ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000100120004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 11, 1955
• Content Type: REPORT

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DRAFT ` TOP SEE'
IAC-D-55/9.4
Fifth. Drat:
11 August 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
An.!ua1 Report to the National Security Council on the
taus of - the Foreign- Irtelligence Program a
of 30 June 1955
1. Evaluation of US Ca bilities to Provide Warnin ; of Attack
a. The current estimated air capabilities of the USSR have
made us even less optimistic than we were. last year about our ability
to give warning of surprise attack. At least in the period from now
until 1958, the USSR will have a progressively uncrossing capability
for launching; attacks on the US in such ways as would probably
provide no specific advance warning to US intelliCence.
b. The USAF now operates world-wide on a 2#-hour basis an
Indication System for detecting; inmiinent Conmunist attacks, e;spcc-
ially air attack with nuclear weapons. Major air comxaands have
subsidiary centers tied in with Washington by preferenta.al use charaels
of cor :aunication for flash transa:aission of early warring; intelligence.
This system is in turn tied in with the National Indications Center
maintained on a 24-hour basis by the. Watch Cornnitteo of the IAC.
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Evaluation of Soviet Capabilities and Intentions
a* Intelligence is generally adequate to support over?Oil
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assessments of the strengths of the USSR, Communist China, and
the Satellites, The general limitations of intelligence: on the
USSR are evident in the process of attempting to measure the forces
shaping Soviet policy. We can illuminate the broad outlines of the
thief problems confronting Soviet leadership, but we are still unable
to determine the degree to which these problems, such as the alloca-
tion of Soviet economic resources and German rearmament,, generate
pressures on Soviet policy. The main questions of political intelli-
gence often involve matters of judgment
degree of independence enjoyed
by Communist China in matters of major policy, the degree of likeli-
hood that the USSR will withdraw from East Germany,, the likelihood
of open intervention by the USSR in hostilities between the US and
Communist China which threatened the existence of tie latter,
b. We hd a made progress in economic intelligence on the USSR,,
most notably in improving techniques for measuring economic growth.
However, there remains the basic problem, that of determining the
extent to which the Soviet economy is capable of meeting the competing
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claims for resources arisin" from the various interna). and
external commitments of Soviet -)ola.cy. In an effort to find some
solution to this pro ,~lem, we have recently focused attention on
a particularly difficult aspect of inte.lliGence on Soviet resources
allocation, the estimated economic cost of the over-all Soviet military
effort.
C. New techniques for acquirinL; and analyzinG; data have
advanced our %nowled e of Soviet scientific and technologrical
capabilities. Progress has been made in intelligence on Soviet
development of guided missiles, nuclear weapons and electronic
equipmaent. Despite advances in these and other fields, important
questions such as the characteristics of various Guided missiles,
the existence and nature of a . Soviet biological war-'are program,
and the apportionment of nuclear r aterial among various types
of weapons and systems, remain to be answered.
d. Although we have succeeded in collecting much information
on the separate branches of the Soviet armed forces, we have yet
to construct the picture of probable Soviet strategy so essential
to estimaten( general trends in the Soviet milita ?y establishment,
probable Soviet choices in weapons syutons, or the strength of
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particular military components. The requirement for such estimates
is particularly urgent at the present time because of recent indica-
tions that So*Let military thinking is adjusting to the impact of
modern military teehnologr.
Collection
In most respects there has been little appreciable change in
our collection capabilities within the Bloc, largely because of the
continued strict enforcement of Sino-Soviet counterintelligence
measures. However, there has been a considerable improvement in the
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ALLEN W. DULLES
Chairman
Attachments s Intelligence Advisory Committee
gtat~ ecial Proprans
A--Warning of Attack pp. 5-8)
fl-Evaluation and Estimates (pp. 9-20)
C--Collection (pp. 21-31)
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A. WARNING OF ATTACK
Evaluation of US Capabilities
a. Vie believe? as we did at the time of our previous report,
that the US could expect possibly as much as six months and not
less than 30 days warning of Soviet preparation for full-scale
land, sea, and air attack, providing that"the Soviets went to full,
or nearly full mobilization prior to the attack.
b. The current estimated air capabilities of the USSR have
made us even less optimistic than we were last your about our ability
to give warning of surprise attack. Should the USSR attempt a major
surprise air attack against the US from forward bases in 1955, the
preparations might be detected, and if they were, would provide a
generalized degree of warning of several days, and specific warning
of unusual and possibly threatening air activity on the order of 18-24
hours. A lessor scale of attack, involving about 250 aircraft, if
accompanied by an extraordinary security effort could be launched as
early as 1955 with no assurance of specific advance warning to US
intelligence; (apart from that provided by early warning radar). Attacks
against US bases for. forces overseas, or against US allies, could be
made with aqua.l or greater likelihood of being accomplished without
advance warning..
