AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES, AND RELATED POSITIONS AND TERRITORIES OF THAT AREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP59-00224A000100260006-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 22, 1998
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 26, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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84TH CONGRESSl
1st Session f
I REPORT
No. 13
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED
STATES FOR PROTECTING THE SECURITY
OF FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES, AND
RELATED POSITIONS AND TERRITORIES
OF THAT AREA
REPORT
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
S. J. Res. 28
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1955
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
WALTER F. GEORGE, Georgia, Chairman
TIIEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, Rhode Lsland
J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Arkansas
JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabam
IIUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota
MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Kentu-;ky
ALEXANDER WILEY, Wisconsin
H. ALEXANDER SMITH, New Jersey
BOURKE B. HICKENLOOPER, Iowa
WILLIAM LANGER, North Dakota
WILLIAM F. KNOW LAND, California
GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont
IfOMER E, CAPEHART, Indiana
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
RICHARD B. RTSSELL, Georgia, Chairman
HARRY FLOOD BYRD, Virgirla
LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Texas
ESTES KEFAUVER, Tennessee
JOHN STENNIS, Mississippi
STUART SYMINGTON, Missoiri
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carciina
STYLES BRIDGES, New Hampshire
LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, Massachusetts
RALPH E. FLANDERS, Vermont
MARGARET CHASE SMITH, Maine
FRANCIS CASE, South Dakota
JAMES H. DUFF, Pennsylvania
HERMAN WELKER, [dabo
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84TH CoNortESS SENATE a aall REPORT
1st Session c I No. 13
AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT TO EMPLOY THE ARMED FORCES
OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PROTECTING THE SECURITY OF
FORMOSA, THE PESCADORES, AND RELATED POSITIONS AND
TERRITORIES OF THAT AREA
JANUARY 26, 1955.-Ordered to be printed with an illustration
Mr. GEORGE, from the Committee on Foreign Relations, submitted
the following
REPORT
The Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed
Services, hereinafter referred to as the "joint committee," having had
under consideration the President's message of January 24, 1955, rec-
ommending action to meet certain threats to the peace and security
of the United States, and. Senate Joint Resolution 28, report the
resolution supporting the President in his recommendations, and rec-
ommend that it do pass.
It is the purpose of this resolution to make it clear that it is essential
to the vital interests of the United States that Formosa and the Pes-
cadores remain in friendly hands and that the President of the United
States is authorized to employ the Armed Forces of this Nation for
that purpose.
Formosa was ceded by China to Japan after the Sino-Japanese
War of 1895. At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the President of the
United States, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the
Generalissimo of the Republic of China declared their purpose to be
that-
Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized
or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all
the territories Japan has stolen front the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa,
and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
Administrative control of the island was turned over to the Republic
of China after the Japanese surrender in September 1945.
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In December 1949, after the Chinese Communists had obtained
control of practically all of the Chinese mainland, the National
Government of China, established its seat on Formosa. Some hos-
tilities continued between the Nationalist and Communist forces on
the mainland.
President, Truman outlined American policy toward Formosa at
his January 5, 1950, p:~oss conference in the following language:
The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa or on any other
Chinese territory. The T: nited States has no desire to obtain special rights or
privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it
have any intention of util zing its Armed Forces to interfere in the present situa-
tion. The United States Governme,it will not pursue a course which will lead
to involvement in the civil conflict in China.
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he New York Times a .25,1955
DEFENSE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC: President Eisenhower asked Congress for author-
Ay to use the armed forces Lo defend Formosa (black area) and the near-by Pescadores.
On June 25, 1950 the North Korean Communists launched their
aggression against the Republic of Korea. On June 27, 1950, when
ordering United State,:; air and naval forces to give Korean forces
cover and support, President Truman stated:
The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has
passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now
use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the
United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these
circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct
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PROTECT THE SECURITY OF FORMOSA 3
threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing
their lawful and necessary functions in that area.
Accordingly I have ordered the 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.
