OUTSTANDING MAGAZINE ARTICLES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00453R000200170001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 25, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 19, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For
Report No. 409
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June 19, 1953
OUTSTANDING i1AGA."6.TNE ARTICLES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
This weekly report presents digests of current magazine
editorials and articles of special pertinence to U.S. foreign
relations--but does not necessarily mirror over-all opinion.
This issue includes digests from the following magazines
listed in the order in which they appear.
Current History, p. 1
The Reporter, p. 2
America, P. 4
U.S. News & World Report, P. 5
Human Events, p. 6
Business Week, p. 6
Barron's, p. 8
Freedom & Union, P. 9
The New Leader, p. 10
Christian Century, p. 11
Newsweek, p. 11
The Nation, p. 13
The New Yorker, p. 14
Time, p. 15
New Republic, p. 15
Collier's, p. 16
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEPART1,%FT OF STATE
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BIG POWER CONFERENCE - Business Week, p. 7
CHINA & KOREA - America, p. 5; U.S. News & World Report, p. 5;
Human Events, p. 6; Business Week, p. 7;
Barron's, p. 8; New Leader, p. 10; Christian
Century, p. 11; Newsweek, p. 12, Nation, p. 13;
New Yorker, p. 14; Collier's, p. 17
CZECHOSLOVAKIA - Business Week, p. 6
FOREIGN AID - Reporter, p. 2
FOREIGN POLICY - Current History, p.
1;
Reporter, p.
3;
Freedom & Union, p.
9;
New Leader,
p.
10;
Christian Century,
p.
11; Newsweek,
p.
11
INDOCHINA - Collier's, p. 16
JAPAN - Reporter, P. 3
LATIN AMERICA - Newsweek, p. 12
MIDDLE EAST - America, p. 4; Nation, p. 13
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION - Collier's, p. 17
RUSSIA - New Leader, p. 10; Time, p. 15; Collier's, p. 17
SPAIN - New Leader, p. 10
STATE DEPARTMENT - Christian Century, p. 11; Newsweek, p. 11;
New Republic, p. 15; Collier's, p. 17
TURKEY - Nation, p. 13
TRADE - Current History, p. 2; Freedom & Union, p. 9
UNITED NATIONS - New Republic, p. 15
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OUTSTANDING MAGAZINE ARTICLES RELATING TO
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
CURRENT HISTORY - June
"A Bipartisan Foreign Policy" - Norman A. Graebner
Pres. Eisenhower appears determined to avoid the partisan
attacks on foreign policy which helped to weaken the preceding
leadership. In the U.S. the task of defining and maintaining
an able foreign policy is aggravated by distribution of powers
between the Executive, Congress, and the public. Public policy,
even if based on a clear understanding of the national interest,
can become effective only if supported by Congress and public
opinion. Without bipartisanship there is no clear method by
which foreign policy can be brought into line with U.S. interests.
Bipartisanship was reached in a limited field during the recent
post-war years, although never applied to two troublesome areas,
Palestine and China.
Despite his personal election triumph, Pres. Eisenhower can
accomplish little in a sustained foreign policy without bipartisan
support. It is obvious that he and Sec. Dulles understand the
need for this support--evidenced by their appointments, such as
Mr. Lodge to UN, by the inclusion of key Democrats in foreign
policy conferences, and by the new President's continued adherence
to the basic foreign policy which he endorsed as head of NATO, and
again late in his campaign. Any changes in policy toward Europe
or the Far East under the new administration have been matters of
degree, not intention. Democratic foreign policy spokesmen have
pointed out that their build-up of Chinese Nationalist forces on
Formosa in the past two years anticipated a move commensurate with
Eisenhower's releasing of the Seventh Fleet. Further, many foreign
policy observers, including Democratic leaders, have believed for
many months that the time had arrived to demand more purposeful
defense activity from W. Europe as a condition to further U.S. aid.
Thus recent moves hardly comprise a new policy.
Prospects for future inter-party harmony on foreign policy
under the Eisenhower Admin. still appear bright. It is even
possible, in this realm at least, that he can effectively break
the deadlock which has characterized Congress since Roosevelt's
leadership was challenged in 1938. To accomplish this, he must
have, as Allen Nevins suggested, both a plan and the courage to
fight for that plan. Effective presidential leadership is the
only guarantee against extensive partisanship in Congress.
