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December 9, 2016
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July 21, 1998
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June 1, 1958
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Approved For Release 2000/08L22 CIA-RDP61-00391 R000100-160 Estimated Long kinge Significance of Antarctica to the' w%ie,-L backgroundof'the complex of interrel:.ted considerati)nas scientists, strategic, economic and political, The Soviets have come to attach the greatest importance to earth science re_:oarch: ge:.>physice, ,eolog , geography due to the great dependence placed upon ar.d their uuc:e5sfui contribution to the industrialization of the _'ovjet Union, It :r not be too strong a statement to state that-the vc::7 foundations of `av_et industrialization itself-came to depend in part on the =,rimrcry dapen3e,ic= placed upon earth scientists from the earliest period of Leninist rule to survey, map, and develop the natur*..' resources of the Sovitt :,'pion. Similarly, earth scientists have also hen charged to aid. the fatherland in the struggle against nature, in which the drouth problem blab an immediate urgency and given primary consideration. As a consequence early importance became attached to the development of capabilities to forecast the caprices of dynamic geophysical phenomena. The enefite to '}e derived from such capabilities were indivisiole: ec:inoctic, :military and political To be able to forecast for ecDnomic necessities wade it also possible to forecast for military o,.Perationa.l needs; both asswn9d importance to sustain the State and its ideological foundations. Thus under the struggle compulsions of comtnurist ideology, b--.,sic research has simsultaneouay economic, miilita ~nd i,tical significance:` rv}bysicul Approve"` For Release 2000/08 DP61-00391 R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08 DP61-00391 R00'01'00160007-6 environmental data for ope-ational purposes becomes c::;ua11y importunt with mechanical design data in the "hardware" development, This has been>ruflected in the Soviet-restriction of any forms of oArth science data as well ae many types 'of mechanical data.' Substantial investments have been made in.e-:rth science research, development and educ ion fr?in the earliest days. After an initial period of emergency activity earth science moved into the field of bai.ic research, For e.;a=pie,, b;i 1,930 a magnetic survey of the entire country-vas launched, in 1932 a LTavimetr3_c survey was decreed. Topographic napping of to entire country evolved. The study of the Arctic for the development of the Northern Sea ?toute was begun in the earliest years of Sv1et rule. With evulvinv saccese- such sup)ort has been continuw.d up to the present, with the result that Soviet earth scientists have never been without re:juire i fisc.-il s~_iprort. As progress developed in the study and of earth science phenomena in the fulfillment of projects for i:.mediate domestic needs, particul-irl.y after World War II, Soviet scientific interests advanced into the worldwide study of the earth as a whole. This expansion of interest is inherent in the nature of earth science phenomena themselves: (1) no two ,oints in, on, or above the earth are identical; (2) these ;;henomena are dynamic in apace and times (3) there is a dynami.csj, worldwide interrelationship of these phenomenal and (L) observational data become pro,;ressively more Approved For Release 2000/087'2T! eIA-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 rncanningful the ; eater thcix .;n in +,,i n:, e! udiesp the :Loviets ',ritk. their re a rGn institu~,es Pere rep red toe rd e launch i It; of 1 hd.l f offered the o : timely of opportunitic-s to _artiri r e5 .system. tic worldwide pro gram to ',t f Ind ,y^' t'i:"t.;, otherwise could not have bf cry calle,:;,c do Some indicati:)n of , he, signs ficar ce ?af this ax ogo am to to the ', ~Y .'SLY and Geophyaica in order to avoid a y presaurea to s, ;re any of its Soviets had not been willing to form: the .nt er:;i tional Uniou of xecdevy sigr'ificant and vol;:minofis data (except fo of the world. weather dit,-4) with UCf L ?