As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa
to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The 7th Fleet will
see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must
await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or
consideration by the United Nations.
By article 2 (b) of the peace treaty with Japan, signed on September
8, 1951, "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and
the Pescadores." The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations
discussed the territorial provisions of the peace treaty in the following
words:
During the negotiation of the treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the
view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty
over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition
was to- be made of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this
would have been an unwise course to pursue. It might have raised differences
among the Allies which would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion
of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter
into force now, leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as South
Sakhalin, and the Kuriles.
In his first state of the Union address on February 2, 1953, President
Eisenhower expressed the views of the administration on Formosa as
follows:
In June 1950, following the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea, the
United States Seventh Fleet was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa
and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against
the Chinese Communist mainland.
This has meant, in effect, that the United States Navy was required to serve
as a defensive arm of Communist China. Regardless of the situation in 1950,
since the date of that order the Chinese Communists have invaded Korea to
attack the United Nations forces there. They have consistently rejected the
proposals of the United Nations Command for an armistice. They recently
joined with Soviet Russia in rejecting the armistice proposal sponsored in the
United Nations by the Government of India. This proposal had been accepted
by the United States and 53 other nations.
Consequently there is no longer any logic or sense in a condition that required
the United States Navy to assume defensive responsibilities on behalf of the
Chinese Communists. This permitted those Communists, with greater impunity,
to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea.
I am, therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no longer be em-
ployed to shield Communist China. Permit me to make crystal clear, this order
implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation
to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.
On July 27, 1953, an armistice was concluded in Korea. In Decem-
ber 1953 preliminary consideration was given to a mutual defense
treaty with the Republic of China. After the conclusion of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty in September 1954, the
negotiations with the Republic of China were speeded up and on
December 2, 1954, the treaty was signed. It was submitted to the
Senate on January 6, 1955, where it is now pending.
Under article II the parties agree that they-
separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subver-
sive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political
stability.
Under article V it is provided that -
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed
against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace
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4 PROTECT THE SECURITY OF FORMOSA
and safety and declares tl.at it would act to meet the common danger in. accord-
ance with its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be
mmediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such
neasures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
Both of these articles, by article VI, are made applicable to 'Taiwan
and. the Pescadores and the island territories in the west Pacific under
the jurisdiction of the I nited States. They are also made applicable
"to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement."
At it press conference on December 1, 1954, Secretary of State Dulles
responded to questions raised on this problem in a manner indicated
by the following excerpts from a Department of State press release:
At his news conference on December 1, Secretary Dulles was asked a series of
questions relating to the purpose of the treaty with the Republic of China. Asked
to clarify the provision for the inclusion of other territories, Mr. Dulles replied:
The provision [article VII is comparable to the provision in the Korean treaty.
Where there is a country v, hieh we recognize and which claims rightful sovereignty
over more territory than it actually controls, there we adopted the practice of
providing by the treaty that it can be extended to other territory, and in the
Korean treaty we provide that initially it covers the area which is south of the
armistice line but that it can be extended to other territory at a later date. The
provision is comparable i:r this respect with regard to the Republic of China.
That has reference not onlj to these offshore islands but possibly to other territory
which might come under the effective control of the Republic of China.
Asked about the posit: on of the United States with respect to the offshore
islands, Mr. Dulles replied:
The position on the offshore islands is unaffected by this treaty. Their status
is neither promoted by the treaty nor is it demoted by the treaty. As I have said
several times, the injunction to our Armed Forces is to defend Formosa and the
Pescadores. Now, whether or not in any particular case the defense of these
offshore islands by reason of the nature of those islands or the nature of the
attack against them is suc i that it is deemed part of the defense of Formosa, that
would be a matter which on the firsi instance at least the military people would
advise, and the President would probably make the final decision.
The question of the status of the offshore islands began to become
acute as early as September 1954 when the Chinese Communists
bombarded Quemoy Island. On January 17, they launched air attacks
on Ichiang Island and the Tachen Islands. Ichiang fell to the Com-
munists under an amphibious assault on January 18.
