HOUSE COMMITTEE ON EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP58-00597R000200070007-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
~ ?' ~ ~ ~ ~
HOUSE COMMITTEE- ON EXPENDITURES IN
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
REPORT AND ANALYSIS
`BY TBn
LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
LIBRARY OF .CONGRESS
H. R. 2319
TO PROMOTE THE NATIONAL SECURITY BY PROVIDING FOR
A NATIONAL DEFENSE ,ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH SHALL BE
ADMINISTERED BY_ A SECP~ETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,
AND FOR A DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, A DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY, AND A DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
WITHIN THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, AND
FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT WITH OTHER DEPART-
MENTS AND AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT CONCERNED
WITH. THE NATIONAL SECURITY
Piinted for the use of the Committee on Expenditures
in the Executive Departments
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON :1947
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
REPORT AND ANALYSIS BY TI-IE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
SERVICE; LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
SCOPE OF REPORT
In view of the variety of proposals made in recent years for the
reorganization of the armed forces, and the tangled history of these
proposals, it seems desirable to present this report in four parts, as
follows:
I. A brief chronological statement, covering developments
from 1944 to the present.
II. A summary of the more significant reorganization plans
proposed during this period.
III. A discussion of the evolution of ~ reorganization proposals,
describing the progressive concessions made by the Army,
the Navy, and the President in the attempt to reach an.
accord.
IV. A review of issues and arguments.
This arrangement involves some duplication and is designed to,
enable the reader to review one or another aspect of the problem.
without having to trace it throughout the entire, report.
PART I. CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT
? This discussion takes as a starting point the hearings on a single'
department of the armed forces conducted by the Select Comnuttee'
of the House on Post-War l~'Iilitary Policy in the second session of the
Seventy-eighth Congress, April-May 1944. The earlier history of
-the unification problem is important and interesting but is not essential
to an analysis of the. current controversy.' The major events from.
1944 on are summarized below, in the order of their occurrence.
1. I-Iearings before the Select Comrr.,ittee of the House of R,epreseratatives
on Post-W?r Mi.litary PoliCy.(78th Cong., ~d sass., pt. 1)
Under the chairmanship of Representative Woodl?um the committee
held hearings from April 24 to May 19, inclusive, on the proposal to
establish a single department of armed forces. Kepresentatives of the
War Department testified iI1 favor of the proposal as a postwar
measure. Lieutenant Cxeneral 'McNerney, Deputy Chief of Steil',.
United States Army, presented' a plan of unification. Representatives
of the Navy Department ~~ere gererally noncommittal anal recom-
mended. further study. The committee reported June 15, 1944
(II. Rapt. No. 1645, 78th Cong., 2d sass.), that the time was inoppor-
tune for legislation and strongly urged the armed services to niake~
further studies of the problem. ,?
~ For brief summaries of unification liroposal5 and studies. prior to the outbreak o[ World War II see
Uoiflcat,ion of the War and Navy Departrnents and.Postwar Organization for National Security (F.berstadt
report), Senate Committee Print, 79th Cong., 1st sass., PP?'I84-187, and Army-Navy Consolidation, Edi-
tariel Research Reports, vol. II, 1945, PP.,?39-243.
.?i?wq^?I 3h~;~??i~di~l ~ill,i Iti .Ii,4'io'1 ,t3a ear ~4,[o~3?i,r[ .~Igi?ltri?rl{ "rroi,t
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
L. Study by Joint Chiefs of Staff'
On May 9, 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed a special com-
mittee to study the reorganization of national defense and make
recommendations. The basic question was stated in the following
terms:
What is the organization which will provide the most effective employment of
our military resources in time of war axxd their most effective preparation for war,
in time of peace?
The special committee, consisting of .two representatives of the
War Department and two representatives of the Navy Department,
reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff April 11, 1945. A majority
favored a single department and reported that of the field officers
interviewed almost all Army officers and almost exactly half of the
Navy officers also .favored one department. Detailed proposals
were presented by the committee. One Navy .representative, Admiral
J. O. Richardson (retired), dissented, proposing that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff organization be continued after the war by statute and that
further study of the problem in the light of war experience be made.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff took no action on the report.
3. Eberstadt report
On May 15, 1945, Chairman Walsli, of the Senate Committee on
Naval Affairs, sent a letter to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal suggest-
ing that a study be made to deteimme whether or not it would be
desirable to propose the establishment of a Council on National
Defense as an alternative to the proposal for a consolidation of the
War and Nav;= Departments. On June 19 Secretary Forrestal
requested Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt to prepare a report and recom-
mendations on the following matters: .
1. Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head
inxprove our national security?
2. If not, what changes in the present relationships of the military services
and depax~tmeut.s has oxxr. war experience indicated as desirable to improve our
national security?
3. What form of postwar organization should be established and maintained
to enable the military services and other Government departments and agencies
most effectively to provide for and protect our national security?
The report was transmitted to Secretary Forrestal September 25
and by him to Senator Walsh on October 18. It was printed for the
use of-the Naval Affairs Committee October 22, 1945.
The Eberstadt report opposed the establishment of a single depart-
ment. It recommended three coordinate departments-War, Navy,
and Air-each headed by a civilian secretary of Cabinet rank, and
tied together by interdepartmental committees, with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff the mayor link. It also placed great stress on committees
and agencies linking the armed forces with the civilian departments.
~. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Military A~'ai,rs
This committee held hearings on two ~ unification bills (S. 84 and S.
1482) from October 17 to December 17, 1945. Representatives of the
War Department testified in favor of unification. General Collins
presented a detailed plan for the War Department. Representatives
of the Navy Department opposed a single department type of ,organi-
zation and other features of unification, and supported the "coordina-
tion" principle: largely asset forth in the Eberstadt report.
?0 ~ Q ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
EXPENDITURES IN THE EXCUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
6. President Truman's unification message of December Y9, 196
In this message the President laid down aseven-point program for
the reorganization of the armed forces. He strongly urged the estab-
lishment of a single department with three coordinate branches with a
Chief of Staff to act as chief military adviser to the Secretary and the
President.
