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November 9, 2016
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July 8, 1998
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November 17, 1958
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Approved For Re jjDP6l -00391 R0002002400 F7 'November 1958 roblem evaluate the Adequacy of the US pro To determine the iWlications to the US of current soviet activities and the projected expansion of the USSR in the Antarctic,, and to ^ta zts eancex Ans 1958*59 aetivi les as we Antarctic plans which were made, in A -to 158, in Moscow and subsequently m o d i f i e d and elaborated di o Iona as toll s The Soviet network is to be oxpded to eight and possibly nine stations by the establishment of three .rorv in the 1958-59 season. Sovetskaya will be retained as an active, observation station. A new station in to be established at the Soviet plans actor in area of Thurston he third to be tolled e v is to be t tap on Princess Qu a n Maud Land at ive I cce+ssibility"i a second to be called inners ya,a with a the a i ent is to be aphic and geologic observations and stuffs are to be undertaken along the coastal areas of tae Amundsen arA Bellingshausen ess (85 ) and along the coast of q?ceeu Maud Land, (.1 OW-450: ). t anographio sum" *re to be undertaken In 190-59 in the exit i' ifie and Atlantic Oceans ad,a e above two coastal areas. A mjor tractor trove, approsis te:Ly 3#150 ,idle, accee t'bt . - Lasae *v Fodor o cti Miry y . Vostok its Pole - Pole of Soviets h vs proposed that an inter' tional reapp;f project for Antarctica at 10j,000#000 (oasts : areas at .x5t atlo - .t:Lat . Oj OWg and at i.450, 0-lx]. 00000 0) be set up urydar WAR. The Soviets have a eredd to map am-third of the area and aT other part which other nations could not d*a"takex and prap:>sard the use of two 8oviet jet-aircraft and Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61-00391 R000200240001-2 d SUR conference Approved For ReI P61-00391 R000200240001-2 THIRD D 2. activities th Organisational changes recently instituted reflect a shift in Antarctica, includes enter or announcements pointing to now or expanded rent arrangements in the planning, coordination and C operations and research. An Interdepartmental established under the PrassidiUm, of the Academy d the long.-standing Arctic Scientt to Research Institute ,he Northern Sea Route was expanded into the Arctic and Ant activities and cientific Rase s Znatitute. The reporting of Soviet a is being stepped up with the issuance of two serial pub] scat ofs. Current activities and preliminary results are being issued in an elaborate Information Bulletin while more definitive studies and finding* are to be is, the Proceedings c the Complex Antarct: Progress announcements indicate that the second whaling fleet is in the latter phases of eonatruction. One report indicates that a third may be connection with tb. description of a 6cavist "scientific tore Soviet build-up submarinesa :scheduled for operatiorn this past aumtuer, a Soviet source indicates biil iitie s for the adoption of atomic one for t na broad prospects utilization of submarines for scientific purposes in the Arctic and Ant n 'ctic for the economic needs of the country". d. A responsible Soviet scientist has disclosed that atomic energy o>rm unspecified, presumably for power at the stations) will be utilized in the Arctic and than Antareti0.. e. On. a~r 30, 1958, Nes meayano v,a: President of the Aoadmy of Sciences., USA, had reportedly stated to an American in a conference that the Soviet Union is con launching earth satellites from the Antarctic, as well as from Frans oetf ` Land in the Arctic. Implications of Soviet expansion The expansion of the Soviet network to eight and possibly nine stations is a far cry from the modest original Soviet announcement in July, 1955, of desiring to establish "one and possibly two stations". Moreover, it belie the uncertainties and doubts concerning the Soviet posat-IC! network displayed by Somov at the First SCAR Conference at the Lague in rebruary, 1958, when he .1 6AW64 Approved For Relea P61-00391 R000200240001-2 Approved For R end to Indics. :he most prominent in number as well as in extensiveness of geographic not be continued,. As Soviet transcontinental operations develop we anticipate that addittionai skip ply bases will be required in the interior, a of which may become Baer-season stations. This would further broaden Soviet presence vi th an even greater interior network. I. It established, the Bloc not of sight