I. ESTIMATED LONG RANGE SIGNIFICANCE OF ANTARTICA TO THE USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00391R000100160007-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: June 1, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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Estimated Long kinge Significance of Antarctica to the' w%ie,-L
backgroundof'the complex of interrel:.ted considerati)nas scientists,
strategic, economic and political, The Soviets have come to attach the
greatest importance to earth science re_:oarch: ge:.>physice, ,eolog ,
geography due to the great dependence placed upon ar.d their uuc:e5sfui
contribution to the industrialization of the _'ovjet Union, It :r not
be too strong a statement to state that-the vc::7 foundations of `av_et
industrialization itself-came to depend in
part on the =,rimrcry dapen3e,ic=
placed upon earth scientists from the earliest period of Leninist rule
to survey, map, and develop the natur*..' resources of the Sovitt :,'pion.
Similarly, earth scientists have also hen charged to aid. the fatherland
in the struggle against nature, in which the drouth problem blab an
immediate urgency and given primary consideration. As a consequence
early importance became attached to the development of capabilities to
forecast the caprices of dynamic geophysical phenomena. The enefite to
'}e derived from such capabilities were indivisiole: ec:inoctic, :military
and political To be able to forecast for ecDnomic necessities wade it
also possible to forecast for military o,.Perationa.l needs; both asswn9d
importance to sustain the State and its ideological foundations. Thus
under the struggle compulsions of comtnurist ideology, b--.,sic research has
simsultaneouay economic, miilita ~nd i,tical significance:` rv}bysicul
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environmental data for ope-ational purposes becomes c::;ua11y importunt
with mechanical design data in the "hardware" development, This has
been>ruflected in the Soviet-restriction of any forms of oArth science
data as well ae many types 'of mechanical data.' Substantial investments
have been made in.e-:rth science research, development and educ ion fr?in
the earliest days. After an initial period of emergency activity earth
science moved into the field of bai.ic research, For e.;a=pie,, b;i 1,930
a magnetic survey of the entire country-vas launched, in 1932 a LTavimetr3_c
survey was decreed. Topographic napping of to entire country evolved.
The study of the Arctic for the development of the Northern Sea ?toute
was begun in the earliest years of Sv1et rule. With evulvinv saccese-
such sup)ort has been continuw.d up to the present, with the result that
Soviet earth scientists have never been without re:juire i fisc.-il s~_iprort.
As progress developed in the study and of earth science phenomena in the
fulfillment of projects for i:.mediate domestic needs, particul-irl.y after
World War II, Soviet scientific interests advanced into the worldwide
study of the earth as a whole. This expansion of interest is inherent
in the nature of earth science phenomena themselves: (1) no two ,oints
in, on, or above the earth are identical; (2) these ;;henomena are dynamic
in apace and times (3) there is a dynami.csj, worldwide interrelationship
of these phenomenal and (L) observational data become pro,;ressively more
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rncanningful the ; eater thcix .;n in +,,i n:,
e! udiesp the :Loviets ',ritk. their
re a rGn institu~,es Pere rep red toe rd
e launch i It; of 1 hd.l f offered the o :
timely of opportunitic-s to _artiri r e5
.system. tic worldwide pro gram to ',t f Ind ,y^' t'i:"t.;,
otherwise could not have bf cry calle,:;,c do
Some indicati:)n of , he, signs ficar ce ?af this ax ogo am to
to the ', ~Y
.'SLY
and Geophyaica in order to avoid a y presaurea to s, ;re any of its
Soviets had not been willing to form: the .nt er:;i tional Uniou of xecdevy
sigr'ificant and vol;:minofis data (except fo
of the world.
weather dit,-4) with UCf L ?-`3
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The strategic significance sterna it-dtially and primarily from
scientific,.importance of south
polar data to the a~ii total of a l i
observations as well as for thei.x' regional. significance. Although
ostensiVlye brought to the .area fob t , TGX progic t . i
note, the expansion of' Soviet', act '4,1.'.t -At either h:i've
sign i ficant . to
o relevancy
to the MY program or tho strew4upon those 6-ubjects of the 16Y that h-av
particular value to military objectives. l,ea ,nsad air "t vigation studiuu,
the compilation, at
navigational;-hydrographic descriptions for
na ~;rztx. n .1.