6. Report of Senate Military Affairs Committee
On April 9, 1946, Senators Thomas, Hill, and Austin, members of a
subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, introduced
S. 2044. The Thomas-Hill-Austin subcommittee reported to the full
committee April,ll, 1946. Its report was adopted by the committee
and S. 2044 was favorably reported (13 to 2) on May 13. It followed
fairly closely the President's recommendations and incorporated
much of the Eberstadt report mechanism for civilian-military coordina-
tion.
7. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs
The committee began hearings on S. 2044 on Apri130 and continued
to hold hearings through July 11. Representatives of the Navy
Department opposed S. 2044. The committee did not report out the
bill.
8. Presidential efforts to secure Army-Navy agreement
On May 13 the President instructed the War and Navy Depart-
ments to atempt to reach an agreement on a plan for the organization
of the armed forces. On May 15 a letter vTas sent by Senator Walsh,
chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, and representative
Vinson, chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, to Secre-
tary Forrestal in which it was stated that it was doubteful if anv
agreement providing for a single department would meet with the
approval of Congress. Other features of the bill were also said to
have little chance of securing congressional approval. The letter
concluded
Any compromise which results from a conference by the ~Var and Navy De-
partments which does not embody most of the views of those Members of Congress
who have made a study of the importance of sea-air power in our national defense
structure and which in general does not conform with the views expressed in this
letter would not, in our opinion, be in the best interests of the United States.
On June 15 President Truman sent identical letters to Senators
Thomas and Walsh and' Representatives Mav and Vinson, transmit-
ting documents showing points upon which the War and Navy
Departments had agreed and disagreed and submitting his own
recommendaitons on the items of disagreement. S. 2044 was revised,
but opposition continuing, the President requested that, the measure
be dropped.
9. Unified command announcement of December Y6, 196
The War and Navy Departments announced on this date that uni-
fied command had been established in seven command areas in various
parts of the world. `The commander in each area was to be responsible
directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (The principle of unified com-
mand in theaters of operation was.e'stablished after Pearl Harbor and
was generally applied during the. war. It was not used in the Pacific
area for the assault on Japan. With the end of the war the idea of
unity of command in the field had gradually disintegrated.)
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
E%PENIjITURES IN THE EXCUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
10. Presidential announcement of Army-Navy agreement, January 16,
196
Letters to the President from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and
.Secretary of War Patterson stated that agreement had been reached
to support legislation providing for a Secretary of National Defense
? with general over-all direction over three departments-War, Navy,
and Air-and for other coordinating agencies.. There was also agree-
ment on a draft of an Executive order assigning functions to the three
branches of the armed forces. The .President stated that in his
opinion the agreement reached was "an admirable compromise,"
and "a thoroughly practical and workable plan of unification" and
that he heartily approved it.
Y1. Transmittal of proposed bill by'the President, February ~6, 191.7
In a communication directed to the Speaker of the House and Sena-
tor Vandenberg, the President stated that the proposed bill had been
.drafted by representatives of the armed services and ?had the approval
got .the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the. Navy, and the Joint
::Chiefs of Staff.. He added: ,, ,,
? ' It is my belief 'that this suggested legislation accomplishes the desired unifica-
tion of the services, and I heartily recommend its enactment.
PART II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROPOSALS
Beginning with the War Department plea submitted to the House
Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy (V~'oodrum committee)
in the spring of 1944, there has been'a succession of proposals for the
reorganization of the armed forces. Particularly significant in the
development of the controversy were the praposal of the special
committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 11, 1945; the Eberstadt
plan; the plans presented b}- the War Department at the Hearings
of the Senate Committee on Military Affairs; the President's proposals
of December 19, 1.945; the Thomas-Hill-Austin bill (S. 2044); the
President's plan of June 15, 1946; and the draft of a proposed bill
submitted to the Congress by the President, February 26, 1947.
There follows a summary of each of these proposals.
1. 19~/~ War Department proposal 2
This proposal had three general features:
(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces headed
by a Secretary who would be tLle principal adviser to the President
and the Congress on political and administrative matters relating to
national defense. There would , be Under Secretaries for the Army,
Navy, and Air, and also a Director of Common Supply Services.
(b) There would be a U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff headed by a Chief
of Staff and including the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and
Air Forces. The Director of Common: Supply Services would be
included on a subordinate status. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be
the President's military advisers and would report directly to him in
the field of military strategy and on budgetary recommendations and
the allocation of appropriated funds.
9 See testimony of Lieutenant Ceneral McNerney, hearings before the Select Committee on Postwar
Military Policy, House of Representatives, 78th Conga, 2d s@ss., pt. I, pp. 34-37, chart, p. 38.
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
EXPENbITIIRES IN THE EXCIITIVE DEPARTMENTS
(r,) It was recommended that the legislation establishing a single
department be general in character. The Secretary for the Armed
Forces would have over-all control of such. matters as procurement,
supply of common items, storage, construction, provision of facilities,
welfare, financial administration, hospitalization, personnel standards
and administration, recruiting, military education in civilian irstitu,-
tions, and public relations. The manner of administering the depart-
ment and the extent of decentralization would be left to develop in an
evolutionary manner. .
.2. Report of the Joint Chiefs of Sta?~ Special Committee for Reorganiza-
tion of National Defense a
The recommendations of the majority of the special committee go
into considerable detail. The. essential features of the plan recom-
mended are as follows:
(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces headed
by a civilian Secretary, who would be the principal adviser to the
President on the political, economic, and industrial aspects of military
problems; be responsible for the administration of the Department;
and act as a member of the Joult Chiefs of Staff. Directly 'responsible
to him wotrld be a Commander of the Armed Forces, an Under Secre-
tary for business matters, and several assistant secretaries for staff
functions .
(b) There would be an Under Secretary for Business Matters,
occupying roughly the same position for such matters as the Com-
mander of the Armed Forces has for military matters. He would have
such assistant secretaries' as might be required for the various duties
that would have to be performed.
(c) There would be one military Commander of the Armed Forces
who would also be Chief of Staff to the President and a member of the
United States Chiefs of Staff. He would have responsibility for the
decision. of all questions involving command. and military control of
the armed forces. He would have a staff which would be concerned
with matters involving more than one component. There would
also be Deputy Chiefs of Staff for personnel, intelligence, plans, and
operations, and logistics.