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c. In the period between now and 1958, Soviet capabilities
for surprise attacks will a1Y.most certainly increase. For example,
the USSR will have a arogressi'vcly increasing capability for
launching attacks on the US from interior Soviet bases. Such a
method of attack would probably provide no specific advance warning
to US intelligence.
2._ The Watch Committee
The Watch Committee and its permanent staff, the National
Indications Center, moved in January to near and more suitable
quarters in the Pentagon. In addition to its continued concentration
on detecting indications of possible attacks on the US, its possessions
and overseas bases, a major focus of the Watch Committee's attention
during recent months has been the situation in the Formosa Straits
area. In dealing with the development of that situation, the Watch
Committee has improved its techniques, including the
compilation and dissemination to the intelligence community and
to overseas commands of an indicator list specifically, responsive
to the Offshore Islands situation.
3. Foxn:losa Straits Coverage
a. In response to the President's desire for coordinated intel-
ligence coverage of the Formosa Straits problem, the IAC established
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an ad hoc Current Intelligence Group on the Formosa Straits. This Group
issued daily reports from 21 March to 6 May, and now issues weekly reports
supplemented by such special reports zs events require.
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USAF Indications Center
The Air Force has activated, and now operates world-wide on a
2b-hour basis, an Indications System keyed to the detection of imminent
Soviet/Communist attacks, especially air attack with nuclear weapon.
The Air Defense Command, Alaskan Air Command, Far East Air Command,
Northeast Air Command and USAF Europe, all have subsidiary indications
centers tied in with the Unified commands system and with Washington by
preferential use channels of communication for flash transmission of
early warning intelligence. This system is tied in with the National
Indications Center referred to in para. 2 above.
5.
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25X1 C The proposed a closer integration of the activities
of indications centers in Washington, This proposal
was declined by the IAC in view of the adequacy of existing
communications channels, the present substantial exchange of evaluations,
ancl the processing by the US Indications Center of operational
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6. SHAPE Request for Indications Intellit once
We have noted an increase in the requests fr=, SIl.I1I=E for intel-
liG::nce which could be made available to all National Mer:iber rel, r~
sentrtives. The IAC now has i efore it a request for 3.: tel.lij once
on indications of Soviet military cLCGression. While the policy of
the IAC on release of intellj.,.;ence to SHAPE, because of the multi-
a,ationalities problem, has been cautious (though more liberal with
resl)cct to the Stnndin, Group), we of course make nvaiiable to
Gericral Gruenther and his US staff officers auly intelli,.cn:.ce of use
to then.
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B. EVALUATION AND ESTIMATES
1. National, Intellire11ce Fsti mate$ (NIE)
no The NSC rcaffirrecl, with procedural changes, its directive
for producing; "net evaluations" of the capabilities of the USSR to
inflict direct injury on the continental US and key US installations
overseas. For the pending; study, scheduled to ?;o to the NSC on
1 October 1955, the IAC has produced several estimates keyed to the
focal period of raid-1958. These have included "Soviet Gross Capa-
bilities for Attacks on the US and Key Overseas Installations Through
Mid-195 3," and "Probable Intel.li,Gez ce Warning of Soviet Attack on the
US ThrouEh Mid-1958.11
b, Intelligence support was also rendered to the NSC on ether
topics, and of the 30 NIE's published during; the last six ronths,
19 wore related to specific NSC papers or policy decisions (compared
to 16 of the 24 published clurin ; the preceding; six months)
c. Special. estimates are in process in support of the work of
the Spccitx,i. Assistant to the President for Disarmorlent.
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d. The IAC is now surveying the use to which recipients are
putting NIE's, in. order to determine how those estimates can be
made more useful to policy makers.
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2. National irtolligence Surveys (NIS)
Since the start of the NIS Program in 194,8, over 2,700 sections
have boon produced on 87 foreign countries and areas. This repre-
sents over one half of the total world covera{e, most of which
has been on JCS high priority areas. The goal of 8 equivalent NIS
per year established for the program was attained and it is expected
that this rate of production will. continue. New eleice;:its are being
produced in accordance with revised interagency requ.ircuents for
psychological warfare and the United
States Information Agency programs. There has been in provement during
the past year in the collection of ort in support of NIS.