aide, topographic surgmying`
tad mappin'g,, represent the former. The ho ivy
emphasis on Soviet oceanographic program, which ,,isra
combined prograa : of
89. , incl-,ded, end the emphasis
of wave studies? sea ice conditions,, e> n .flour eo ogyy reprreaer-*t ex l'r-xr:
knowledge significant to guided-'miss le capabilities. Oven their pr-3?ir
of the MY program represents an effort that can contribute ba&-166c
capabilities. The heavy emphasis on grn'rtxi etr7 beyond the core intereat
that clearly reflect the development and impro: ement: of air and sca ope:rat cc:, a
however thee ? are
concurrent benefits that takr'` on ~'eic .inpi8rfcncs0 ' l iresence on the
ice cap provides the only Soviet outpost und& r exclvgive Soviet Ccyltrcl 111L
Southern Hemisphere. Therefore, in addition to the long-range scientific
vailable a assure sources of data in thw ",water
hemisphere" that could support supply weather and ioncaepheeic storm
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orecantin and also serve af; comnw ic.:- " or,s t. ru:::'lssiun r_`
submarine operations during an emergency period, The re,;ioual v-,-er:-tior- a
experience on the ice cap as well as on the seas , rovides a }.r~?J_r;
Capability to operate under the conditions Ind in the enviror u.;t.t
characteristiilto the ens
g rally
higher elePationsa colder :-Ktetapt,,r.t,uresy
lower o:cygen content, and lower air`.preaaures that chnrr cteristica J.y-
differentiate the Antarctic from the lirctic. In tie connecti.:
believe that several published remarks -if Dr. L. I Shcherbal:nv, : le.:J.int,
figure in Soviet Antarctic scientific planninj;, :tre nvLewurt.i rP Li ur,e
source he categorically stated (1956) that "tile Antarctic it e and islands, are etrategieally important," In another instance, he
expressed his personal conviction that the Soviet Union will cortlnae
its scientific operations "since they are r.xtrelaeiy neces:iazy to .ren }h,
a v-iriety of applied branches of science: sea and air i,avibati%ii,
forecasting service, the whaling industry and others?" lit-, e. v.:;.ix-1oo,,
after the IGY, the improvement of continuously ~;,e z at~r.g ba;:i. n f,;r
scientific research and economic development, and also the establishment
of settlements around meteorologicak * d radio:b*sen, as "in the oviet
Arctic. Since the Soviets have dibclosed pl&ns to use nuclear-,.,U4:.rad
vessels in Antarctica, they presumably wo :1d be ca; able of est~:bli s! :lc ,;
bases that could generate nuclear-power er.ari.
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of the IG7 Program
geology, geography9 mineral-resource ex?loraticr.
mapping, hydrographic charting and navigation studies and (2) .:3 far
greater area coverage than originally announced in their IGY program.
Since we know that the Soviets have a strong; interest in bi-polar
research ear Be as an essential part of their interest in the atudj of
worldwide interrelationship of geophysical and :dated oceanic,, ter c3stri ,_f,
and atmospheric phenomena, and since these by their nature becomfs
increasingly meaningful with the ,montinuous accumulation of data covering
the widest possible area, we feel that'the"Foviete will continue to
great scientific importance to the continuation of their observ-ationa
in Antarctica indefinitely after :the IGI.
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Indirect importance derives from scientific data that will improve Soriez.
forecasting capabilities (weather, seismic, communications) for the
Northern Hemisphere to support the practical needs of agriculture, housing,
transportation etc., and from basic studies on marine biology and world
ocean dynaidcs that Will lead to improved estimates of ocean food resc tr:.es
for fishing requirements. Direct benefits, however, are derived entirely
The econor4c significance of Antarc'.ica is both direct and iridire-t,
Ec onoed.c
from whalir operations. The Soviet Union is the fourth large:,t
(considering the UK and Union of South Africa separately) producer Df
Antarctic whale oil. The Soviets, however, have ambitious plans to
increase their whale take. three new catchers have already bt:-e: &ddady
and a whole now fleet is now in production, including a factory shi,, of
45,000 tonnage, In anticipation of this expansion the Soviet Antarctic
program includes a special study of whale resources* Fuel and mineral
resources, although present in the Antarctic,. are of unknown value and
are likely to remain unexploited for a long time to cane. i4evertneless,
the Soviets are undertaking geologic studies and mineral exploration.
To date, only iron-ore deposits have been found, but one S-)vict scientist
and South America, resources may include dia*onds, rare elements, and
precious metalso
speculates that, on the basis of geologic structure and analopr to :frica
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Political interest in.Antarctica is based primarily if not entirely
a complex of Soviet scientific, oconoaic, and strategic consideratiors.
Since 1935 Soviet policy has consistently limited itself to an assertion
of rights to be a participant in any resolution of Antarctic sovereignty.