-`3 Approved] For Release 2000/08 -RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/2.: CIA-RDP61-00391 8000100160007-6 The strategic significance sterna it-dtially and primarily from scientific,.importance of south polar data to the a~ii total of a l i observations as well as for thei.x' regional. significance. Although ostensiVlye brought to the .area fob t , TGX progic t . i note, the expansion of' Soviet', act '4,1.'.t -At either h:i've sign i ficant . to o relevancy to the MY program or tho strew4upon those 6-ubjects of the 16Y that h-av particular value to military objectives. l,ea ,nsad air "t vigation studiuu, the compilation, at navigational;-hydrographic descriptions for na ~;rztx. n .1. aide, topographic surgmying` tad mappin'g,, represent the former. The ho ivy emphasis on Soviet oceanographic program, which ,,isra combined prograa : of 89. , incl-,ded, end the emphasis of wave studies? sea ice conditions,, e> n .flour eo ogyy reprreaer-*t ex l'r-xr: knowledge significant to guided-'miss le capabilities. Oven their pr-3?ir of the MY program represents an effort that can contribute ba&-166c capabilities. The heavy emphasis on grn'rtxi etr7 beyond the core intereat that clearly reflect the development and impro: ement: of air and sca ope:rat cc:, a however thee ? are concurrent benefits that takr'` on ~'eic .inpi8rfcncs0 ' l iresence on the ice cap provides the only Soviet outpost und& r exclvgive Soviet Ccyltrcl 111L Southern Hemisphere. Therefore, in addition to the long-range scientific vailable a assure sources of data in thw ",water hemisphere" that could support supply weather and ioncaepheeic storm jm.~ R000100160Q07-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 CIA-RDP61-00391 R0001 00160007-6 SECRET orecantin and also serve af; comnw ic.:- " or,s t. ru:::'lssiun r_` submarine operations during an emergency period, The re,;ioual v-,-er:-tior- a experience on the ice cap as well as on the seas , rovides a }.r~?J_r; Capability to operate under the conditions Ind in the enviror u.;t.t characteristiilto the ens g rally higher elePationsa colder :-Ktetapt,,r.t,uresy lower o:cygen content, and lower air`.preaaures that chnrr cteristica J.y- differentiate the Antarctic from the lirctic. In tie connecti.: believe that several published remarks -if Dr. L. I Shcherbal:nv, : le.:J.int, figure in Soviet Antarctic scientific planninj;, :tre nvLewurt.i rP Li ur,e source he categorically stated (1956) that "tile Antarctic it e and islands, are etrategieally important," In another instance, he expressed his personal conviction that the Soviet Union will cortlnae its scientific operations "since they are r.xtrelaeiy neces:iazy to .ren }h, a v-iriety of applied branches of science: sea and air i,avibati%ii, forecasting service, the whaling industry and others?" lit-, e. v.:;.ix-1oo,, after the IGY, the improvement of continuously ~;,e z at~r.g ba;:i. n f,;r scientific research and economic development, and also the establishment of settlements around meteorologicak * d radio:b*sen, as "in the oviet Arctic. Since the Soviets have dibclosed pl&ns to use nuclear-,.,U4:.rad vessels in Antarctica, they presumably wo :1d be ca; able of est~:bli s! :lc ,; bases that could generate nuclear-power er.ari. Approved For Release 2000/08/22 CIA-S '00391 R000100160007-6 -7 Approved For Release 200 12 : CIA-RDP61-00391 R0001 00160007-6 ~~ET of the IG7 Program geology, geography9 mineral-resource ex?loraticr. mapping, hydrographic charting and navigation studies and (2) .:3 far greater area coverage than originally announced in their IGY program. Since we know that the Soviets have a strong; interest in bi-polar research ear Be as an essential part of their interest in the atudj of worldwide interrelationship of geophysical and :dated oceanic,, ter c3stri ,_f, and atmospheric phenomena, and since these by their nature becomfs increasingly meaningful with the ,montinuous accumulation of data covering the widest possible area, we feel that'the"Foviete will continue to great scientific importance to the continuation of their observ-ationa in Antarctica indefinitely after :the IGI. Approved For Release 2000/ Cf Ef IA-RDP61-00391 8000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP61-00391 R0001 00160007-6 Indirect importance derives from scientific data that will improve Soriez. forecasting capabilities (weather, seismic, communications) for the Northern Hemisphere to support the practical needs of agriculture, housing, transportation etc., and from basic studies