On January 20, the President, consulted with certain representative
leaders of the Congress with respect to the situation developing in the
.Formosan area. On January 24, 1955, he sent the following message
to Congress:
To the Congress of the United States:
The most important ol. jcctive of our Nation's foreign policy is to safeguard
the security of the United States by establishing and preserving a just and
honorable peace. In the Western Pacific a situation is developing in the Formosa
Straits that seriously imperils the peace and our security.
Since the end of Japaneae hostilities in 1945, Formosa and the Pescadores have
been in the friendly hands of our loyal ally, the Republic of China. We have
recognized that it was important that these islands should remain in. friendly
hands. In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously
dislocate the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic, and military
forces upon which the peace of the Pacific depends. It would create a breach in
r;he island chain of the Western Pacific that constitutes, for the United States
and other free nations, the geographical backbone of their security structure in
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that ocean. In addition, this breach would interrupt north-south communications
between other important elements of that barrier, and damage the economic life
of countries friendly to us.
The United States and the friendly Government of the Republic of China, and
indeed all the free nations, have a common interest that Formosa and the Pesca-
dores should not fall into the control of aggressive Communist forces.
Influenced by such considerations, our Government was prompt, when the
Communists committed armed aggression in Korea in June 1950, to direct our
Seventh Fleet to defend Formosa from possible invasion from the Communist
mainland.
These considerations are still valid. The Seventh Fleet continues under Presi-
dential directive to carry out that defensive mission. We also provide military
and economic support to the Chinese Nationalist Government and we cooperate
in every proper and feasible way with that Government in order to promote its
security and stability. All of these military and related activities will be
continued.
In addition, there was signed last December a Mutual Defense Treaty between
this Government and the Republic of China, covering Formosa and the neighbor-
ing Pescadores. It is a treaty of purely defensive character. That treaty is now
before the Senate of the United States.
Meanwhile Communist China has pursued a series of provocative political and
military actions, establishing a pattern of aggressive purpose. That purpose,
they proclaim, is the conquest of Formosa.
In September 1954 the Chinese Communists opened up heavy artillery fire
upon Quemoy Island, one of the natural approaches to Formosa, which had for
several years been under the uncontested control of the Republic of China. Then
came air attacks of mounting intensity against other free China islands, notably
those in the vicinity of the Tachen group to the north of Formosa. One small
island (Ichiang) was seized last week by air and amphibious operations after a
gallant few fought bravely for days against overwhelming odds. There have
been recent heavy air attacks and artillery fire against the main Tachen Islands
themselves.
The Chinese Communists themselves assert that these attacks are a prelude to
the conquest of Formosa. For example, after the fall of Ichiang, the Peiping
radio said that it showed a "determined will to fight for the liberation of Taiwan
[Formosa]. Our people will use all their strength to fulfill that task."
Clearly, this existing and developing situation poses a serious danger to the
security of our country and of the entire Pacific area and indeed to the peace of
the world. We believe that the situation is one for appropriate action of the
United Nations under its charter, for the purpose of ending the present hostilities
in that area. We would welcome assumption of such jurisdiction by that body.
Meanwhile, the situation has become sufficiently critical to impel me, without
awaiting action by the United Nations, to ask the Congress to participate now, by
specific resolution, in measures designed to improve the prospects for peace.
These measures would contemplate the use of the Armed Forces of the United
States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa and the Pescadores.
The actions that the United States must be ready to undertake are of various
kinds. For example, we must be ready to assist the Republic of China to re-
deploy and consolidate its forces if it should so desire. Some of these forces are
scattered throughout the smaller offshore islands as a result of historical rather
than military reasons directly related to defending Formosa. Because of the fir
situation in the area, withdrawals for the purpose of redeployment of Chinese
Nationalist forces would be impractical without assistance of the Armed Forces
of the United States.
Moreover, we must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese
Communist forces obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and
be prepared to take appropriate military action.
I do not suggest that the United States enlarge its defensive obligations beyond
Formosa and the Pescadores as provided by the treaty now awaiting ratification.
