will not be able
to maintain anything like our present level of
exports. Other countries have to be able to sell
to us in order to buy from us. They are now
selling to us at a rate of less than $11 billion per
year. They are receiving more than $15 billion
worth of American goods. The gap between what
they earn and what they get is being closed by
military and economic assistance programs that
create a donor-recipient relationship as irksome to
our allies as it is to us. The slogan "trade not aid"
was imported from Great Britain, not made in
America.
Within the last year or so, more and more
Americans have been facing up to the only alter-
natives the trade front offers, i. e., larger imports,
lower exports, or continued free grants of U. S.
resources to make up the difference. Not all of
them come out with the same answer, of course.
Some feel that our postwar exports have been
freakishly high and should be reduced. Others
believe that more turmoil would be created if
wheat, cotton, and tobacco growers were deprived
of their export markets and forced to turn to
poultry raising, truck farming, and other forms of
production for the domestic market.
Many leaders of U.S. opinion in recent months
have spoken in favor of a more liberal import
policy. The National Association of Manufac-
turers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation, the National Cotton
Council, the United States Tobacco Associates, the
Committee for Economic Development, the Con-
gress of Industrial Organizations the American
Federation of Labor, and the Detroit Board of
Commerce have gone on record to this effect.
Other countries particularly Japan and the in-
dustrialized countries of Western Europe, tend to
regard U.S. import policy as the key to whether
or not we can be depended upon to behave as the
world's largest creditor nation and most important
supplier of essential commodities. They tell us
in the U.N. Economic and Social Council, the
Economic Commission for Europe, and elsewhere,
how vitally they will be affected by our decisions
next year on the future of the Trade Agreements
Act. On a lesser scale they regard simplification
of our complicated customs procedures as an-
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other important index of the way in which Amer-
ica is moving. Almost every foreign official one
talks to can give hair-raising examples of business-
men in his country whose products got hopelessly
tangled in the jungle of American tariff and cus-
toms procedures. Some learned to their sorrow
that tariff rates for plate glass differ according
to the thickness and area of the glass, that dolls
and toys are subject to 11 different rates, that cot-
ton shirts ordinarily charged a 25 percent duty
must pay a 50 percent duty if initials are em-
broidered on them. Some grew old and gray and
cynical in the months or years that elapsed before
their final liability was decided.
Other European manufacturers have from time
to time bumped their heads against the "Buy
American" laws under which our Government pro-
curement agencies give preference to domestic
suppliers unless the price of the foreign commod-
ity, after payment of the tariff, is at least 25 per-
cent below the comparable American product.
They would like to see this extra road block re-
moved.
Soviet delegates attend the plenary sessions of
the Economic Commission for Europe. They're
not the least bit bashful. Recently, they have said,
in effect, to the European nations: "Look, fellows,
it's a pipe dream to expect the United States to
adopt more liberal trade policies and make it
easier for you to compete with American produc-
ers. Americans want to dump their surplus pro-
duction abroad, but they don't want to buy from
you and they don't want you to sell to us. Don't
let the Americans push you around. We'd love
to buy your machinery, we'd love to increase our
trade with you."
We, the United States, have pointed to the
progress toward trade liberalization that we and
other free countries have made since 1934, and
particularly to our magnificent record of interna-
tional assistance during the postwar period. As
for machinery exports to the U.S.S.R., as long as
millions of people live in fear of Soviet aggres-
sion it has seemed elementary commonsense for us
to urge our friends to withhold from the Soviet
bloa any goods that might increase its war po-
tential. Moreover, we believe, the Soviets eventu-
ally want to become self-sufficient anyhow, and
therefore don't desire a permanent strengthening
of trade ties with the free world.
Nevertheless, the East-West trade issue remains
a thorny one. Unlike the United States, a number
of other countries have traditionally secured a
substantial portion of essential imports?grain,
coal, and timber, in particular?from Eastern
Europe and have sold both producer's and con-
sumer's goods to that area in return. In the pres-
ent situation, they are more than willing to
withhold items of obvious strategic importance.
But they are responsible sovereign states, not satel-
lites. They do not recognize any U.S. right to
decide unilaterally what course of action they
6
should follow. As for Japan, trade with Mainland
China was even more important to her in prewar
days than trade with Eastern Europe was to
Western Europe. Until Burma Thailand, For-
mosa, and the rest of Southeast Asia become more
important markets, it is hard to see where Japan
should turn to compensate adequately for the loss
of her China trade.
Purpose of Regional Economic Commissions
The United States is a member not only of the
U.N. Economic Commission for Europe (EcE),
but also of the Economic Commissions for Latin
America and for Asia and the Far East. All three
commissions have the same general purpose: to
expedite economic reconstruction, to expand the
level of economic activity, to strengthen the ties
between the countries of the region and between
the region and the rest of the world. They have
no laws to administer, no funds to distribute, no
sanctions to impose. Their function is largely the
educational one of discussing common problems
and persuading officials of the member govern-
ments to adopt measures that are recognized as
desirable in the common interest. EachE commis-
sion has a competent professional secretariat
which prepares an annual economic survey of the
region and other basic information.4
The Economic Commission for Europe has
been seriously handicapped by the East-West split.
Its members are politically and economically more
sophisticated than the members of the Asian and
Latin American commissions. Whereas he Euro-
peans are more interested in trade problems, the
members of the other commissions, coming from
so-called underdeveloped areas, are concerned pri-
marily with economic development problems.
The Economic Commission for Asia and the Far
East is by all odds the most picturesque. It offers
more variety in delegates' costumes, with tur-
baned Indians, Burmese men in colorful skirts,
Philippine delegates in beautifully embroidered
shirts, and all in the exotic but poverty-ridden
surroundings of the Far East. Its problems are
the most overwhelming.
The Latin American Commission falls some-
where between the other two. Impressive eco-
nomic headway has been made in Central and
South America in the last 5 or 6 years. The gov-
ernments, by and large, are determined to main-
tain and, if possible, increase the pace. The aver-
age per capita income in the area is still under
$250 per year. In Asia it is less than half of that.
In the United States it is about $2,000.
A number of the underdeveloped countries are
one-crop countries, nations whose welfare depends
almost entirely on the American and European
markets for their tin, or rubber, or sugar. Small
' For a review of the most recent ECD economio survey,
see ibid., Apr. 13, 1953, p. 534.
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shifts in demand can cause great misery. Con-
tinued economic progress on their part requires,
in their view, greater stability in the world market
for their raw material exports. They are conse-
quently groping for arrangements that would re-
duce the violent and often uneconomic fluctuations
in the prices of primary commodities.
International commodity agreements have been
suggested as a means of stabilizing the market.
Such agreements are hard to negotiate. When
surpluses are in the offing, consumers hope for
price declines and shy away from premature com-
mitments. When shortages occur, producers are
anxious to make up for lean times and charge what
the market will bear. The result is that whether
we and other governments feel kindly or unkindly
toward commodity agreements in principle, not
very many are concluded in practice. The Inter-
national Wheat Agreement stands almost alone.
A second area of concern to the underdeveloped
areas is the need for increased food production.
In the early postwar years, every country wanted
a steel mill, every country was going to be self-
sufficient in textiles and export to other countries;
none was going to import. Gradually the over-
riding importance of increased food production
has come to be understood, thanks in part to the
educational work of U.S. representatives. The
tremendous possibilities of enriching the poorer
areas of the world through better seeds, fertilizers,
and farm implements, fairer distribution of the
available land, cheaper credit, and agricultural
extension work, are being realized. A comprehen-
sive land-reform program has been undertaken
in Formosa. The same is true in India. A dra-
matic effort is being made in Iran. Important
reforms were introduced in Japan during the pe-
riod of American military occupation. The new
Government in Egypt seems determined to move
forward in the field of land reform. A program
has been initiated in Southern Italy, an area which
can properly be classed with the underdeveloped
areas of the world. The results of such programs
in terms of increased human dignity are even more
important than the immediate economic results.
Despite the importance of increased food pro-
duction and agrarian reforms in the underde-
veloped areas, industrial undertakings still have
the greatest allure. Politically, they symbolize
development in the eyes of the have-nots. Eco-
nomically, they draw surplus population from the
countryside and, by diversifying the economy,
make it less vulnerable to shocks from abroad.
Through loans ;and technical assistance the United
States is helping in the construction of steel
plants, cement plants, power plants, and other
basic facilities in various parts of the world. We
will have to continue to help transform ancient,
static, agrarian economies into more dynamic,
more diversified, better-balanced mixtures of
industry and agriculture.
July 6, 1953
Benefits of Technical Assistance
Technical assistance remains one of the most
important weapons in our foreign economic policy
arsenal. The underdeveloped countries tend to
stress their need for grants and loans but grants
and loans without ,adequate preparation to use
them effectively will do little to speed the actual
development process. One of the reasons for the
feeling of greater hopefulness one gets in India
and Pakistan, is the presence there of a corps
of responsible trained public officials and business-
men who know how to prepare and organize
projects, how to teach and supervise others, how to
put paper plans into operation. With their co-
operation, the fruits of some of the U.S. and
U.N. technical-assistance projects are becoming
apparent. In Latin America, where technical
assistance has had a longer history, progress is
even more notable.
The touchiness regarding outside aid which
exists among peoples of the underdeveloped coun-
tries is not always appreciated by Americans. It is
even more acute in nations that have just won their
independence than in those that have had it for
a long time. Nothing could be more erroneous
than. the notion that Asia, the Middle East and
Africa are eager to get U.S. aid and reluctant to
stand on their own feet. Their people are ex-
tremely sensitive about outside aid, though less
sensitive when it comes via the politically irre-
proachable United Nations than when it comes
directly from the United States. They need for-
eign technicians, foreign capital, and foreign
equipment, but the conditions under which they
obtain them can make or break their governments.
At the U.N. meetings the Soviets have repeatedly
pointed out the risks which other countries run
when they increase their dependence upon foreign
technicians and foreign capital, or strengthen their
ties with the United States.
Our own security is too intimately bound up
with the security of other free-world nations to
allow us the luxury of washing our hands of coun-
tries that exasperate us. Neither can we impose
alien programs and policies upon other peoples.
Yet we have to reconcile these hard facts with the
commonsense policy of avoiding a bigger burden
than we can carry. Our assistance should be
matched by reasonable efforts on the part of other
countries. After all, their future depends pri-
marily on their own domestic decisions; what we
do, at best, is to provide the extra push that can
get them started or help them over the hump.
Other countries have erected trade barriers that
ought to be eliminated. Many of their financial
and exchange and credit policies could stand re-
vamping. So could their tax programs. Under-
developed countries in need of capital can do much
to improve the climate for foreign and domestic
investment. Their development plans will have
to be flexible enough to encourage more initiative
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and experimentation. We have a right to ask for
action along these lines from them. We exercise
that right both in our international discussions
and in our direct dealings with foreign govern-
ments.
In this process of mutual education, frictions
and misunderstandings are bound to arise. The
development process, like the course of true love,
is seldom smooth; it creates lots of stresses and
strains. The lure of higher wages may bring peo-
ple off the land and into the cities, where a change
in the economic situation may leave them tempo-
rarily jobless and stranded. Selfish groups now
occupying a privileged status may lose their priv-
ileges, resent that fact, and stir up trouble. The
Communists will fish where the waters are
troubled. Progress and stability are hard to
reconcile.
We will be quite unrealistic if we expect 100
percent success in the sense that all nations aided
directly or indirectly by the United States will
adopt our brand of politics or economics, or will
agree with us in the United Nations or elsewhere.
Failure on our part to act in ways that will ex-
pand trade and help fulfill the pent-up aspirations
of the underdeveloped areas can assure the loss of
large regions important to the security of the
United States. Unfortunately, though, even the
most skillful actions cannot guarantee that those
areas will stay on our side.
? Mr. Asher, author of the above article, is a spe-
cial assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Eco-
nomic Affairs. He has been a delegate to several
sessions of the U.N. Economic and Social Council
and of its regional economic commissions. His
article is based on an address made before the
Economic Education Workshop at Mars /toll Col-
lege, Huntington, W. Va., on June 11.
Reported Easing of Restrictions
on Travel in U.S.S.R.
Statement by Press Officer Lincoln W hite1
I have had a number of questions about reports
of the removal of Soviet travel restrictions. The
Department has not received detailed information
as to the extent of the reported easing of travel
restrictions on foreigners in the U.S.S.R. Infor-
mation so far available indicates that there are
still considerable areas within the Soviet Union
which are not open for travel and that, further-
more, some of the travel permitted is only for pur-
poses of transit between points in the Soviet Union.
Now, I have also been asked what our thinking
is with respect to the travel restrictions we have
8
Made to correspondents on June 23.
imposed on a reciprocal basis.2 In answer to that,
information on the Soviet action is not Sufficiently
detailed to permit any judgment about modifica-
tion of our travel restrictions.
Disturbances in East Germany
Following are the texts of a statem,ent on th,e
East Berlin demonstrations issued on June 17 by
the Allied military authorities in West Berlin; a
letter sent on June 20 by Maj. Gen. P. T. Dibrova,
Soviet military commander in Berlin, to Maj. Gen.
Thomas S. Timberman, U.S. Commandant in Ber-
lin; the Allied Commandants' joint message sent
on June 24 in reply to Gen. Dibrova's letter;
and an exchange of correspondence between the
President and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of the
Federal Republic of Germany.
Allied Commandants' Statement, June 3,7
The British, French, and U.S. Commandants
met with the Berlin municipal authorities this
morning. Together they considered all aspects of
the present situation. The Commandants and the
Berlin authorities fully agreed on the need of
maintaining public order in the Western Sectors
and on the advisability of adopting a completely
calm attitude.
They noted certain information according to
which demonstrations in the Soviet Sector were
alleged to have been incited by West Berlin agents.