and possibly nine stations will distribution. The US, on the other hand, operates 3 major stations, South ,, cede (L6??) as d -RDP61-00391 R0002 N' net, entirely in the Auetraliaulclaimeed at the Stockholm iC U meetings in September, 1957, might the joi: at.operation of Hallett Station (arrangaztsn is have been made with Australia and Argentina for the continued operation of Wilkes and Ellsworth contributing personnel to the scientific pro ram) . Soviet propaganda to stress (a) the superiority of their larger effort in station number and coverages, and (h) their major scientific e ontrib utioi opinion with the: We must anticipate existing that this large scale error a rehonsiv among the countries a Southern Hemisphere The possible accomplishment of the difficult feat of establishing the rat an the coastal area of the Unclaimed Sector will afford a both the eseientif"i icipatos with New Zealand in well as lay international vigor and capabilities in the Antarctic. or hinging this Soviet achieve ont to the early Tearlat the .eut$ a s: discoveries of fie' the establishment nd Alexander I islands. The Soviets, if successful in the llingsbauseefl station, will bosom the first nation Lion to challenge the primacy of US rights in the b cl aiaeed Sector. If the Soviets prove able to repeat their past achievements with a similar progm of a loration,, geophysical observation, geographic studies, au -ys and mapping such a s has been annoinced, for the Bellingshausen area, the reprssees an a activities . I in the urtel rd evidenced in scisntiftc reports, and maps and charts will salve argument with which: to challenge the record of US nelai Sector. Soviet activities, should they continue to contemplated, would tend to diminish the relative strength of US riots in that area built up through the years exploration,, and other activities, This would become a serious consi.dl eration in the event that the US should decide to make a claim to Approved For ReledswrCwx 61-00391 R000200240001-2 Approved For Release : GIA= DP61-00391 R000200240001-2 THIM DRAP ids, in Cause i provision of mhich the 'US sight be expected to c- r1ghta) to the so-called Unclaimed Soctor. nee of a Soviet station within. the Security tons, overlooking it of a ra:jIvxe Of the proposed treaty, F. at W Troaty of roaches to Drake Passage is likel, d arrangements under the totes its claim (or its ie, ,oval Assist e, and anxiety not only in Argentina and Chile but among the a ntries , as weU. in the present missile-jittery environment the Soviet p less than 1500 miles frc the Guth American continent may well ie>ys~ and cosapiex ties in US-Latin American defense 7. The + ar ng Soviet station network and, y bases that be sot up in connection wit; possible substance to a long-term Soviet set to traverse Programs and develop n es visa 'sd in 19% b D. D. 1. Shchez'ba cova- now chaff. of the interd par ental Antarctio Ce as e . Expressing his convtcti*n that the Soviets win ue fir activities in Antarctica because of their i tportance of these activities to a snnabr of applied sciences, after the l' the Soviet stations . rr +ed and will ultimately be of eo continuously operat9 speculates that settlements, built around meteorological and radio stations, may be established and dev*lopment 34 been the ease in thertet Far Furth. in Queee Maud land represents another area histo?i. irateere st to the ':3511. At approximately 100B the station would lie between the point where Bellingshausen xsaadee his discovery of the "icy continent of Antierotica" (69''25'5 2?1otW) and his second penetration (6907% 1?'.0.;5' 0). The political significance of the region Is evidenced visit of the Slava whaling fleet in ,arch, 1948, explicitly to verify thatt the I C,& field Seer br Lazaryev, cc andex of iitngshauseeon' a other ship, was a part of the continental ice sabt 1d of Antarctica. As early as 1,955 the ovtet Antarctic planning chart had given gel.l.ingshausen's name to the two ice ice in this area.. The station would lie in the nds'alang a coastal zone anid southward to an in their forthcoming to Latzaryev station will Approved For Release. t1la?I -00391 R000200240001-2 Approved For Rele 61-00391 R000200240001-2 have the opportunity to cross extensive interior areas never seen by man, and much of which lie in the unclaimed hinterland of the Norwegian claim. f accomplished the Snv ..ets will hem also acquire the political ad antagess Of discovery, Original scientific observations,, and mapping. 