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CURRENT HISTORY (Contd.)
"The Reciprocal Trade Battle" - Mary K. Hammond
There is little doubt that from the viewpoint of strictly
economic self-interest, and from more important over-all political
strategy, the U.S. must liberalize its trade policies. It must
be tackled in areas where possible action should be taken immed-
iately to bridge the dollar gap and help bring about a healthier
status to world economics. These areas include: 1) Much greater
foreign investments. 2) Repeal of the "Buy American Act."
3) Repeal of legislation requiring that at least half of the
shipments from U.S., financed by MSA, be carried in ships flying
the American flag. 4) Greater off-shore procurement during the
re-arming of Europe. 5) Greater customs simplification. 6) Greater
imports.
If our policy is to strengthen the free world, economically,
militarily and politically, we must abandon the guid pro quo
mentality, if only from the standpoint of enlightened self-
interest. It is highly unlikely that any of these problems will
be tackled frontally in the immediate future. There was much in
Pres. Eisenhower's April 7 speech to encourage belief that he
would actively work for freer trade. Yet a disturbing feature
was the administration's decision to seek only a single year's
extension of the act. This makes it very difficult for foreign
firms to make long-range plans. The President also proposed to
use the year for a thorough re-examination of the country's
economic foreign policy. In essence, the struggle has merely
been postponed for a year. There have been two sweeping surveys
since 1947, one headed by Gordon Gray and the other by Daniel W.
Bell. Both came to the same-conclusions. It seems unlikely that
another survey can objectively reach a different conclusion.
THE REPORTER -- June 23
"Boomers and Boomerangs"
Mr. Stassen's 56 "evaluators" of the MSA Program were mainly
business men, most of whom had not had previous experience with
foreign aid or foreign policy. Not all of them were able to take
the two days' briefing before leaving to evaluate what the govt.
had been doing in the foreign aid business. One of the ideas back
of the project was-that these men would come home booming the MSA
and impress home communities with its importance. But just as the
Administration was deciding to build up MSA as clearinghouse for
all aid programs, the chief evaluator recommended that most of
Mr. Stassen's job be liquidated. Also, at the time of Italy's
elections, the evaluator for Italy reported that no aid given by
U.S. "will make any permanent improvement." Italy has many
troubles, for no way has yet been found for the U.S., by giving
aid, to make in another country the structural changes that the
peoples' welfare demands. But aid--through the Allied Commission,
then UNRRA, then the Marshall Plan--certainly has caused "permanent
improvement" of very large dimensions, as production indices show.
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THE REPORTER (Contd.)
No govto program, certainly not PISA, should be immune from
independent "evaluation" by experts. But there are lessons in
this incident for the next evaluators: 1) They should be experts.
2) They should talk to other than Americans abroad. 3) Their
trips should not be timed in countries where elections are being
held. 4) They should maintain silence when they reach home.
"Japan: Westward t e Course of ut " - Harold Strauss
The tawdriness of democratic Japan is called Coco-Coloniza-
tion and is blamed on Americans, but actually in large measure
it springs from a widespread revulsion among young people against
all things Japanese. They equate all traditional manners, customs,
and art with the past, with defeat, and therefore with feudalism,
nationalism and weakness. This attitude helps to explain some
of the political paradoxes in Japan: that Japan is a loyal ally
though many of its people are anti-American; that they will rearm
if they must, but fear our hotheadedness if they do; that they
crave U.S. loans and education but hate their impact on daily
life; that they search for renewed power through technology but
dream of quiesence and even seclusion. This inner conflict
causes the question: how much good and how much harm have been
done by American influence in Japan? On the credit side, there
are huge scientific and economic gains, and some political im-
provements. The common people, especially farmers, are much
better off materially. These are tangible benefits. But all
this has cost something, even though the costs are intangible.
"Three Countries--and Us" (editorial by Max Ascoli)
The American who inquires about the politics of European
democracies is in for an unpleasant time these days. Even if he
is an isolationist; he is likely to be disturbed by the realiza-
tion that his "go-it-alone" pattern of thinking seems to be a
European fashion. He is subject to acute embarrassment when asked
to explain our Administration's policies. Europeans are familiar
with the causes of Administration difficulties in developing its
own foreign policy, for they know by experience how bitter and
devastating intraparty factionaaism.can be. But they cannot
figure why the Administration puts so much emphasis on keeping
together a hopelessly split party. It would be understandable
to them if the Republicans' conquest of power had been the
revolutionary culmination of a hard-fought class struggle.
