TAB 'A' REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00213A000200030002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1950
• Content Type: REPORT

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TAB "As'
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
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SECTION I
Types of National Intelligence
In order that the process of drafting an intelligence pro-
duction plan may proceed with some general understanding
of what is being planned, the Committee has drafted a rough
categorization of national intelligence. Probably few intelli-
gence products actually adhere rigidly to any of these cate-
gories. Many intelligence products undoubtedly contain some
elements of all these categories. The abstraction is useful,
however, in indicating the main emphasis that should be ob-
served in intelligence products falling roughly into one or the
other of these categories.
A CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
PRODUCTION BY TYPES
Categories
Functional
Types of
Subcategories
Intelligence Product
A. Basic
(None)
Compendium of organized in-
Intelligence
formation on any given area
or subject; a basis for the for-
mulation of intelligence reports
and estimates
B. Reportorial
1. Descriptive
Summary description of new
Intelligence
event, situation, or trend
20 Reportorial-
Preliminary ("spot")
Analytic
analysis of reported new
event, situation, or trend
C. Estimative
1. Analytic-
Summary analysis or synthe -
Intelligence
Synthetic
sis of one or more situations
or trends and their present
bearing on US security
2. Predictive
Contingent prediction of future
situations or trends and esti-
mates of future bearing on'
US security
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SECTION II
Intelligence Plying
Ao Principles.
1. Within the general framework of the intelligence
categories presented in Section I, the Committee drafted
the following statement of the basic principles underlying
the process of planning the production of national intel-
ligence.
. 20 A plan. is the reflection of the latest judgment of
intelligence producers as to what substantive matters
are of major concern, to US national security and the
appropriate ways of producing and disseminating such
. intelligence o
3o This judgment about substantive matters of major
concern should reflect.
-
a.0 As much knowledge as possible of what policy
makers a?e r f ct concerned withe .
b.0 As much knowledge as possible of events,
situations, or trends in world affairs that have or may
have a bearing on US security.
B. Basis of the Plan,
1. As the; first step in formulating a national intellim
gence production plan., the Committee agreed.that one way tea.
to describe those matters of major concern to US security
is in terms of "power situations."' Such a list would be
relatively stable, and would provide a basis and a guide for
examining foreign situations systematically.
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a These substantive matters of major concern to
US security are international "'power situations," trends
toward them, their precise nature or. character, and their
consequences. Power -situations are those political,
military,. economic, ideological, and other situations
that affect the ability of the US to promote or defend. its
interests.
bo Power -situations encompass several basic factors:
(1) Power Status and Potential.
(a) Military.
(b) Economic.
(c) Political o
(d) Ideological.
(e) Other.
(2) Intentions of Leadership (wielders of power;
i.e., officials, organized pressure groups, mass attitudes,
et all:):
(a) Concerning maintenance and development
of power.
(b) Concerning employment of power.
(3) Stability of Leadership.
(a) Institutional o
(b) Ideological.
co These power situations may:
(1) Presently exist.
(2) Promise to materialize in the future.
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d. Power -situations or factors in power -situations
may be examined by analyzing.
(1) Present Situation.
(a) Its nature.
(b) Its consequences.
(2) A Future Situation.
(a) Its probability.
(b) Its nature.
(c) Its consequences.
eo Power-situations or factors in them must be defined
in terms of some specific power-grouping (political, regional,
or` ideological) or some specific component thereof.
2. Having described in general terms those matters of major
concern to US security, the Committee agreed that the next step
in an intelligence production plan, is to list the major power
groupings affecting US security and to assign priority ratings
to the different groupings. Such a listing must be reviewed,
if not necessarily revised, at regular intervals. This listing
would provide a further guide to the relative importance of
intelligence on any given situation. Below is a sample listing.
Major Power-Groupings Affecting US Security (with Priority#)
(Regional) (Institutional Ideological)
(1) The USSR (inela EE Satellites) (1), International Communism
(2 China (2)
(2 Scandinavia (2)
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(2) Central. Europe Border Area
25X1
Austria
Finland
(2) Western. Europe (continental)
(3) East Asia Border Area
0
(3)
(3)
Southeast Asia Peninsula
Balkan & Near East Border Area
Non-Communist Asiatic Crescent
Indian Subcontinent
(4) Rear Area Near East (including (4) Islam
Egypt)
(4) Africa (excluding Egypt) (4) Organization of
American States
(4) Western. Hemisphere and Miscel-
laneous Atlantic and Pacific
Areas
3. In establishing priorities and defining fields of study,
as well as in judging individual projects, some criteria should
be developed in practice by which to judge the relative importance
.to US security as well as the urgency of proposed projects o These
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criteria would be derived from the attempt to answer such
questions as these-,
a. Does the project analyze and/or estimate the
effects of an existing event, sit aation9 or development upon
.US security?