9 The recent shift in plans to a traverse across Queen Maud Land to crossing to _.Bellingshsaussen station has not been abandoned but delayed. While initially the motivations for these ambitious efforts may have been primar ly scientific, there are strong indications that governmental approval was probably given for political reasons and for the propaganda value of scoring an achievement in Antarctic exploration which would outdo the Fuchs-.Hillary success. If successful with both crossings, the Soviets,, indeed, will have added a spectacular nation-capturing contribution to the build-up of the Soviet Union as a leading Antarctic power. 10. The sudden possible entry of Poland into Antarctica appears to be a Soviet manusver to gain another Soviet Bloc voice in whatever possible future administrative machinery that may be created under the proposed treaty ar4 in the Special Committee on Antarctic Research as well. U. The lack of a reconrsaiaasarsas-Ntype map coverage of Antarctica represents a basic deficiency in the topographic delineation of the area. The Soviets, aware of this deficiency began mapping and charting from the very outset of their operations, and have repeatedly stressed their progress in new mapping as well an corrections to foreign swips, including US. This boasting., however, is not without considerable justification, Soviet coastal mpping a.-,,4 chartings, including ground-controlled aerial photography, radarscope photograp1i r and echo-soundings, now covers coastal, areas over 3.260 of longitudinal extent with 140x,b more scheduled for the 1M-59 season.. In contrast the US has abstained almost completely from ax V cyst tic mapping during the past three seasons;, while charting has been undertaker on a nonA-i.nt erf erenco basis, and principally in the Rose - ea . < . s a consequence a basin has been laid for Soviet leadership in the mapping of the whole of Antas3cti,csa;. 12. The eventual introduction of a scientific submarine., and probsb4 the atomic ice-breaker into Soviet Antarctic research will not only increase Soviet scientific results but will also carry significant propas da aot in these two 8i itjc,snt topics that rank high in world-wide public interest Approved For Release 7 6IA-RDP61-00391 R000200240001-2 Approved For Release ; 61-00391 R000200240001-2 THIRD DBAYT The great an)aiety, manifested in Australia over uhfounded report, the o r3 iubmari a base by the Soviets pr de'si apple indication of the stronger reactions that are likely to result when a Soviet submarine should ap;ear in Antarctic waters. 13. Though the Soviet contemplation of the launching of au earth a ica site is not its o eurence may not be like sl years,, it in not Premature to take cognizance of the problem at this time, TIhe a significance of the rep .art at this time right lie in its possible indication of Soviet intentions to further exploit the psyeholo ,cal impact of the aputniikea. At the present time there appears to be no technologicl or scientific advantage in the launching of satellites from the polar areas tbanselvea. While there Is some erergoncee of scientific thinking that Launchings from p, the belt of radiation in the higher altitudes is believed to be *nee advantageous to the future launching of manned sate3,Uteee this is too speculative At the present t;9 to prwide a basis for the reported Soviet Plans- it ev'4ence of t eee Soviet intaentior ahou d peresist ho ver, ale he e t ' v +r x en*F3,on v~ sputnlx 4MP-LOMW designed not only to Capitalize On the sputniks as such,, bit parti.cuisriy to impreu the Southern Hemisphere peoples with Soviet eApabiliti:eees to 3&unch missiles in this region. 14. Soviet Antarctic operations have been accomplished with an unueually small commitment of men, ships,, and aircraft. The establishment of a six-station net (including two nearly 900 miles fa the coast) and m eiive coastal :mapping and chartings and geologic and oceanographic urvyes have been achieved with no more, than 3 ships (none iee-b aaker) about 400 pex nne ., and 15-.20 aircraft. xpansion into two wi.deiy'-separated areas of Antarctica ich t a true 59 rim increased their commitment by only one ship and by about 100 additional men. Sow of the fs tors that account for their successes with weir 5= 11 loh effort include (1) multiple, lase of ships - logistics scieentifi.c, cargo (hauling freight return ships), and continuation into seer Arctic Operations (2) intensive air operations the year round - in Jan uary- ovem'f r, 1957, a dozen aircraft on scientific and logistic n ssic ne logged more than 3#000 hrs. and flew 420#000 miles, (3) i reeaeaec mobility by extensive air _6_ Approved For= qg IA-RDP61-00391 R000200240001-2 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP~ R000200240001-2 THIRD DRAFT --- m- - _- - - -- 884 x."epeprWaQ sclen'ti.r (4) use of a -e perienc+ed corps of Arctic protolsojonall The sib.: of the economy of Soviet operations is in (1) its minis diversion of resources from Soviet Arctic operations, and (2) the lesser strain on l even essened by the profits or soviet operations,, which in the 1957-58 season amounted to nearly *6, ,000. 