POSSIBLE SURPRISE DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00321R000400160006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 30, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
ITI
DATE
1
Mr. Warner, GC
2
221 East Bldg.
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
Attached for your files is a paper which
the Director used when briefing the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on 2 Tiny 58r
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
J. S. Earman
7/30/58
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11
CI A-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-0-342531
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2013/06/11: CIA-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5
1 MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
In connection with your upcoming appearances
on Capitol Hill, I attach a catalogue of "Possible
Surprise Developments" which could serve as a basis
for raising flags, if you wish to take the oppor-
tunity to do so.
The list is dreary indeed, but I believe
realistic. STAT
HUNTINGTON D. SHELDON
Acting DD/I
29 July 1958
(DATE)
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5
POSSIBLE SURPRISE DEVELOPMENTS
I, Anglo-American intervention has stilled for moment worst effects of
Iraqi coup, but this probably not only upheaval we can expect in
Middle East.
A. Nasir has radical Arab nationalism on his side.
B. This explosive force holds further opportunities for pro-Nasir
elements and for Soviet bloc.
II. Lebanon and Jordan are countries most immediately threatened by
Iraqi developments.
A. Lebanese crisis likely to end in compromise with some advantage
to rebel elements.
B. Jordan's King Nu'sayn is in imminent personal peril despite
presence of British troops.
III. As the impact of Iraqi developments spreads to the periphery of
the Arab world, we are faced with additional dangers.
A. The ruler of oil-rich Kuwait wishes to reach an accommodation
with Nasir; if the British oppose, violence and sabotage in
Kuwait seem almost inevitable. There could be an Iraq-type
coup or a direct clash between a "liberating" Iraqi army and
the British.
B. The Saudi government is seeking to reconcile itself to Nasir.
C. Pro-Western leaders in the Sudan and Libya are threatened by
prospect of direct coup action. Also their support base,
gradually being eroded, a process which is fairly well advanced
in both countries, particularly in the Sudan.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5
D. Renewed Yemeni harassing operations against the British in Aden
and further Saudi and UAR aid to the Oman rebels are definitely
in prospect.
IV. As Israel's sense of isolation grows, the Israelis may turn to
neutralism. Another possibility is that "activist" elements may
touch off another Arab-Israeli war; even moderates feel Israel
must seize West Jordan if King Husayn is overthrown.
V. Elsewhere in Middle East, trouble may develop suddenly as follow-up
to heavy impact of Iraqi coup.
A. Iran--Shah lacks popular support, depends on loyalty of army.
Anti-Shah elements might try coup if significant faction of
army were to switch support.
B. Turkey--Ankara might attempt military venture in Syria.
C. Kurdish tribes in Iranian and Turk border areas may be stirred
up by UAR and Soviet Union.
D. Pakistan--rulers uneasy. Chronic instability due to political
factionalism and economic stagnation continues.
VI. North African problems only temporarily out of limelight.
A. Algerian rebellion continues, and De Gaulle's policies not
likely to prove solution.
B. In Morocco, agitation increasing for closing US airbases and
adoption of neutralism.
C. Tunisian regime of Bourguiba fears Algerian rebels. Egypt might
try to overthrow Bourguiba because of pro-Westernism.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5
VII. Asian countries now quiet, but surprises possibly in store.
A. In Laos young anti-Communists may attempt coup to reverse trend
of increasing Communist influence. Such a move could lead to
trouble, not only internally, but also with Viet Minh.
B. Cambodia is developing closer ties with Communist bloc which
could involve military aid pact with Peiping.
C. In Ceylon Bandaranaike is threatened by communal strife, labor
unrest, and Communist activity.
D. Dormant conflicts in Formosa Straits and Korea remain potential
dangers.
E. Countries friendly to US where one individual is dominant
figure--like Chiang in Formosa, Rhee in Korea, Diem in South
Vietnam, and Sarit in Thailand--these countries bear watching
because of uncertainty if leader should suffer mishap.
VIII. Even in Western Europe, developments may come with surprise.
A.
For example, France may demonstrate a nuclear capability before
we are ready to deal with consequences.
IX.
Latin America is likely to continue periodic turmoil.
A.
More trouble is brewing in Guatemala where attempt to overthrow
Ydigoras may be in offing and Communist influence is again rising.
B.
Venezuela remains unstable.
start a bloody civil war.
A move by military factions could
Communist strength is increasing.
C.
Unstable conditions continue in Cuba and Peru. The Communists
are making gains in Brazil and Chile. Rumors continue that
Peron will soon return to Argentina.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/11: CIA-RDP60-00321 R000400160006-5