But, unhappily, the danger of armed attack directed against that area compels us
to take into account closely related localities and actions which, tinder current
conditions, might determine the failure or the success of such an attack. The
authority that may be accorded by the Congress would be used only in situations
which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries to, an attack against
the main positions of Formosa and the Pescadores.
Authority for some of the actions which might be required would be inherent
in the authority of the Commander in Chief. Until Congress can act I would not
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6 PROTE(.;T THE SECURITY OF FORMOSA
"iesitate, so far as my constitutional powers extend, to take whatever emergency
action might be forced upon us in order to protect the rights and security of the
United States.
However, it suitable congressional resolution would clearly and publicly estab-
lish the authority of the ]:resident at, Commander in Chief to employ the Armed
Forces of this Nation proripily and effectively for the purpcsesi ndicated if in his
judgment it became necessary. It would make clear the unified and serious in-
tentions of our Government, our Congress, and our people. Thus it will reduce
the possibility that the Chinese Communists, misjudging our firm purpose and
national unity, might be disposed to challenge the position of the United States,
and precipitate a major crisis which even they would neither anticipate nor desire.
In the interest of peace, therefore. the United States must remove any doubt
regarding our readiness to fight, if necessary, to preserve the vital stake of the
tree world in a free Formosa, and to engage in whatever operations may be re-
quired to carry out that purpose.
To make this plain requires not only Presidential action but also congressional
action. In a situation such as now confronts us, and under modern conditions of
warfare, it would not be prudent to await the emergency before coming to the
Congress. Then it might be too late. Already the warning signals are flying.
I believe that the threatening aspects of the present situation, if resolutely faced,
may be temporary in character. Consequently, I recommend that the resolution
expire as soon as the President is able to report to the Congress that the peace and
security of the area are reasonably assured by international. conditions, resulting
from United Nations action or otherwise.
Again I say that we wo,.?ld welcome action by the United Uations which might,
in fact, bring an end to the active hostilities in the area. This critical situation has
been created by the choice of the Chinese Communists, not by us. Their offensive
military intent has been flaunted to the whole world by words and by deeds. Just
as they created the situation, so they can end it if they so choose.
What we are now seeking is primarily to clarify present policy and to unite in its
application. We are not establishing a new policy. Consequently, my recom-
mendations do not call for an increase in the Armed Forces of the United States
or any acceleration in military procurement or levels of defense production. If
any unforeseen emergency arises requiring any change, I will communicate with
the Congress. I hope, however, that the effect of an appropriate congressional
resolution will be to calm the situation rather than to create further conflict.
One final point: The action I request is, of course, no substitute for the treaty
with the Republic of China which we have signed and which I have transmitted
to the Senate. Indeed, p ?esent circumstances make it more than ever important
that this basic agreement; should be promptly brought into force, as a solemn
evidence of our determination to stand fast in the agreed treaty area and to
thwart all attacks directed against it. If delay should make us appear indecisive
in this basic respect, the pressures and dangers would surely mount.
Our purpose is peace. That cause will be served if, with your help, we demon-
strate our unity and our determination. In all that we do we shall remain
faithful to our obligations as a member of the United Nations to be :ready to
settle our international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that inter-
national peace, and security, and justice, are not endangered.
For the reasons outlined in this menage, I respectfully request that the Congress
take appropriate action to carry out the recommendations contained herein.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWEr.
The President's met sage of January 24 and Senate Joint Resolution
28, introduced to give effect to his recommendations, were by unani-
mous consent referred jointly to the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Committee on Armed Services for consideration, study, and
submission of recommendations to the Senate. During the afternoon
of January 24, the joint, committee, under the chairmanship of Senator
George, heard Secretary of State Dulles in executive session. On
January 25 in executive session it heard Adm. Arthur W. Radford,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway,
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Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Chief of Staff of
the Air Force, Adm. Robert B. Carney, Chief of Naval Operations,
and Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The committee met again on January 26 to consider action on the
pending resolution. An amendment offered by Senator Humphrey
to further limit the geographic scope of the resolution was rejected by
a vote of 8 yeas to 20 nays with 2 absent. A second amendment in
the nature of a substitute offered by Senator Kefauver was rejected
by a vote of 8 yeas to 20 nays with 2 absent. Subsequently, the
committee by a vote of 27 to 2 with 1 absent agreed to report favorably
Senate Joint Resolution 28 to the Senate, without amendment.