be Does the project appraise the effects on US
security of various lines of action.. the US might take. in a
particular situation?
cn Does the project shed light on. the capabilities
and. probable courses of action of foreign countries, groups,
or individuals or. combinations thereof that might affect US
security?
d. Does the project forecast an event, situation, or
development that will have repercussions on US security?
eo Does the project provide background information
essential, to the understanding or evaluation of a foreign event,
situation,, or development affecting US security interests,
and is this material not available elsewhere?
Co. Project List.
The end product of planning is a .list of specific projects
with a schedule for their production. This list would reflect
the latest judgment .of intelligence producers and consumers
(guided by the listings in paragraphs A. and Bo) as to what
substantive matters are of major concern to US national
security. The list would be divided into two parts--Major
Fields of Study, and Specific Projects (with completion. dates).
The first part would be under constant review but would not
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necessarily change often. The second part would be changing
constantly. A sample list, is presented at the end of this
section.
D. Application of the Plano
The Committee recognized that the above plan applies
primarily to estimative intelligence (see chart in Section. I).
Planning in such specific. terms cannot be done for reportorial
intelligence. The priority guides in Paragraph B?above and
the list referred to in Paragraph Co, however, will serve
as a basis for determining the subject matter of reportorial
intelligence. Moreover, the priorities governing the pro-
duction of basic intelligence-should be assigned and reviewed
in the light of Paragraphs Band Co
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Sample Schedule of Projects (1 March 1950)
Major Fields of Study
Global Situations Affecting US
Security
Soviet (EE Satellite) Capabilities
.for open war
Soviet intentions with respect to
open war
Soviet economic power potential
Strategy, Tactics, and Current
Activities of International Com-
munism
Chinese Power Potential and
Alignment
Alignments and Effectiveness of
UN
Projects (With completion dates)
Review of World S ituation as it
Relates to US Security
Effectiveness of US Export Controls
Petroleum Sabotage
Effects of Soviet Atomic Capabilities
Soviet Capabilities and intentions:
Probability of War 1951-1954
USSR Petroleum Industry
Soviet-Satellite Shipbuilding
Possibility of Soviet Troop With-
drawal from E. Germany in 1950
Succession of Power in USSR
Theory and Practice of Communist
Subversion
Crisis in Indochina
Soviet Objectives in FE Border Areas
Consequences of US Recognition of
Communist China
Developments in Taiwan
Food Outlook in Communist China
Civil Aviation in China
Vulnerability of China to Pressures
Soviet Role in the UN
UN in Relation to US Security.
Relative Resources East-West
Labor Blues
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Power-Potential and Alignment-of
Scandinavia
Western European Leadership:
European Regionalism
Alignment of Western European.
nations
Stability of Leadership of Western
Europe
Economic power -potential,
W. Europe
Alignment of European "neutrals"
Alignment of the small states of
European border areas
Power Potential and Alignment
of Germany
Power Potential and Alignment of:
The Region of the Non-Commu-
nist Cresirent in Asia
Indian Subcontinent
Indonesia
Southeast Asia Peninsula
25X6
Korea
Yugoslavia
Greece-Turkey-Iran
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French Labor Unrest
Consequences of Change in French
Government
Economic "Integration" of West-
ern Europe
Situation in Finland
Orientation of West Germany
South Asiatic Regionalism
Communist Penetration of India/
and Pakistan
European Consequences of Independ-
ence of Indonesia
Civil Aviation, SEA
Communist Influence in Burma
Rubber Production in SE Asia
Japanese Peace Treaty
Yugoslav-Soviet. Relations
Situation in Greece
Suppression of Communism in
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Power-Potential of Rear Area Communist Penetration of Arab 4
Near East States
Power-potential of Emergent Communist Infiltration of Central
African Dependencies America
Power-potential and alignments of Civil Aviation in Latin America
Latin America
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SECTION III
Proposed Media for Execution of Intelligence Production Plan
A. The following general types of media of dissemination
are presented as appropriate for intelligence produced under
the national intelligence plan. The committee does not consider
herein the question of allocation of responsibility for these media
of dissemination among the IAC agencies not the suitability of
ORE's present specific media of dissemination,
B. Basic Intelligence.
The committee accepts in general the NIS production
program as presently planned and executed, but recommends
that the need for it and other types of basic intelligence be ex-
amined periodically and correlated with other kinds of intel-
ligence production.
