IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET EXPANSON IN ANTARCTICA TO THE US POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00391R000200240001-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 17, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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F7 'November 1958
roblem
evaluate the Adequacy of the US pro
To determine the iWlications to the US of current soviet activities
and the projected expansion of the USSR in the Antarctic,, and to
^ta zts eancex Ans 1958*59 aetivi les as we
Antarctic plans which were made, in A -to 158,
in Moscow and subsequently m o d i f i e d and elaborated di o
Iona as toll s
The Soviet network is to be oxpded to eight and possibly nine
stations by the establishment of three .rorv in the 1958-59 season. Sovetskaya
will be retained as an active, observation station. A new station in to be
established at the
Soviet plans
actor in area of Thurston
he third to be tolled e v is to be t tap on Princess
Qu a n Maud Land at
ive I cce+ssibility"i a second to be called
inners ya,a with a the a i ent is to be
aphic and geologic observations and stuffs are
to be undertaken along the coastal areas of tae Amundsen arA Bellingshausen
ess (85 ) and along the coast of q?ceeu Maud Land, (.1 OW-450: ).
t anographio sum" *re to be undertaken In 190-59 in the
exit i' ifie and Atlantic Oceans ad,a
e above two coastal areas.
A mjor tractor trove, approsis te:Ly 3#150 ,idle,
accee t'bt . - Lasae *v Fodor
o cti Miry y . Vostok
its Pole - Pole of
Soviets h vs proposed that an inter' tional reapp;f project for
Antarctica at 10j,000#000 (oasts : areas at .x5t atlo - .t:Lat . Oj OWg and
at i.450, 0-lx]. 00000 0) be set up urydar WAR. The Soviets
have a eredd to map am-third of the area and aT other part which other nations
could not d*a"takex and prap:>sard the use of two 8oviet jet-aircraft and
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2.
activities th
Organisational changes recently instituted reflect a shift
in Antarctica, includes
enter or announcements pointing to now or expanded
rent arrangements in the planning, coordination and
C operations and research. An Interdepartmental
established under the PrassidiUm, of the Academy
d the long.-standing Arctic Scientt to Research Institute
,he Northern Sea Route was expanded into the
Arctic and Ant
activities and
cientific Rase s Znatitute. The reporting of Soviet
a is being stepped up with the issuance of two serial
pub] scat ofs. Current activities and preliminary results are being issued
in an elaborate Information Bulletin while more definitive studies and
finding* are to be is,
the Proceedings c the Complex Antarct:
Progress announcements indicate that the second whaling fleet
is in the latter phases of eonatruction. One report indicates that a third
may be
connection with tb. description of a 6cavist "scientific
tore Soviet build-up
submarinesa :scheduled for operatiorn this past aumtuer, a Soviet source indicates
biil iitie s for the adoption of atomic one
for t
na broad prospects
utilization of submarines for scientific purposes in the Arctic
and Ant n 'ctic for the economic needs of the country".
d. A responsible Soviet scientist has disclosed that atomic energy
o>rm unspecified, presumably for power at the stations) will be utilized in
the Arctic and than Antareti0..
e. On. a~r 30, 1958, Nes meayano v,a: President of the Aoadmy of Sciences.,
USA, had reportedly stated to an American in a conference that the Soviet
Union is con
launching earth satellites from the Antarctic, as well
as from Frans oetf ` Land in the Arctic.
Implications of Soviet expansion
The expansion of the Soviet network to eight and possibly nine stations
is a far cry from the modest original Soviet announcement in July, 1955, of
desiring to establish "one and possibly two stations". Moreover, it belie
the uncertainties and doubts concerning the Soviet posat-IC! network displayed
by Somov at the First SCAR Conference at the Lague in rebruary, 1958, when he
.1 6AW64
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end to Indics.
:he most prominent in number as well as in extensiveness of geographic
not be continued,. As Soviet transcontinental operations develop we anticipate
that addittionai skip ply bases will be required in the interior, a of which
may become Baer-season stations. This would further broaden Soviet presence
vi th an even greater interior network.