The outlines of a U.S. policy, haltingly developed under
the Truman Admin., never became fully articulate, nor was it
forcefully expressed to fire the imaginations of people at home
and abroad. A policy of inter-locking associations--ranging
from federations to loose alliances, led but not bossed by the
U.S.--has been in the making since end of the war. But national-
isms of the most obtuse variety raise extraordinarily strong
obstacles to establishment of an inter-locking system of alliances.
Yet this U.S. policy of alliances, each established for a definite,
limited purpose, was and still is the only one that can prevent
Communist enslavement of our Allies. It is a policy that puts a
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THE REPORTER (Contd.)
premium on both supranational unity and national self-reliance--
the only policy that can tackle the difficulties of each nation
by separating what can be done by supranational bodies and what
is within the means of the nation principally concerned. There
is no other way of draining the swamps of French and Italian
politics.
The resistance of European politicians to dangerous novelties
hardens these days when they look at internal U.S. politics.
They see the Senate going all out for the Bricker amendment, and
no longer fear that the U.S. may give to the world it is supposed
to lead the example of yielding a shred of its national sovereignty.
U.S. diplomacy, to be sure, goes on preaching, with the utmost bad
grace, the cause of other peoples' integration. But how can this
berating be taken seriously abroad when the Administration does
not succeed in establishing any degree of integration among the
branches of the U.S. govt.?
The policy of interlocking alliances is no dream. NATO
shows that it works. NATO operates with a thoroughly inter-
allied general staff led, but not bossed, by an American supreme
commander.
AMERICA - June 20
"_ erusaim ? A, n of _Aggr?~ ession" (Current Comment)
While it might be the better part of prudence for the U.S.
not to become too directly involved in controversies in the M.
East, there is no excuse for the weak, wavering nature of the
support we have given UN resolutions on the status of the Holy
City. Col. W.A. Eddy, long with the diplomatic service in the
M. East has stated that we should not hesitate before too late
to rescue from present aggression the Holy City--the area wherein
the UN pledged that nothing should be done to prejudice its
international character. The aggression referred to was an
"aggression against the UN," symbolized by the defiant statement
last Dec. of Israeli Prime Min. Ben Gurion that Jerusalem is and
will remain his capital. This despite the fact that in all UN
resolutions on Palestine, reaffirmed in the Lausanno protocol
May 12, 1949, and never repudiated by the world body, both Old
and New Jerusalem are explicitly excluded from the jurisdiction
of any one state.
"Trade With Chnao_ the Larger Issues" (Current Comment)
Sen. Mundt, subbing for Sen. McCarthy, released a list of
162 free world ships that have made 264 trips to Red China.
The U.S. imposed a complete embargo; other nations, more
dependent on overseas trade, eargoed only certain strategic
materials. Hence their trade it legal. They continue it be-
cause they need Chinese products and the profits from the carry-
ing trade. Seagoing commerce is England's life-blood. Never-
theless, such trade helps the enemy as well as the allies. No
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AMERICA (Contd.)
solution can be reached until the U.S. liberalizes its own foreign
trade policies. The niggardly compromise renewal of the RTA Act
is certainly no solution.
"Agreement on PW's" (Current Comment)
An armistice in Korea seems only a breath away and the mere
fact that the Communists have signed agreement amounts to a
victory for UN patience and persistence in upholding the
principle of voluntary repatriation. The ideal application of
this principle would, of course, have been immediate release of
all balky POW's. An armistice on that basis would have been too
much to hope for. As it is, we have the next best thing: an
agreement providing utmost protection of P04's and guaranteeing
eventual freedom to those who crave it.
U.S. NEWS AND dORLD REPORT -- June 19
"What Communists W j with a Truce"
China is the winner, U.S. the loser, in a truce now. Uneasy
armistice is the most to expect. Big armies stay on either side
of the old battle line, ready to go. Truce for China: a welcome
breathing spell. Communists will use a cease-fire to freshen up
their troops, rebuild N. Korea's Army, make it a match for S.