Since such allegations may give rise to serious
misunderstandings as to the origin of such demon-
strations, the French, British, and U.S. Com-
mandants stressed clearly that neither the Allied
authorities nor the West Berlin authorities have,
in any manner whatsoever, either directly or indi-
rectly, incited or fostered such demonstrations.
Gen. Dibrova to Gen. Timberman, June 20 3
Confirming the receipt of your letter of June 18,4
I consider it necessary to draw your attention to
the fact that in your letter the events in Berlin on
June 17 are represented in a distorted way, and I
decisively reject the protest contained in that letter
as devoid of any basis.
In connection with this, I must inform you that
the measures taken on June 17 by the military
authorities in the Eastern sector of Berlin were
completely necessary to curtail the burnings and
other disturbances caused by groups of provoca-
2 For text of the 'U.S. note of Mar. 10, 1952 to the U.S.S.R.
on this subject and for a map showing areas in the U.S.S.R.
which were closed to foreign travel as of Jan. 15, 19528
see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1952, p. 451.
Texts a this and the following letter were released to
the press by the Department on June 24 (press release
334).
BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 897.
Department of State Bulletin
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teurs and fascist agents from the Western sectors
of Berlin who were sent here.
It has been determined that the instigators of the
disorders, sent out from West Berlin, were supplied
with arms and radio transmitters, and were espe-
cially instructed. Of the numerous proofs on
hand, it is sufficient to indicate only the following,.
Investigative agencies of the German Democratic
Republic published on June 19 the text of the
interrogation of the arrested Werner Kalkowski,
residing in the American sector of Berlin at Naun-
instrasse 34, which showed that he was sent, in a
group of 90 persons, into the Soviet sector of Berlin
to set fires, loot shops, and create other disturb-
ances, and which also showed that he, like other
hirelings, performed this for money as mercenary
agents of a foreign intelligence. So that you
should have a fuller presentation of the matter, I
enclose the text of the testimony of Werner Kal-
kowski of June 19.5
In view of the above and of other specifically
determined facts, your letter can only be appraised
as a futile effort to remove the responsibility for
the crimes of the hirelings-provocateurs of war
and instigators of excesses from the representatives
of the three powers in West Berlin.
In the circumstances cited, the Soviet occupying
authorities could not remain inactive, nor afford
freedom of action to the agents sent out from
West Berlin. It is fully natural to ask you how
the United States, English, and French authorities
would have acted if agents-provocateurs had been
sent out from East Berlin to set fires, conduct
Following is a summary of the enclosure:
"Werner Kalkowski arrested with other agents-provoca-
teurs by the East German security police on June 17, 1953,
made the following admissions:
"He was a resident of West Berlin. On June 16, at
6 p. in. he had accepted the offer of a good reward from one
Paul Gunting to stir up disorders in East Berlin.
"On June 17, at 8 a. in. he joined a group of over 90 men.
The leaders of the group were Paul Gunting, one Hans
Jurgen, and an American by the name of Heaver. Heaver
was in uniform and wore two stars on his "shoulder-
boards". Instructions were given to join the strikers in
the Eastern sector, to incite them to demand the overthrow
of the GDR Government, and to transform a peaceful
demonstration into a riot. Furthermore, the group was to
take an active part in the riot, raid government buildings,
set fires, loot stores, knock down the VOPO's and rouse the
mob against the lawful authority, using weapons if neces-
sary. The group moved to Potsdamer Platz, joined the
strikers and started shouting slogans against the govern-
ment. Twenty men had bottles filled with gasoline which
they had received from an American truck standing on the
Potsdamer Bridge. On Potsdamer Platz, those who had
bottles started to set fire to a number of buildings. Others
threw stones at the police and at windows. The group
then proceeded to Leipzigerstrasse where it continued to
cause violence and shots were fired at the German police
and crews of Soviet tanks. Kalkowski himself did not
shoot because he did not have a weapon. His part con-
sisted only in rousing the mob against the government.
In this he was helped by the Americans who had set up
two loudspeakers and continuously broadcasted incitement
to violence."
July 6, 1953
CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
pogroms, commit murders and other disturbances,
and instigate acts of violence in West Berlin.
Of course, those guilty of the fires, looting, and
other acts of violence will be brought to trial and
severely punished.
So far as the re-establishment of communication
between the Eastern and Western sectors of Berlin
is concerned, I consider it necessary to draw your
attention to the fact that the Soviet military au-
thorities see no hindrances either as to transport or
other communication between the two sectors of
the city, on condition that the Commandants of the
three powers in West Berlin take all measures nec-
essary to guarantee the curtailment of forays by
provocateurs and other criminal elements onto the
territory of East Berlin.
Allied Commandants to Gen. Dibrova, June 24
We, the French, British and American Com-
mandants, have received your letter of June 20
and hasten to reject your allegations that the dis-
turbances of June 17 were the result of action by
groups sent from Western sectors of Berlin. The
statement in the inclosure to your letter that an
American called Heaver who was wearing a uni-
form with two stars, which are the insignia of a
major general, was seen giving the instructions to
organize the disorders is, we are sure you will
agree, Major General Dibrova, unworthy of seri-
ous consideration and must be held to discredit
the rest of the informant's testimony.
You and the world are well aware of the true
causes of the disorders which have recently oc-
curred in East Berlin, and it is therefore unneces-
sary for us to tell you that the three powers in
West Berlin had no responsibility whatever for
instigating them.
We must therefore continue to demand that the
remaining restrictions imposed on the Berlin pop-
ulation be lifted and that the steps which you have
already taken to reestablish circulation within
Berlin be carried to their logical conclusions, free
and unfettered movement between all sectors.
We on our side shall continue as always to ful-
fill our responsibility for the maintenance of law
and order in our sectors, and we are ready to do
our part in reestablishing normal conditions of
life throughout the whole city.
President's Correspondence With Chancellor
White House press release dated June 26
Chancellor Adenauer to the President, June 01
The people of the East sector of Berlin and of
the East zone have despite the use of Soviet troops
and tanks risen up unarmed against the regime of
terror and force and demanded their rights of
freedom. Many have had to pay for their bravery
and courage with their lives. Nothing shows more
clearly than the outcry of these tormented people
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how intolerable the conditions in this area of Cen-
tral Europe are. I should like to appeal to you
urgently, Mr. President, in accordance with a reso-
lution of June 10 of the German Bundestag, of
which the American Government was notified, to
do everything in your power in order that these
conditions may be done away with, the human
rights which have been violated may be restored
and the entire German people may be given back
the unity and freedom which alone guarantee a
lasting peaceful development in Europe.
President Eisenhower's Reply, June 25
I have received with deep interest and sympathy
your message of June 21st. The latest events in
East Berlin and Eastern Germany have stirred
the hearts and hopes of people everywhere. This
inspiring show of courage has reaffirmed our be-
lief that years of oppression and attempted in-
doctrination cannot extinguish the spirit of
freedom behind the Iron Curtain. It seems clear
that the repercussions of these events will be felt
throughout the Soviet satellite empire.
The United States Government is convinced that
a way can and must be found to satisfy the justified
CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
aspirations of the Urerman people tor treedom and
unity, and for the restoration of fundamental hu-
man rights in all parts of Germany. It is for the
attainment of these purposes that the government
you head and the United States Government have
been earnestly striving together. Although the
Communists may be forced, as a result of these
powerful demonstrations in East Germany to mod-
erate their current policies, it seems clear that the
safety and future of the people of Eastern Ger-
many can only be assured when that region is uni-
fied with Western Germany on the basis of free
elections, as we urged the Soviets to agree to in
the notes of September 23, 1952, dispatched by the
American, British and French Governments.? It
is still our conviction that this represents the only
realistic road to German unity, and I assure you
that my Government will continue to strive for
this goal.
In their hours of trial and sacrifice, I trust that
the people of Eastern Germany will know that
their call for freedom has been heard around the
world.
? BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1952, p. 517.
America's Changing Relationship With Germany
by Richard Strausl
I am honored to have the opportunity to speak
to you this evening about a problem which is very
much on the minds of a great many Americans
these days: our changing relationship with Ger-
many. I know that this new relationship raises
numerous questions, especially in the minds of
those of us who, like you and me, fought against
Germany and defeated her and are now asked to
understand the re-establishment of German armed
forces. To understand this new relationship be-
tween the two countries we must first understand
why it became necessary to alter our initial concept
of Germany's treatment in the postwar era. We
must understand how extensive the changes are
and on what conditions they are predicated. Once
we have examined these questions we can draw
certain conclusions and, on the basis of the current
structure of the German political scene, arrive at
I Address made before the Convention of Jewish War
Veterans of New Jersey at Mt. Freedom, N. J., on June 20.
Mr. Straus is public-affairs specialist in the Bureau of
German Affairs.
10
an understanding of the forthcoming events in that
area.
It became apparent as early as 1946 that our
long-range objectives which sought to eStablish in
Germany a democratic people firmly allied with
the free democratic world and without any mili-
tary might to threaten the security of her neigh-
bors was going to be tempered by a factor which
arose as the result of the changing balance of
power brought about by World War II. The
Soviet Union's drive to gain control not only over
the territory of other peoples but, through the use
of Communist propaganda, over the minds of men
the world over, was a factor which had an imme-
diate impact in Germany where the Soviet Union
was a co-occupier. I need not remind you of the
Berlin blockade and the clarity with which Soviet
intentions were demonstrated during that period.
Nor need I remind you of the meaning of the im-
position of the Iron Curtain which prevented the
flow of people, of goods, of news, and of ideas from
West to East.
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This Iron uurtam Demme a gradual reality in
Germany until it reached the point where Four
Power control in Germany became completely im-
possible. Since the Western Powers, the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France, wanted
to proceed with the objectives which they had
initially set for themselves, namely the establish-
ment of democratic forces in Germany including
the establishment of a democratic government, the
Federal Republic of Germany was established in
September 1949 and has proved itself to be a
bulwark of democracy during the last 4 years.
Up until 1950, however, no one had given any
serious thought to ever again establishing German
armed forces, in any context. In June of that
year, however, war broke out in Korea. The
analogy between Korea divided at the 38th parallel
into free and subjected areas to a Germany divided
at the Elbe into similar areas was all too obvious.
The parallel had become even clearer when the
Soviet Union began to arm a so-called "People's
Police" in Eastern Germany. It was clear from
the beginning that this, now 130,000 man-strong,
police corps was nothing but an army or, at any
rate, would serve as a cadre for armed forces in
case of hostilities.
The Western Powers were, therefore, faced with
the necessity of having to expect an attack upon
Western Germany at any time. As occupation
powers, we had the responsibility to defend that
area, and, as military strategists, we realized that
Germany must be defended if Europe is not to fall.
We could do this job ourselves and have the Ger-
mans sit by and watch their country being de-
fended by soldiers of other countries, or we could
try to raise German armed forces under such safe-
guards as to make a German military venture
impossible. In September 1950, in New York, the
Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, France,
and this Government approved the principle of
the establishment of German contingents under
appropriate safeguards. Later that year they de-
termined that these contingents should be raised
within the framework of a European Defense
Community, a plan that had been expounded by
the French Prime Minister Ren?leven.
Chancellor Adenauer, a European statesman at
heart, who has always recognized the dangers in-
herent in German militarism and in a German
national army, wholeheartedly endorsed this
decision.
When it had been determined that German
armed contingents were to be raised and that
Germany was to participate in the defense of
Western Europe, it became obvious that she could
participate only as an equal partner and that the
occupation rules which still governed her had to
be removed. In the meantime, the German Gov-
ernment had demonstrated its basic democratic
nature and its strength to maintain a basically
democratic posture. It was, therefore, an appro-
priate step on the part of the three Western Powers
July 6, 1953
CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
to accept Germany as an equal partner and to
conclude with her the Convention on Relations
between the Three Powers and the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany which was signed at Bonn on May
26, 1952.
Contractual Agreements
These agreements, commonly known as the
"Contractual Agreements with Germany," will
serve to govern the relationship between the three
Western occupation powers and Germany until a
peace treaty can be concluded for all of Germany.
The contractual agreements return to Germany
virtual sovereignty. They maintain for the
United States, the United Kingdom, and France
only such powers as relate to Germany as a whole
(that is, the relationship with the Soviet Union),
certain emergency powers, and the right to station
troops in the territory of the Federal Republic.
In addition to a general agreement establishing
the principles of the new relationship, there are
specific conventions relating to the rights and
obligations of the foreign forces, to settlement of
matters arising out of the war, and to the financial
relationship between Germany and the current
occupying powers.
Treaties between nations are only valuable if
the political conditions in both countries permit
the treaties to become effective. The relaxation
of the restrictions on Germany's sovereignty must,
therefore, be viewed in the context of the current
political situation in that country. We could not
have concluded or ratified the contractual agree-
ments if certain basic political conditions had
not been established in Germany?conditions upon
which our whole policy is predicated. These con-
ditions require a firm commitment on the part of
the Federal Republic for an alliance with the
free world. They require the maintenance in
Germany of a government with a basically demo-
cratic structure. They require adequate guar-
antees on the part of Germany not only in writing
but in political reality that they will never again
attack a peaceful neighbor. And, finally, they
require what the agreements themselves concede
to the Western powers, the right to station our own
forces in Germany for the defense of the free world
and the right to proclaim a state of emergency in
any of the following four conditions: In case of
an attack upon the Federal Republic; in case of
subversion of the liberal democratic order; in
case of a serious public disturbance; and in case
of a grave threat of any of these events.
Let us, therefore, examine whether these con-
ditions on which our agreements are predicated
now exist in Germany. The current government
composed of members of the moderate right-wing
parties is firmly allied with the West. Chancellor
Adenauer himself, as you are unquestionably
aware, is a statesman who has made the re-estab-
lishmeat, perhaps the establishment for the first
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time, of harmonious Franco-German relations one
of the basic tenets of his policy. His Government
is firmly convinced that Germany's future lies in
the free world and that unless her ties with the
free world are bound firmly, Germany will be
subjected to pressures both from the extreme left
and the extreme right which would cause consid-
erable political unrest. Popularly, the thesis of
the firm alliance with the West has deep roots.