I. It established, the Bloc not of sight and possibly nine stations will
distribution. The US, on the other hand, operates 3 major stations, South
,, cede (L6??) as d
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net, entirely in the Auetraliaulclaimeed
at the Stockholm iC U meetings in September, 1957, might
the joi: at.operation of Hallett Station (arrangaztsn is have been made with
Australia and Argentina for the continued operation of Wilkes and Ellsworth
contributing personnel to the scientific pro ram) .
Soviet propaganda to stress (a) the superiority of their larger
effort in station number and coverages, and (h) their major scientific
e ontrib utioi
opinion with the:
We must anticipate
existing
that this large scale error
a rehonsiv among the countries a
Southern Hemisphere
The possible accomplishment of the difficult feat of establishing the
rat an the coastal area of the Unclaimed Sector will afford
a both the eseientif"i
icipatos with New Zealand in
well as lay international
vigor and capabilities in the Antarctic.
or hinging this Soviet achieve ont to the early Tearlat
the .eut$ a s:
discoveries of fie'
the establishment
nd Alexander I islands. The Soviets, if successful in
the llingsbauseefl station, will bosom the first nation
Lion to challenge the primacy of US rights in the b cl aiaeed Sector.
If the Soviets prove able to repeat their past achievements with a similar
progm of a loration,, geophysical observation, geographic studies, au -ys
and mapping such a s has been annoinced, for the Bellingshausen area, the
reprssees an a
activities . I
in the urtel
rd evidenced in scisntiftc reports, and maps and charts will
salve argument with which: to challenge the record of US
nelai Sector. Soviet activities, should they continue
to contemplated, would tend to diminish
the relative strength of US riots in that area built up through the years
exploration,, and other activities, This would become a serious
consi.dl eration in the event that the US should decide to make a claim to
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ids, in
Cause i
provision of mhich the 'US sight be expected to c-
r1ghta) to the so-called Unclaimed Soctor.
nee of a Soviet station within.
the Security tons,
overlooking
it of a ra:jIvxe Of the proposed treaty,
F. at W
Troaty of
roaches to Drake Passage is likel,
d arrangements under the
totes its claim (or its
ie,
,oval Assist e, and
anxiety not only in Argentina and Chile but among the
a ntries , as weU. in the present missile-jittery environment the Soviet
p less than 1500 miles frc the Guth American continent may well
ie>ys~ and cosapiex ties in US-Latin American defense
7. The + ar ng Soviet station network and,
y bases that be sot up in connection wit;
possible substance to a long-term Soviet set
to traverse Programs
and develop n
es visa 'sd in 19% b D. D. 1. Shchez'ba cova- now chaff. of the interd par ental
Antarctio Ce as e . Expressing his convtcti*n that the Soviets win
ue fir activities in Antarctica because of their i tportance of these
activities to a snnabr of applied sciences, after the l' the Soviet stations
. rr +ed and will ultimately be of eo continuously
operat9
speculates that settlements, built around meteorological
and radio stations, may be established and dev*lopment 34
been the ease in thertet Far Furth.
in Queee Maud land represents another area
histo?i. irateere st to the ':3511. At approximately 100B the station
would lie between the point where Bellingshausen xsaadee his discovery of the
"icy continent of Antierotica" (69''25'5 2?1otW) and his second penetration
(6907% 1?'.0.;5' 0). The political significance of the region Is evidenced
visit of the Slava whaling fleet in ,arch, 1948, explicitly to verify
thatt the I C,& field Seer br Lazaryev, cc andex of iitngshauseeon' a other ship,
was a part of the continental ice sabt 1d of Antarctica. As early as 1,955 the
ovtet Antarctic planning chart had given gel.l.ingshausen's name to the two ice
ice in this area.. The station would lie in the
nds'alang a coastal zone anid southward to an
in their forthcoming
to Latzaryev station will
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have the opportunity to cross extensive interior areas never seen by man,
and much of which lie in the unclaimed hinterland of the Norwegian claim.
f accomplished the Snv ..ets will hem also acquire the political ad antagess
Of discovery, Original scientific observations,, and mapping.