on marine biology and world ocean dynaidcs that Will lead to improved estimates of ocean food resc tr:.es for fishing requirements. Direct benefits, however, are derived entirely The econor4c significance of Antarc'.ica is both direct and iridire-t, Ec onoed.c from whalir operations. The Soviet Union is the fourth large:,t (considering the UK and Union of South Africa separately) producer Df Antarctic whale oil. The Soviets, however, have ambitious plans to increase their whale take. three new catchers have already bt:-e: &ddady and a whole now fleet is now in production, including a factory shi,, of 45,000 tonnage, In anticipation of this expansion the Soviet Antarctic program includes a special study of whale resources* Fuel and mineral resources, although present in the Antarctic,. are of unknown value and are likely to remain unexploited for a long time to cane. i4evertneless, the Soviets are undertaking geologic studies and mineral exploration. To date, only iron-ore deposits have been found, but one S-)vict scientist and South America, resources may include dia*onds, rare elements, and precious metalso speculates that, on the basis of geologic structure and analopr to :frica Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08122 CIA-RDP61-00391 R0001 00160007-6 [SECREt Political interest in.Antarctica is based primarily if not entirely a complex of Soviet scientific, oconoaic, and strategic consideratiors. Since 1935 Soviet policy has consistently limited itself to an assertion of rights to be a participant in any resolution of Antarctic sovereignty. We feel that the primary goal of Soviet interest is to remain on the continent at their era pleasure .and xith the right of acci s to any place in the area -- on lands ice or sea. It is our view that any overt such act or acts (1) threaten world peace, (2) deny all rights to all act that my in any way threaten that right of access and freedom of operation will Beet with diplomatic protest and a general appeal to all non-claimant countries, probably through UN channels, on the grounds that countries having an interest in Antarctica, and (3) are contrary to the right to scientific research for the benefit of all mankina. Approved For Release 2000/08/22. , Y14'- P61-00391 R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/22 CIA-RDP61-00391 R0001 00160007-6 II, Extent and direction of existing USSR interest in Antarctica A. Political position No diplomatic action has been taken since the issuance 7f the aaaoranduii of 1950 to re-assert:Soviet rights to Antarctica. During the period of Soviet operations there has been a careful exclusion of any references to the political question in the Soviet press and foreign broadcasts. There have been several references to the problem by Soviet scientists in literature intended primarily for domestic consumption. There has been on notable.exception, however, in a brief current event item published in the Soviet journ al. Foreign Affairs, No. 3, 1957, which summarises Western press accounts on "A New Bone of Contention" in Antarctica. The item notes the, UK/Chile/Argentina conflict, describes US Jperation High Jump (19117) as disclosing the real aim--i.e. military -- of the U.S., repeats U.S. intent to undertake nuclear to ting- notes the pleas of th+: U.S. press and Representative Tollefeon to make a claim for the 900-1500M sector, speculates on whether the area will become a place for new conflicts or an opportunity for mutual understanding in the struggle against nature, and, finally, notes the proposals of the Soviet Government for a solution "not-by unilateral seizure but by negotiation between all countries concerned and on the !oasis of joint exploration and exploitation." In another rare instancf-, Dr. V. G. Dort, Approved For Release 2000/08/2F2 : CIA-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/at A-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 Chief of -the Maritime Expedition of the Soviet Antarctic Expeditions 1955-56, in his report to the Collegium of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, (parent ministry of the Chief Adi.daistration of the Northern Sea Route which serves as executive agent for the Expeditions) categorically declared that the USSR Antarctic explorations secures the right of the Soviet Union in the settlement of Antarctica's legal