We feel that the primary goal of Soviet interest is to remain on the
continent at their era pleasure .and xith the right of acci s to any
place in the area -- on lands ice or sea. It is our view that any overt
such act or acts (1) threaten world peace, (2) deny all rights to all
act that my in any way threaten that right of access and freedom of
operation will Beet with diplomatic protest and a general appeal to all
non-claimant countries, probably through UN channels, on the grounds that
countries having an interest in Antarctica, and (3) are contrary to
the right to scientific research for the benefit of all mankina.
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II, Extent and direction of existing USSR interest in Antarctica
A. Political position
No diplomatic action has been taken since the issuance 7f the
aaaoranduii of 1950 to re-assert:Soviet rights to Antarctica. During the
period of Soviet operations there has been a careful exclusion of any
references to the political question in the Soviet press and foreign
broadcasts. There have been several references to the problem by Soviet
scientists in literature intended primarily for domestic consumption.
There has been on notable.exception, however, in a brief current event
item published in the Soviet journ al. Foreign Affairs, No. 3, 1957, which
summarises Western press accounts on "A New Bone of Contention" in
Antarctica. The item notes the, UK/Chile/Argentina conflict, describes
US Jperation High Jump (19117) as disclosing the real aim--i.e.
military -- of the U.S., repeats U.S. intent to undertake nuclear to ting-
notes the pleas of th+: U.S. press and Representative Tollefeon to make
a claim for the 900-1500M sector, speculates on whether the area will
become a place for new conflicts or an opportunity for mutual understanding
in the struggle against nature, and, finally, notes the proposals of the
Soviet Government for a solution "not-by unilateral seizure but by
negotiation between all countries concerned and on the !oasis of joint
exploration and exploitation." In another rare instancf-, Dr. V. G. Dort,
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Chief of -the Maritime Expedition of the Soviet Antarctic Expeditions
1955-56, in his report to the Collegium of the Ministry of the Maritime
Fleet, (parent ministry of the Chief Adi.daistration of the Northern Sea
Route which serves as executive agent for the Expeditions) categorically
declared that the USSR Antarctic explorations secures the right of the
Soviet Union in the settlement of Antarctica's legal status. This frank
admission clearly confirms our suspicions that the numerous activities by
scientists -- such as the raising of the Soviet flag at sevetal scattered
points as well as at each station, giving Soviet names to geographic
fe-Aures, depositing. Soviet notes in stone eairus and recurrent emphases
on Soviet achievements in hitherto unexplored areas -- were explicity
v
undertaken to build up a basis for establishing Soviet rights to Antarctica.
Similar recent action was taken by a Soviet whaling vessel which landed
recently on an uninhabited Zavodovskiy Island (discovered by Bellingshausen)
in the South Sandwich Islands, gathered scientific sarples and erected
a large silp surmounted by a Soviet star, There are also indications
of continuing Soviet historical research to overcome a basic weakness
in their assertions of prior Russian continental discovery by Bellingshausen.
No Soviet evidence poet presecnted demonstrates that Bellingshausen
himself claimed to have made a discovery of the continent. Soviet
research in 1957 has published two maps to demonstrate that Bellingshausens
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diary entries described continental ice features rather than just
icebergs in a field of sea ice. We also believe that the expansion. of
initial plans for an ambitious year-long (1958-59) oceanographic survey
of the sooe of Antarctic convergence in the Pacific and Atlantic oceanic
areas had more than Just .a scientific motivation. Plans were expanded
in mid-1957 to penetrate the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seas (off the
Unclaimed Sector) with unprecedented seaward landings in the vicinitiue
of Cape Dart and Thurston Peninewia. Even more recently the plans were
again changed to attempt the feat by the end of the 1957-58 eeason
(March or April). We feel that these changes were designed to gain
added prosti;,-e for Soviet Antarctic activities by a feat which the U.S0
had not accomplished in an area of exclusively U.S. activities and
where its rights are least disputed. This would serve to (1) simultaneously
broaden the Wage of Swift activities at the opposite side of the
continent to strengthen their claimed continent-wide interests, and
(2) in an impressive basis for challenging any claim to the Unclaimed
Sector that would otherwise be based on a record of exclusive U0S0
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B. Nature and direction of operational efforts
As outlined in CIA/RR-x&-145 and further analyzed in CIA/SI 56-57
the nature of the Soviet program and the evolution of Soviet operations
discloses a caaples of interwove( interoates scientific, Antarctic
operational experience, propaganda, and political(, The operations of
the Second Antarctic Expedition (1)56-57 and plans and initial efforts
of the Third (1957-58) disclosed a continuation of the direction of their
interests initially revealed in their earlier Planning and o
peratioaso
Operations in 1956-57 increased an land and sea' with greater success
attained bl- the latter. Despite additional tractors and aircraft
difficulties were encountered in setting up the two main interior stations.