Korea. Also, Chinese get a chance to relax, patch up things at
home, where food is scarce, and the program to industrialize is
way off schedule. There are political troubles, too. Pressure
for trade with the West is sure to grow. Chinese are offering
enticing markets. It's just what the Communists ordered--a
chance to get goods and stir up trouble for the Allies at the
same time. Truce for tJIg j : a blind alley. No freedom to
maneuver, to try for an armistice advantage in Asia. Allied
build-up to match Communists is out. What is more likely is
pressure to "get the boys home," cut down in Korea, try to keep
S. Koreans in check. The enemy can really put the heat on now.
He's got the most productive part of Korean industry and power,
and can build it up while arguing over peace terms. The initiative
is in his hands.
" i , It's aNew 'cold war' "
The promise of a truce in Korea is being accompanied by
rapid-fire developments that mean new headaches for the U.S. all
around the world. The U.S. appears to be losing ground rapidly
in the cold war. Almost everywhere, the initiative seems to be
moving from American to soviet hands. Molotov seems to Europeans
to be putting our diplomats into baffled retreat. All through
Europe, the U.S. position is weakened. Pressure inside each
nation to cut loose from the U.S. alliance and go its own way
is strengthened. As a result of the Soviet moves, these con-
clusions about the future are being drawn by many appraisers in
Europe: The European Army, as a counter to Russian armed
strength, is dead. NATO is faced with growing trouble. Europe's
political leaders who have accepted the lead of the U.S. are in
serious political trouble. Their days in office appear numbered.
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U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT - (Contd.)
East-West trade is to grow toward prewar size. Even barriers
against strategic shipments to Communist countries may be
dropped. A Big Four meeting will be held to seek new deals
with Russia.
What is really happening is that World War III, Communist
style, is entering a new strategic phase. Armed uprising is to
be held in abeyance. Men in the Kremlin are calling a halt to
tough talk. Soft talk is taking place. Meanwhile, Communists
can try again their "popular front" infiltration, build up
their strength and wait for new opportunities.
HUMAN EVENTS - June 10
"Kore it
Few leaders on Capitol Hill privately deny that the Korean
settlement represents a defeat, perhaps the first real frustrating
defeat in American history. It is hard to conceal shame over
the surrender of the POWs to what is obviously a Soviet-dominated
commission. While there are various assurances that we will not
sell out our Chinese Nationalist allies, there is little
confidence that this will not occur. Those who have long wanted
to "get out" of Korea and bring the boys home are deeply troubled
by two aspects of the settlement: 1) It is still a UN truce and
will probably be a UN peace. The desire of men like Taft is to
keep us free from costly and dangerous entanglements arising from
UN membership. What looms is an expensive Korean 'rehabilitation"
program and perhaps a vast Point IV spending spree in the whole
Far East. 2) The Administration has not yet, but should ere
long recognize the reality of the defeat and investigate the
reasons thereof so that we can in the future avoid repetition.
Congressional committees might well probe such matters, calling
Gens. MacArthur, Van Fleet and Ridgeway to explain why real victory
was not achieved- victory, for which there is no substitute.
BUSINESS WEEK - June 13
"Sovietg Tighten zec leash11
The Czech currency "reform" is a prize example of Communist
social engineering, practically wiping out all personal savings
and raising the cost of living by 20% to 40%. This time Moscow
may have gone too far, for resistance seems much greater than
anything the Russians figured on. The squeeze play was probably
intended as an answer to the U.S. policy of "liberation." By
reducing industrial workers and free peasants-the main sources
of potential resistance--to a state of hopelessness, the Russians
could expect to stymie U.S. policy. The move also may be tied to
Soviet plans for Germany. If the Russians are ready to withdraw
from East Germany, it's pretty obvious that Moscow would first
want to protect its flank in Czechoslovakia. Moscow's overall
aim seems clear enough--to reduce Czech living standards, bring
them down as quickly as possible to the Russian level. If the
Russians have any idea about outright annexation, such a leveling
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BUSINESS WEEK (Contd.)
would inevitably precede the move. Even if Soviet aims don't go
this far, the squeeze play makes sense as an answer to U.S.
liberation talk and as a preliminary to a big push for German
unity. But if the move boomerangs, as it well may, the Russians
would find their position in Czechoslovakia weaker instead of
stronger.