3. Military Intelligence
n. We can report no appreciable change in the status of military
intelligence as described in our last report (NSC 5509, Part 7).
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Military intelligence is kenorally adequate to support broad
nsse sstients of the military, logistical, industrial, and g;overnrient
control strengths of the USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites.
b. Nevertheless, information in many critical fields is
not adequate, qualitatively or quantitatively, to provide a firm
intelligence basis for the formulation of military plans, the cal-
culation of risks, the conduct of military operations, the develop-
vent of material, the orientation of research, and the allocation of
resources*
c. Within the last six months improvements have been made
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in. certain limited categories of military information on the Sino-
Soviet Bloc. These have included gains in (a) our knowlodgo of
Soviet postwar modifications of tactical doctrine for regiments
and battalions, as a result of acquisition of Soviet Field Service
Regulations, dated 1.53; (b) the degree of reliability and accuracy
(c) our knowleclee of the
pattern and scope of the Soviet program for modernizing ground
weapons, to the extent that such weapons have been issued to troops
in Germany and Austria. This last development has also muck possible
some confirmation of existing estimates on the production of weapons.
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The Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to exercise the most stringent
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of security measures.
military information
This has steadily reduced ovcrv access to
e. In view of the basic nature of the obstacles confronted an
expanded program must be operated over a long period of time before
a significant reduction in our critical deficiencies is in sight.
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ipproximatc,ly 85% of the
minimal requirements f o 25X1 A
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in support of joint war plansa, were completed
at the end of Fiscal Year 1955. The remaining 15% of the minimal
requirements are scheduled for completion by the end of calendar
year 1955. desired by the 25X1 B
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Services for developrient of the optimum opporttinities, for air
action, were approxicately 70%o satisfied at the end of Fiscal
Year 1955?
1~. political In- tell!:, ence
a. Resources and capahil:,_ties for production of political
intell_ic,ence on the Sine-Soviet Bloc rer:iain urnchankled and con-
tinue to make possible a reasonatly accurate interpretation of
political developments.
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b. The program for analyzing prob].eras of the underdeveloped
areas in the free world continues as a major focus of attention,
together with the study of vulnerabilities in those areas to Cora-
uunist infiltration and other action. Negotiations are in progress
between State and CIA to strengthen the production of intelligence on
international Cormunism. We have also concentrated on attitudes and
reactions in the Free World to the development of nuclear weapons,
with increasing emphasis upon the question of the force and extent
of neutralism. Instructions have been sent to US missions overseas
covering
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5. Economic Intelligence
a. There has been continued improvement in our intelligence
on the economy of the lino-Soviet Bloc. This improvement has
been primarily in research and analysis, but also in collection,
Useful advances have boon made in techniques for the study of long-run
Soviet economic growth and for estimate of Bloc capabilities. Increasing
emphasis is being given to the costing and economic evaluation of
individual Soviet military programs, including guided missiles and air
defense programs; and to Soviet defense expenditures. However, important
gaps continue to exist in data on industries and products which are
closely identified with priority military uses. Attempts are being made
to correct inadequacies in data and methods for analyzing Soviet arri-
culturalcapabilities and their implications, Bloc consumer goods
production, Soviet economic penetration of underdeveloped areas, and
other economic fields of national intelligence interest. The coordination
effort in the field of economic intelligence under NSCIB 15/1 has been
particularly noteworthy in recent months.
b. Special attention had been given to the analysis of the
nature and importance of Sino-Soviet relationships to the economic
growth potential of Communist China. Outputs of certain basic
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industries are reasonably well established but more inforrlation
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and expanded research are required or over-all consumption and
on agricultural and transportation capabilities.
c. Economic intelligence continues to support the US pro,ram
for underdeveloped areas. It has given extensive support to the
President's proc;rcri for peaceful uses of atomic energy.
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problems that have arisen during the past year. Acceleration in the
effort to improve enforcement of eco o~:ric defense measures, requires
improved collection of information ou trade control violations and
increased analysis of trade and financial transactions. The com-
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has provided agreed estimates relating to trade t.ith
Cozmiuniot China.
