CONTROLLING INACCURATE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE SOVIET BLOC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00597A000100070173-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 173
• Publication Date: September 22, 1955
• Content Type: MEMO

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ILEMORANDU DLI
SUBJECT
SECRET
Cotr
Situ& i
September1955
curate Statements about the
Soviet Bloc
. Reference is snack to your memorandum dated 22 August 1955,
subject as above, on which you have requested our views and suggestions.
2. In connection with the possible types of solutions suggested in
paragraph 2 of reference memorandum, I would make the following corn-
a. If the DCI or the Whit. Houae were to furnish the Congress
ed version of Soviet military strength, economic con-
'event data, there is some question in my mind as
as or tlmeUeis because of its unclassified nature. In
once such an unclassified statement were offered to the Congr
be a certain number of Congressmen of varying degrees of
would wish to refute or argue with portions of it because
onclusions which they had reached based on their travels
rmatice. This means that the document submitted would
become a controversial one. If such a document were
should certainly not be submitted by this Agency. as we
uld promptly becoree embroiled in controversy on details
raised by Congressman Feighan following the publication
r'S article in Parade Ma acing on 3 July 1955.
b. I would consider A inadvisable to have the DCI brief a joint
session of several Congressional eonaroittees on the Soviet picture.
While CIA provides the facts to the policy makers of the Government, it
to the latter to determine which of several policies they might follow
basis Q1 these facts, If all these facts were made available to
committees of Congress, many of the individual members would
Olin* with the policy of the Executive Branch in particular
when the members felt that other policies more in keeping
ndividual predliections should have been followed, While
gument goes on at the present time, most Congressman do
igence briefing material as a basis for their arguments.
in as wide a briefing as would be involved here. it is
hether the DC! could brief on an all-source basis including
Information. I believe that a partial briefing is probably
at all. Most Congressional briefings on Soviet matters
policy views an.d should be given by the appropriate depart
appropriate, committees, rather than by the DCL
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c. As a generalmost likely to make public
statements on capabilitiesof the Soviet Union ar. already represented
an the IAC end would presumably get t facts from their intel-
ligence officers. In Executive session, d appear to me that no
matter tow much guidance such officiate receive from CIA or the intel-
ligence commusity, the frallities of human nature will always crop up,
particularly in connection with appropriations.
4. The suggestion that the President would direct the members
liraach to clear certain statement* on Soviet capabilities
ve considerable appeal in order to accomplish the
ever, this would place the Agency in a quasi-censor
would appear to be politically inadvisable. It is
dials occassionally ask us for guidance; it is another
s manustory.
3. It is agreed that it would be highly desirable to eliminate the
y Inaccurate statements which are made regarding the USSR and the
The problem has two facets - The Executive and the Congressional.
at It -would be appropriate for the President to try to elimbutte
or contradictory public statements on Soviet capabilities frown
e Branch pronouncements, but / do not believe that the DCI
-monitor for the various reasons indicated above. 1 think
ts should be cleared through the White House itself, utilis
cial Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, the Special Assistant to the President (Psychological 'Warfare).
ber of the President's office as the President would
Such an official could, of course, consult the Director
y on any controversial point. While a general manual for guid-
ance could be prepared, I do not believe that an unclassified document
of thIs type would be worth preparing for this purpose.
4. In so far as the Congress is coacernsd, any special msaual or
briefing which was given them would e the subject of so much
controversy and interpretation as to reader it almost useless. As a
concrete example, let us say that such a briefing had been prepared but
had not included the details on new Soviet aircraft which became available
this Spring. The Congress woUld then say that there bad been an intel-
ligence failure in not knowing about these aircraft. If in defense CIA
the* stated that we had some informatiori about the aircraft, but it had
bees too Uglily classified to be revealed, we would have been in the middle
of another controversy. It would appear preferable to continue to have
appropriate policy officials, such as the Secretaries of State and Defense,
Cil ONLY
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continue to brief the Congress onSoviet matters in connec
legislation appropriations, etc. at present. Ham= nature being
what t is do not believe that their statements can be controlled
either through DCI briefing of Congress or release of a Whit* House
statement. The most that could be hoped for would be to bring the
Executive Branch into lime through White House clearance of statemenk.
so that their authoritative statements may serve as the best guide to the
general public.
OGC:WLP:pmm
Org & I - Addressee
1 - Mr. Kirkpatrick
2 - OGC
511
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r L. Inctrzheirmer
lative Counsel
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