"Truce in Korea"',
In assessing the Korean struggle, most Americans will realize
that what has been accomplished is an achievement without parallel.
For the first time in history, the free world has checked armed
invasion. Korea now represents a victory that can be accepted
with honor. We will continue to seek the goal of a unified and
independent state without letup, but in declaring that we will
depend on peaceful means, the President made clear the great
difference between communism and democracy. His emphasis on the
principle that there cannot be independence without interdependence
has decisively strengthened the U.S. position as leader of the
free nations. This leadership will be further tested in the months
to come. ire must not be lulled into a sense of false security.
Now that clamor for a meeting with the Russians will inevitably
increase, we must have a positive formulation of new policies.
Pres. Eisenhower has shown that our basic democratic principles
will not be overthrown for the sake of expediency. He deserves
the support of all Americans for his stand. If we are to meet
the Russians, our real strength, as he pointed out, lies in a
united alliance of the democracies.
"Strategy for a Co ~d Peace at
U.S. policy-makers know that the thaw in the cold war will
be a slow and dangerous process at best. The bitter S. Korean
opposition to the truce is probably an omen of the confusion and
frustrations that lie ahead. Communists will take full advantage
of all such differences in the Western camp. There is no reason
to expect that any really important East-West agreements covering
either Asia or Europe will core of the meetings. Nonetheless,
the end result probably will be a less tense and quite different
international atmosphere than we have known for the past five or
six years. That is what the Soviet leaders seem to want, especially
if they can get it without offering anything much beyond a Korean
truce. But only very serious economic strains inside Russia, for
which there is no real evidence yet, would be likely to force
Moscow into a real peace pact with the West. Korea has paid off
for the Chinese Reds but they have paid a heavy economic price,
as has Russia.
At the Bermuda meeting, Pres. Eisenhower will do his best
to stall off a meeting with the Russians as long as he can, and
will concentrate on getting a common front on Germany. On Far
East questions, he will. have his hands full, e.g., trying to persuade
the British and French to support the U.S. in blocking Red China's
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BUSINESS WEEK (Contd.)
admission to UN, or at least to agree that the question should
be kept out of the Korean political conference. Then the French
will insist that they cannot continue to carry the Indochina
burden. At Bermuda the U.S. is almost certain to drop a plan
now being considered in Wash., whereby the Korean political
conference will take up a package deal including a cease-fire in
Indochina where the Communist price for settlement would certainly
be too high.
Moscow is undoubtedly ready to join the West in a statement
of peaceful intentions. It may offer, too, to open up the flow
of trade and culture between East and West-probably the best we
can hope for this year.
BARRON'S - June 15
"Bitter, Truce"
A Korean truce, if it comes, will be a very bad one. Surely a
good many Americans know this in their hearts. The justification
for making peace now is that many months ago this country and its
allies abandoned search for decisive victory; and to go on fighting
a war of attrition means a needless sacrifice of American life;
and that possibly we may get back those American POWs whom the
Communists have not butchered. These are compelling reasons for
ending the bloodshed and for hoping that in the end Mr. Rhea will
bow to the inevitable.
Few will question the President's hard decision to liquidate
the conflict. But little is gained and much is lost by refusal
to admit the costs as well as gains. Militarily speaking, an
armistice holds out large advantages to Communists. Chinese troops
will be free to move southward to make further trouble off Formosa
and in Indochina. And even to maintain the present line on the
peninsula will presumably entail a heavy continuous U.S. commitment.
Politically the truce will leave Korea truncated on a line that
runs just 30 miles north of Seoul. It is argued that in establish-
ing this line U.S. forces accomplished their "mission"--i.e., to
stop aggression. But to stop aggression is not to liquidate it,
and the fact is that UN did contemplate unifying and pacifying the
country under the only legal govt. that exists. In his letter to
Mr. Rhea, Pres. Eisenhower seems to have forgotten about this.
The final agreement signed at Panmunjom on POWs makes sorry
reading in view of the millions of leaflets dropped behind enemy
lines promising all POWs freedom of choice. Their fate now rests
with a so-called "neutral" repatriation commission, including
India which has favored the Communist cause. What kind of neutrality
is this? Finally, the agreement allows Communist representatives
to try to persuade the POWs to change their minds. No provision is
made for counter-argument or even for freedom of debate. The con-
clusion is that the whole pressure of the present apparatus will be
not to release the POWs into freedom, but to force them to return
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BARRON'S (Contd.)