status. This frank admission clearly confirms our suspicions that the numerous activities by scientists -- such as the raising of the Soviet flag at sevetal scattered points as well as at each station, giving Soviet names to geographic fe-Aures, depositing. Soviet notes in stone eairus and recurrent emphases on Soviet achievements in hitherto unexplored areas -- were explicity v undertaken to build up a basis for establishing Soviet rights to Antarctica. Similar recent action was taken by a Soviet whaling vessel which landed recently on an uninhabited Zavodovskiy Island (discovered by Bellingshausen) in the South Sandwich Islands, gathered scientific sarples and erected a large silp surmounted by a Soviet star, There are also indications of continuing Soviet historical research to overcome a basic weakness in their assertions of prior Russian continental discovery by Bellingshausen. No Soviet evidence poet presecnted demonstrates that Bellingshausen himself claimed to have made a discovery of the continent. Soviet research in 1957 has published two maps to demonstrate that Bellingshausens Approved For Release 20,('~ : CIA-RDP61-00391' R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/?2 : CIA-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 SE fET diary entries described continental ice features rather than just icebergs in a field of sea ice. We also believe that the expansion. of initial plans for an ambitious year-long (1958-59) oceanographic survey of the sooe of Antarctic convergence in the Pacific and Atlantic oceanic areas had more than Just .a scientific motivation. Plans were expanded in mid-1957 to penetrate the Amundsen and Bellingshausen Seas (off the Unclaimed Sector) with unprecedented seaward landings in the vicinitiue of Cape Dart and Thurston Peninewia. Even more recently the plans were again changed to attempt the feat by the end of the 1957-58 eeason (March or April). We feel that these changes were designed to gain added prosti;,-e for Soviet Antarctic activities by a feat which the U.S0 had not accomplished in an area of exclusively U.S. activities and where its rights are least disputed. This would serve to (1) simultaneously broaden the Wage of Swift activities at the opposite side of the continent to strengthen their claimed continent-wide interests, and (2) in an impressive basis for challenging any claim to the Unclaimed Sector that would otherwise be based on a record of exclusive U0S0 Approved For, Release 2000/08/22 :CIA-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 Approved For Release 2000/08/2 CIA-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 B. Nature and direction of operational efforts As outlined in CIA/RR-x&-145 and further analyzed in CIA/SI 56-57 the nature of the Soviet program and the evolution of Soviet operations discloses a caaples of interwove( interoates scientific, Antarctic operational experience, propaganda, and political(, The operations of the Second Antarctic Expedition (1)56-57 and plans and initial efforts of the Third (1957-58) disclosed a continuation of the direction of their interests initially revealed in their earlier Planning and o peratioaso Operations in 1956-57 increased an land and sea' with greater success attained bl- the latter. Despite additional tractors and aircraft difficulties were encountered in setting up the two main interior stations. One sledge-tractor train reached a point 536 stiles (74003 'S - 97o23'g) from the coast intended to become Kaasomol'skaya, an intermediate station to Vostok. The Vostok train, due to a late start and operational, difficulties (high altitude, rarer atmosphere, loose snow), stopped 3)3 miles from the coast, 480 miles short of its destination at the South 0ecmagnetio Pole. No field attempt was made to establish Sovetskaya. These fat lures meant that no I0i observations were undertaken at the South Oec agnetie Pale or at 8oretskeya as planned Observations, however, were taken at temworary Vostok I. Despite this. setback other stations, particularly Oasis at ice-free, American-discovered, Bunger Hi11s. Approved For Release 2000/OIL IA-RDP61-00391'R000100160007-6 proved .For Release 2000/08/22 CIA-RDP61-003918000100160007-6 as well as into the interior, Geological studies were continued, and etailed geological map of the Oazie (Bunger Hills) area was completed, 