(d) There would be three coordinate components-Army, Navy,
and Air Force-each headed by a single commander and each having
a considerable measure of autonomy in operation.
(e) There would be a United States Chief of Staff to advise the
President on broad matters of military strategy and on budgetary
matters. The members would be the Secretary, the Commander of
the Armed Forces, and the commanders of the three components.
8. Eberstadt report recommendations 4
(a) Three coordinate Departments-War, Air, and Navy-were
recommended. Each would have a civilian Secretary, a civilian
Under Secretary, and such assistant secretaries as might be needed,
commanded by a military officer. Navy and Army air arms would
be retained.
Heazings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, iJth Cong. 1st sess., pp. 411 ff., chart
opposite 412.
+ See report to Hon. James Forrestal on Unification of .the War and Navy Departments and Postwar
Organization for National Security, Senate Committee. Print, 7~Jth Cong. 1st sess., pp. 6 ff., also chart opp.
p. 8.
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
(b) A National Security Council would be established. to link ug
military and foreign policy. It would be composed of .the Secretaries
of State, War, Navy, and Air, the Chairman of the National Security
Resources Board, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The President would
be the Chairman, and in his absence the Vice President or the Secre-
tary of State. The Council would have a permanent secretariat. It
would have policy-forming and advisory functions and would aniong
other things advise on the combined military budget. The Central
Intelligence Agency would be a part of its.
(c) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would be given a statutory basis and
would advise on strategy, logistic plans, and budgetary matters. In
these areas the Joint Chiefs of Staff would constitute the major
coordinating mechanism for the three Departments.
(d) A National Security Resources Board would be set up to work
out industrial and civilian mobilization plans. It would be composed
of representatives of the War, Navy, and Air Departments, the Chair-
man of the Military. Munitions Board, and representatives of such
other temporary or regular agencies as might be involved. The
Chairman would be an appointee of the President with full power of
decision.
(e) A Military Munitions Board, with functions broader than those
of the Army-Navy Munitions Board, would act as a coordinating
agency in the field of procurement and logistics.. Its members would
be the civilian Under Secretaries of the three Departments. A
civilian Chairman appointed by the President would have full power
of decision. The Committee would supervise all joint committees
on procurement and logistics matters.
(f) Each Department would have an Assistant Secretary for Scien-
tific Research and Development. A civilian research agency "was
recommended to link civilian and. military research.
(g) A Military Education and Training Board, lender the supervision
of the Joint Chiefs of fitaff, would coordinate military education and
training. It would be composed of representatives of the three
Departments, and would have an Advisory Board on Military Edll-
cation and Training.
(h) A Central Intelligence Agency would be established in the
National Security Council.
~. War Department (Collins) plan 5
The War Department plan proposed at the Senate Military Affairs
Committee hearings in 1945 was a modification of the plan recom-
mended by the special committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(a) There would be a single Department of Armed Forces, with a
civilian Secretary, a civilian Under Secretary, and three or more
civilian assistant secretaries to coordinate scientific research, procure-
ment, and industrial mobilization plans, and legislative affairs and
information.
(b) A Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, assisted by a small staff
for military personnel matters, intelligence, joint training, and logis-
tics, would be in command of the military aspect of the Department,
under the Secretary.
(c) Under the Chief of Staff of the .Armed Forces would be the
s See hearings before the Committee on Military Affairs, U. S. Senate, 79th Cang. 1st sess., pp. 156 ff.,
also chart opposite p. 156.
001p48~~~ o~~~~~~.,~
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
three major components, each headed by a Chief of Staff (Chief of
Naval Operations in the case of the Navy): Each component would
have a considerable measure of autonomy and would retain its ow-i
service system. The Secretary would be able to consult directly with
the three Chiefs of Staff. The theater commanders would also be
under the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.
(cl) There would be a Director of Common Supply and Hospitaliza-
tion, also under the Chief of Staff of the Arliied Forces.
(e) The U. S. Chiefs of Staff, consisting of the Chief of Staff to the
President, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Chiefs of
Staff of the three components, would have powers of recommenda-
tion on military policy, strategy, and budgetary requirements. Their
recommendations would go to the President through the Secretary,
with his comments. Any dissenting member could report to the
President' through the Secretary.
(f) The Chief of Staff to the President and the Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces would not be tal:.en from the same component at any
given time. Their terms as well as those of the Chiefs of Staff of the
components would be limited in order to insure rotation of office.
5. President Truman's first plan 6
(a,) There would be a single Department of National Defense, with
a civilian~Secretary. A civilian Under Secretary, and several civilian
assistant secretaries, would be available for assignment to whatever
duties the President and the Secretary might determine from time to
time.
(b) The Department would have three coordinate branches, each
wider an assistant secretary. The Navy would retain its own carrier-
ship and water-based aviation, and the Marine Corps.
(c) The President and the Secretary would be given ample author-
ity to establish central coordinating and service organizations, military
and civilian. The details should not be specified in legislation, but
should be left to executive decision.
(d) There would be a Chief of Staff of National Defense and a
commander for? each of the three components.
{e) The Chief of Staff and the three Commanders would constitute
an advisory body to the President and the Secretary. The position
of Chief of Staff would rotate among the three components. The
President and the Secretary could communicate directly with the
three Commanders.
(j) It was recommended that the State-ti'~Tar-Navy Coordinating
Committee be continued, and that following reorganization of the
armed forces military research be coordinated under one agency, and
a government-wide intelligence service be established.
6. The Thomas-Hill-Austin bill (S. ~20~~, 79th, Cong., ,2d sess.)7
(a) There would be a single Department of Common Defense,
headed by a civilian Secretary. The War and Navy Departments
mould be abolished. The Department of Common Defense would
e Message to Congress from the President, December 19, 1945, llaily Congressional Record, pp. 12573-
42577.
7 As reported out by the Senate Military Affairs Committee, May 13, 1946. See Senate Report No.
1328, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., which accompanied S. 2044. Substantial amendments were proposed following
the President's recommendations of June 15. See Committee Print of June 26, 1946.
99092-47-2
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
have a civilian Under Secretary and a civilian Secretary, without
cabinet status, for each of the three components-Army, Navy, and
Air Force.