9 The recent shift in plans to a traverse across Queen Maud Land to
crossing
to _.Bellingshsaussen station has not been abandoned but delayed. While initially
the motivations for these ambitious efforts may have been primar ly scientific,
there are strong indications that governmental approval was probably given
for political reasons and for the propaganda value of scoring an achievement
in Antarctic exploration which would outdo the Fuchs-.Hillary success. If
successful with both crossings, the Soviets,, indeed, will have added a
spectacular
nation-capturing contribution to the build-up of the Soviet
Union as a leading Antarctic power.
10. The sudden possible entry of Poland into Antarctica appears to be
a Soviet manusver to gain another Soviet Bloc voice in whatever possible future
administrative machinery that may be created under the proposed treaty ar4
in the Special Committee on Antarctic Research as well.
U. The lack of a reconrsaiaasarsas-Ntype map coverage of Antarctica represents
a basic deficiency in the topographic delineation of the area. The Soviets,
aware of this deficiency began mapping and charting from the very outset of
their operations, and have repeatedly stressed their progress in new mapping
as well an corrections to foreign swips, including US. This boasting., however,
is not without considerable justification, Soviet coastal mpping a.-,,4
chartings, including ground-controlled aerial photography, radarscope photograp1i r
and echo-soundings, now covers coastal, areas over 3.260 of longitudinal
extent with 140x,b more scheduled for the 1M-59 season.. In contrast the US
has abstained almost completely from ax V cyst tic mapping during the past
three seasons;, while charting has been undertaker on a nonA-i.nt erf erenco
basis, and principally in the Rose - ea . < . s a consequence a basin has
been laid for Soviet leadership in the mapping of the whole of Antas3cti,csa;.
12. The eventual introduction of a scientific submarine., and probsb4
the atomic ice-breaker into Soviet Antarctic research will not only increase
Soviet scientific results but will also carry significant propas da aot
in these two 8i itjc,snt topics that rank high in world-wide public interest
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The great an)aiety, manifested in Australia over uhfounded report,
the
o r3 iubmari a base by the Soviets pr de'si
apple indication of the stronger reactions that are likely to result when
a Soviet submarine should ap;ear in Antarctic waters.
13. Though the Soviet contemplation of the launching of au earth a
ica site is not
its o eurence may not be like
sl years,, it in not Premature to
take cognizance of the problem at this time, TIhe a hi.et significance of the
rep .art at this time right lie in its possible indication of Soviet intentions
to further exploit the psyeholo ,cal impact of the aputniikea. At the present
time there appears to be no technologicl or scientific advantage in the
launching of satellites from the polar areas tbanselvea. While there Is some
erergoncee of scientific thinking that Launchings from p,
the belt of radiation in the higher altitudes is believed to be
*nee advantageous to the future launching of manned sate3,Uteee this is too
speculative At the present t;9 to prwide a basis for the reported Soviet
Plans- it ev'4ence of t eee Soviet intaentior ahou d peresist ho ver,
ale
he e
t
'
v
+r
x
en*F3,on v~
sputnlx 4MP-LOMW designed
not only to Capitalize On the sputniks as such,, bit parti.cuisriy to impreu
the Southern Hemisphere peoples with Soviet eApabiliti:eees to 3&unch missiles
in this region.
14. Soviet Antarctic operations have been accomplished with an
unueually small commitment of men, ships,, and aircraft. The establishment
of a six-station net (including two nearly 900 miles fa the coast) and
m eiive coastal :mapping and chartings and geologic and oceanographic
urvyes have been achieved with no more, than 3 ships (none
iee-b aaker) about 400 pex nne ., and 15-.20 aircraft.
xpansion into two wi.deiy'-separated areas of Antarctica
ich t a true
59
rim
increased their commitment by only one ship and by about 100 additional men.
