OGC SECURITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP59-00882R000300210003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 8, 1955
• Content Type: MF

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Approved For Reledws~ 20 8 , A-'7kd 9-V k
8 September 1955
'.Z IORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
SUBJECT : OGC Security
I. In recent weeks three members of this Office have been cited
for security violations. This has raised the question whether security
procedures currently in force in the Office are adequate.
2. Our security procedures differ from those of some of the other
offices .of the Agency only in that we do not have a single staff duty
officer for the whole office. Instead we assign areas of responsibility
for staff duty check to various members of the Office. This system is
more convenient for OGC because of the small size of the office. !or-
mally, staff duty check is assigned on a rotating basis to the men in a
division or branch and to attempt to so assign it in this Office would
result in staff duty for some individuals on at least a weekly basis
and sometimes more often. Moreover, because of the nature of the duties
of the attorneys, many of them would not be able to be present at the
close of business in order to perform the staff duty check and as a re-
sult, there would be a good chance of the check being overlooked. The
present system is perhaps not completely adequate in that it often re-
sults in only one check being made of an office. The only solution short
of regular staff duty cheek,which does not seem feasible for OGC, would
seem to be assignment of two individuals each of whom must check his area
and safes each night in order that a double check is always performed and
the chance of material being left out or safes left open decreased.
3. All of the recent violations were the leaving out of classified
material. In one case, material was inadvertently folded inside of un-
classified material which is normally left on the desk. In the other
cases, the material was left in the open but not seen by anyone before the
office closed. Therefore, in two of the three recent violations it is
possible that a more thorough check system would have prevented the vio-
lation.
4. It is proposed that the present security procedure be revised
along the line suggested and that each member of the Office be briefed on
his obligation to see that his area is double checked before closing up for
the night. 25X1 A
Approved For Releas0/Al2fi :, GIAD V0882R000300210003-0