(b) Four Assistant Secretaries, tinder the Secretary, would super-
? vise and coordinate scientific research and development; intelligence
activities; procurement, logistics, industrial mobilization and hos~
pitalization; and educational and_tx?aining activities.
(c) A Chief of Staff of Common Defense would act as the Secretary's
chief military adviser, and would also~act as chief military adviser of
the President. The appointment would be rotated. The Chief of
Staff would have a small staff.
(d) rl Chief of Staff of Common Defense and the commanding offi-
cers of the three components would constitute a Joint Staff of the
Department. The Joint Staff would make recommendations to the
President through the Secretary' on military poli"cy, strategy, and
budgetary requirements. The Secretary could attach his comment on
these recommendations. Any one of the three commanding officers
could report to the President after consideration by the Joint Staff,
through the Secretary, who could add his comment to those of the
Joint Staff.
(c) The President would be authorized to reorganize the Depart-
ment and its military components-under the provisions of the Re-
organization Act of 1945, with the proviso that no component could
be abolished.
(f) A Council of Common Defense would be set up as an indepeud=
ent agency, to coordinate foreign and military policy. It would be
headed by the Secretary of State and would include the Secretary of
Common Defense and the? Chairman of the i~lational Security Re-
sources Boaa?d. It would have a permanent secretariat with an Execu-
tive Secretary.
(g) There would also,be a National Security Resources Board for
industrial and civilian mobilization planning. This Board would be
tinder the authority of the Council of Common Defense.
(h) A Central Intelligence Agency, operating as an agency of the
Council of. Common Defense, would compile, analyze, elvaluate and
disseminate information gathered by civilian and military agencies.
7. President Truman's second plan $
This plan contained twelve .points. Eiglxt represented agreement
between the V~ar and 1Vavy Departments. On four there ryas disa-
gre~ment. ((a), (b), (c), and (d) below.)
(a) Thera would ba a, single Department of National Defense with
a civilian Secretary. Each of the three services would have a civilian
Secretary, who would not have a seat in the Cabinet. The civilian
Secrretaries would be members of the Council of Common Defense.
(The Navy Department oppoaed a single Department.)
(b) The three services-Army, Navy, and Air Forces-would have
parity. (The Navy Department preferred to preserve the two De-
partment arrangement.)
(c) The Navy would retain some naval aviation but not as much
as it wanted.
(d) The 1Vlarixte Corps would remain in the Navy with its mission.
intact. (The ~'~Tai? Department position would have reduced its
mission.) ,
s See letter from President Truman to' Senators Thomas and Walsh, and Representatives MaY and
Vinson, June 15, 1946.
fl- GB ~ C- /~ ~ 6A ~ ~, All fi~ ~ ~ ~ -n
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
On the remaining eight points there vas agreement.
(e) A Council,of National Defense, consisting of the Secretai;~~ of
State, the Secretary of National Defense, the civilian Secretaries of
the t,lu?ee military services, and the Chairman of the National Security
Resources Board, would integrate foreign and military policies.
(f) A National Security ,Resources Board, under the Council of
National Defense, would establish and keep up to date policies and
programs for the use of the nation's resources in support of our
national security. It would be composed of representatives of the
military services and other appropriate agencies.
(g) The Joint Chiefs of Staff would formulate strategic plans, assign
logistic responsibilities to the services, integrate military programs,
and make recommendations on budgetary matters. It would be the
highest source of military advice.
(la) There would,be no single military Chief of Staff. (The ~Var
Department agreed to drop this featu,re.)
(i) A Central Intelligence Agency, under the Council of National
Defense, would compile, analyze, and evaluate information. gathered
by military and civilian agencies.
(j) (k) (l) Agencies would be established to coordinate military
supply and procurement, scientific research and development in the
military services, and military education and training.
8. Dra,~t of proposed bill submitted by the President, February, ,26, 197
(a) A National Defense Establishment would be created, headed
by a civilian Secretary of National Defense. The Establishment
would consist of the Departments of the Navy, Army (instead of
War), and Air Force, together with all other agencies created within
the Establishment. The Secretary of National Defense would estab-
lish policies and programs for the Establishment and for the depart-
ments and agencies therein; exercise authority and control over such
agencies; and formulate and finally determine the budget estimates
and control the budget program.
(b) The Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force,
under the direction of the Secretary of National Defense, would be
administered as individual units by their respective Secretaries. The
Secretary of any one of the three departments would be permitted
to present to the President any report or recommendation relating to
his Department, after so informing the Secretary of National Defense.
(c) The Secretary of National Defense would be authorized to
appoint not more than four special civilian assistants, and such other
civilian personnel as might be required to perform the functions of
the National Defense Establishment. He~would be specifically pro-
hibited from establishing a military staff, but officers of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force could be detailed to him as assistants and per-
sonal aids.
(d) A Department of the Air Force would be created, containing the
United States Air Force. Transferred to the United States Air Force
would be the Army Air Forces; the Air Corps, United States Army;
and the General Headquarters Air Force (Air Force Combat Com-
mand) .
(e) A War Council would be set up within the National Defense
Establishment. Itjwould be composed of the four Secretaries, and
the Chiefs of Staff of the three departments (Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in the case of the Navy). The Secretary of l~Tational Defense
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
would have power of decision. The Council would advise the Secre-
tary of National Defense on matters of broad policy.
(f) The Joint Chiefs of fita.ff, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of
the three departments and. the Chief of Staff to the Commander in
Chief, if any, would be established within the Defense Establishment. `
Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secre-
tary of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prepare
strategic plans and provide strategic direction; prepare logistic plans;
establish unified area commands when needed; formulate policies for
joint training; review material and personnel requirements of the
military forces; provide United States representation on the Military
Staff Committee of the United Nations; and act as military advisers
to the President anal the Secretar.~- of National Defense. Under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. would be a Joint Staff of not more than one
hundred officers, composed of approximately equal numbers of officers
from the Army, Navy, and Air Forces.
(g) A i\~funitions Board, composed of a civilian Chairman appointed
by the Secretary of National Defense and a,n Under Secretary or
Assistant Secretary from each of the three military departments,
would provide coordination within the Establishment with regard. to
various aspects of procurement, production.,- distribution, and other
industrial and service functions.