It is easy to blame all these unpalatable aspects on the UN
or on perfidious Albion. We take little comfort in such over-
simplification. To a peculiar degree, the Korean war has been
an American show: Wash., not London, assumed leadership in the
original intervention; and Wash., not London, recalled MacArthur
and opened the way to negotiations. What the nation is now
painfully discovering is that a negotiated settlement in this
case is no substitute for victory, and must entail loss of
legitimate political objectives. If and when the guns go silent,
the Administration will find that its job is just beginning-to
rebuild out of partial defeat and imperishable sacrifice a Far
Eastern policy worthy of the American people.
FREEDOM & UNION - June
" o Will Investigate., These Three Red Aggntsi"
Three powerful agents are working for Moscow in the Atlantic
democracies, particularly in the U.S. and Britain, and none is
costing the Kremlin a ruble. 1) party politics, 2) the profit
motive gone blind, 3) the principle of absolute national sovereignty.
No investigating committee is inquiring into the work that these
three are obviously doing for the Kremlin. Indeed, Moscow can rely
on no one more than on Sen. McCarthy to wink at everything that
Mr. Party Politics, Mr. Profit Motive and Mr. National Sovereignty
are now doing in the U.S. to aid communism. Where democracies are
divided by national sovereignty, personally ambitious and demogogic
politicians in each of them can thrive on attacks made and received
across their national lines, such as those that are constantly
erupting between the U.S. and Britain. But unite these democracies
through a federal govt., and personal ambition persuades even the
most demogogic politician never to say anything that might offend
or alienate the citizens of any State in the Union since the only
way to highest power is to build up a following in all parts of it.
When Atlantic democracies limit their national sovereignty
by eliminating trade and currency barriers between them, there
will continue to be many economic divisions among them, born of
the profit motive. But the competitors for the rich market this Union
will form will not be nations with flags wrapped around them, but
corporations, many of whom will soon have stockholders and branches
in every nation in the Union. Limit national sovereignty to the
truly domestic affairs of the Atlantic democracies, eliminate it
as regards their truly common affairs, govern the latter by the
same democratic methods that govern the former--and then the
struggle for markets on which Moscow counts for the destruction
of freedom will end. The orthodox way to treat recurring eruptions
in Atlantica is the same as those that witch-doctors use who would
cure smallpox by covering with soft salve each pack as it comes
while explaining they are too busy to seek for any hidden germ.
Those who apply this treatment today are still called statesmen or
practical men. They grow impatient with the "dreamers" who say:
"The salve doesn't cure. The patient is getting worse. These
eruptions come from the same germ. Let us remove it. Or try to."
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THE NEW LEADER - June 15
"No Peace for Korea" - (editorial)
The fate of Korea in the Fifties has been as shabby as that
of Poland in the Forties and Czechoslovakia in the Thirties.
Our Korean policy has been a mosaic of defeatism, with each new
timidity leading inevitably to the next. Practically speaking,
the U.S. has little choice but to accept the truce which our
leaders have prepared. Our failure in Korea to achieve what
might have been a monumental victory is disheartening, but a
fact which, having willed, we must accept. But this failure
should not lead us into isolationism and shortsightedness. we
must not "lose sight of the objective expressed by the UN for a
united, independent and democratic Korea." If this objective is
again thwarted by the Communists, we must continue to give the
Korean Republic not only the economic aid pledged, but military
aid also. In Formosa and Indochina, too, political reform,
economic assistance and military aid must become part of a single
policy of creating bastions of democracy. Such a policy requires
more than a mutual--defense pact with Seoul. It requires, as it
has ever since the Red conquest of China, a Pacific Pact as firm
and explicit as NATO. Until a real Pacific Pact is concluded,
East Asia will continue to invite Communist aggression. It goes
without saying that Red China cannot be considered for a seat in
the UN. Also, the truce should be no excuse to halt the buildup
of our own armed forces. For if our present level of defense has
been insufficient to beat back communism in little Korea, how can
we ever meet the challenge of a growing world Communist empire?
"Moscow and mid" - (editorial)
The danger of a Moscow Madrid pact is great, for the strategic
advantages that the Soviets would derive from it are immense.