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6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence
a. Through intensified research our understanding of Soviet
basic scientific capabilities and scientific manpower has iuproved
Successful application
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nesrL-ed, will be required for substantial improvement in scientific
and technolc ical i.ntelliG;ance.
b. Atonic Energy. Si; nifieant information on both technical
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and administrative phases of the Soviet atomic enemy prr) ;rau has been
ohtnined Burin( the first half of 1955. We have continued our per >;ran,
be;i.;un in 1951
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Information thus far
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enerr';y prod rare. The appox'tioni :nt of the Soviet fissionable rmterial
stockpile arione possible weapons types, a.lth ouch susceptible of
estiriation by indirect methods of varyin; reliability, still cam.-.ot
be determined by direct evidence.
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e. Guided missiles'. Preparation of the first national in-
telligence estimate on guided missiles revealed critical gape in
our knowledge. Recent action reemphasizing the position of this
field within the highest priority category of national intell ..
gence objectives has resulted in increasing the effort on the
collection and analysis of information. Considerable effort is
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results. To foster further improvements, the IAC I.ae astahliahocl
an ad hoc coxittee to survey and evaluate the status of the
nation's guided missile intelligence effort on the Sinn-Soviet
Bloc. assist in this survey.
In the light of limited, but perhaps significant information ro-
cently acquired, we have undertaken a review of the national esti-
mate, completed last fall, of the Soviet guided missile program.
d. DioloRical Warfare. Based on the experience gained in
producing the first community wide estimate in this field, a.
joint study of critical deficiencies in biological warfare intelli-
gence and moans for their elimination was completed in April. Posi-
tive evidence of the nature of the Soviet DW program has yet to be
obtained.
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Electronics. cs. O estirmates, rude as additional information
is received, show an increase in Soviet electronics capabilities.
The specific items of information include evidence on new native
Soviet equipment including radars, relocation and modernization of
already known electronics systoris, acquisition of Soviet-made
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should rrovide irmproved appraisal of the current state of the Soviet
electronics industry and research potential. An incrc;asing -Mount
of information is also being received concerning airborne intercept
(AI) radar. The capabilities of the Soviet broadcast jarmr!mer system
were to a large extent established.
f. Moteorologieal Intelligence. A survey of critical do-
ficiencios in metoorological intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc
is under review by an IAC ad hoc subcommittee.
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4. Aerial Roconnaiasance
Navy and Air Force aerial reconnaissance operations con-
tinue to be performed within the framework of policy guidance fur..
oncies. The value and capability of this
Wished to operating ag
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paeans of gathering intelligence information is recognized', and
collection operations are vigorously pursued. For example, the
Air Force averages more than one thousand aerial reconnaissance
flights annually in peripheral regions of the Communist Bloc.
Useful data related to Communist Bloc capabilities, techniques
of operation, order of battle? military and industrial develop
rionts, and installation changes are being obtained in peripheral
regions.
Recognition of the growing potential of the peaeotime
employment of aerial reconnaissance has resulted in an invigorated
research and development program. Systems currently in the
"drawing board" stage have a potential capability to collect de-
tailed technical information continuously over large areas of the
earth's surface.
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In a related activity, teams using cameras with 100-inch
focal length lens recently developed by the Array have t reduced
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ground photography of considerable intelligence value along the
As equipment becones
available additional tec~ras will be deployed along the Bloc border.
Exri1oitationnoof,_ pefectors
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In recent months the flow of defectors has been normal in
numbers but outstanding or oreoializ?d sources have been rela-
tive3.y few as compared with the past Tear.
6. fro Breams in. Electronics
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b, ELI NT (Nc;n-Comr.unicatio Flectrronio Inter. centNow and
significant information on Soviet equipment and systems, including
airborne intercept radar and navigation systems, has resulted from
ELINT collection activities. The national ELINP progrnxi was
considered by the MC, and NSCID-17 now Provides the basic frame-
work for this ~~rocessing effort; Much remains to be done before a
satisfactory, integrated effort is achieved. We have made progress
j.g)~gtilding ELINT collection capabilities, including the exploita-
to be operational within six months. The quantitative exploitation
of the ELINP potential of clandestine operations is currently
hampered by shortages in equipment and trained specialists.
STATSPEC
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Significant developments in the field of clandestine intelli-
cence operations are reported to the IN ISO quarterly by the
Director of Central Intelligence.
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12. Cnnrd.ination of Infnrru~tion Procossin.
An IAC ad hoc con nittee can infrrnkatinn nrocessIng is at work
on the increasini,,ly complex problem of handling data within the
intelli(*ence corrlunity. The committee is now studying existing
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systens. It will next make studies and recorunend at ions concerning
such matters as a coupon classification schario; uniform publishing,
processing and dissemination procedures; and efficiency of storage
and retrieval of intelligence infornation.
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