(h) A Research and Development Board would be set up in the
Defense Establishment to coordinate research activities within the
F..stablishment and advise the Secretary of National Defense on mat-
ters of research.
(~) Outside the National Defense Establishment would be estab-
lished aNational Security Council, and under it a Central Intelligence
Agency. There would be also established a National Security
Resources Board. These agencies would coordinate military and
civilian policies, programs, and plans in their respective fields. (See
the Eberstadt recommendations and later proposals.)
In the early stages of the discussion of the problem of reorganization
of the armed forces "unification" was the great issue. As the con-
troversy developed and compromise proposals were advanced, how-
ever, the term "unification" became exceedingly flexible. In the
early War Department plans and. in the recommendation of the
special committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, unification signified (1)
a single department, the Secretary of which would be the sole repre-
sentative of the armed forces in the Cabinet, and (2) the provision of
a considerable measure of. centralized. direction and administration
of both military and other activities.
A Chief of Staff was to be the chief military adviser to the Secretary
and to the President anal was to occupy a position superior to that of
the commanding officers of the Army,' Navy, and Air Forces. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff idea was to be maintained, but in an advisory
capacity only, and with limited functions: On the non-military side
the Secretary would have an Under Secretary and a number of
Assistant Secretaries to direct common services and to supervise and
coordinate the programs and policies of the three components. A
considerable measure of autonomy in operation vas to be preserved
?0 .~. ?~. ~ ~ ~. ~ ?~ ?~~ ~.
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
by the components, but in terms both of legal authority and adminis-
trative mechanism the single Department was to be a department in
fact and not merely a loose alliance or coordinating mechanism.
The Eberstadt report and recommendations injected a quite differ-
ent note in the discussion. Accepting tha challenge that organiza-
tional changes were needed, the report .recommended the establish-
ment of an Air Department and the setting up of various coordinating
agencies, some to coordinate policies and programs of the militaa?y
departments and some to coordinate military policies and programs
with intimately related civilian programs. On the military side the
key agencies were to be tha Joint Chiefs of Staff' foi? strategy and mili-
tary policy and the Military AZunitions Board. for procurement and
other matt~i?s. Thy National Security Council, and under its super-
vision aNational Security Resources Board and a Central Intelligence
Agency, would constitute the, grand coordinating mechanism on
military-civilian matters.
At this stage the issue vas "unification," as proposed by the ~Var
Dapai?tment and the special committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
?versus "coordination" as proposed by the Eberstadt report and gen-
erally endorsed by the Navy Department. The Navy Department
favored two Departments rather than three, as recommended in the
Eberstadt report, but preferred the tlu?ee-department arrangement to a
single department. The proposals for an over-alI coordinating
m~~.chanism did not constitute an issue between the War and Navy
Departments.
President Truman's message of December 19, 1945, recommended
legislation along the lines proposed by the War Department and th
special committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He proposed a singly
Department with three coordinate branches, a single Chief of Staff of
the Department, and ample authority and staff to permit the gradual
unification and coordination of programs and services.
The Thomas-Hill-Austin Bill (S. 2044, 79th Cong. 2d sess.), as
reported out by the Sanat~ Committee on 1Vlilit:i,ry Affairs, followed
fau?ly closely the Pi?esidcnt's recommendations and superimpos2cl on
them the Eberstadt report proposals for military-civilian coordina-
tion, including a Council of Common Defense and s~iborduiate to it a
National Security Resources Board a.nd a Central Intelligence
Agency. A variation from the President's recommendations vas the
assignment of definite responsibilities to some of the civilian Assist-
ant Secretaries for such matters as scientific research and develop-
ment, military intelligence, procurement and. related matters, and
military education and training. The President's recommendation
had been to leave all such details of organization to the I'resiclent a,nd
the Secretary.
Thus far the major issue was still "unification," although in order
to meet objections' of the Navy.Department increasing emphasis had
been placed by advocates of unification on the desirability of insuring
a,s great a degree o? ~,utronomy as practicable to th,~ major components.
On June 15, 1946, President Truman recommended atwelve-point
program of reorganization in a letter to Senators Thomas and 1%1'alsh
and Representatives May and Vinson. The letter revealed that the
War Department vas willing to make substantial concessions to the
Navy Department's objections to unification, and. that the President
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
]! 2 EXPENDITURES IN THE EXCUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
also was willing to modify his earlier position. The major feature
.omitted in the new recommendations ~~ as the position of Chief of
Staff. This meant an enhancement of the position of the United
States Chiefs of Staff, and consequently of the status of the com-
manding officers of the th'r?ee components.
Another indication of the .greater prestige to be accorded the three
branches of the Department was the proposaj that the civilian Secre-
taries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force be rflembers of the Council of
Common Defense. Equally noteworthy was the omission of specific
reference to a departmental staff.. There were general recommenda-
tions for the establishment of "agencies" in the fields of procurement
and supply, research, and military education and trammg. Their
status was not indicated, but they appeared designed as coordinating
rather than operating t~gencies. .
Substantial differences of opinion remained, the major one con-
cerning the desirability of having a single department. The Navy
Department still favored the two-department arrangement, but
apparently was not too strongly opposed to the three-department,
set-up provided it were permitted to retain the kind of air force it.
desired. It is quite clear, however, that the kind of "unification"
provided in the President's recommendations is quite different from
that contemplated theretofore by the advocates of a single depart-
ment.
As stated in the President's letter:
Each service would retain its autonomy, subject of course to the authority
and over-all control by the Secretary of National Defense. It is recognized that
the services have different functions and different organizations and for these
reasons the integrity of each service should be retained.
This general statement, taken in conjunction with the omission of a
single.Chief of Staff and of specific provision for other Departmental
staffing, reveals the extent to which the idea of unification had been
modified in the attempt to bring about a reconciliation of Army and
Navy viewpoints.
The authors of S. 2044 proposed amendments in the Bill to carry out
the President's recommendations, but no action was taken.
