INTERPRETATION OF NSCID-5 AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO AGREED ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP59-00882R000100300025-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 2003
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: October 22, 1953
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 20 CIA-RDP~9-00882R000100300025-8
22 October 1953
Interpretation of &'&CID-5 and Its Relationship to Agreed
t ctivities
25X1A9A
1. ?4r. s Staff came to
discuss with me the interpretation of HSC - and is relationship
25X1A6A to agreed activities. He stated that an arrangement with CIC for
joint activities in 0 negotiated almost to a successful con-
clusion under General McClure, had come to a halt with his successor,
25X1A9A who said that HI CID-5 legally prevented combined activities between
counterespionage and counterintelligence. I told Mr. 1 I that
in our opinion an attempt to solve this subtle problem on a legalistic
basis would lead nowhere but into confusion and controversy. Also, I
do not believe it too important to spend a great deal of time trying
to define counterespionage and counterintelligence activities in
detail.
2. I felt that generally the problem rested on the question of
responsibility and, therefore, was no different fundamentally from the
positive problems of national and departmental intelligence and other
budget problems, r Thus,, there are some activities which are clearly
counterintel,l.igence, such as those relating to the physical security
of installations and the internal security involving U. ii. personnel.
In these we have no interest except as we could contribute from
incidental information picked up through our proper channels. Equally
clear are some of the purely counterespionage activities of CIA dealing
with Communist operations and psychological or physical subversion.
Between these two is a large area of combined and occasionally con-
flicting interests.
3. To my mind., therefore,, the problem became one of educating
field commanders and the CIC on the problem of divergent respon.s.ibi-
lities with the hope of impressing them that the Director's responsi-
',Ility for the national security overcame the immediate interest of a
post or a station if the two were in direct conflict on an equal basis.
Of course, where the national security interest is remote or tentative
and the CIC interest is immediate and compelling, counterespionage
interest should normally yield to the immediate circumstances. It is
a the interests seem evenly balanced that the problem becomes
truly difficult..
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25X1A9A
25X1A9A
. I told dir. II thought a. possible approach would
be to demonstrate that where the national security interest appeared
in a CIC operation the person conducting the operation should recognize
it and realize that unless he provided for proper attention to the
counterespionage aspects at the possible expense of his own CIC
interests, he was assuming unnecessarily and improperly a responsi-
bility which he could readily pass to the counterespionage side,
responsible properly for such matters to the Director of Central
telligence. Mr. Ppeared very interested in this
analysis and said he would probably be in touch .,rith us.
IAWREI CE R. HOUSTON
Guneral Counsel
o/DD/A
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