'military and political interabtj the Maritime lnbdivision of the Soviet Expedition. This season two vessels, the Ob and Lena, undertook an extrezely ambitious oceanographic and hydrographic survey west of Mir yy, The Lena, with a remarkable adoptation of the Soviet Arctic ?? developed technique of landing scientlBts at widely scattered unprepared landing sites, used two fixed- wing aircraft by hoisting them on the ice from which hops were made into the interior, scientists ewe made at 9h different points to establish astronomic ground control for aerial trapping and hydrographic charting, nio well as for geological, glaciological and geophysical observations. Echo soundings combined with radarscope photography was combined with the land operations for the reconnaissance charting and mapping of 1800 miles of coastline to 40?9 longitude. The Ob although concentrating on deep water sarveys also undertook'some approaches to the coast up to 20?E longitude, before proceeding on a cross section of Antarctic - south Atlantic waters to Capetcwn and along five meridians between 560. 60?So In two seasons the Soviets have secured a fund of unique hydrographic data of significant value to naval capabilities covering coastal areas of 111.30 15 - -Approved For lRetease 2000/08I 4RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 pproved For Release 2000 DP61 (o001001,60007-6 ;GREY in longitudinal extent. While some. of the oceanographic scientific data will be made available under, the`?IOT ages ntit is doubtful whether the photography, geodetic control and sounding data, Na only thereof, will be made available ,,outside of the Soviet ?ona` and n these activities of significant ?a us to acieutc research naval capabilitiei but ,Bch a'recoid of ~IJXA operations ",'together with their continental coverage,;can'-be of talus to support Soviet demands to the right to participate in an resolution of the sovereignty question. It is believed that the Lana technique maps he used by the Ob when it attempts its penetration of the Amundsen - Bellingshausen Sea Area, For the 1957'58 season major activities include (1) a determination to establish the two interior stations, and (2) the attempt to penetrate the Aimunedsen - Bellingshausen Sea area with landings on the coastal area of the Unclaimed Sector. The determination to set up the two interior stations may be further revealing of thedepth of Soviet interest in Antarctica. Following the failure to set these stations up in the 1956-57 season, the scientific head of the Expedition operations qualified future plans for further penetration inland in 1957-58 on condition that ^oheerratians at Vostok I confirm the possibility for people to work during; a long period at such remote parts of the Antarctic coast." Apparently operations at Vostok I not only proved the feaHibility of inland operationb Approved For Release 20,00/0'81 /22.: R0001 00160007-6 QCPfl T charts conpiled are Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP61-00391 R000100160007-6 condition of the high inland plateau the low te.peratures, low ape prepared, Other substantial additions' have c~udad six ataAoapheric ..P"s .... u~rs?+ and to Sir gaair and clothing "a huts. The Ob for its extensive undertaking was again re-outfitted,, S lighter sledges, plus special clothing, oxygen casks, and special 15 100-horsepower tractors, 10 special tiuck-trictors, 46 sledges, designed to cope with the extreme aircraft (including two ].L-12' ~ -- rsi Ling the aircraft park to 20 with the addition of now landing,' facilities, additional scientific inetruuesnts, cad the addition` of facilities for meteorological rocket Bellingshausen Sea area. In unehings (to 100 k*s. altitude) in the vicinity of Mirnyy and the to continue were supported with elabor.perations plus Sovetskaya now in process of becoming erttablifa .,ou Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP61-00:391 R0001 00160007-6 RV.P Approved For Release 2000/08/22 : CIA-RDP61-00391 R0001 00160007-6 rCRE six-station-net 13 planno to'"be manned by pap .i a r:t ot? :i scientists> fit; is preauned ::that that, su sr_o1 Personnel would incr. this. -number. :We feel that the Soviet poet-IUY projrem 1 :Antarctica x411 be designed to reflect the same interei is that motivated the4 coup rehans I vo-:, of their ICT and non-IGY t;;pical and area cov