THE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000100210014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2000
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 30, 1957
• Content Type: REPORT

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30 April 1957
Final -
IAC Approved
PROPOSED BRIEFING FOR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
on
"TBE SOVIET GUIDED MISSILE MCGRAW*
INTRODUCTION
1, The purpose of this presentation is to furnish a wermee.7 of the US
intelligence community's latest estimates of Soviet guided missile capabilities
and probable programs. The intelligence commenity includes the intelligence
organizatiens of the State Department, Army, Navy, Air Force, the joint Chiefs
of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission,. Federal Bureau of -Investigation, and the
Central -Intelligence Agency, -which has a coordinating responsibility in the
field of national intelligence. Inasmuch as our intelligence community is
responsible for producing intelligence on foreign'powers and is neither
responsible nor qualified to evaluate comparable US programs, this presenta-
tion will be limited to a discussion of our best intelligence assessment of
the Soviet guided missile program. The data for this briefing are based on
our most recent community estimates,
BACKGROUND
2. Although the USSR had no known guided missile provasi at the close
of World War II, we have conclusive evidence of a great postwar Soviet
* The Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstains, the
subject being outside his jurisdiction.
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interest in guided missiles, many strong indications of a large and active
?
research and development program, and firm evidence of the present opera-
tional deployment or a surface-to-air missile defense system around Moscow.
Unfortunately, the very effective security surrounding the entire Soviet
military complex, and particularly around sensitive areas such as their
guided missile program, hampers our gathering of intelligence. This is
especially true on the details of specific guided missile systems. There-
fore, IA order to estimate these specific Soviet misoile capabilities in a
field where positive intelligence is not always available, we are forced to
develop our estimates from: (a) all available evidence of Soviet miesile
activity including their exploitation of the German missile experience and
personnel; (b) general knowledge of the "state-of-the-art" in the guided
missile field in the US; and (c) known and estimated Soviet capabilities in
related fields. Our estimates of the intended scoRe. of the Soviet program?
ee contrasted to 221e_hilities? are based largely on probable Soviet military
re?quirements for missiles in relation to other military weapons gystems.
3. Let me enlarge Gomel/bat upon what is meant by "available evidence
of Soviet missile activity". Immediately after World War II, the Soviets
initiated a thorough and systematic exploitation of Gerean guided miseilos
and missile personalities, facilitieo, and equipment. From this exploita-
tLee, me believe the Soviets obtained four general. results; (a) the
acqeisition of overational and prototype missiles, research and production
facilities and equipment, and approximetely 400 Gorman missile specialists;
(b) coopleted studies of German achievements prior to the war's end-1945;
(c) the familiarization of Soviet personnel with German techniques of
research, development, testing, and production of missiles and components;
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and (d) fUrther technical studies and limited hardware development per
by Clorman scientists.
4. moot of the German missile scientisto and technicians taken to the
USSR have been returned to Germany. We have been, and are continuing to,
thoroughly and systematically exploit these valuable sources of technieal
'intelligence. Although me cannot accurately assess the degree to which the
German miselle contributions have been incorporated in the native Soviet
guided missile program, we believe that by 1948 the' USSR'had raised the
level of its guided mitsile knowledge to that which existed in German?' at
the close of World War 11. We therefore estimate that a concerted and
continuous native Soviet guided missile research and development program
could have begun in 1948.
5. This and valuable information from other of our sources, together
with our knowledge of Soviet eapabilities in related fields such as electronics,
aerOdynamics? prepulsion, and nuclear energy, are used in our assessment of
Soviet guided missile capabilities and probable programs.
6. The dates given in this briefing are the ear/iest probable years
during which one or more missiles could have been serially produced and
,,].aced in the hands of trained pereonnel of one operational unit, thus
constituting a limited capability or operational employment. It should be
noted that an additional yeriod of time, varying from a few months to
several years depending upon the missile system, mould be required before
we aro faced with a signifioant threat in terms of actual employment in a
general mar. Our current estimate is baeed on the judgement that the USSF
does not now intend to initiate general war deliberately nd is not now
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prepering for general mar as of aey particular future date. Our estimate
on which this briefing is based covers the period through 1966, although,
or course; estimates as to future years are subject to revision as new
intelligence becomes available.
SOVIMO GUILfreACSSILE. CAPApILI7.226
GEBERAL CONCLUSIONS
7. We estimate that the Soviet guided missile program is extens(ve
and enjoys a very high priority.
8. We believe that the USSR has the native sa entitic resources and
capabilities to develop during thiS period advanced types of guided missile
systems, in all categories for which it has military requirements.
9. We estimate that the USSR has the industrial base and related
induetrial experience to series produce the missile systems it will develoe
during this period. However, in view of competing demands, the limited
evailability of electronic equipmeat vile sericuAy restrict the exteet and
variety of Soviet guided missile proeuction until about 1958. Thereafter,
esseandieg electrouics production will probably make this restriction vetch
less severe.
10. In consonance with miesions to be accomplishdd, me ectimate that
the USSR has requirements for vareous sizes of nuelear, high explosive (HE)
aed eheelical (CW) warheads, and has the capability to develop them op time
semles consistent with the missilee in which they would be employed. In
view ot competing demands, the availability of fiesionable materials via
ierose limitations on the extent of Soviet nuclear warhead production
between now and 1966.