15. The expansion in soviet whaling, fleet operations poses s 10 ranger problems. Soviet benefits from the operations have not been limited to eoononio profits. The whaling flotilla has also Collected scientific data (relative to whaling resources as well as weather, physical geography and climatology) since 1947. In 1957-58 an added scientific team for special studies raisk:'d the number of scientists to 10 including a glaciologist and two geologists. For the 1958-59 season two scientific ships are attached. The whaling fleet has also been used for political ends. The 1957-56 season included landings on two islands of the South Sandwich group (56018'5-X4902718 and 26?)o'W)r and on most of the five emir zbited Ba]lei 162?15' .16 .? .5'E), Metal stake$ Or signs were erected noting the landing. e 1947-48 season the Slavs approached the coast of Antarctica, at the two points where it is claimed that the Bellingshausen expedition discovered the continent, in order to verify the physical geographic plausibility-of that discovery, With the construction of a second and possibly a third fleet, Soviet capabilities will be increased to augment Antarctic operationey, whaling as well, as scientific. As a result of mounting Soviet whaling producttion, the Norwegians have recently expressed alan at the danger of Soviet domination of the industry in the area. if such were to happen, Soviet presence would r expanded in another area of activity. yurthermoree if one were to postulate the Possibility- of Soviet use of the factor, ships for hauling artificial earth satellites and even missiles the fleet could eventually emerge as another significant tool in extension of Soviet power in the Southern Hemisphere. Since the interuatjonal Whaling Cession has not as yet established an independent observer program to monitor whales-cate,rg regulations governing the conduct of whaling, there is no method by which surveillance could be set up to gain knowledge of use of Soviet factory ships for these purposes. rogram proposed by Norway in 1955 an a proton'V1 to the International Whaling Convention; as of 1958 ratification by xi,co, Brasil Approved For R DP61-00391 R000200240001-2 ds (66 ?.i.5' -67 ?ts0' S Approved For Release 00391 R000200240001-2 T Der Soviet refusal to share certain of activities to date ?,- chiefly, new sailing pilota,, hydrographic charts,, echo~.eoundinge, radarse;ope photography, large-scale maps# gravity data, improvements in aide to polar navigation -- creates an imbalance that could have undesirable long-range military implications. Conclusions 17. The expansion of rho Soviet station not into the largest one on the ent,,. lion of another Bloc nation (Poland), the ambitiousness and their initiative to lead a mapping program of the ears to represent a Soviet ge;-verrzmenta L decision to ,,al: position in the A reti,c. If and when augmented by e outstanding one td the contimentj, thereby strengthening the future employment of scientific submarines and ataiaic icebreakers the 1 not only increase already ie rea s ive soviet scientific results but could overshadow the pre-eminence of US in Antarctic affairs with serious +ellit+o from Antarctica at some time in the future, they will have one to US Prestige. It Soviet plans should develop to launch an Winded their *sputnik diploma d the implied threat in the Soviet capability to launch: mlitar eieai.l,s from Antarctica would have a profound effect the pa and political position, the scientific program as xpandod Soviet pros ram presents a long-range challenge the Southern Uespheers, outlined in the current US Operations Plan for Antarctica cannot be considered o support S interests. The current Program was developed as duced min. program at a time when the Srsviet-post.