C. Reportorial Intelligence.
In determining the media for the dissemination of intel-
ligence of this category--namely, summary descriptions and
preliminary analyses of new events, situations or trends in world
affairs---the production plan will recognize that policy-makers
need to be informed quickly and that such media cannot treat
intelligence exhaustively, and must therefore contain brief ana
lyses supported by a minimum of factual .details The committee
believes that the. following media would meet the requirements
of the plan with respect to the production of reportorial intel-
ligence.
1, A Daily Report, Such a publication should present, for
the information of top-level members of the US Government a
brief of the daily traffic of topmost significance to the security
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of the US. This brief should be accompanied whenever
appropriate by short spot analyses or comments. Annexes to
the Daily Report should be published whenever it is deemed
necessary to present a more detailed factual account or brief
estimate on a current development of major significance to US
security.
2. A Weekly Report. Such a publication would provide
for important policy-makers of the US Government an eval-
uative and analytical review of world-wide current develop-
ments and trends of importance to US security. Composition
of the Weekly Report should be determined by the broad
principles applying to production of all types of reportorial
intelligence. In addition, items selected for a Weekly Re-
port should as a rule be of general interest to US security
rather ?than dealing solely with a specific matter or problem.
3. Special Memoranda, Provision should be made for
the production of reportorial intelligence which does not lend
itself readily to periodic treatment, Such intelligence,, though' .
bearing on US security, is of primary interest or concern to
specialized agencies or individuals of the US Government.
D. Estimative Intelligence.
Intelligence of the analytic or estimative type, which
is believed to be the primary mission of CIA, can generally
be produced in the following types of publications:
1. National Intelligence Reports. These reports
should be designed to provide intelligence support for the
daily operations of US action and intelligence agencies and
should be geared to the needs of those engaged in formulating
and implementing specific policy or operations rather than of
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those planning for and making broad policy decisions. As
such, they should emphasized
(a) Factual, statistical, or technical information
which relates to US security; or
(b) Information. of common concern which is either
available in its entirety only to CIA or not readily available
in other form .
While maintaining this emphasis, they should
contain sufficient interpretation and analysis to make the In.
formation readily derstandable and usable to those who are
not experts in the-field in question, They may also contain
factual or specific estimates of limited scope which follow
logically from the presentation of such information.
2. National Intelligence Estimates. Addressing them-
selves to the attention o the President, the members of the
NSC, and the high policy-planning levels of the US Government,
these national intelligence estimates should. deal with develop -
ments of major importance to US security. Such estimates
should:
(a) Assess in a broad context the important aspects
of situations and analyze their cumulative impact on US security;
(b) Make an unequivocal forecast of the maximum
range consistent with the problem;
(c) Contain no more factual information than is
required for support of the analysis and estimate.
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3, Review of World Situation. Such a publication,
issued monthly, to coincide with NSC meetings and stressing
developments of the past month, should present in a global
context a brief review and estimate of~ :situations that
materially affect US security.
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SECTION IV
Machinery for Implementi
for formulating and carrying it o to
the Intelligence Production Plan
A. The Committee firmly believes that the clear assign-
ment of full responsibility in ORE under the AD/ORE is neces-
sary if planning as recommended i1h the foregoing sections of
this memorandum is to be succes ffulo In other words, no
production plan can be any more ffective than the machinery
B. This is true because i telligence_rp?a nn ng is_a
tin ous p oC ss of. judg ~ It involves substantive decisions
about the importance to US security of specific kinds or pieces
of intelligence. It is a dynamic process, an executive activity
rather than an advisory, or purely staff function. Any pro--
duction plan to be effective must be continually revised and re-
planAU recess.... At present: the existence o w e y-varied
production plans in some divisions, as well as the lack of them
in other divisions, has led to production being undertaken on
differing and frequently inconsistent grounds. It is not suffi-
cient merely to add up individual division plans as if planning
were a simple problem in arithmetic or a mechanical task of
rearranging division contributions in a neat pattern. If ORE
production is to be properly focussed, it must be planned
duction is largely the r s t of the. lack of centralization of -the
1policy-makers to ascertain their intelligence needs. It was on
the basis of this reasoning that the Committee concluded that
adequate planning machinery must be an integral part of any
worthwhile system of production planning.
C. The present lack of system-and focus in ORE pro-
situation. Somebody must see that it is properly implemented.
Someone musmt ain in c os?an con iiIuous is w tlrthe-
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viewed, must be kept up to date in terms of the changing
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centrally, on. an ORE -wide basis, with the various division
efforts properly integrated in a process of judgment as to
global importance in terms of US security.