Sow of the fs tors that account for their successes with weir 5= 11 loh
effort include (1) multiple, lase of ships - logistics scieentifi.c, cargo
(hauling freight return ships), and continuation into seer Arctic
Operations (2) intensive air operations the year round - in Jan uary- ovem'f r,
1957, a dozen aircraft on scientific and logistic n ssic ne logged more than
3#000 hrs. and flew 420#000 miles, (3) i reeaeaec mobility by extensive air
_6_
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--- m- - _- - - -- 884 x."epeprWaQ sclen'ti.r
(4) use of a -e perienc+ed corps of Arctic protolsojonall
The sib.:
of the economy of Soviet operations is in (1) its minis diversion of
resources from Soviet Arctic operations, and (2) the lesser strain on
l
even
essened by the profits or soviet
operations,, which in the 1957-58 season amounted to nearly *6, ,000.
15. The expansion in soviet whaling, fleet operations poses s 10
ranger problems. Soviet benefits from the operations have not been limited
to eoononio profits. The whaling flotilla has also Collected scientific data
(relative to whaling resources as well as weather, physical geography and
climatology) since 1947. In 1957-58 an added scientific team for special
studies raisk:'d the number of scientists to 10 including a glaciologist and
two geologists. For the 1958-59 season two scientific ships are attached.
The whaling fleet has also been used for political ends. The 1957-56 season
included landings on two islands of the South Sandwich group (56018'5-X4902718
and 26?)o'W)r and on most of the five emir zbited Ba]lei
162?15' .16 .? .5'E), Metal stake$ Or signs were erected noting the landing.
e 1947-48 season the Slavs approached the coast of Antarctica, at the
two points where it is claimed that the Bellingshausen expedition discovered
the continent, in order to verify the physical geographic plausibility-of
that discovery, With the construction of a second and possibly a third fleet,
Soviet capabilities will be increased to augment Antarctic operationey, whaling
as well, as scientific. As a result of mounting Soviet whaling producttion,
the Norwegians have recently expressed alan at the danger of Soviet domination
of the industry in the area. if such were to happen, Soviet presence would
r expanded in another area of activity. yurthermoree if one were to
postulate the Possibility- of Soviet use of the factor, ships for hauling
artificial earth satellites and even missiles the fleet could eventually
emerge as another significant tool in extension of Soviet power in the Southern
Hemisphere. Since the interuatjonal Whaling Cession has not as yet
established an independent observer program to monitor whales-cate,rg
regulations governing the conduct of whaling, there is no method by which
surveillance could be set up to gain knowledge of use of Soviet factory ships
for these purposes. rogram proposed by Norway in 1955 an a proton'V1 to
the International Whaling Convention; as of 1958 ratification by xi,co, Brasil
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Soviet refusal to share certain of
activities to date ?,- chiefly, new sailing pilota,, hydrographic charts,,
echo~.eoundinge, radarse;ope photography, large-scale maps# gravity data,
improvements in aide to polar navigation -- creates an imbalance that could
have undesirable long-range military implications.
Conclusions
17. The expansion of rho Soviet station not into the largest one on the
ent,,.
lion of another Bloc nation (Poland), the ambitiousness
and their initiative to lead a mapping program of the
ears to represent a Soviet ge;-verrzmenta L decision to
,,al: position in the A reti,c. If and when augmented by
e outstanding one td the contimentj, thereby strengthening
the future employment of scientific submarines and ataiaic icebreakers the
1 not only increase already ie rea s ive soviet scientific results
but could overshadow the pre-eminence of US in Antarctic affairs with serious
+ellit+o from Antarctica at some time in the future, they will have
one to US Prestige. It Soviet plans should develop to launch an
Winded their *sputnik diploma
d the implied threat in the Soviet
capability to launch: mlitar eieai.l,s from Antarctica would have a profound
effect
the pa
and political position, the scientific program as
xpandod Soviet pros ram presents a long-range challenge
the Southern Uespheers,
outlined in the current US Operations Plan for Antarctica cannot be considered
o support S interests. The current Program was developed as
duced min. program at a time when the Srsviet-post.-XGr plans indicated
etwork located entirely within the area of their current
done. The currant program for the first po
uate p iccx.ar y because (1) it fails to prrir:
vities
LO2 regions particularly in western Antarctica, (2) there in no
assurance that an adequate systematic oceanographic program will be imp1emsnted?