It may be one of the results of Germany's attack
on the Soviet Union that the average German has
thereby become aware of the dangers of Soviet
communism and is extremely skeptical of any Rus-
sian move. This general feeling and especially
the opposition to communism is equally as firmly
rooted in the Socialist Party and its members.
Socialism and communism have traditionally been
forces in Germany, the more so since 1945 when
the Gzrman Socialists realized that the Communist
Party was no more than a puppet of a foreign gov-
ernment. Even the voice of those who would have
a "neutral" Germany between East and West have
become very quiet of late. Nothing can better
demonstrate German-Communist relations than
the recent demonstration in East Berlin.
An appraisal of the basic democratic structure
of Germany is more difficult. Mr. McCloy in his
last report to the American people appraised the
situation as follows:
The results of five years of study of the values, hopes,
fears and confusions of the West German rank and file
do not add up to any simple answer to the question of
whether or not democracy as a way of life will win out
against non-democratic ideologies in the Germany of the
future. Although it is not possible to say on the basis
of the facts at hand that a strong and genuine democracy
win grow in Germany, it is possible to say that it ma
grow. There is evidence of sufficient support in Germany
today for democratic principles to provide the conditions
for future progress.
The U.S. Government has accepted this position
as the basis for its program in Germany. It will
continue a vigorous public-affairs program de-
signed to aid and stimulate the democratic forces
inherent in German public life to assure that in
Germany there will grow a democratic structure
of such proportions as to make the alliance between
Germany and the Western World a true alliance
not only of expediency but of moral and political
values.
Security Guarantees
The desire for adequate security guarantees is
one which our Allies share with us and in which
they are perhaps more emotional than many of us.
I am thinking particularly of France, which has
fought three wars with Germany in the last 100
years. It is, therefore, particularly noteworthy
that the plan under which German contingents are
being established was a plan of French origin.
This plan provides for a European army under a
12
European general staff. The structure of these
forces is such as to make it virtually impossible
for Germany to assume control over her own forces
for an aggressive venture at any time. These se-
curity guarantees were basic Allied requirements
in permitting the establishment of a new relation-
ship between the victors and the vanquished of
World War H.
The new relationship is still in the making. The
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Ger-
man Parliament have ratified the contractual
agreements. The German Parliament has also
ratified the European Defense Community (Eno)
treaty. In order for the treaties to go into effect,
the ratification of France to both of these treaties
is still required as is the ratification of tl e four
other signatories (Holland, Belgium, 7_,uxem-
bourg, Italy) to the Eno treaty. Until both of
these treaties are fully ratified, none of the treaties
will go into effect. In the meantime we have grad-
ually moved from the occupation era to the era
of cooperative action.
Many problems which initially had to be solved
by Allied action have now been turned over to the
Germans and are being solved satisfactorily by the
German Government. I am thinking particularly
of the restitution agreement with Israel and the
World Jewish Organizations under which Ger-
many has agreed to pay the sum of $12 billion in
indemnity for the wrongs done to Jews by the
Third Reich. The German Government itself has
stated that this sum in no way can make up for
the human and material losses which were caused
by the Nazi regime but they felt that it represents
in as far as Germany can bear the burden a mate-
rial restitution and thereby an aid to the new
Republic of Israel. I am thinking also of the
recently concluded agreement on German debts.
I am thinking further of individual restitution of
decartelization and deconcentration, all of which
have been or are being assumed by the German
authorities. And finally, I would like to bring to
your attention the action of the German G-overn-
rnent and German people in creating within the
German society such democratic institutions as a
National Conference for Christians and Jews, a
League of Civil Rights and many other eemigov-
ernmental and private institutions designed spe-
cifically to safeguard the initiative which was
taken by the Allied Powers in the immediate post-
war period to establish a democratic Germany
which could become a partner in the free world.
I have every reason to believe that this trend
will continue. There is to be an election in Ger-
many this year and as in all elections there will
be recriminations and nationalistic speeches.
Many of them may be misunderstood by foreign
listeners. But I sincerely believe that once the
election campaign is completed, regardless of
which of the major parties is successful, the trends
which have been set in Germany over the past 4
years will continue.
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Syngman Rhee's Reply to President's Letter
on Korean Armistice
Following is the tewt of a letter dated June 19
from Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic
of Korea, in reply to President Eisenhower's letter
of June 6:1
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: First of all, I must apolo-
gize for my long delay in answering your good
letter of June 6, 1953. To confess the truth, I
made more than one draft, but I could not express
myself clearly without appearing to be argumen-
tative, which I wanted to avoid. I do hope you
will read this letter in the same friendly spirit in
which it is written.
From the beginning, we repeatedly tried to
make clear to all friendly nations that if an armi-
stice permitting the Chinese aggressors to remain
in Korea should be concluded we could not survive.
This apprehensiveness has not abated.
Evidently our friendly nations seem to take it
for granted that the withdrawal of the Chinese
Communists from Korea and the subsequent uni-
fication of Korea can be accomplished by the po-
litical conference scheduled to follow the armi-
stice. I do not wish to enter detailed argument
over this point but I feel I must say, at least, that
we do not believe in the possibility.
It is true that is a matter of opinion. Our opin-
ion is, however, supported by facts which we can
never ignore or forget. The experiences we have
gone through ourselves will remain a guiding
factor in forming our judgments until something
happens which convincingly counter-attacks them.
Now that the United Nations is to conclude a
cease-fire agreement with the Communist aggres-
sors regardless of what may happen to Korea, in
practical terms we are constantly haunted by the
question of how we can survive as a nation at all.
The following passages will, I hope, give you some
idea of our reactions to the situation.
We desire to remain friendly to the United
States to the last, remembering what it has done
for us, both militarily and economically in our
struggle against aggression.
If the United States forces have to stand by, for
'BULLETIN Of June 15, 1953, p. 835.
July 6, 1953
some reason, ceasing to participate in any further
struggle or to withdraw from Korea altogether as
an aftermath of the impending armistice, we have
nothing to say against it.
Whenever they find it necessary or desirable to
leave Korea they can do so with a friendly feeling
toward us just as we are trying to remain their
friends. So long as either party does not inter-
fere with the plans of the other, both can main-
tain the cordial relations between them.
In the first year of this three-year-old war, both
the United States and the United Nations alter-
nately and repeatedly announced, as the war ob-
jectives, the establishment of a united, independent
and democratic Korea and the punishment of the
aggressors. It was at the time of the United Na-
tions drive to the Yalu that they made these an-
nouncements so that we naturally took them as
their declared war objectives. But later, when the
Communist forces proved to be stronger than ex-
pected, the United 'Cations statesmen took to the
interpretation that it had never been intended to
unify Korea by war. That was an open confes-
sion of weakness; very few people took it at its
face value. Nowadays we hear no more about the
unification of Korea or the punishment of the
Communist aggressors, as if either we had achieved
these objectives or abandoned them.
All we hear about is an armistice. There is
grave doubt that an armistice reached in such an
atmosphere of appeasement can lead to a perma-
nent peace acceptable and honorable to us. Per-
sonally, I do not believe that the Communists will
agree, at a conference table, to what they have
never been made to agree to on the battlefield.
Your generous offers of economic aid and an
increase of the R.O.K. defense forces are highly
appreciated by all Korean people, for they are
what we badly need. But when such offers come
as a price for our acceptance of the armistice as
we know it, they cannot but have little induce-
ment, because, as I have said before, to accept such
an armistice is to accept a death warrant.
Nothing would be of much avail to Korea, to
say the least, after that fatal blow should have
been dealt it.
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President's Representative
Departs for Korea
Statement by Walter S. Robertson
Assistant Secretary for Par Eastern Affairs'
I am flying to Korea as the personal representa-
tive of the President and the Secretary of State
and in response to an invitation from President
lthee. I take with me a message from the Secre-
tary to President Rhee, the contents of which I am
not at liberty to disclose. I will discuss with Gen-
eral Clark and Ambassador Briggs, as well as with
President Rhee and the other Korean leaders, all
aspects of the situation in Korea where we and
the Korean people have fought and sacrificed heav-
ily for 3 years. In this way my visit should enable
us in Washington to have a firsthand and up-to-
date picture of how things stand in Korea. I hope
that my visit will also give General Clark and
Ambassador Briggs?as well as President Rhee?
the clearest picture of the views of the U.S. Gov-
ernment.
Made at Washington National Airport on June
22 (press release 332). Other members of the mis-
sion included Carl W. McCardle, Assistant Secre-
tary for Public Affairs, and Kenneth Young, Director
of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
We do not question the sincerity with which
you kindly promised to use your authority to bring
about a mutual defense pact between our two na-
tions, after the conclusion of the armistice. As a,
matter of fact, a mutual defense pact is what we
have constantly sought, and we are behind it heart
and soul; but if it is tied up with the armistice its
efficacy would be diminished almost to a vanishing
point.
Mr. President, you will easily imagine what a
hard situation we confront. We committed every-
thing, including our arms and forces, to the United
Nations action in Korea, incurring frightful losses
in manpower as well as material destruction, in
the sole belief that we and our friends had the self-
same objectives of unifying sundered Korea and
punishing the Communist aggressors. Now the
United Nations seems to stop short of its original
aims and to come to terms with the aggressors
which we cannot accept, not because we have never
been consulted but because those terms would mean
sure death for the Korean nation. Moreover, the
United Nations is now putting pressure on us in
cooperating with it; and is joining hands1 it seems,
with the enemy in this matter of armistice terms.
We cannot avoid seeing the cold fact that the
counsels of appeasers have prevailed in altering
the armistice positions of the United States. In
our view, this perilous trend, if perpetuated by
the conclusion of this fatal armistice, will even-
tually endanger the remainder of the free world
including the United States, which millions of
both free and enslaved hope and pray from the
bottom of their hearts will lead them in liberation
of the peoples in chains behind the Iron Curtain.
14
At this very moment, the Communist forces are
launching a large-scale offensive when the armis-
tice talks have scarcely left anything except the
affixing of signatures by the parties concerned.
This should be a warning for our iminediate
future. The terms of the armistice being what
they are, the Communist build-up will: go on
unhampered until it is capable of overwhelm-
ing South Korea with one swoop at a moinent of
the Communists' own choosing. 'What iS to fol-
low for the rest of the Far East? And thie rest of
Asia? And the rest of the free world?
Still looking to your wise leadership for a
remedy in this perilous hour,
Yours very sincerely,
SYNGISIAN AIME.
General Assembly President
Asks Syngman Rhee's Cooperation
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold; on June
20 transmitted to President Syngman Rhee of
South Korea the following message from, Lester B.
Pearson, president of the U.N.General Assembly: 1
As President of the General Assembl:y of the
United Nations I have been shocked to hear of the
unilateral action which you have sanctioned in
bringing about the release of nonrepatriable North
Korean prisoners from the United Nations Pris-
oner of War Camps in Korea.
I take this occasion to recall the decisifre action
taken by the United Nations when aggreSsion was
initiated in June 1950 and the satisfaction which
you expressed in the response of the United
Nations to the urgent appeals made by you for
military and other assistance. That collaboration,
aimed at the repelling of aggression and the resto-
ration of your country to a condition of peace and
economic well-being, has been marked y 3 years
of effective effort on the part of members of the
United Nations and of your Government and
people, under the direction of the United Nations
Command. In view of what this collaboration has
meant to your people, it is most regrettable that
you have taken action which threatens the results
already achieved and the prospect of a peaceful
solution of remaining problems.
This release of North Korean prisoners from
United Nations Prisoner of War Camp S in Korea
is particularly shocking in view of the progress
made by the armistice negotiators in Panmunjom,
which has resulted in the acceptance of ,principles
laid down in the United Nations General Assem-
bly's Resolution of 3 December 1952, endorsed by
54 member nations. The acceptance of the prin-
ciples underlyincr6 this resolution, especially that of
no forcible repatriation of prisoners, which has
been the basis of your position as well as that of the
United Nations, has only been obtained after 2
'U.N. doe. A/2398 dated June 23.
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years of patient and persistent negotiation by the
United Nations Command.
The action taken with your consent, in releasing
the North Korean prisoners, violates the agree-
ment reached by the two sides on June 8, 1953,
embodying these principles, and it occurs at a time
when hostilities are about to cease, and when the
questions of the unification of Korea and related
Korean problems can be dealt with by a political
conference involving the parties concerned.
In July 1950, as a means of assuring necessary
military solidarity with the United Nations effort
in repelling aggression, you undertook to place the
land, sea and air forces of the Republic of Korea
under the "command authority" of the United
Nations Command. Your action referred to above
violates that undertaking.
As President of the General Assembly of the
United Nations I feel it my duty to bring to your
attention the gravity of this situation. I hope and
trust that you will cooperate with the United Na-
tions Command in its continuing and determined
efforts to obtain an early and honourable armistice.
I should like to take this occasion to express, as
President of the United Nations General Assembly,
my profound sympathy for the sufferings of the
people of Korea during the past 3 years, and my
admiration for the valiant efforts of the Army in
its cooperation with the forces of the United Na-
tions. It is my earnest hope that this cooperation
will continue, not only in the immediate task of
obtaining the armistice but in assuring that the
armistice is thereafter faithfully observed, in
order that we may jointly proceed toward our
common objective of the unification of Korea by
peaceful means. If this cooperation were ended,
it would be the Korean people who would suffer
first and suffer most.'
