Pros and Cons Regarding Proposed Organization of Supplemental Programs Division

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP60-00538A000100040001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 1, 2000
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2000/08/
Pros and Cons Re ardin Pro sed Organization of Su le ital
Pro rams Division
not readily interchangeable because of the nature
and special skills required.
training
MINT and S.I. material - especially the nature and success of the
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Appoved For Release 2000/08
1. Four branches are proposedt Supplementary Lctivities, aLIk Activities,
Broadcasting Activities, Auxiliary Functions.
2. Arguments in favor of setting up k.I. and LINT in a separate division,
rather than in Operations and Training Livision which operates other
Comma field activitie;st
a. LINT and "T are primarily monitoring rather than transmission and
reception activities. They are not concerned with CIA Communications,
but rather with foreign electronic radiations.
b. Ei.IWr and ST monitoring involve higiiy specialized techniques and
skills, special equipment and specially trained personnel. FLINT
personnel specially are more engineers than technicians.
a. LUNT involves, in addition to monitoring, a research and analysis
function, which is not the case in normal headquart:rs to field
communications activities.
d. rLINT and ?.T. personnel, and normal Commo technical personnel are
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fields, with DD// operational support of lesser significance. Nor-
mal, Commo opera
e largely in support of m /P.
g. FLINT and .T. nonitorin& activities are full-time jobs. A Commo
technician could not spend part of his defy on FLINT and ..I.,
part on normal Como operations. If LLINT and .1, were attached
to operations and Training Liviaion, it would be more adininiatrativ*
then substantive attachment.
h. LINT and 5.1. field rnonitorir require greater penetration then
normal Cora field activities.
I. fl T and S.I. activities, because they are part of gency- ,de ard
government-wide program in these fields, re
dination with components not concerned with normal Coro operations.
FLINT and S.I. field activities will be so large that their attach-
ment to Operations and Traininr Division would make that organization
ton unwieldy and too complex to administer.
k. LIT and b-1- direction, targeting and rec?oirerr:ents will derive
Iargei r from OSI and- r?e+spectively, while normal Como activities 25X1 C4a
get their direction largely f ror: is i /?.
1. Comro people who handle E . #. , and possib
security clearances.
u#.re specie l
Arguments in favor of setting uI, .T . and LINT in Operations and Train-
ing Division:
a. pecause of Commoi3 functional organization, all Corso
ties would logically fall under operations and ':raining Livislon.
b. "ensitlvity and Special skills could he provided by establishing
separate branches within :operations and Training Livision.
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c. Operations and Training Division will be involved, to some extent,
in ELINT and S.T. on e. project basis even if Supplemental Programs
Division is created, and attachment of all LLTWT and S.:' . activities
to Cpsrations and Training Division would eliminate possible dupli-
cation and overlap.
d. Field station administration would be simplified by having control
of all field activities and all personnel and facilities at each
station under one command.
e. One focal point for all field support and programing would be pro-
vided.
is coverage of all Comoro field activities would be possible,
permitting consolidated operation of normal Congo, z LI and S.I.
within each geograpiic area.
Arguments in favor of Betting up "block broadcasting" under a separate
divisions
a. Block broadcasting,, in addition to transmission, involves a aasonl toring
operation to determine penetration and to detect jamming. 'hiB jam-
ming may be in the form of LLINT or S.T. radiation.
b. Block broadcasting is more sensitive than normal Como operations,
and requires handling more like ELINT and S .I .
c. Block broadcasting requires special skills in the use of normal
Comoro equipment.
d. Some block broadcasting facilities require deeper cover and penetra-
tion then normal Cc .o facilities.
Arguments in favor of setting up "block broadcasting" in Operations and
`raining Livision?
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a. Block broadcasting is simply a specialised application of normal
commo equipment and personnel. Both are interchangeable with other
cnr mo ec uipment and personnel.
b. Operations and Training Livision is primarily intended to gu
DD/P operations. Block broadcasting is a direct part of this program
and its location in Operations and Training Division w uld permit
greater consolidation and coordination of the program.
Block broadcasting will continue to be done by Operations Livision,
and its establishment in another division would be duplication.
d. The relationship between block broadcasting and a; LIN? and S . T. is
relatively secondary. Block broadcasting personnel are not inter-
ested in the nature of Jamming of their broadcasts, but rather in
the tact that they are being jammed. There is also jamming of normal
Comm.o operations.
e. Block broadcasting, unlike :LINT and u.I., will be done largely from
normal Commo ;-tations, and it would simplify Station administration
if it were under Operations Livision.
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