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SPECIFIC NMSSILE CAPABILITIES
U. The following dates for specific missile capabilities give the
eFlyrob8. in which we estimate the threat agaUtbegin, but,
as previously indicated, an additional period of time, varying with missile
type, would be required for these missiles to become available in qpantity.
12. Sur:ace-to-Air Missiles. We estimate that surface-to-air missile
syatems have one of the highest priorities among current Soviet military
programs. At Moscow, an exteneive system of surface-to-air missile sites .
haa been constructed, and all sites are probably now operational. This
syetem can probably direct a very high rate of fire against multiple targets
at maximum altitudes of about 60,000 feet and maxima horizontal ranges of
about 25 nautical milers.
13. Luring the period 1958-1961, surface-to-air ystems with increased
range and altitude capabilitiea for static defense of critical areas, and
with low and high altitude capabilities for defense of static targets, field
forces, and naval vesaels, could probably become available for operational
emp14ment. Some time between 1963 and 1966, the USSR could probably have
in operation a surface-to-air system of some capability against the ICBM.
14. We estimate that series production of surface-to-air guided
missiles is mar andergay in the USSR, and that it will probably produce
such misailes inlarge ouantities. Nuclear warheads could now be incor-
porated into a limited number of Surface-to-air missiles, We estemate that
soae percentage of surface-to-air missile's will be so equipped between
now and 1966.
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15. Air-to-Air Missiles. Despite a lack of significant intelligence,
we estimate that the USSR bas pursued the development of air-to-air missiles,
and that it could now have in operationdl use a 2-3 nautical mile range
missile capable of tail-cone attacks in good weather. It is probable that
the USSR could have a 5 nautical mile all-weather missile operational in
1958 and a 15-20 nautical mile all-weather missile, capable of employing
a nuclear warhead in 1960.
16. Air-to-Surface Missilee. In 1955 the USSR could probably have
had a 20 nautical mile subsonic air-to-surface missile available for
operational use. lb. 1956-1957 a 55 nautical mile subsonic missile could
probably be available, and there is some evidence that such a missile has
reached at least final flight test stage. A 55 nautical mile supersoeic
missile could probably be available in 1958. These missiles, designed
primarily as anti-ship weapons, could also be employed against isolated
and vell-defined radar targets on land. In 1961) a 100 nautical mile
supersonic missile could probably be available for employment by heavy
bombers. Each of these missile types could employ nuclear warheads.
16. Surface-to-Surfac2,Ballietic Missiles Terith_u_ to_35.0 Bauticl
Idles Pangs. There is considerable evidence of Soviet development of
short-range surface-to-surface missiles, and we estimate that the USSR
could probably have had available for operational use in 1954 ballistic
missiles with the following maximum ranges: 75 nautical miles, 175 200
nautical miles, and 350 nautical miles. These types could be 0%11pp:el
with nuclear warheads. However, the USER would probably consider CW
warheads desirable for certain specific purposes, and might employ HE in
the two shorter-ranee types.
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18. Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Missiles with 700-1600 Nautical
Niles Range. EVidence an Soviet development programs leads us to ectimate
that the USSR could probably have bad a 700 nautical mile maximum range
ballistic missile for operational use in 1956. We have firm evidence that in
1911.9 the USSR vas interested in a 1600 nautical mile intermediate ranee
ballistic missile (MHO and we believe it is a logical step in the Soviet
development program. We estimate that the USER is developing an IRBM, and
that it could probably have such a missile in operation in 1959. Both these
missile types would probably employ, nuclear varheads. We believe the USSR
woubi rapidly acquire a considerable Dumber of both the 700 nautical mile
and the 1600 nautical mile missiles.
19. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with 5500 Nautical Niles Failge?
We have no direct evidence that the USSR is developing an ICBM, but ve
believe its development has probably been a high priority goal of the
Soviet ballistic missile 'program. We estimate that the USSR could peobably
have a 5500 nautical mile ICBM ready for operational use in 1960-1961. We
believe that tbe USSR will seek to acquire a considerable number of ICBM,r.
with nuclear warheads ac rapidly as possible.
20. Submarine-launched Surface-to-Surface Miseiles. We believe the
ussa would probably have developed aruise-type miesiles initially; and
there is 20110 evidence pointing to the existence or Soviet eubwarineu
equipped to carry such miseiles. The USSR could probably have had it
operation in 1955 a subsonic turbojet missile capable of a maximum range
of 500 nautical miles, and a supersonic ndssile capable of this ramp could
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probably be in operation in 1957. A supersonic cruise-type missile capable
of ragesup to 1000 nautical miles could probably be operational in 1962.
These miSsile types mould require nuclear warheads. With a vigorous program,
the ussa ndaht achieve an operational sdbnarine-launched 1RBM system sometime
during the period 1964-1966.
21. 1411th Satellite Vehicle. The USSR will probably neke a major
effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We believe
that the USSR has the capability of orbiting, in 1957, a satellite vehicle
which could acquire scientific informal.Lon and data of limited military
value. A satellite vehicle possessing sdbstantial reconnaissance capabilities
of military value could probably be orbited in the period 1963-1963.
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