Pakistan To Receive U.S. Wheat
Signature of the Wheat Aid Act
Statement by the President
White House press release dated June 25
I am deeply gratified to sign this act which
makes it possible to send up to 1 million tons of
wheat to help avert famine among the people of
Pakistan. We are fortunate in being able to help
them by sharing some of the fruits of our labor and
soil.
Americans have a strong feeling of friendship
for the people of Pakistan. We have great admira-
2 On June 23 Department Press Officer Lincoln White
made the following statement to correspondents:
"The United Nations has a major and immediate interest
in the Korean situation. Mr. Pearson, as President of the
General Assembly, has forcefully expressed this interest in
a message to President Rhee which has just been released.
The views contained in Mr. Pearson's message accord with
those expressed to President Rhee by spokesmen for the
United States Government."
July 6, 1953
CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
tion for this young country which is engaged in a
valiant and determined effort to overcome prob-
lems of tremendous magnitude. Their efforts re-
mind us of the turmoil and struggle of our own
early clays?and the struggle which confronts us
on a broader scale today.
We are proud to have such staunch friends as
the people of Pakistan, who are dedicated to the
democratic way of life. We are happy to be able
to respond to their need with this aid.
The swift action by the Congress in making pos-
sible this aid, within 2 weeks after my message
requesting such assistance, i reflects the sympathy
and concern of the people of the United States for
the people of Pakistan.
Our sincere hopes for peace and prosperity go
with this grain.
Shiploading Ceremony
Remarks by Horace A. Hildreth2
As American Ambassador to Pakistan, I am
naturally very pleased to be present at this
ceremony.
The Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, has asked
me to express to you his sincere regret that he is
unable to be here personally He does want me to
tell you how impressed he was with what he saw
on his recent visit to Pakistan.
Certainly there are many features about the
country and its people which have great appeal
for Americans. It is a nation of hard-working
people who are determined to achieve their pri-
mary goals, which include increasing their stand-
ard of living. In its few years of existence as a
nation, it has accepted grave responsibilities in
world affairs.
Although it has not been long since I was ap-
pointed to my post, the first and outstanding thing
I learned of at firsthand was the deep amount of
good will and friendship which exists on the part
of the people of Pakistan toward the United
States. At this critical moment in history, when
our country and the rest of the free world is threat-
ened by the most imperialistic, godless power the
world has known, our people can indeed be happy
that these warm feelings exist. The swift action
of the U.S. Government in approving emergency
wheat aid to Pakistan has been cited by a leading
Pakistani paper as "proof of infallible friendship
between two free nations." It is evident from the
response in the United States that this sentiment
of friendship is reciprocated here.
Why do we give this wheat to Pakistan?
Let me say what I think about it as the American
Ambassador to that country.
I have seen at firsthand the needs of this young
nation, Its Government and people are faced with
For text of the President's message, see BULLETIN of
June 22, 1953, p. 889.
2 Made at Baltimore, Md., on June 26 (press release
337.)
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Long-Range Program Recommended
For Underdeveloped Areas
President Eisenhower, Prime Minister
of Pakistan Exchange Messages
On June 29 the White House made public the
following exchange of messages between the Presi-
dent and Mohammed Ali, Prime Minister of
Pakistan:
The Prime Minister's Message
have received with much pleasure the news that
you signed, on the 25th June, 1953, the Bill providing
one million tons of wheat grant to Pakistan. This
news has been received here with a general sense of
relief because we know now that with this generous
aid we shall be able to meet the food shortage with
which Pakistan was faced. This generous grant
from the people of the United States of America and
the promptness with which your Government has
acted is a fine practical proof of friendliness and
good will which the United States of America bears
towards my country. I assure you that this timely
help, which will relieve distress in the country, has
earned the deep gratitude of the nation.
I also wish to convey my personal thanks to you
and your Government for all that has been done to
help Pakistan.
The President's Reply
appreciate the warm expression of your grati-
tude for the action of our people in providing wheat
for your stricken country. Our response to your
call was made in the American tradition of giving
help to the best of our ability where help is needed.
It is also a true measure of the friendly feeling and
admiration which Americans have for the people of
Pakistan. We are proud to count your vigorous,
young nation among our friends.
internal economic problems of great magnitude.
They are facing them with courage and imagina-
tion. Meanwhile the forces of nature have not
been kind.
Pakistan is now faced with a critical food short-
age which threatens many of its people with
famine and starvation. It is sometimes difficult
for Americans to imagine the sufferings of men
and women who live far from our shores unless we
have personally seen them for ourselves. But these
sufferings are nonetheless real. This wheat will
help prevent many, many human beings from
starving. At the same time, this aid will be of
tremendous help in alleviating what otherwise
would be a grave danger to the economy and
internal stability of Pakistan.
Pakistan sprang from the deep desire of its
people to be free and to remain free. The United
States can be proud of its support.
We have shown our interest in many ways?
through Point Four and other economic help, our
exchange of persons program, the work of private
American organizations, and now with this grant
of wheat. I will indeed be happy and proud to
return to my post at Karachi knowing that my
country has responded so quickly to this request
of a friend.
16
A long-range program for building up the less
developed areas will help achieve economic bal-
ance throughout the free world, an AdVisory Com-
mittee on Underdeveloped Areas has reported to
Mutual Security Director Harold E. Stassen.
The observation was made by the group of pri-
vate citizens after a 2-month study of past and
current U.S. programs in underdeveloped areas.
Their report, made public on June 13, is titled
"Economic Strength for the Free World?Prin-
ciples of a United States Foreign Development
Program." The report concerns the less indus-
trialized countries of Southern Europe as well as
those of Latin America South and Southeast Asia,
the Middle East, and America, and proposes guide-
posts for future programs for their development.
In recommending a long-range program, the
Committee suggests that private investment, stim-
ulated by an expanded U.S. Government invest-
ment-guaranty program, should play a greater
role in the underdeveloped areas and that, while
industrialization is necessary, it shonld not be
emphasized to the point where it would unbalance
the economy.
In a foreword to the report, Mr. Stassen describes
it as "a thoughtful and reasoned document which
contributes to our understanding of the problems
of the underdeveloped areas and to our apprecia-
tion of the widening United States interest in those
areas." Callinc, the publication of the report
"most timely," kr. Stassen also said it "can serve
as one of the guides in the review of programs
for Mutual Security now under way or which may
be undertaken in the future."
Warning that "economic development [in these
areas] cannot be promoted effectively on a year-to-
year basis," the report concludes:
There should be some assurance to the free world that
we are "in the world for good" and that our interest in
the less developed areas is not a short-run emergency
policy. Recognition of the inevitable and continuing role
and responsibilities of the United States in today's inter-
dependent world is a fundamental problem of American
public policy and legislative understanding.
In discussing the potential role of the under-
developed areas in the balancing of free world's
economy, the Committee points out that these
regions are "a significant segment of the trading
world," with untapped sources of raw materials.
The development of these areas' the Committee
concludes, could help, for instance, to reduce
Western Europe's dollar deficit.
The report suggests that increased U.S. invest-
ments would aid the development of these regions
and, at the same time, help produce commodities
required in Europe and now obtainable only from
dollar areas.
Other recommendations and findings in the
report include:
Department of State Bulletin
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?Public financing should develop basic serv-
ices, such as transport, power, communications,
and health and sanitary services which, in turn,
would attract more private capital into the less
developed areas;
?The advisability of broadening the U.S.
Government guaranty program, administered by
MSA, to cover war risks under certain conditions
should be carefully explored;
?The financing of projects for direct produc-
tion, especially in mining or industry, should nor-
mally be left to private capital, "where the risk
of loss will help to assure careful screening ;"
?While industrialization "has become a power-
ful symbol, the economic counterpart of nation-
alism and political independence," there should
be countersteps to the tendency of some less
developed countries "to make industrialization
the principal . . . focus of their efforts toward
economic development, and to undermine their
position as materials producers in seeking to
achieve it;"
?In view of the extra financial burdens placed
on some underdeveloped areas as a result of the
free world's defense buildup, military programs
should be integrated with economic and financial
programs.
The report also considers a variety of other
phases of development programs and possibilities,
including the need for technical assistance, types
of financing, population problems, and questions
involved in the search for basic and strategic
materials.
The members of the Advisory Committee who
made the study are:
Chairman, John E. Orchard, professor of economic
geography, Graduate School of Business, Columbia Uni-
versity; Edwin G. Arnold, executive associate, Ford
Foundation, New York; C. W. de Kiewlet, president,
University of Rochester; John W. Harriman, dean of the
Graduate School, Syracuse University; Lester K. Little,
inspector general of Chinese Customs (retired) ; Edward
S. Mason, dean, Littauer School of Public Administra-
tion, Harvard University; Stacy May, economic adviser
on staff of Nelson A. Rockefeller and adviser to the Inter-
national Basic Economy Corporation, New York City; and
Whitney H. Shepardson, president, National Committee
for Free Europe.
MSA Productivity Allotments
To France
The Mutual Security Agency (MsA) on June 5
announced the allotment of $30 million in defense-
support funds to France under terms of a special
agreement concluded on May 28. The new alloca-
tion enables France to create a fund of 9,450,000,-
000 francs to finance an expanded industrial and
agricultural productivity program.
France is the sixth Western European country
to conclude a productivity agreement with the
United States. Earlier agreements have been
July 6, 1953
CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
reached with the United Kingdom, Western Ger-
many, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Italy. A
total of $77 million in defense-support funds has
now been committed for the six countries under
the productivity agreements. Negotiations for
similar agreements are pending with Norway, Bel-
gium, Austria, Turkey, and Greece.
The productivity agreements are being made
under the terms of 1951 and 1952 amendments to
mutual -security legislation which direct the
Agency to conclude agreements that would make
possible the utilization of the equivalent of ap-
proximately $100 million in Western European
currencies in an area-wide productivity drive of
expanded proportions.
France will immediately launch a three-pronged
productivity campaign designed to stimulate
French free enterprise through the cooperative
action of all elements of the economy.
The purpose of the French productivity pro-
gram was stated by Robert Buron, French Minister
of Economic Affairs, in his May 28 letter to Henry
R. Labouisse, MSA Mission Chief in France, con-
cluding the agreement. The letter stated:
The development of the mutual security and the indi-
vidual and collective defense of the free world depends in
large measure on the establishment in France of a healthy
and expanding economy capable of assuring a progressive
rise in standards of living. In order to attain these ob-
jectives, the French Government considers that it is highly
desirable to stimulate the expansion of the French economy
by encouraging the increase of production and produc-
tivity of industry and agriculture in cooperation with the
union organizations which have been members of the
National Productivity Committee and with like-minded
labor groups. To make this action effective, it is recog-
nized that competition should be encouraged, while re-
strictive trade practices which result in decreased
production and higher prices, should be combatted.
In the three-phase program, France will pro-
vide ( L ) francs equivalent to approximately $10
million as grants for use in industrial, housing,
distribution, agricultural, and research projects
designed to increase output, lower prices, and
raise wages; (2) francs equivalent to $2,400,000
for the European Productivity Agency established
May 1 under the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (0Enc) ; and (3) francs
equivalent to approximately $14.6 million to make
loans and loan guarantees to private enterprises
and cooperatives wishing to modernize their op-
erations for the purpose of improving produc-
tivity. The franc equivalent of $3 million will
be reserved for the U.S. Administrative Account.
Notable in the uses that will be made of the
franc funds is the tentative allocation of
700,000,000 francs (equal to $2 million) for as-
sistance to industrial firms or cooperatives who
wish to improve methods of organization and man-
agement as examples which may be followed by
other firms and cooperatives. Typical of this
type of project are those currently being carried
out in cooperation with the French shoe and men's
clothing industries. Similar "pilot projects"
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will be encouraged in such industries as cotton,
silk, and building construction.
Also noteworthy in the intensified French pro-
gram is the allocation of 850 million francs (equal
to $2,420,000) in the agricultural field, chiefly for
the development of a unified extension service
for farmers. Other projects in this field are aimed
at the improvement of product quality market or-
ganization and distribution.
The principles governing the 5.11 billion franc
(equivalent to $14.6 million) loan program re-
strict such loans to enterprises which are con-
sidered by the French Productivity Commissariat
(established by decree, May 28) to be adaptable
to improved productivity techniques, and which
will use such loans for the purpose of expanding
production and improving productivity. Loans
may be made for the purpose of purchasing equip-
ment, supplies, and services or for plant expansion
and the increase of working capital. Directed
primarily toward small and medium-sized enter-
prises, the loans will regularly be at 6 percent
interest.
In entering into the agreement the French Gov-
ernment noted that the additional funds will give
vastly greater impetus to France's productivity
effort, which has been under way since 1948.
To Norway
The Mutual Security Agency (MM) on June
10 announced the allotment of $4 million in de-
fense-support funds to spur Norway's productiv-
ity drive. Industry, commerce, agriculture, and
fisheries will be affected.
The Norwegian Government will use the $4
million credit to purchase commodities needed in
her defense program, but will deposit an equiva-
lent amount of kroner to finance the expanded
productivity drive. The Norwegian Storting
(Parliament) is appropriating an additional 5
million kroner (equal to about $700,000) to fur-
ther the productivity drive.
The MSA allotment was made under the terms of
a special productivity agreement between the Gov-
ernments of Norway and the United States, as pro-
vided by 1951 and 1952 amendments to mutual-
security legislation authorizing the use of up to
$100 million to stimulate productivity and free
enterprise.
Under the expanded Norwegian productivity
drive, about 10 million kroner (equal to $1,400,000)
generated by the MSA allotment will be used to
help finance the operations of a new nongovern-
mental Norwegian productivity institute. The
institute's main functions will be to promote pro-
ductivity, make grants of funds to public, private
and cooperative institutions and organizations
pursuing productivity goals, and provide advice to
the Norwegian Government on the operation and
administration of a revolving productivity loan
fund.
18
The Government will launch the revolving loan
fund with another 10 million kroner (equal to
$1,400,000) generated by the MSA dollar allotment.