The draft of the proposed Bill submitted. by the President, February
26, 1947, which incorporates the legislative program agreed on by the
War and Navy Departments as announced by the President January
16, still further enhances the autonomous position of the three branches
of the service by designating them as Departments, each headed by a
Secretary. The earlier unification idea is represented by the pro-
visionfor aSecretary of National Defense, who as head of the National
Defense Establishment (not Department) ~ would apparently be the
sole Cabinet member from the armed forces, and. would exercise
authority, supervision, and control over the Departments and agencies
within the Establishment. In other respects the Bill appears to
follow rather closely the Eberstadt report proposals, with provision
for a War Council (an added feature), a Jomt~ Chiefs of Staff, a
Munitions Board, and a Research acid Development Board within
the National Defense Establishment, and a National Security Council,
a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security Resources
Board to coordinate military and civilian agencies.
It is interesting to compare the complomise reached by the War
and Navy Departments with the original War Department and Navy
Approved For Release 2008/108/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
EXPENDITURES IN THE EXCUTIVE DEPARTMENTS 13
Department views and with President Truman's first message. The
War Department and the PIesident have yielded on the idea of a
single department, and on the matter of a single Chief of Staff. The
role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in t11e latest plan is more prominent
than in their earlier proposals., In addition, it would appear from
the draft of the executive order included in the President's announce-
ment of January 16 that the War Department. has yielded to the
Navy Department's position with I?espect to the role of the Marine
Corps and of the Navy's air arm: The President at first sided with
the War Department on both issues, but has indicated his approval
of the latest agreement.
The' Navy Department has modified its position to the extent of
agreeing with the provision for a National Defense Establishment,
headed by a Secretary. of National Defense who would have broad
authority over the Departments. It has also apparently yielded on
Cabinet status for the Secretaries of the Departments. It has agreed
to the establishment of a Department of the Air Force, but is to retain
its owli air arm.
An evaluation of the relative importance of the mutual concessions
is extremely difficult because of uncertainty as to the precise extent
and character of the authority of the Secretary of National Defense.
PART IV.. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS
'The fundamental issue in the controversy over reorganization of the
armed forces has been .the method rather than the desirability of
reorganization. All concerned have been in agreement that the pre-
war form of organization will no longer. suffice, and that, at a mini-
mum, legislation should be enacted placing on a permanent statutory
basis the major changes put into effect during the war.
Prior to Pearl Harbor the chief means of securing coordination
between the War and Navy Departments, short of the President,
was the use of joint committees. In the field of operational planning
the Joint Board, established in 1903, had advisory powers ol~ly.
Action could be taken on its decisions only through the Secretaries.
A large number of joint committees grew up in other areas to work on
common problems.
After Pearl Harbor the number of joint cozrunittees increased
rapidly. In the critical area of military policy and strategy, however,
the Joint Board was not adequate. Though never abolished it was in
effect replaced by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, set up by the President in
February 1942. This body never had a formal charter, but it gradu-
ally assumed broad powers of action. In matters involving .new and
mayor policies, and in matters where unanimity could not be obtained,
decision rested with the PIesident. Subject to these limitations, how-
ever, the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually directed military policy and
strategy.
Neither the War Department nor the Navy Department proposed
returning to the prewar system. The Navy Department tool, the
position that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had operated with great success
during the v>ar a.nd shoiilci by statute be made the permanent chief
coordinating agency on military, strategic, and other matters. 1'he
joint committee system used during the war to coordinate the two
Departments with reference to supply, procurement, personnel and
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
other matters would be continued, but placed on a more systematic.
basis. The War Department and the President contended that the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the joint committee device, though an im-
provement over the prewar organization, should be replaced by a
single department of the armed. forces with. a single military Chief of
Staff. Considerable autonomy would be left to the component serv-
ices, but the separate Departments would be abolished.
Subsidiary to the main issue, but very important to it, was the
issue of the postwar status of the air force. During the war, Army
Air Forces- was given a virtually autonomous position by Executive
Order. The VPar Department proposed that the air arm be given
parity with the Army and the Navy in a single department. Its
early proposals indicated that the projected air force would take over ,
a considerable part of the Navy's air arm. The Navy Department
countered by saying that the, postwar status of Army Axr Farces
within tlxe War Department was the War Department's problem, but
that the Navy needed its own air arm and was opposed to the idea of
a single department with three coordinate branches.
Although. the War and Navv Departments have now agreed on a
compromise plan which has the Preside.nt's approval, it is still im-
portant to review the arguments advanced for and against, the earlier
unification proposals. On the side of unification the main arguments
may be stated, briefly, as follovJs:
1. A unified military command is essential to a unified military
program and to proper strategic planning. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff is not a unified command. Under pressure of war it was
possible for the members of the Staff to reach agreement on most
matters. Even so, some aspects of military policy vTere not takexx
up, and in other instances delays occurred. With the pressure of
war removed, the principle of voluntary agreement would operate'
less anal less effectively. A Joint Chiefs of Staff should be re-
tamed in an. advisory capacity; but it is essential that there be a
single Chief of Staff to provide a unified top military command.
2. A single department organization with a unified military
command is essential to the operation of unified command iu the
field, the desirability of which is conceded. Field commanders
are hampered in carrying out operations by divided command at
home, with all that that implies in the way of delays, differences
in policies, training, procurement methods, etc.'
3. Unification would make possible an integration of budgetary
requirements and a planned control of budgetary allocations.
Under the present system there is no real budgetary planning for
the armed services. Congress is presented with estimates pre-
pared by the two Departments with very little regard to each
other's programs. Proper integration. requires the establishment
of a single department.
4. Unification would make possible large savings and greater
efficiency in matters of procurement, supply, bases, etc. Dupli-
cation, competition in bidding, unnecessary differences in speci-
fications and other forms of waste and inefficiency were common-
. place during the war. Joint boards and joint committees, com-
posed of Departmental representatives and operating on a basis
of voluntary agreement, cannot provide the degree of effiiciency
and economy that could be effected under a single department.
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
5. For similar reasons, a single department type of organi-
zation could be more effective than joint boards and joint com-
mittees in coordinating military research, military training pro-
grams, military personnel policies, and military intelligence
activities. Voluntary agreement is an inadequate .device for
eliminating the duplications, discriminations, undesirable com-
petition, and absence of coordination that exist in these areas.