1) The friendship of a power that stands athwart the western entrance
in the Mediterranean; 2) Spain's ability to supply such vital
commodities as wolfram. Considering Peron's well-known affinity
for Franco, and his own current efforts to sign an economic agree-
ment with Moscow, he might be the logical broker between the latter
and Madrid. Franco is enjoying his new-found popularity with the
Russians. The earnest object of U.S. attentions, Franco is playing
both ends against the middle. In a recent speech to a military
audience that was deliberately kept out of the Spanish press, he
promised to get "many times the amount that they (Russia and the U.S.)
are now haggling over." In the face of these shameful maneuvers,
the U.S. should tell Franco to go hang. -4e should have done it long
ago.
"Unity, and Reciuro t " - Wm. Henry Chamberlin
Unity among the non-Communist powers is a political, military
and moral asset which no American in his right mind would throw
away. Disruption of this is probably the main purpose of the
Kremlin's new conciliatory manner. Yet, as we saw during W. Tar II,
unity can be purchased at too high a price--as in the case of
Stalin's demands that spelled injustice for the Poles and others of
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THE NEd LEADER (Contd.)
E. Europe, in order to maintain "unity" with the USSR. The lesson
from this experience is that maintaining Western unity is a
responsibility that rests on other nations besides the U.S. Some
naive Americans who favor this or that foreign nation, assume that
if we give in unconditionally to Great Britain on Far Eastern
policy, to France on German rearmament, all will be well. But
unity loses meaning and content if its maintenance involves loss
of national honor or abandonment of the very conditions of effective
resistance to the Soviet threat.
The moral is that unity must be accompanied by general
acceptance of the principle of reciprocity--which has not prevailed
in the handling of the Korean crisis. The U.S. should make every
reasonable effort to hold the anti-Communist coalition together.
But it cannot make all the effort. Even so powerful a country as
the U.S. cannot, in the long run, help people unable or unwilling
to help themselves.
CHRISTIAN CENTURY - June 17
"Armistice in Korea'." - (editorial)
As this article goes to press, it is not clear what course
Syngman Rhee will follow if a truce is declared in Korea. He has
threatened to go on fighting alone but it is doubtful if he
would be able to make good on this threat. It is difficult not
to sympathize with Dr. Rhee's position but there are certain things
to keep in mind about the S. Korean leader's attitude. 1) He
demanded from Pres. Eisenhower a free hand to launch another war,
and the President was justified in warning him against "reckless
adventure." 2) Under the truce, S. Korea will be larger than it
was in June 1950. 3) The mass of Korean people want no more war.
4) The commitments made by the U.S. to help South Korea hold much
promise for a better future for that nation.
"Is American Policy he j ar East Shifting?" - (editorial)
The speech which Sec. Dulles made on his return from the
M. East could have "sensational" implications, but the same could
have been said about other speeches of the Secretary of State and
these have been "interpreted into innocuousness." Mr. Dulles was
very candid in admitting that U.S. policy by favoring Israel had
lost the goodwill of the Arabs. He hinted at several places that
there would be shifts in foreign policy. The direction in which
these changes point is toward a friendlier relation with the Arab
states. "We hope the Secretary's hints work out into active
American policy."
NEWSWEEK - June 22
"Diplomacy Takes Oyer" - Ernest K. Lindley
With a ee?se-fire in Korea, how well prepared is U.S. diplomacy
to shoulder the greater burden? We have a President and Sec. of State
with unusual grasp of world affairs. The President's high tribute
to Mr. Dulles last week was timely, for the Secretary has not only
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been a target for various R-~;pubi?eanac in Congress but has lacked
firm support of some members of the White House staff. In key
positions are other men of long experience and ripe judgement in
international affairs, including Allen Dulles, W. Bedell Smith,
and the Chiefs of Staff. And State Dept. has a corp of first.
rate career man.. But to give the impression and State Dept.
is in good shape would be misleading. The wreckage of VOA and
related activities i:; being detached. Probably efficiency and
morale are at the lowest o bb wit Ain living memory. Grdtesqueries
in the name of 'esecurity* have subjected the U.S. Govt. to derision
at home and abroad. Theses are amw--ong the consequences of the White
House policy of appeasing M_rCart+iii. To say we have seized the
initiative vis-a-vis Moscow daava