Six million kroner (equal to about $840,000) will
be used to finance intensive productivity programs
for agriculture and fisheries under guidance of the
respective ministries. The kroner equivalent of
$320,000 will be set aside as Norway's Contribution
to the new European Productivity Agency estab-
lished on May 1 by the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (OEEc) .
The new institute will take over the major re-
sponsibility for carrying on Norwegian produc-
tivity and technical-assistance activities organized
in cooperation with MSA. In the past, these activi-
ties have been handled by special offices in. the
Norwegian Departments of Industry and
Commerce.
To Belgium
The Mutual Security Agency on June 16 al-
lotted $1 million to Belgium to launch an expanded
agricultural and industrial productivity program
in that country.
Belgium is the eighth Western European coun-
try to conclude a special agreement with the
United States for such a program.
The Belgian Government has indicated that it
will use the $1 million allotment to pay for com-
modities and services which have "direct bearing
on the improvement of productivity or the pro-
motion of the productivity program."
Belgium is to match the dollar allotment with
50 million Belgian francs to be used as follows: 41
million for agricultural and industrial loans and
grants in direct support of the expanded pro-
ductivity drive; 4 million to be contributed to the
new European Productivity Agency established
under the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEc) ; and 5 million to be reserved
for use of the U.S. Government as provided by
the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948.
Apart from funds for technical-assistance proj-
ects, Belgium has received no dollar grants since
1950 when it was indicated that the country needed
no further dollar assistance. The agreement for
economic cooperation between Belgium and the
United States, drafted in July of 1948, continues
in effect, however, and the June 16 allqtment was
made under its provisions.
Belgium is one of the first countries to plan the
use of its MsA-generated productivity funds to
establish demonstration plants in various indus-
tries to convey "to the broadest segment possible
of the Belgian population" the results which can
be obtained from application of productivity
principles. It is proposed to launch the demon-
stration program in the Belgian shoe industry,
adding other consumer goods industries as the
program progresses.
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The North Atlantic Marine Research Program
MEETING OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE NORTHWEST ATLANTIC FISHERIES
AT NEW HAVEN, CONN., MAY 25-30, 1953
by -William M. Terry
The International Commission for the North-
west Atlantic Fisheries held its third annual meet-
ing at New Haven, Conn., from May 25 to May 30,
1953. Commissioners and advisers from the 10
member nations met at the Bingham Oceano-
graphic Laboratory as guests of Yale University
to review the status of the great groundfish fish-
eries off the west coast of Greenland, the coast of
Labrador, and on the banks of Newfoundland,
Nova Scotia, and New England. The member
nations are Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United King-
dom, and the United States. The U.S. Commis-
sioners are John L. Kask, Assistant Director,
Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Department of
the Interior, Bernhard Knollenberg, attorney,
Chester, Conn., and Francis W. Sargent, Director
of Marine Fisheries, Massachusetts Department of
Conservation.
The Commission, established pursuant to a con-
vention signed in February 1950, is responsible for
the investigation, protection, and conservation of
the fisheries of the Northwest Atlantic Ocean. In
essence its task is to keep these fisheries under con-
stant review, to guide and coordinate the research
efforts of its 10 member nations, and, when condi-
tions warrant, to propose regulatory measures to
the member nations. The first such regulation,
recommended by the Commission at its second
annual meeting in 1952, limits the size ,pf meshes
in nets used in the haddock fishery off the New
England coast. It entered into force on June 1,
1953.
The U.S. interest in certain of these fisheries, and
consequently in the Commission, is great. In-
deed, it was the initiative of the United States
which brought the Commission into being. Each
year American fishermen catch approximately 800
million pounds of fish, valued at about 35 million
dollars, in the Northwest Atlantic area. Some
15,000 fishermen in New York and the New Eng-
land States are dependent upon these fisheries for
July 6, 1953
their livelihood. In recent years New England
fishermen had become increasingly concerned about
the conservation of the haddock fishery and had
urged the Government to seek means of restoring
haddock to previous levels of abundance. Since
this important fishery was conducted by the fish-
ermen of many nations, it was clear that only
through international cooperation could the had-
dock resources be protected. Accordingly, in 1949
the United States invited the governments of the
10 nations most interested in the problem to meet
in Washington to arrange for joint action. As a
result of this conference, the International Con-
vention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries' es-
tablishing the Commission, was concluded on
February 8, 1949.1
The Commission has made great progress toward
its objectives. Prior to its third annual meeting
it had acquired a small staff and developed a sys-
tem for the collection and dissemination among
its members of statistical and scientific informa-
tion. At its second annual meeting it proposed
the mesh regulation, mentioned previously, as a
likely answer to the problem in the New England
haddock fishery. Thus concrete action which will
benefit the United States was taken only a short
time after the creation of the Commission. Also,
at the second annual meeting, the Commission
established a working group of scientists to draw
up a comprehensive research program for the Con-
vention area, in a sense a master plan for future
investigations. Progress on the whole was some-
what hampered, however, by the fact that only
six of the signatory governments had ratified the
convention. Until membership was complete, all
phases of the work could not go forward.
For text of the final act of this conference and of the
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
eries, see Documents and State Papers (Department of
State publication 3484) for March and April 1949, p. 707;
for a report on the International Commission's first meet-
ing, in April 1951, see BULLETIN of June 11, 1951, p. 954.
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At the third annual meeting, all signatory
governments were represented by Commissioners
for the first time. The remaining four signatory
nations had ratified the convention during the past
year, so that membership is now complete.
The most important items of business before the
Commission at this meeting were (1) a review
of the status of the fish stocks in the several sub-
areas into which the Convention area is divided;
(2) consideration of research activities sched-
uled for the coming year; (3) recommendations
to member governments for improvement of the
Commission's statistical work; and (4) considera-
tion of a comprehensive research program for the
Convention area.
Problems of Subareas
The first two of these items were dealt with at
meetings of the five panels, committee-like organi-
zations set up to keep under continuous review the
fisheries of the five subareas. The United States
is a member of panels V, IV, and III which include
the fisheries on the New England Banks, the Nova
Scotian Banks and the Grand Banks, respectively.
Generally speaking the reports of the scientists
who worked in the five subareas in past years pre-
sented an encouraging picture. Only in subareas
4 and 5 was there evidence of need for immediate
action. In subarea 5, the New England haddock
fishery is at a low level. The Commission had
already proposed a mesh regulation as a partial
answer to this problem, and at this meeting it
adopted certain amendments to increase the regu-
lation's effectiveness. The report of Canadian
scientists on the fisheries in subarea 4, the Nova
Scotian Banks, indicated possible decline in the
cod fisheries and considerable destruction of im-
mature haddock at sea. A special committee of
scientists was constituted to study intensively the
situation in subarea 4 and report to the Commis-
sion at its next annual meeting. If the evidence
warrants, the Commission will consider regulation
of the fisheries in subarea 4 at that time.
Except for its proposal for amending the mesh
regulation for subarea 5, the Commission's recom-
mendations to member governments dealt largely
with improvements in the system of collecting fish-
ery statistics. The problem of statistics is both
important and difficult to solve. A current and
complete statistical picture of the fisheries is essen-
tial to a clear understanding of the status of the
fisheries, the progress of research, and the effec-
tiveness of management measures. Ten nations
fish in the Convention area, each using its own sys-
tem of collecting data, its own standards of meas-
urement, and its own methods of reporting. This
great mass of data must be brought together by the
Commission, the various types of measurement
must be converted to a single standard, and the
data analyzed, interpreted, and made available to
20
researchers. Much progress has been made in this
direction, and it will be furthered by the recom-
mendations adopted at New Haven.
Possibly the most significant of the Commis-
sion's actions at its third meetingwas the adoption
of a comprehensive research program for the Con-
vention area. At its second annual meeting the
Commission had agreed that it was essential to
develop a research program which would coordi-
nate and direct at a single goal the efforts of the
research agencies of the member governments.
Most of those governments had conducted inves-
tigations of the fisheries for years anC. had obtained
considerable information. However, each govern-
ment carried on these studies independent of the
others with the result that there was duplication
of effort, certain problems were completely over-
looked, and the scientists of one natibn frequently
were unaware of, and therefore did not benefit
from, the work of those of other nations. The
progress of research was necessarily slow. To cor-
rect this situation, the Commission appointed a
special committee of scientists to work during the
year on the development of a comprehensive re-
search program. The program developed by this
committee was adopted by the Commission at the
third annual meeting.
Research Program Adopted
Briefly, the program designates cod, haddock,
redfish, and halibut as the four species of most
importance in the Convention area and poses three
fundamental questions with respect td these species
which must be answered if the Commission is to
achieve its objectives. The questions are:
a. What are the principal fish stocks, Where are they
located, how are they divided, and how are they now used?
b. How do intensity and method of fishiting affect the
stocks and the long-term yield?
c. How are the stocks affected by natural factors?
The program then outlines the work to be done in
answering these questions, specifying (1) essen-
tial records on all fisheries which must be collected
by all countries, i. e., statistics on catch and effort
and samples of catch for analysis of length and
age composition; (2) essential records to be ob-
tained cooperatively, not necessarily by every
country, i. e., data defining the stocks and their
movements, data making possible the assessment
of the sizes of stocks and rates of mortality and
recruitment, and data making possible a determi-
nation of the effects of natural factors on abun-
dance and distribution; and (3) contributory in-
formation to be obtained as opportunity permits,
e. g., measures of basic productivity which will
give the rate of production of the organic material
on which fish ultimately depend for food.
The program then proposes means of coordinat-
ing the work. It is contemplated that the work
will be carried out by national research agencies in
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Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
centers far removed one from the other. If the
program is to be effective, with no duplication of
effort, special provision must be made for pooling
the varied knowledge and experience, for the coor-
dination of the work, and for the development of
sound recommendations. The program proposes
four measures to accomplish this coordination:
(1) the establishment of three working parties on
cod and haddock, redfish and halibut, and hydrog-
raphy respectively, to consist of active research
workers; (2) provision of opportunity for work-
ing scientists to make visits to the research stations
and ships of other countries to observe and prac-
tice techniques and develop ideas; (3) maintenance
at Commission headquarters of an up-to-date reg-
ister of scientists engaged in the various branches
of the Commission's work; and (4) exchange,
through the Commission, each December or as soon
thereafter as possible, of programs for the ensuing
year. This coordinated program will result in
providing the Commission with more accurate and
comprehensive data on the fish stocks and a better
understanding of the effects of man and nature
upon them which will enable it to undertake timely
management measures to insure the continued pro-
ductivity of these important fisheries.
Other important actions at the New Haven meet-
ing were (1) the selection of Halifax, Nova Scotia,
as the site of the Commission's permanent head-
quarters; (2) the adoption of a budget of $33,000
for the coming fiscal year; and (3) the election of
Stewart Bates, Deputy Minister of Fisheries of
Canada, as chairman, and Commander Tavares de
Almeida, of the Portuguese Fishery Department,
as vice chairman of the Commission for the next
2 years. Mr. Bates succeeds Dr. Kock of the
United States; Commander de Almeida succeeds
A. T. A. Dobson of the United Kingdom.
The U.S. Commissioners are of the opinion that
the Commission's accomplishments during its first
2 years are significant. With ratification of the
convention during the past year by France, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain, the Commission has reached
full membership and has perfected its organiza-
tion. The adoption of a comprehensive research
program has made it possible for the first time in
the history of the Northwest Atlantic fisheries to
coordinate the efforts of more than 100 scientists,
a dozen vessels, and some 15 research laboratories
from 10 nations. The Commission has become an
effective working organization, and promises to
become a model of international cooperation in
the investigation and conservation of international
fishery resources.
? Mr. Terry, author of the above article, is a for-
eign affairs specialist in the Of/ice of Foreign
Activities, Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior.
July 6, 1953
Economic and Social Council
Full Employment. Implementation of full employment
and balance of payments policies. E/2408/Add. 1,
May 18, 1953. 153 pp. mimeo; E/2408/Add. 2, May
29, 1953. 53 pp. mimeo; Analysis of replies of gov-
ernments to the questionnaire on full employment,
balance of payments and related policies, 1952-53.
Report by the Secretariat. Relative economic prog-
ress of the more developed and the less developed
countries between 1948 and 1952. E/2445/Add. 2,
June 12, 1953. 3 pp. mimeo; Report by the Secretary-
General under Council resolution 426 B (XIV).
E/2449, June 11, 1953. 16 pp. mimeo.
Freedom of information. Comments and suggestions of
governments transmitted for the information and
assistance of the Rapporteur on Freedom of Informa-
tion. E/2427/Add. 1, June 9, 1953. 6 pp.; Summary
of comments and suggestions received by the Rap-
porteur on Freedom of Information from information
enterprises and national and international profes-
sional associations. E/2439, June 10, 1953. 26 pp.
mimeo.
Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries.
Impact of Selected Synthetics on Demand for Natu-
ral Products in International Trade. Study by the
Secretariat. E/2438, May 29, 1953. 38 pp. mimeo;
Question of Methods To Increase World Productivity.
Working paper prepared by the International Labour
Office on the role of labour in programmes for in-
creasing productivity, and measures needed to safe-
guard the interests of workers. E/2440, May 22,
1953. 33 pp. mimeo; Relative Prices of Primary
Products and Manufactures in International Trade.
Report by the Secretary-General. B/2455, June 8,
1953. 107 pp. mimeo.
Proceeds of Sale of UNRRA Supplies. Report by the
Secretary-General. E/2444, May 28, 1953. 8 pp.
mimeo.
Financial Implications of Actions of the CounciL Work
Programmes and Costs of the Economic and Social Ac-
tivities of the United Nations. Note by the Secretary-
General. E/2448, May 28, 1953. 53 pp. mimeo.