and (3) of the lack of an adequate program in aerial mapping. These
deficienceies if not corrected would (1) weaken the US political position
particularly in western Antarctica, (2) eventually lead to the erosion
of US pre-eminence and leadership in Antarctic affairs, (3) provide the
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and outperform the 16, and (1) yield lees
of basic sea3
'ic data
resulting in a deficiency not only disadvantageous to US sciencebut also
to longs-run U defense capabilities.
19. To meet the challenge of the tae rariding -aviet p?ogra and its
adverse political, scientific and defense :U)plicatiot for the United States?
it is deemed advisable to augment US activities along the following linest
a.. Expand US interior operations with (1) se reral
stations, and (2) expanded traverse operations. The fr ra r od be
most advantageous in the area between the bass of Palmer Panin
and the Pensacola and -Sentinel I4ts.. This would (1) permit UntQue9,
fruitful geologic investigations, (2) serve geodetic requirements by
establishing ground control positions for aerial mapping,, (3) provide
additional year-around meteorological coverage by the use of automat
weather stAtions during the inter months, (4) provide IMiagination-capturing
material to publicize Us activities and dilute Soros.
(5) maintain rights bake;
Unclaimed Sector, and
(6) provide
potations that would be further useful as six resdue facilities for
the future, when expanded A r operations for mapping will be required
as well, as for the surveillance of Soviet stations and the dm .very of
Free-World scientist-observers.
b. Outfit either a special icebreaker or an lce-reinforced vessel
for a systematic oceanographic and hydrographic survey program,, including
echo-soundings and radarscope photography. Such a program would not
only be valuable to basic science but would aloes provide sign =cant
military as well as psychological advantages. By the -llection of
its own hydrograaphic data, the US would, not be left behind the xe nian
in the charting of the oceans*
aphid
data are essential not only to naval prepaarddiaepae but
stric
for the world gravity survey now underieay btr the U A and T'S }!O for the
development of a world geodetic datum for US guided missile requirements.
Such a Systematic t oceanographic program would also serve to strengthen
the US position in obtaining Soviet oceanographic and charting data
which have been obtained by the Soviets over the past throe w.asms and
not yet released by them.
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Begin systematic lil,000,o00 aerial mapping as soon as
practicable to ensure prior US mappin ,; particu:Laarr in Western Antarctica.
Such mapping is to conform to the master plan and specifications developed
for the Working Group by its Technical Advisory Comcaittee on Antarctic
appin . The g prior Soviet mapping of any s-t3t,sstantia7r part of the
continent, .partia^ xlarly of, this area, would be disadvantageous to the
us political position therein as well as to its prestige in general.
The adverse* consequences of Ub inaction would be further compounded by
the opportunity that would be afforded to the Soviets to produce the
ightiasst possible record of their capabilities! and territorial
activities.
d. Attempt to secure adequate arrangements in a any future political
int on Antarctica as well as within SCAR for a complete exchange
of all scientific resuite, data and related materialsa, produced since
the beginning of the I0' as well as those produced in subsequent programs.
This is sued. especially to (1) secure maps and charts compiled by the
Soviets and (2) secure earth satellite tracking data from future
ob rvat ons . -
US participation at the Wilkes and 221sworth stations
ught stop up publicity to emphasize more the joint character of operations
at those stations.
seek continuation of the Norwegian station, and
on to its development as a joint US-4orwegian activity.
Develop cooperatives arrangements with other friendly countries,
Eu as with Belgians in their traverse operations, to improve the
position of l ..World countries in Antarctica, in order to reduce the
b1: -ftimulate through mess World mbere of the International
of Soviet ac hisvemente and to increase US prestige in ?ntarctica,
on the establishment of an independent observer program
'eillance of Soviet is aii,i operations.
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