6. The desirability of parity for the air forces increases the
need for a single department of the armed forces. The difficulties
of coordinating two Departments are great enough; with three
Departments the confusion, waste, and lack of integration would
be much increased. Moreover, the President would be called on
more than ever to settle inter-service disputes that ought to be
adjusted at a lower level.
7. A unified department of the armed forces, with a single
Cabinet representative, would make for more effective civilian
control and would facilitate the coordination of the armed forces
department with civilian agencies. With separate departments
the Secretaries tend to represent their respective services, and
civilian control is discounted. Furthermore, it is not possible to
coordinate the policies and programs of the armed forces with
those of civilian agencies concerned when there is no effective
coordination within the armed forces themselves.
' 8. Unification would not "merge" the three services, removing
all distinctions and breaking down service traditions. Adminis-
tration would be decentralized as far as practicable, and no fears.
need exist that any one of the services would be subordinated
to the others. Through a system of rotation care can be taken
that top military command is never long held by representatives
of any one component.
Opponents of the proposal for a single department with a Chief of
Staff accepted most of the objectives stated in the above arguments.
They contended, however, that unification was the wrong method.
VPhereas proponents of unification argued that that type of organiza-
tion was necessary to provide unified military policy and strategy,
unified command m the field, an integrated budget, efficiency and
economy, proper coordination of research, intelligence, training and
personnel programs, maintenance of civilian control, and proper coor-
dination with civilian agencies, opponents of the scheme,flat~ly stated
that the two-Department arrangement, coordinated by a Joint Chiefs
of Staff and a system of joint boards .and committees, furnished a
better method for attaining these objectives. The chief arguments
against unification may be stated as follows:
1. Postwar organization of. the armed forces should be based on
experience. Unification is an untried experiment in this country.
On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the system of joint.
boards and committees operated successfully during the war.
There mere few instances where the Joint Chiefs of Staff failed to
reach agreement, or where serious delays occurred in reaching
decisions. The war experience demonstrated that unified com-
mand in theaters of operations could be successfully exercised
without departmental unification. Unquestionably coordination
in matters of procurement and supply, research, training, per-
sonnel policies, and intelligence activities was not always as
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
16
effective as it might have been. Failures due to administrative
weaknesses, however, have been exaggerated. The magnitude of
operations made complete coordination. impossible, regardless of
the form of organization. To the extent that faulty organization
was responsible, it was due to the .necessity of constructing a
coordinating mechaiusm in the midst of a war. These failures
point, not to the abandonment of the idea of coordination, but to
the rationalization and perfection of the joint coordinating ma-
chinery.
2. Unification of top military command and of the organization
to determine military policy and strategy and to exercise budget-
ary control might result in the relegation of one of the branches
-of~ the service to a subordinate role. (This aagument was used
with reference to the position of the Navy.) A sound and secure
military program is best guaranteed by maintaining the independ-
ence of the services, and by having ~a Joint Chiefs of Staff to fur-
nish the necessary integration. A single Chief of Stiff would
possess a dangerous degree of power and it would be almost im-
possible to find an officer with broad enough training and vision
to be entrusted with it.
3. Likewise with respect to the civilian aspects of armed forces
administration, it would be unwise to place the entire adminis-
' tration under one Secretary. 'For one thing, the jcb is too big
-for, one man. Also, the two Departments are organized along
quite different lines, and an attempt to unify them would cause
?endless confusion. .Still more significant is the danger that the
specialized and distinctive needs of the different service arms
might be disregarded in a unified department. There are often
sound reasons for parallel facilities, special requirements, distinc-
tive procurement systems, competition in research, different
training methods, etc. No doubt a greater degree of coordina-
tion can be secured, but changes should result from voluntary
:agreement of the services following careful study and discussion,
=and not from the imposition of directives from the top. -
4. Unification .proposals are not specific enough concerning
the relation of the service components to the department. It is
?all very well to say that the details of administration should be
allowed to work themselves out, but the nature of the relati.on-
-ship is not a detail.
5. Claims of increased efficiency and economy .by unification
proponents are dubious. Requirements of the services would
be the same regardless of the form of organization. The probabil-
ities are that such alarge-scale organization as a unified depart-
ment of the armed forces would be less efficient than the present
arrangement. An enormous overhead administrative machinery
would inevitably develop.
6. The problem of an autonomous air force can be solved with-
out the creation of a unified department of the aimed forces.
.Army Air Forces can be given a permanent status of autonomy
within the War Department, or, as an alternative, a separate
Department of the Air Force can be established. (The Eberstadt
report recommended the latter. The Navy Department pre-
ferred the former. The Navy's major concern, however, was the
retention o~ its own air arm whatever happened to Army Air
QA~A~82~1
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
. EXPENDITURES IN T$E EXCUTIVE DEPARTMENTS 1"j
Forces. It`might also be pointed out here that the Navy Depart-
ment objected to the War Department's unification proposals
on the grounds that Army Ground Forces would take over a
part of the mission of the Marine Corps.)
7. Unification would weaken civilian control, because the larger
the establishment the easier it is for the military to exercise real
control.
8. Unification would do nothing to remedy the outstanding
weakness in Axisting organization-the absence of an effective
mechanism for coordinating the military services with civilian
agencies. ,
It was for many reasons difficult. for the impartial observer to
devaluate these, arguments for and against unification. The validity
of some of them hinged on the history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
which of course was not available. Wartime operations in matters
of procurement. and supply and in other areas were on such a vast
scale that generalizations could not easily be checked. Experience of
other countries was. inconclusive. One principle of administrative
organization could be set. off against another, making judgment an art
rather than a science.. An objective, such as "the maintenance of
civilian control;" though commonly accepted, was not susceptible of
precise definition, besides which no formula was known by which it
'might be attained. For these and other reasons, the controversy
was by many regarded mainly as a scrap between the Army and the
Army Air Forces on the one hand and the Navy on the other. Wit-
nessesfor the Navy Department made it clear that they feared that the
prestige and power of the Navy would be endangered by the establish-
. meat of a unified organization In which the Navy would be one of three
coordinate branches. They cited as grounds for their fears tho
proposal to include part of the naval air arm in the proposed Air
Force, and the proposed transfer of part of the Marine Corps Mission
to the Army. The bitterness of the controversy between the Army
and the Navy became in the minds of many an argument against
unification.