Participation of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization in the Expanded Pro-
gramme of Technical Assistance. E/2452, May 29,
1953. 5 pp. mimeo.
Question of Admission to Membership in the Regional
Economic Commissions of States Not Members of the
United Nations. Memorandum by the Secretary-
General. E/2458, June 8, 1953. 9 pp. mimeo.
Report of the Regional Conference on Mineral Resources
Development. E/CN. 11/I&T/85, May 18, 1953.
80 pp. mimeo.
I Printed materials may be secured in the United States
from the International Documents Service, Columbia
University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y.
Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents)
may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the
United States.
The United Nations Secretariat has established an
Official Records series for the General Assembly, the
Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the
Trusteeship Council, and the Atomic Energy Commission
which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and
reports of the various commissions and committees. In-
formation on securing subscriptions to the series may be
obtained from the International Documents Service.
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Problems in The Administration of The Pacific Trust Territory
Statement by Frank E. Midkiff
Special U.S. Representative to the U.N. Trusteeship Councill
I am happy to appear here before you as special
representative of the United States to assist in
your review of the report on the administration
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for
the year July 1951 to June 1952.
Almost a full year has elapsed since the period
of the report. Although I, myself, have been in
office only a little over 3 months I shall endeavor?
using in part the experience of a recent 5-week
tour of the trust territory?to bring you up to date
on developments regarding some of the major
problems in which I am sure the Council is
interested.
I should like to say that we derived much benefit
from the presence of the Council's Visiting Mission
with us at Honolulu and throughout the territory.
Their understanding of our problems and their
thorough and patient examination of every phase
of our administration has been most encouraging.
In the opening paragraph of chapter 1 of its
report, the mission has stated the three factors that
make our problem of administration of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands particularly diffi-
cult and challenging. These factors are, first, the
vast oceanic zone over which the very small land
areas are scattered; second, the negligible re-
sources; and third, the diversity of the population.
The mission's report gives a, concise description of
each of these factors. I would emphasize that the
problems arising from the geography, the meager
resources, and the diverse population are numer-
ous. I feel, however, that continual progress is
being made by the administration in meeting these
problems.
The Council in its examination last year of the
previous report on the administration of the Trust
Made in the Trusteeship Council on June 23 and re-
leased to the press on the same date by the U.S. Mission to
the U.N. Mr. Midkiff was appointed by the President on
Mar. 13 as High Commissioner of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, succeeding the late Elbert Thomas.
22
Territory of the Pacific Islands made a number of
suggestions and recommendations in the political,
economic social, and educational fields. The
Visiting Mission has also commented on problems
in these fields. I should like to review certain of
these items.
The Council last year expressed the hope that the
administration would foster local initiative for
purposes of creating additional regional organiza-
tions. The Government of the trust territory in its
program of developing regional political organs is
attempting to enlist the widest possible support for
these bodies throughout the areas they serve. In
this process, and in the operation of the regional
bodies themselves, guidance by the administrative
staff is, of course, very necessary. This leadership,
however., must be neither so persuasive nor so
obvious that the members of the bodies themselves
feel powerless and without independent voice.
This danger has been recognized in the case of the
Ponape Congress, which has been organized in the
past year. Every effort is being made, therefore,
to provide judicious administrative assistance in
the form of advice to members, and explanation of
procedures for conducting meetings and of com-
mittee organization, in preference to direct leader-
ship by the administration on the floor at congres-
sional sessions. Though the new organizations
introduce methods new to the Micronesians, they
can be expected to learn quickly by practice and
experience.
The Palau Congress presents a somewhat differ-
ent case. There the emphasis must now be placed
upon gradually reducing the reliance of the Con-
gress upon leadership by the administration.
This problem was noted by the Visiting Mission
and is recognized by the Government of the trust
territory.
The Truk District is planning to conduct annual
conferences of chiefs from all islands of the dis-
trict as a step toward regional integration and
eventual formation of a regional congress.
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It is of significance to note that to date regional
bodies have developed around existing groups
having distinct cultural identities. Future bridg-
ing of traditional gaps to provide wide represen-
tation in the form of territorial legislature will
depend for success upon gradual and concurrent
development of closer economic and social ties be-
tween the diverse population groups. The devel-
opment of these ties and the breakdown of present
localized loyalties and interests will take place
only over a period of some time and, as the Visit-
ing Mission observed, cannot be forced without a
resultant disintegration of the age-old and nor-
mally evolved social structure that would have
unforeseeable repercussions throughout the indig-
enous societies.
Fostering Political Development
Conscious of the need for caution in this respect,
the administration is continuing its fostering of
political development and, as a part of this activ-
ity, has planned a conference on self-government
to be held this summer at Truk from July 3-10.
The conference will be attended by Micronesian
and administration representatives from each dis-
trict to discuss problems confronting the local
communities.
In the local communities, the trend of develop-
ment is, I believe, in accord with the expressed
recommendations of the Council last year. The
electoral system of selecting magistrates and other
local officials is now utilized by 97 out of the 117
municipalities. This is encouraging, although I
think note should be taken of the statement of the
Visiting Mission that these figures do not neces-
sarily indicate a drastic casting off of the tradi-
tional authority of the chiefs. The acceptance of
electoral machinery reflects a willingness to try
out democratic processes of government and rec-
ognition of the need, as the mission stated, for
local officials who because of their education or
acculturation are more able to serve in a liaison
capacity with the administration.
I would like to suggest, however, that this is a
desirable form of development. Until the Micro-
nesians have made a fuller adaptation to the bene-
ficial aspects of the new cultures they are meeting,
they must rely in large part upon the old ways
and the cultures they themselves evolved over a
period of centuries in order to live in the unique
situation of these small islands on a great ocean.
Basically, theirs is a family organization with
adaptation to an economy of scarcity, wherein
strict observance of rules and of resource distri-
bution must be observed. These rules were learned
in infancy and childhood and were taken for
granted as normal. Without such control enforced
by responsible family leaders, the Micronesians
even today would be faced with desperate eco-
nomic and social maladjustments. The demo-
cratic changes that are being brought about must
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therefore be watched carefully and timed properly
to avoid a serious dislocation which none would
desire or advocate.
The Council in its review last year expressed the
view that the administering authority should
study means of giving more effective participation
to indigenous judges in the district courts and
the Court of Appeals of the High Court. The
report that is before you describes what has been
done in this respect. As stated there, Microne-
sians have been appointed to all judicial positions
in the district courts and 21 special Micronesian
judges have been appointed to assist in the trial
division of the High Court. As the Council is
aware, all judges in the municipal courts are Mi-
cronesians.
I turn next to the administrative machinery of
the trust territory. One of our big problems, of
course, is transportation, to which the Council and
the Visiting Mission have called attention. The
recent acquisition of a second vessel of 4,800-
ton capacity will improve markedly the interdis-
trict supply situation and the movement of copra
to markets. Its presence also should reduce ma-
terially further disruption in the scheduling of
district field trips. It is hoped that one auxiliary
schooner will be in the service next month in the
Yap District, as a replacement for one district
motor vessel (AKL) of 200-ton capacity now in
use. Acquisition of additional schooners is
planned as rapidly as possible. These sailing
vessels are more economical and more in line with
the experience of the Micronesians than the present
motor vessels.
The Visiting Mission has commented upon the
problem of obtaining well-qualified personnel to
staff positions in the trust territory. I fully
concur in the existence of this problem. We are
aware of it and are giving it attention. Our
people must meet standards as to education, train-
ing, and demonstrated performance. On the
whole I think they do, and the few who do not are
being replaced by appointees of higher qualifica-
tions. I am pleased to say that there has been a
steady rise in the quality and ability of our staff
over the past 2 years. This trend will be con-
tinued.
Training of Administrative Personnel
The desirabilities of pre-service and in-service
training for employees is appreciated by the ad-
ministration. Our staff members are now given
an orientation in Honolulu prior to assignment
in the Islands, and attention is being given to an
extension of this training to provide additional
study in the fields of ethnology and anthropology
of the Pacific Islands.
On the subject of in-service training, I believe
the Council would be interested in our training
program for Micronesian employees. We have
had a training specialist in Truk for some months
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with the purpose of establishing as a pilot project
in the Truk District, an in-service training pro-
gram of wide scope for Micronesian employees.
The purpose of this program is to accelerate the
training of Micronesians to replace American
personnel wherever practical. I hope next year
to be able to give you further details on the pro-
gram that will be established as a result of this
undertaking.
The Council has on several occasions urged the
passage of organic legislation for the territory. I
can say at this time that hearings are planned on
this legislation early next month by the appropri-
ate committee of the House of Representatives in
the Congress.
The Council and the Visiting Mission have both
commented upon the location of the headquarters
of the trust territory. As the mission noted, Pres-
idential authorization has been given to locate the
headquarters on Dulbon Island in the Truk Atoll.
I would like to say frankly to the Council that no
money is being requested at this time for the con-
struction of the facilities that would be needed to
make such a move of the headquarters possible.
The location of the trust territory headquarters is
one on which there is considerable difference of
opinion. Some of the disadvantages of a move
at this time to Truk were noted by the Visiting
Mission. The factors must be carefully weighed
and considered before a final move is made. Re-
cently we have moved a large part of our staff
forward to Guam and Truk. Our central staff,
whether stationed in Honolulu or in the field, must
be on the move from district to district, like circuit
riders. There is no one place, even a central spot
in the Truk Atoll, that is near the other districts or
convenient as a center of transportation and com-
munications. It would be over 400 miles to the
nearest other district center and over 1,100 miles
to the next nearest district center.
The Agricultural Program
In the economic field, as the mission has ob-
served, agriculture is the principal economic ac-
tivity of the territory. In our agricultural
program we are encouraging and assisting the
islanders in the improvement of their subsistence
and cash crops and are conducting experimental
work with new crops in an effort to diversify these
crops. The introduction of cacao is progressing
satisfactorily in Palau where several thousand
seedlings have been set out on the plantation on
Babeldaup and further clearing of trees is under
way. Similar experimenting with cacao is in
progress at Netalanim plantation on Ponape.
I wish to comment on the suggestion of the Vis-
iting Mission that there should be a separate
department of agriculture in the trust territory
organization. I would like to point out that the
chief agriculturist of the territory is stationed in
the field and has broad program responsibilities
24
in respect to agricultural development., Organi-
zation changes which were effected June 30 will
create a field agricultural division within the eco-
nomic program of the territory, and it is believed
probable that this organization will meet present
needs.
Currently, the Government of the trust territory
employs seven district agriculturists and five inter-
district agriculturists. The district agriculturists
spend the greater part of their time administering
the agricultural program of their districts and
part of their time teaching and supervising in-
digenous teachers of agriculture. In addition to
these activities, there are special agricultural proj-
ects under the interdistrict personnel. These proj-
ects include cacao development, the Matalanim
plantation, the agricultural experimental station
at Ponape, and the cattle introduction, program.
Moreover the work of the entomological 5pecialists
are primarily concerned with agriculture. The
combined expense of these agricultural activities
totals 90 percent of all expenditures in the past
year on economic development. This I believe,
illustrates the emphasis which agriculture is, and
should be, receiving.
The Visiting Mission drew attention in its re-
port to methods of land utilization and land con-
servation. The indigenous methods Of shifting
cultivation are being changed through education
to the rotation concept, and through regulations,
which are admittedly difficult to enforce govern-
ing the burning off of land. Projects have been
approved for the reclaiming of swampland for
giant taro, and also for the reclaiming of tracts
of land by re-establishing coconut culture where
intensive cultivation has robbed the land of its
fertility. Commercial fertilizers will be used to
establish leguminous plants which will be used as
green manure for the coconut culture. ,
Insofar as agricultural research to serve low
islands is concerned, experiments are being con-
ducted at Ngatik in Ponape, and an allotment of
funds has been made for the conduct of ow-island
agricultural experiments in the Jalint Atoll.
The in-service training program which I previ-
ously mentioned will include the training of indig-
enous agricultural personnel. This program is to
be given emphasis in our future operations.
A long-term agricultural program which is being
formulated includes an agricultural survey, the
rehabilitation of indigenous agriculture, plant and
animal introduction, conservation and reforesta-
tion, agricultural extension education, and in-
creased effectiveness in the enforcement of guar-
Calendar of Meetings
The "Calendar of Meetings," regularly1 featured
in the BULLETIN'S first issue of the month, will
appear in the July 13 issue.
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antine regulations. This program should help in
placing agricultural development in the territory
on a sound footing.
The Island Trading Company and its projected
termination have been of concern to the Visiting
Mission. I might say that the Government of the
trust territory recognizes and values the help that
the company has been to the people of the trust
territory. Its services filled the tremendous vac-
uum caused by the war and have made an invalu-
able contribution to maintaining the flow of trade
and developing local private enterprises in the
area. Since the determination by the Congress
last year that this company should be liquidated as
of December 31, 1953, considerable thought has
been given to how the services of the company
could be replaced and, I might add, we would like
to see t replaced, if possible, by the activities of the
Mier esians themselves rather than by outside
comp ies in order that the greatest possible mone-
tary r turn might accrue to the people of the terri-
tory. 1 his replacement, I venture to hope, will be
possibl but it may be more surely and more satis-
factori accomplished if the Island Trading Com-
pany's tivities were temporarily extended. The
question f ex ending the life of the corporation is
now un nsideration. Every effort will be
made to t the economy of the area whenever
the comp finally liquidated.
Land Claims Problems
I found on my trip through the trust territory, as
did the Visiting Mission, that land problems exist
in all districts and that the people are anxious for
their settlement. These land problems center
around three principal issues: first, the public
domain with respect to which there are claims for
land alienated by the Japanese; second, claims aris-
ing out of the use or deterioration of lands as a
result of war activities; and third, use of some
lands for current trust territory administrative
installations.