D. On the principle that planning is an integral part of
intelligence production, substantively competent and exper-~
ienced intelligence producers are required as full-time
planners. While the EPB is composed of substantively com-
petent chiefs of producing components, it is not a satisfactory
instrument for the continuous day-to-day work of maintain-
ing a production plan,
E. The Committee, 'therefore, recommends the estab- ?
lishment in ORE of a small administrative unit composed of
substantively competent intelligence officers to be designated
the intelligence planning unit. It should operate under the
direct supervision of the AD/ORE and the general policy
guidance of the EPB. Its chief should be a regular member
of the EPB and have direct access to the AD/ORE and other
members of the EPB. Its functions should be:
1. Maintain close and continuing liaison with the prin-
cipal intelligence consumers as one method of ascertaining
their intelligence needs,
2. Formulate, in consultation with the chiefs of
producing components in ORE, a. National Intelligence Pro -
duction Plan drafted along the lines of the sample recom-
mended in this memorandum,
3. Submit the current plan to the EPB for review and
approval quarterly or oftener in event of basic recasting of
the plan.
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4. Keep the plan under continuous review in the light
of the needs of policy-makers, the intelligence produced in
ORE, and the IAC agencies, and the capabilities of all. pro'-
duping components, making revisions as regtured within' the
general framework of the plan.
5. Conduct general review. of intelligence production
to determine that it meets the plan.
6. Participate in the coordination of the plan outside
ORE and in the allocation of responsibilities under the plan.
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SECTION V
Additional Problems and Recommendations
In the, course of its deliberations, the committee. con-
sidered several subjects which have a bearing on planning
intelligence production but which. did not seem either to i'll
within the committee's terms of reference or to be within the
capability of the committee to consider adequately. The com-
mittee, therefore, recommends that the EPB undertake studies
to review the following subjects-
A. Allocation of Production Responsibility: Very broad
interdepartmental allocations of intelligence production re-
sponsibility have been made in NSCID #3, such as:
Military p Department of the Army
Political, cultural, sociological - Department of State
National intelligence - CIA
CIA is responsible for national intelligence as a whole, while
other agencies are responsible for contributions thereto (as
well as for strictly departmental requirements). It follows,
therefore, that CIA may indicate to the respective IAC agencies,
under the broad NSCID allocations, those portions of their ...
fields of responsibility (military, political, etc.) which require,
at any given time, special productive effort to meet national
intelligence needs. Such action by CIA would constitute inter-
departmental allocation of production responsibility. Allocation
could presumably proceed on the basis of the major fields of
study listed as a sample in Section 11, by assigning such fields
of study to respective IAC agencies in accordance with their
capability and competence. The committee submits this as one
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approach to the problem of allocation, while recommending
that the whole matter be studied as an important corollary to
the spbject of national intelligence planning.
B. Services of Common Concern- The performance of
services of common concern by ORE has an important bearing
on the quantity and quality of ORE production, which is the
essential ingredient of a national intelligence production plan.
It is recommended that services of common concern be re-
examined to determine the extent of their influence on the
implementation of a production plan.
Co Media- Section III above describes in general terms
the media considered appropriate to disseminate national
intelligence. The committee does not believe that all these
media need necessarily be produced by ORE. It should be
noted, however, that only CIA is in a position to produce, as
they are defined in Section III, a Daily Report, a Weekly
Report, a Review of the World Situation, and National Intel
ligence Estimates. These four publications by their very
nature transcend departmental responsibilities and can only
be produced by a cental intelligence agency. The committee
recommends, however, that the EPB conduct a survey to
determine:
1. Whether the Daily Summary and thq Weekly
Summary now being produced by ORE are adequate in scope
and treatment.
2. What types of National Intelligence Reports
ORE should produce.
3. What types of special memoranda ORE
should produce.
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D. Intelligencence Support for Other Offices in CIA: ORE
is currently devoting a considerable effort to filling requests
from other offices in CIA, particularly from OPC o Such
requests, particularly if they increase, could interfere
seriously with fulfillment of national intelligence as speci-
fied in the National Intelligence Production Plan, The com-
mittee therefore recommends that the EPB study these requests
to determine the extent to which they interfere with the prod-
uction of national intelligence.
E. Working Papers- Because the efforts now being de-
voted to the production of working papers may affect the pro-
duction of national, intelligence; because working papers. are
disseminated primarily to working levels in the IAC agencies
and to other offices of CIA; because each division in ORE has
adopted a different policy with regard to working papers; it is
recommended that the EPB study the whole question of work-
ing papers with reference to their effect upon national Intel-
igence production.
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