In the spring of 1946 ~ the President directed the V~rar and Navy
Departments to attempt to reconcile their differences. From that
point on the unification- issue in fact gradually dropped out of the
picture, though the word and many of the arguments about it con-
tinued to be employed. The Army-Navy agreement embodied in the
draft of the proposed Bill submitted by the President, February 26,
1947, does not provide for "unification" of the armed forces in the
sense in which the early War Department plans, the President's
message of December 19, 1945, and S. 2044, as reported out by the
Senate Military Affairs Committee in the spring of 1946, used that
term. The War Department -and the Navy Department would
not be abolished, though the name of the War Department would be
changed to the Department of the Army and the present Army Air
Forces would become the core of a new Department of the Air Force.
There would be a Secretary of National Defense, and a National
Defense Establishment, but no Department of National Defense.
There would be no unified top military command. The three De-
partments would be administered as individual units by their re-
spective Secretaries, under the direction of the Secretary of National
Defense. (For detailed summary see pt. II (8) of this report.)
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
1.$ EXPENDITURES IN THE EXCUTTVE DEPARTMENTS
Only a tentative evaluation of the Army-Navy compromise pro-
posal can be made at this time. Some of the more important con-
siderations are as follows:
1. The fact that the War and Navvy Departments are appar-
ently in agreement on the proposal removes one objection that
was serious iu the case of uiufication. On the other hand, it
may be argued that the compromise achieved lacks the advan-
tages either of unification or of the joint board aiid joint com-
mittee method of coordination. .:
2. The argument advanced for unifi.cation.to the effect that a
single ~hief of Staff is essential to the proper integration of mili-
tary policy and strategy and to the successful operation of unified
command in the field, constitutes an argument against the com-
promise plan. Irrespective of the relative merits of the Chief of
Staff versus the Joint'Chiefs of Staff arrangement, there are sub-
stantial differences between the two, not only with respect to the
nature of the command, but also-with respect to'the nature of
the staff. Though the staff members: in~ both cases be drawn
from the components in approximately equal numbers, they are
more likely to act as representatives of their respective compo-
vents in the case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff arrangement than
in the case of a urufied command.
3. The administrative structure is admittedly complicated, and
its operation full of uncertainties. What is an "Establishment,"
and what would be the exact status of the three Departments
therein? How much power in fact would the Secretary of
National Defense be able to exercise? His legal authority is
stated in broad terms, but ability to exercise authority is depend-
ent on, among other things, adequate staffing facilities. Will his
position evolve into that of the head of a unafied organization of
the armed forces, or will he be merely a sort of over-aIl coordi-
nator of a group of practically independent Departments and
autonomous boards?
These complexities and uncertainties do not necessarily con-
stitute arguments against the compromise. It can be argued
that any organization in as vast a field as that of the national
defense will in reality be complicated, no matter how orderly and
simple it looks on paper. ~ It can also be argued that the proposed
arrangement insures flexibility, and makes possible an evolu-
tionary approach to the complex problems of coordination.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the proposed arrange-
ment makes coordination more difficult than a.t present, and
throws a greater burden of decision on the' President. The plan
provides for four Secretaries instead of the present two, all having
access to the President.
4. Thus far no claims of substantial immediate economies have
been made for the new plan. In fact it is likely that the imme-
diate effect of the reorganization would be an increase in the
cost of administration. The administrative overhead for three
Departments would very likely be greater than for two, and
besides there would be the cost of administering the National
Defense Establishment and the now or enlarged. Boards and
coordinating agencies.
~a?~Q~~~
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
 Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4
EXPENDITIIRES IN THE EXCUTIVE DEPARTMENTS 19
On the other hand, long-run savings and increased efficiency
will result if the Establishment and the agencies under it succeed
inachieving hoped-for economies in facilities, supplies, research
and scientific development, and other areas. It should also be
pointed out that opponents of unification expressed skepticism
concerning the claims made of the economies that it would
bring about.
5. The proposed plan and the proposed executive order con-
tained in the President's release of January 16 indicate that the
Army has agreed to accept the Navy's position respecting the
role of .the Navy air arm and of the Marine Corps. The plan
provides for a Department of the Air Force, but the Air Force
is to be constituted by transfer of the Army Air Forces; the Air
Corps, United States Army; and the General Headquarters Air
Force (Air Force Combat Command). These decisions remove
some of the Navy Department's more serious objections both to
unfication and to the creation of a separate Department of the
Air Force. It could be argued, however, that the decision to
leave Navy's air arm intact makes less necessary than ever the
creation of a separate Department of the Air Force.
6. The mechanism for coordinating the National Defense
Establishment with civilian agencies has not at any time con-
stituted an zssue between the War and Navy Departments.
The present proposals, calling for a National Security Council, ,
a Central Intelligence Agency, and a National Security Resources'
Board, have been generally accepted from the time of the Eber-
stadt recommendations. The State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee and the National Intelligence Authority, Presidential
creations, have performed some of these coordinating functions.
The proposed agencies are related to, bu.t not a part of the organi-
zation of the armed forces, and under the proposed bill would
not be a part of the 1ational Defense Establishment.
Since this report deals with th.e general problems involved in the
reorganization of the armed forces, no attempt will be made to analyze
the more detailed administrative provisions in the proposed bill.
Difference of opinion a?egarding some of them may well arise. The
basic question, however, is whether the compromise reached provides,
under all the circumstances, a more promising arrangement than either
unification or the joint board and joint committee type of organization.
One of the major difficulties in attempting to reach an answer to this
question is the difficuity of visualizing how the proposed method of
organization would actually operate. The essence of the compromise
is to superimpose a Secretary of National Defense, head of a National
Defense Establishment, on the coordinating machinery recommended
ui the Eberstadt repox?t. Perhaps in the cotu?se of hearings and
discussion more light will be thrown on the Secretary's role and on
the degree of independence reserved to the departments. ~ Pending
further discussion and clarification of these matters, widely differing
conclusions are bomid to be drawn concerning the significance of the
proposed organization, and judgment as to its efficacy will be largely
hypothetical.
O
Approved For Release 2008/08/07 :CIA-RDP58-005978000200070007-4