The first of these, claims with respect to the pub-
lic domain, is being tackled promptly by the land
claims personnel, which is now being reconstituted
as the Division of Land Titles and Claims. Con-
siderable work, as revealed in the report of the
Visiting Mission, has been done in Saipan. That
work is now being extended to the other districts.
Difficulties lie in the fact that many land records
and survey markers were destroyed during the war
years. There is the further necessity of translat-
ing such land records as exist from Japanese. I
assure the Council that this work of settling- land
problems is being given a high priority. I should
also like to add that it is anticipated that islanders
now holding revocable permits to public domain
lands, if they are not otherwise claiming title to
particular lands, will be afforded the opportunity
to homestead permanently the public domain pres-
ently under their cultivation.
July 6, 1953
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The second category of land claims, which arose
largely out of the war, and which relate to the use
of private or public lands by the Armed Forces of
the United States, are currently under considera-
tion by the administering authority.
The third category of land claims, those result-
ing from use of public land by the trust territory
administration, is also one that the Division of
Land Titles and Claims will look into. On Uliga
Island in Majuro discussions have been in progress
with the owners of land occupied by the District
Headquarters for some months. The land claims
here were established in 1952, and in April 1953
a committee of the Marshallese claimants under-
took to propose a fair rental value for use of the
occupied land. As yet there has not been agree-
ment between the administration and the claim-
ants on the amount of compensation. This agree-
ment, however, will be the last step to settlement
of this problem at Majuro.
Another type of claims problem which is cur-
rently under consideration by the Administering
Authority is that involving claims against Japan
and Japanese nationals. Members of the Council
are no doubt aware that article 4 (a) of the Treaty
of Peace with Japan provides, in part, that claims
of the residents and administering authorities of
certain areas, including the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands, against Japan and its nationals
shall be the subject of special arrangements be-
tween Japan and such authorities. The United
States is currently giving consideration to the type
of claims which may be appropriately included
in any special arrangements to be negotiated with
Japan on behalf of the residents of the trust ter-
ritory pursuant to the provisions of article 4 (a)
of the treaty. The Council will appreciate that
the problems raised by these claims are numerous
and complex. The Administering Authority how-
ever, is acutely conscious of the importance of this
problem to the people of the trust territory, and
plans are under study looking toward the disposi-
tion of these claims.
The Administering Authority is also aware of
the difficult situation resulting from the partial
redemption of yen currency by military authori-
ties immediately after the war. This matter is
also being given attention by the Administering
Authority, and it is hoped that a satisfactory solu-
tion will be found for this problem which, under-
standably, is of concern to the people of the trust
territory.
The United States will, of course, keep the Coun-
cil informed of the progress made in dealing with
the various types of claims of the people of the
trust territory.
The Council asked last year for additional infor-
mation regarding those repatriated Japanese who
have Micronesian wives or families in the territory.
This question has been carefully considered. The
Administering Authority considers, as previously
stated to the Trusteeship Council, that the return
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en bloc of former Japanese or other foreign resi-
dents is undesirable for social and economic rea-
sons. Nevertheless, subject to appropriate security
clearance, the Government of the trust territory
would be willing to permit the return of Japanese
spouses and children of mixed unions where the
members of the family concerned are agreeable
and when prior investigation reveals in each case
that the returnees would be acceptable to the par-
ticular Micronesian community and their return
would not create serious social and economic situ-
ations.
The Council asked last year that we continue to
accelerate the training of Micronesian medical per-
sonnel. That has been done. As the Visiting Mis-
sion noted, 38 are attending the Central Medical
School at Suva, Fiji, and 3 are being given ad-
vanced hospital training at hospitals in Hawaii.
Teacher-Education Program
The training of teachers is always a key factor
in any educational system. Accordingly, we are
strengthening our teacher-education program in
the direction of training teachers to meet the needs
of their own community and are concentrating
effort on teacher education. An 8-week summer-
school program is held each summer in each of
the districts and attended by all indigenous teach-
ers in the district. In most districts demonstra-
tion schools, where teachers attend and practice
teaching under competent supervision, are part of
the summer teacher-education program.
Throughout the rest of the year, the supervisor
of teacher education in each district visits elemen-
tary schoolteachers in their island schools, and
works with them on the job for extended periods
of time ironing out difficulties which the teacher
may be having and helping the teacher prepare
materials locally to enrich the teaching program.
In Palau District this year several teachers were
called in for a 6-week teacher-training period in
the fall while in the spring others were called in
for a 12-week program. Through such training
we are continually improving the quality of our
teaching staff.
The Visiting Mission points up a real problem
in the difficulty which graduates of nos (Pacific
Islands Central School) face in obtaining scholar-
ships for advanced training overseas ite to the
fact that the level of education provided by Pics
is not quite sufficient for scholarship requirements.
Experience has shown that carefully selected
students from Pics have been able to enter the
senior year at the Honolulu University High
School and then to go on to the university during
the second year of residence in Honolulu.
This attendance at an accredited high school in
Hawaii or elsewhere for a year may well be the
26
most practical solution to the problem. Often very
intensive preparatory coaching in fundamentals
of learning and in background material is required.
Continued attention has been given to scholar-
ship possibilities for Micronesian students to study
abroad. As stated in the annual report a Micro-
nesian scholarship committee administers a schol-
arship fund. This committee just recently met
and acted upon seven scholarship appointments
for study in Hawaii.
A teaching function is central in all our efforts.
We are trying to train and develop the Microne-
sians and to help them become as effectively self-
governing in meeting the challenges of the modern
world as their traditional social organization
proved to be long ago. We are working to develop
democratic institutions in such a way that they
may rest upon and be sustained by a sound econ-
omy that will support standards of living such as
they desire and can become able to pay for.
Nearly all new ideas in these field S should be
subjected to patient testing to see whether or not
they are really beneficial, and by such testing and
possible subsequent adjustments to avoid serious
disappointments and discouragements that result
when visions turn into mirages.
By wise guidance and cautious approach the
Administering Authority is certain that sound
and enduring progress can be attained.
Current Legislation on Foreign Policy
Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce Appropri-
ation Bill, 1954. Report (To accompany H. R. 4974).
S. Rept. 309, 83(1 Cong., 1st Sess. 30 pp.
Reorganization Plan No. 9 of 1953. Message From the
President of the United States Transwitting Reor-
ganization Plan No. 9 of 1953. H. Doc, 19, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. 4 pp.
State Department Information Program?VOice of Amer-
ica. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations of the Committee on Government
Operations, United States Senate, Eighty-third Con-
gress, First Session Pursuant to S. Res. 40. A Resolu-
tion Authorizing the Committee on Government Op-
erations To Employ Temporary Additional Personnel
and Increasing the Limit of Expenditures. Part 6,
March 1, 1953. 79 pp.; Part 7, March 5 and 6, 1953.
120 pp.; Part 8, March 12, 1953. 79 pp.; Part 9,
March 13, 16, and 19, 1953. 100 pp.
Ninth Semiannual Report on Educational Exchange Activ-
ities. Letter From Chairman United States Advisory
Commission on Educational Exchange Transmitting
the Semiannual Report of All Programs and Activities
Carried on Under Authority of Section 603 of Public
Law 902, Eightieth Congress. H. Doe. 154, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 pp.
The Agreement Revising and Renewing the International
Wheat Agreement. Message From the President of
the United States Transmitting A Certified Copy of
the Agreement Revising and Renewing the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, Which Was Open for
Signature in Washington April 13 to 27, Inclusive,
1953, and Was Signed During That Period on Behalf
of the Government of the United States of America
and the Governments of 44 Other Countries. S. Exec.
H, 83d (Jong., 1st Sess. 38 pp.
Department of State Bulletin
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Effects of the President's Reorganization Plans
on the Department of State
Statement by Donold B. Lourie
Under Secretary for Administration'
This is the first time I have been called before
your Committee, and I am pleased to have the
opportunity to explain as best I can what effects
the President's Reorganization Plans 7 and 8 will
have on the State Department.2
Mr. Dodge and General Smith 3 have given you
a comprehensive picture of the proposals outlined
in Reorganization Plans 7 and 8 and I would like
to give you a more detailed discussion of those pro-
posals. The President has pointed out in his mes-
sage on the reorganization that there are two major
deficiencies in the organization of the executive
branch for conducting foreign affairs:
(1) There has been no clear assignment of cen-
tral responsibility for foreign policy below the
President;
(2) A number of programs which implement
our foreign policy have been scattered within the
executive branch rather than appropriately
grouped together for the most efficient and econom-
ical administration.
The President made it clear in his message trans-
mitting the reorganization plans to the Congress
that our organization for the conduct of foreign
affairs has been built upon a patchwork of statutes.
This must be studied carefully as a basis for new
legislation, but this will take time. The President
added that by early next year we should be pre-
pared, with appropriate consultation with the Con-
gress, to recommend such legislation, but in the
meantime we should go ahead to improve the pres-
ent arrangements within the framework of existing
legislation. That is what these measures are de-
signed to do. This is a move in the direction of
1 Made before the Committee on Government Operations
of the House of Representatives on June 22 (press release
331).
2 For texts of these plans and the President's Message
transmitting them to the Congress, see BULLETIN of June
15, 1953, p. 849.
'Joseph M. Dodge, Director, Bureau of the Budget, and
Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith.
July 6, 1953
making it possible for the Secretary of State to
spend more of his time and that of his principal
assistants on the development and control of
foreign policy and our relations with foreign gov-
ernments.
I believe that these proposals offer the oppor-
tunity for the Secretary of State and the State
Department to concentrate attention on the advice
and assistance which the President desires in the
formulation and control of foreign policy and,
in addition, provide a focal point for coordina-
tion of foreign-affairs activities throughout the
Government.
May I add that I came to the Department of
State without preconceived ideas on how the De-
partment of State could best be organized. One
of the things that impressed me was the fact that
I, like most people in this country, never realized
the extent of the administrative burdens that fall
on the Secretary of State under the present ar-
rangement where he is ultimately held responsible
for personnel, for budget, for regulations, and
other administrative aspects of operating pro-
grams, such as the information program. At the
present time these operating responsibilities tend
to keep him and his principal assistants from con-
centrating on the primary role of the State Depart-
ment in the formulation and control of foreign
policy itself. Under the proposals before the com-
mittee, there are more than a dozen operating pro-
grams for which the Secretary now has this kind
of responsibility, which would be placed in other
agencies where they can be effectively consolidated
into truly hard-hitting instruments to support our
national objectives.
Under these proposals, the Secretary of State
would be relieved of operating responsibility for
the following programs:
(1) The program authorized by the Kersten
amendment of the Mutual Security Act of 1951 for
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aiding persons who have escaped from Communist
areas;
(2) the foreign-information programs of the
International Information Administration includ-
ing those large-scale and important programs in
Germany and Austria.;
(3) the special U.S. program for the relief and
resettlement of refugees coming into Israel;
(4) the technical-cooperation program carried
out by the Technical Cooperation _Administration;
(5) the Institute of Inter-American Affairs;
(6) administration of the local currency fund
generated by the food-relief assistance program
for the Yugoslav people' authorized by the Yugo-
slav Emergency Relief Assistance Act of 1950;
(7) the payment of ocean freight for private
relief shipments under the terms of the Mutual
Security Act;
(8) the program for guaranteeing convertibil-
ity of currency acquired by U.S. exporters of in-
formation media materials under the terms of the
Mutual Security Act;
( 9) operating phases of U.S. participation in
five special multilateral programs in the general
mutual-security field,
(a) United Nations Technical Assistance
(UNTA ) ?the multilateral technical-assistance
program carried out by the United Nations and its
specialized agencies to enlist technical skills from
many nations to help the governments and peo-
ples of underdeveloped areas to develop their eco-
nomic resources;
(b) the program of the United Nations Inter-
national Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF),
which assists underdeveloped countries in Asia,
Af rica, and Latin America in the development of
long-range maternity and child welfare activities;
(c) relief and rehabilitation for the Korean
people, provided through the United Nations Ko-
rean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) ;
(d) aid to Arab refugees from Palestine pro-
vided through the United Nations Relief and
Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNnwA) ;
(e) the program carried out by the Intergov-
ernmental Committee for European Migration
fIcEm) to assist in the movement of migrants from
Europe to overseas areas desiring to receive
immigration.
Secretary's Role Clarified
In the past it has not always been clear that the
President looked to the Secretary of State as the
Cabinet officer primarily responsible for foreign
affairs in the executive department. During the
war and at other times in the past, agencies were
created which dealt primarily in foreign affairs
but which were not responsible to the Secretary
of State in any way, not even policy coordination.
As a result, we often found various agencies of
the Government operating overseas expressing
28
different views and different policies and working
at cross-purposes. These two reorganization plans
make it crystal-clear that the Secretary of State
is the Cabinet officer within the executive branch
who is primarily responsible for foreign relations,
subject to the guidance and direction only of the
President himself.
I believe that the reorganization proposals
which you are considering will result in a single
and straightforward organization of agencies and
functions relating to foreign affairs, an% I am sat-
isfied that these proposals clarify the role of the
Secretary of State and will make it possible for
him to function with much greater effective,ness in
Washington and abroad.
One of the chief problems faced by those re-
sponsible for drafting Reorganization Plans 7 and
8 was separating foreign economic aid and foreign-
information programs from the Department of
State and yet retaining overall control of foreign
policy for the Secretary of State. This difficulty
has, I believe, been resolved in these proposals.
Ultimately, the only way that the : primary re-
sponsibility of the Secretary for foreign policy
within the executive branch can be assured is by
the reliance of the President himself on the Sec-
retary of State and by the President's use of the
Secretary of State as his principal channel of
authority on foreign policy. The President has
clearly stated his intention of doing exactly this
in his message to the Congress and in his letter
to the heads of the executive departments and to
the Director for Mutual Security.