The President, in his message to the Congress recommending the
enactment of the pending resolution, stated that-
The most important objective of our Nation's foreign policy is to safeguard the
security of the United States by establishing and preserving a just and honorable
peace. In the western Pacific, a situation is developing in the Formosa Straits,
that seriously imperils the peace and our security.
The recent action of the Chinese Communist Government in attack-
ing the Tachen group of islands and its statements to the effect that
"the Government of the People's Republic of China * * *" is "deter-
mined to liberate their own territory of Taiwan" indicate that the
Chinese Communists are contemplating the use of force to capture
Formosa and neighboring islands. Probing operations are underway
to test the determination of the Republic of China and the United
States in their resolve to prevent Formosa and the Pescadores from
falling into unfriendly hands. Under these circumstances, the
President in his message stated:
In the interest of peace, therefore, the United States must remove any doubt
regarding our readiness to fight, if necessary, to preserve the vital stake of the
free world in a free Formosa, and to engage in whatever operations may be required
to carry out that purpose.
The resolution is designed to stabilize the area by spelling out the
action the United States will take to protect Formosa and the Pesca-
dores against armed attack. If we make our intentions clear now, we
may avert more serious consequences at a later time. This resolution
underlines the fact that the President has the full support of Congress
in the use of the Armed Forces in the protection of our vital interests
in this area.
The course of action to which this resolution commits the United
States is not without danger. There is the possibility, for example,
that the Chinese Communist regime may think that our action is a
bluff. Should the Communist regime proceed on that assumption,
the American people must realize that under this resolution the Presi-
dent of the United States could use the Armed Forces of the United
States in the defense of Formosa, the Pescadores, and "such related
positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands." Indeed,
the resolution is broad enough in its language so that the President,
if he finds it necessary, might take appropriate action in the area in
the event Chinese Communist forces should be grouped in such a way
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8 PROTEC'T' THE SECURITY OF FORMOSA
as to present a clear and immediate threat to the security of Formosa
or the Pescadores. Thi::. resolution would be indicative of congressional
support for such action.
The question was rai,;,ed during joint committee consideration of the
pending resolution as to whether action taken by the United States
under these circumstances might; bring into effect the Soviet-Chinese
Treaty of February 14, 1950. Article I of that treaty provides in
part:
In the event of one of tie High Contracting Parties being attacked by Japan
or states allied with it, and thus being. involved in a state of war, the other High
Contracting Party will immediately render military and other assistance with all
the means at its disposal.
There is, of course, a .possibility that the Chinese Communists might
seek to invoke the treaty for the purpose of enlisting the support of
the Soviet Union. This is a calculated risk which the United States
must take. Two points should be noted in this connection, however.
In the first place, it is not the intention of the United States to take
a;gressive action against any country. In the second place, the lan-
guage of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty is open to widely different inter-
pretations. The executive branch indicated to the joint committee
that it very much doubts whether the terms of the treaty would be
invoked even if further difficulties should arise between the United
States and Communist China.
Members of the joint committee are hopeful that the United
Nations might soon be in a po. ition to take appropriate action to
bring an end to hostilities in the Formosan Straits. The committee
ventures to express such a hope despite the fact that the Peiping
radio on January 25 st?sted that- -
Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory. The liberation of Taiwan is
a matter of China's sovereignty and internal affairs. No outside interference
is allowed.