One sledge-tractor train reached a point 536 stiles (74003 'S - 97o23'g)
from the coast intended to become Kaasomol'skaya, an intermediate station
to Vostok. The Vostok train, due to a late start and operational,
difficulties (high altitude, rarer atmosphere, loose snow), stopped 3)3
miles from the coast, 480 miles short of its destination at the South
0ecmagnetio Pole. No field attempt was made to establish Sovetskaya.
These fat lures meant that no I0i observations were undertaken at the South
Oec agnetie Pale or at 8oretskeya as planned Observations, however, were
taken at temworary Vostok I. Despite this. setback other stations,
particularly Oasis at ice-free, American-discovered, Bunger Hi11s.
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as well as into the interior, Geological studies were continued, and
etailed geological map of the Oazie (Bunger Hills) area was completed,
'military and political interabtj
the Maritime lnbdivision of the Soviet Expedition. This season two
vessels, the Ob and Lena, undertook an extrezely ambitious oceanographic
and hydrographic survey west of Mir yy, The Lena, with a remarkable
adoptation of the Soviet Arctic ?? developed technique of landing scientlBts
at widely scattered unprepared landing sites, used two fixed- wing aircraft
by hoisting them on the ice from which hops were made into the interior,
scientists ewe made at 9h different points to establish
astronomic ground control for aerial trapping and hydrographic charting, nio
well as for geological, glaciological and geophysical observations. Echo
soundings combined with radarscope photography was combined with the
land operations for the reconnaissance charting and mapping of 1800 miles
of coastline to 40?9 longitude. The Ob although concentrating on deep
water sarveys also undertook'some approaches to the coast up to 20?E
longitude, before proceeding on a cross section of Antarctic - south
Atlantic waters to Capetcwn and along five meridians between 560. 60?So
In two seasons the Soviets have secured a fund of unique hydrographic data
of significant value to naval capabilities covering coastal areas of 111.30
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in longitudinal extent. While some. of the oceanographic scientific data
will be made available under, the`?IOT ages
ntit is doubtful whether
the photography, geodetic control and sounding data,
Na only
thereof, will be made available ,,outside of the Soviet ?ona`
and n
these activities of significant ?a us to acieutc research naval
capabilitiei but ,Bch a'recoid of ~IJXA operations ",'together with
their continental coverage,;can'-be of talus to support Soviet demands
to the right to participate in an
resolution of the sovereignty question.
It is believed that the Lana technique maps he used by the Ob when it
attempts its penetration of the Amundsen - Bellingshausen Sea Area,
For the 1957'58 season major activities include (1) a determination
to establish the two interior stations, and (2) the attempt to penetrate
the Aimunedsen - Bellingshausen Sea area with landings on the coastal
area of the Unclaimed Sector. The determination to set up the two
interior stations may be further revealing of thedepth of Soviet interest
in Antarctica. Following the failure to set these stations up in the
1956-57 season, the scientific head of the Expedition operations qualified
future plans for further penetration inland in 1957-58 on condition that
^oheerratians at Vostok I confirm the possibility for people to work during;
a long period at such remote parts of the Antarctic coast." Apparently
operations at Vostok I not only proved the feaHibility of inland operationb
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charts conpiled
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condition of the high inland plateau the low te.peratures, low
ape prepared, Other substantial additions' have c~udad six
ataAoapheric ..P"s
.... u~rs?+ and to Sir gaair and clothing "a
huts. The Ob for its extensive undertaking was again re-outfitted,,
S lighter sledges, plus special clothing, oxygen casks, and special
15 100-horsepower tractors, 10 special tiuck-trictors, 46 sledges,
designed to cope with the extreme
aircraft (including two ].L-12' ~ -- rsi Ling the aircraft park to 20
with the addition of now landing,' facilities, additional scientific
inetruuesnts, cad the addition` of facilities for meteorological rocket
Bellingshausen Sea area.
In unehings (to 100 k*s. altitude) in the vicinity of Mirnyy and the
to continue were supported with elabor.perations plus Sovetskaya now in process of becoming erttablifa .,ou
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six-station-net 13 planno to'"be manned by
pap .i a r:t ot? :i
scientists> fit; is preauned ::that that, su sr_o1 Personnel would incr.
this. -number.
:We feel that the Soviet poet-IUY projrem 1
:Antarctica x411 be
designed to reflect the same interei is that motivated the4 coup rehans I vo-:,
of their ICT
and non-IGY t;;pical and area cov