There are also some other very important safe-
guards in these proposals. For example, the Pres-
ident has given the Secretary clear authority to
provide guidance on our foreign policies to all
other agencies of the Federal Government. The
President has directed that other officials of the
executive branch will work with and through the
Secretary of State on matters of foreign policy.
The plans also specifically provide Presidential
assurance that the Foreign Operations Adminis-
tration and the U.S. Information Agency will be
headed by men who support and enjoy the full
confidence of the Secretary of State. This is es-
sentially a plan for teamwork. It will avoid many
of the frictions and frustrations which so often
jeopardize the harmonious collaboration of agen-
cies working in closely related fields.
The Secretary's leadership will also be made
effective by the authority given him to review the
plans and policies relative to the programs and
legislative proposals of the two principal operat-
ing agencies in the foreign-affairs field. To assure
his ability to carry out this responsibility, the
requirern ent is laid down by the President that the
heads of the Foreign Operations Administration
and the U.S. Information Agency shall at all times
keep the Secretary informed in such a way that he
BULLETIN of June 15, 1953, p. 855.
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can be certain that the programs of the agencies
and the implementation of their programs further
the attainment of our foreign-policy objectives.
The President, in his message to the Congress,
made it clear that only part of the job can be done
by giving the Department of State the clear au-
thority to provide guidance on our foreign policies
to all agencies of the Federal Government. He
went on to say: ". . . it is equally important that
each chief of diplomatic mission in each foreign
country provide effective coordination of, and for-
eign policy direction with respect to, all United
States Government activities in the country."
The chief of a diplomatic mission plays a vital
role in applying this clear-cut assignment of re-
sponsibility for foreign policy to the conduct of
our foreign relations overseas. A chief of mission
receives all of his instructions from the President
and the Secretary of State and is responsible for
exercising general direction and leadership of
the entire U.S. effort in the country to which he
is accredited. He assures unified development and
execution of U.S. programs. In addition to coor-
dinating activities of U.S. representatives carry-
ing out programs in his country, he sees that the
interpretation and application of instructions re-
ceived by U.S. representatives are in accord with
established U.S. policy. The chief of mission is
actively concerned with the programs developed
by the Foreign Operations Administration for
his country and with the programs developed by
the U.S. Information Agency for that country.
It is his responsibility to see that representatives
of these and other U.S. agencies in his country
are adequately informed as to current and pro-
spective U.S. policies. Where the chief of mission
considers it necessary in the interests of the United
States, he may recommend the withdrawal of any
U.S. personnel assigned to his country.
Reduction in Size of Department
When these proposals become effective, the State
Department will have only about one-half the num-
ber of positions that exist today.
I have tried to study the evolution of the De-
partment of State in the postwar years to see what
the causes were of the rapid increase in the size
of the Department. Just before and immediately
after the end of the war, for example, there were
only 12,910 positions in the State Department, both
at home and abroad, including U.S. nationals and
local employees in this total. Now this was the
time when the Department was in the process of
reestablishing normal diplomatic and consular ac-
tivities in almost one-half the countries of the
world, when the United Nations had just been
born, and when such activities as issuing passports
and visas, or the demands made upon the Depart-
ment for maintaining the security of its estab-
lishments overseas, were all at abnormally low
levels.
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: CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
It was at this time, in the early part of the fiscal
year 1946, that nearly 13,000 more positions were
added to the Department?in effect, doubling the
size of the Department in the period of just a few
short weeks. How was this done? It was done
by transfers to the Department in the period im-
mediately after V?J Day of responsibility for
programs which had been carried on during the
War by independent agencies?the Office of 'War
Information, the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs, the Office of Strategic Services, the For-
eign Economic Administration, and the Office of
the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner.
These swollen wartime functions were dras-
tically and rapidly reduced in size. The fact re-
mains that 2 years later, by fiscal 1948, the con-
solidation of some of the wartime functions that
had to be carried on in peacetime as continuing
functions of the Department of State (such as
intelligence), together with the continued rise in
the volume of normal peacetime activities, resulted
in a 50 percent increase in the number of employees
working on regular State Department functions.
From 1948 to 1953, however, the staff on regular
diplomatic and consular activities had been re-
duced from 17,989 positions to 12,851?a reduction
of over 20 percent.
In the fiscal year 1950 there came another enor-
mous addition to the size of the Department, re-
sulting from the transfer of responsibility from
the military services to the State Department for
programs in Germany and Austria. This resulted
in the addition of nearly 19,000 positions. In ef-
fect we had once again doubled the size of the
Department.
By the current fiscal year, the total number of
employees of the Department at home and
abroad?still including not only U.S. nationals but
local employees as well?had reached 42,000. Of
these, approximately 13,000 were engaged on the
regular functions of the Department, 9,500 on
German and Austrian Affairs, 3,500 on the Tech-
nical Cooperation Administration programs,
12,000 on foreign information and exchange pro-
grams, and another 4,000 who were rendering ad-
ministrative services to programs carried on by
other agencies, such as the Department of Defense
and the Mutual Security Agency.
As I said in my opening remarks about the size
of the Department, the immediate result of the
reorganization proposals is to cut the size of the
Department approximately in half. However if
we look ahead and take into account the antic-
ipated reduction in appropriations for the Depart-
ment in fiscal year 1954 we find that the number
of positions allocated to the normal State Depart-
ment functions will in fact be smaller than the
number in the fiscal year 1946, before the addition
to the State Department of any of the continuing
peacetime functions arising from the war. We
estimate that there will be approximately 11,700
positions for the regular State Department func-
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tions in the coming fiscal year as compared with
12,910 in the fiscal year 1946. In fact, my study
of the history of the postwar evolution of the De-
partment of State shows clearly that the Depart-
ment resources devoted to the traditional respon-
sibilities and basic policy functions have actually
declined during this period.
I find that very few people understand the fact
that out of the present 42,000 employees of the
Department of State, 32,000 are overseas. Under
these reorganization proposals, the Department of
State expects to have approximately 16,000 people
overseas?including U.S. nationals and all local
employees.
Educational Exchange Retained
I should point out that the Department of State
retains, under these reorganization proposals, the
educational-exchange programs now administered
by the International Information Administration.
These programs differ from those of the mass
media like radio broadcasting or motion pictures
of the present International Information Admin-
istration. They involve direct face-to-face com-
munication and contact between the people and
institutions of the United States and those of other
countries.
In fact official educational-exchange programs
began before the present combined information
and educational-exchange program was started.
They originated before the Second World War and
have been administered continuously by the De-
partment of State. I should also say. that they
have not created the same kind of complex operat-
ing and policy problems as those faced by other
media. Perhaps in part for this reason, their
administration within the framework of the
Department has been effective.
The responsibilities of the Department of State
for the exchange program are to a great extent
supervisory, rather than operational, in nature.
Certain administrative functions with regard to
about three-quarters of the program are delegated
to private organizations and other Federal agen-
cies in this country and to binational commissions
and committees abroad.
I should also point out that the Department of
State is instructed by the President to control the
content of a program designed to assure accurate
statements of official U.S. positions on important
issues and current developments. Such official
statements, specifically identified by an exclusive
descriptive label, will normally be disseminated on
a worldwide basis by the new U.S. Information
Agency. This is a new concept. Its objective is
clear. It is to present accurately, without exag-
geration and without the slightest tinge of "propa-
ganda" the official position of the United States
on major current problems and issues. It is the
President's desire that such an official program
30
come to be known by the leaders and governments.
of other nations as a completely dependable state-
ment of the official position of the United States on
important problems and issues. The President
hopes that by use of the official program technique,
such leaders of other countries will in fact come to
rely on what is stated in such a program as a cor-
rect statement and an official statement of the U.S.
position.
I do believe that these first steps outlined in the
reorganization proposals which are before you
will result in much clearer assignments of respon-
sibility and far more effective teamWork on the
part of the President's executive departments and
principal advisers and assistants. From the point
of view a the Secretary of State, these proposals
move in the right direction. They constitute a
blueprint of the first essential steps toward meet-
ing the needs of our Government in , the conduct
of foreign affairs. If adopted, they will have these
main results: (1) provide for the assignment of
primary responsibility for all foreign-policy mat-
ters to the Secretary of State; (2) group together
a number of homogeneous programs which help
to implement our foreign policy; (3) make pos-
sible more efficient administration of the respective
programs; and (4) permit the Secretary of State
and his principal assistants to devote a major pro-
portion of their time and resources to concentra-
tion on basic foreign-policy functions
For these reasons I respectfully urge that this
committee approve Reorganization Plans 7 and 8
as submitted by the President.
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on June 24 confirmed the following:: James
S. Kemper as Ambassador to Brazil; L. Corrin Strong as
Ambassador to Norway; M. Robert Guggenheim as Ambas-
sador to Portugal.
Consular Offices
The consulate at Vitoria, Brazil, will be closed to the
public as of June 19, and will be officially Closed on June
30, 1953. The Vitoria consular district will be transferred
to the jurisdiction of the consular section of the Embassy
at Rio de Janeiro.
The consulate at Fortaleza, Brazil, will be closed to the
public as of June 30, and will be officially closed on August
15, 1953. The Fortaleza consular district will be divided
between the consulate at Recife and the consulate at
Belem. The State of Ceara will be tranSferred to the
Recife consular district and the State of Piaui will be
transferred to the Belem consular district.
Department of Stale Bulletin
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July 6, 1952 Index
Aid to Foreign Countries
Pakistan to receive U.S. wheat (Eisenhower,
Hildreth) 15
American Principles
America's changing relationship with Germany
(Straus) 10
The economics of U.S. foreign policy (Asher) 3
American Republics
Consular offices closed 30
Asia
KOREA:
General Assembly president asks Syngman
Rhee's cooperation 14
Syngman. Rhee's reply to President's letter on
Korean armistice (text) 13
PAKISTAN:
To receive U.S. wheat (Eisenhower, Hildreth) . 15
President Eisenhower, Prime Minister of Paki-
stan exchange messages 16
Congress
Current legislation on foreign policy . . . . 26
Effects of the President's reorganization plans
on the Department of State (Lourie) . . 27
Europe
BELGIUM: MSA productivity allotments . . .
FRANCE: MSA productivity allotments . . .
GERMANY:
America's changing relationship with Ger-
many (Straus)
Disturbances in East Berlin
NORWAY: MSA productivity allotments . . 18
U.S.S.R.:
Disturbances in East Berlin 8
Reported easing of restrictions on travel in
U.S.S.R. 8
18
17
10
B
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 22-26, 1953
Releases may be obtained from the Office of the
Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department
of State, Washington 25, D.C.
No.
Date
Subject
331
6/22
Lourie: Reorganization plans
332
6/22
Robertson: Visit to Korea
*333
6/24
U.S. teachers under exchange program
334
6/24
Allied message on Berlin riots
*335
6/26
Farrar: Retirement
t336
6/25
Dulles: IIA library books
337
6/26
Hildreth : Wheat loading ceremony
1.338
6/26
Waugh: International Wheat Agree-
ment
*339
6/26
Dulles: U.N. Day observance
*340
6/26
French teachers in exchange program
t 341
6/26
Termination date of Claims Commis-
sioners
t342
6/26
Hale: Resignation from post
*Not printed.
tHeld for a later issue of the BULLETIN.
vol. Xxix, No. 732
Finance
The economics of U.S. foreign policy (Asher)
3
Fisheries
The North Atlantic marine research program
(Terry)
19
Foreign Service
Confirmations (Kemper, Strong, Guggenheim)
30
Consular offices
30
International Meetings
The North Atlantic marine research program
(Terry)
19
Labor
The economics of U.S. foreign policy (Asher) .
3
Mutual Security
Long-range program recommended for under-
developed areas
16
Productivity allotments to France, Norway,
Belgium
17
Prisoners of War
General Assembly president asks Syngman
Rhee's cooperation . . . . . . . .
14
Syngman Rhee's reply to President's letter on
Korean armistice (text)
13
State, Department of
Effects of the President's reorganization plans
on the Department of State (Laurie) . .
27
Trust Territories
Problems in the administration of the Pacific
trust territory (Midkiff )
22
United Nations
Current U.N. documents: A selected bibliog-
raphy
21
General Assembly president asks Syngman
Rhee's cooperation ...... . .
14
Problems in the administration of the Pacific
trust territory (Midkiff)
22
Syngman Rhee's reply to President's letter on
Korean armistice (text)
13
Name Index
Adenauer, Konrad
9
All, Mohammed
16
Asher, Robert E.
3
Eisenhower, President
9,
15
Guggenheim, M. Robert
30
Hildreth, Horace A.
15
Kemper James S
30
Lourie, Donold B
27
Midkiff, Frank
22
Orchard, John E.
17
Rhee, Syngman
13,
14
Strong, L. Corrin
30
Robertson, Walter S
14
Straus, Richard
10
Terry, William M
19
White. Lincoln
8
U. 5. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1953
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
. . . the basic source of information on U.S. diplomatic history
Just published: 1935, Volume I, General,
The Near East and Africa
. . . another volume in the continuing, comprehensive record
of the United States in world affairs. The documents con-
tained in this volume show the increasing threat of a rapidly
rearming Nazi Germany, and the confusion and lack of co-
operation among the other European powers. They reflect
deep concern over the Ethiopian-Italian conflict. In the face
of growing danger, the United States adopted new principles
of strict neutrality to keep out of any war, and endeavored, by
use of its moral influence, to preserve peace and uphold inter-
national obligations.
This volume (xcvii, 1,074 pp.) was compiled ir the Division
of Historical Policy Research, Department of State. It may
be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., for $4.25.
Order Form
Supt. of Documents
To: Govt. Printing Office
Washington 25, D.C.
Please send me a copy of Foreign Relations of the United
States, 1935, Volume 1, General, The Near East and Africa.
Enclosed find: Name
(cash, check, or
money order).
Street address
City, Zone, and State
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP58-00453R000100300009-2