The joint committee agrees with the President who stated that he
would "welcome action by the United Nations which might, in fact,
bring an end to the active hostilities in the area." The joint com-
mittee cannot agree that the use of force in this area is a matter of
domestic concern to the Government of the Republic of China or to
the Chinese Communist Government. The use of force, under the
circumstances existing in that area, threatens the peace of the Western
Pacific and the whole Far East. The joint committee questioned Mr.
Dulles closely as to wl.ether a solution might be forthcoming in the
near future in the United Natiors. The Secretary indicated that this
Government would do its utmost to encourage and support the
United Nations in bringing a cease-fire into effect in this area.
Whatever the origin of hostilities between the island of Formosa
and the China mainland, the fact is that they endanger the peace
of the world. The joint committee did not believe that legalistic
arguments should prevent this Government and the United Nations
from taking such action as might be necessary to preserve peace in
the area.
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It should be noted that the resolution provides that the authority
of the President is to include "the securing and protection of such
related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands
and the taking of such other measures" as he judges are appropriate
to assure the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.
In this connection, members of the joint committee raised a number
of questions about the desirability of establishing specific geographic
limits within which the resolution might apply. Potential aggressors
might then be put on notice that any aggression within the specific
area would be met by the armed might oT the United States.
Both Secretary Dulles and Admiral Radford testified at some length
against the desirability of listing the individual islands covered by the
resolution or spelling out in concrete terms the latitude and longitude
of the areas to be defended. The joint committee agrees that, in this
particular instance at least, it would seem unwise to define too precisely
the geographic scope of the resolution. Such action might handicap
our country by depriving it of flexibility that may be needed to meet
unforeseen situations that might arise in the future.
During committee hearings certain questions were raised as to
whether or not it was necessary for the President to seek congressional
authority for the action proposed. There was some difference of
opinion among committee members with respect to this matter which
is one of the most difficult problems in the whole field of constitutional
law. It was felt, however, that this is essentially a matter of domestic
concern and should not affect the principal purpose underlying the
resolution which is to make unequivocally clear that the Congress
supports whatever action the President may find necessary to take to
be sure that Formosa and the Pescadores do not fall into unfriendly
hands.
In this connection, the joint committee noted that the resolution
does not enter into the field of controversy over the relative powers of
the President and the Congress. It does call for the two branches of
the Government to stand together in the face of a common danger.
With such unity there can be no question that the necessary constitu-
tional powers exist for such action as may be required to meet the kind
of emergency contemplated by the resolution.
JOINT COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION
The joint committee, regardless of the collateral issues that were
raised and considered during executive hearings, believes that it is in
the vital interests of the United States to support the President of the
United States in the action he finds necessary to defend United States
interests in Formosa and the Pescadores. It recommends that the
Senate approve the pending resolution.
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APPENDIX
18. J. Res. 28, 84th Cong., 1st soss.]
JOINT RESOLUTION
,kuthorizing the President: to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for
protecting the security of Formosa, the Pescadores and related positions and
territories of that area
Whereas the primary purpose of the United States, in its relations with all other
nations, is to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and
Whereas certain territories in the West Pacific under the jurisdiction of the
Republic of China are now under armed attack, and threats and declarations have
,een and are being made by the Chinese Communists that such armed attack is
in aid of and in preparation for armed attack on Formosa and the Pescadores,
Whereas such armed attack if continued would gravely endanger the peace and
;ecurity of the West Pacific area and particularly of Formosa and the Pescadores;
, tnd
Whereas the secure possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific
Island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the
United States and all friendly nations in or bordering upon the Pacific Ocean; and
Whereas the President of the United States on January 13, 1955, submitted to
he Senate for its advice and consent to ratification a Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States, of America and the Republic of China, which recognizes
that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against territories, therein
described, in the region of Formosa and the Pescadores, would be dangerous to
he peace and safety of the parties to the treaty: Therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled, Th::.t the President of the United States be and he hereby is
authorized to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary
for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores
against armed attack, the authority to include the securing and protection of
such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the
taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring
the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores.
This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace
and security of the area i;:, reasonably assured by international conditions created
by action of the United Nations or otherwise, and shall so report to the Congress.
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