-XGr plans indicated etwork located entirely within the area of their current done. The currant program for the first po uate p y because (1) it fails to prrir: vities LO2 regions particularly in western Antarctica, (2) there in no assurance that an adequate systematic oceanographic program will be imp1emsnted? and (3) of the lack of an adequate program in aerial mapping. These deficienceies if not corrected would (1) weaken the US political position particularly in western Antarctica, (2) eventually lead to the erosion of US pre-eminence and leadership in Antarctic affairs, (3) provide the Approved For RJ E flDP61-00391 R000200240001-2 Approved For Release : CIA-RDP61-00391 R000200240001-2 and outperform the 16, and (1) yield lees of basic sea3 'ic data resulting in a deficiency not only disadvantageous to US sciencebut also to longs-run U defense capabilities. 19. To meet the challenge of the tae rariding -aviet p?ogra and its adverse political, scientific and defense :U)plicatiot for the United States? it is deemed advisable to augment US activities along the following linest a.. Expand US interior operations with (1) se reral stations, and (2) expanded traverse operations. The fr ra r od be most advantageous in the area between the bass of Palmer Panin and the Pensacola and -Sentinel I4ts.. This would (1) permit UntQue9, fruitful geologic investigations, (2) serve geodetic requirements by establishing ground control positions for aerial mapping,, (3) provide additional year-around meteorological coverage by the use of automat weather stAtions during the inter months, (4) provide IMiagination-capturing material to publicize Us activities and dilute Soros. (5) maintain rights bake; Unclaimed Sector, and (6) provide potations that would be further useful as six resdue facilities for the future, when expanded A r operations for mapping will be required as well, as for the surveillance of Soviet stations and the dm .very of Free-World scientist-observers. b. Outfit either a special icebreaker or an lce-reinforced vessel for a systematic oceanographic and hydrographic survey program,, including echo-soundings and radarscope photography. Such a program would not only be valuable to basic science but would aloes provide sign =cant military as well as psychological advantages. By the -llection of its own hydrograaphic data, the US would, not be left behind the xe nian in the charting of the oceans* aphid data are essential not only to naval prepaarddiaepae but stric for the world gravity survey now underieay btr the U A and T'S }!O for the development of a world geodetic datum for US guided missile requirements. Such a Systematic t oceanographic program would also serve to strengthen the US position in obtaining Soviet oceanographic and charting data which have been obtained by the Soviets over the past throe w.asms and not yet released by them. Approved For Rele P61-00391 R000200240001-2 Approved For ReleasV%JUVIIITfi1-00391 R000200240001-2 THIRD nom' Begin systematic lil,000,o00 aerial mapping as soon as practicable to ensure prior US mappin ,; particu:Laarr in Western Antarctica. Such mapping is to conform to the master plan and specifications developed for the Working Group by its Technical Advisory Comcaittee on Antarctic appin . The g prior Soviet mapping of any s-t3t,sstantia7r part of the continent, .partia^ xlarly of, this area, would be disadvantageous to the us political position therein as well as to its prestige in general. The adverse* consequences of Ub inaction would be further compounded by the opportunity that would be afforded to the Soviets to produce the ightiasst possible record of their capabilities! and territorial activities. d. Attempt to secure adequate arrangements in a any future political int on Antarctica as well as within SCAR for a complete exchange of all scientific resuite, data and related materialsa, produced since the beginning of the I0' as well as those produced in subsequent programs. This is sued. especially to (1) secure maps and charts compiled by the Soviets and (2) secure earth satellite tracking data from future ob rvat ons . - US participation at the Wilkes and 221sworth stations ught stop up publicity to emphasize more the joint character of operations at those stations. seek continuation of the Norwegian station, and on to its development as a joint US-4orwegian activity. Develop cooperatives arrangements with other friendly countries, Eu as with Belgians in their traverse operations, to improve the position of l ..World countries in Antarctica, in order to reduce the b1: -ftimulate through mess World mbere of the International of Soviet ac hisvemente and to increase US prestige in ?ntarctica, on the establishment of an independent observer program 'eillance of Soviet is aii,i operations. Approved For Release : I P61-00391 R000200240001-2