POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 21, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 September 1959
MEMORAIV'DUM FOR THE' DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUDJECT: Possibly: Developments in Iraq*
1. The situation in Iraq has grown even more uncertain since
our last estimate (SNIE 36.2/2-59, "The Short-Term Outlook for
Iraq," dated 30 June 1.59). Qassim has continued certain moves
to limit Communist activities, such as pulling the teeth of the
Popular Resistance Forces. At the same tine,, these measures have
been overshadowed by his failure as yet to move against the Commu-
nists for their part in the Kirkuk atrocities of mid-July,, his
public approval of pro-Communist Col. Mahdawifs antinationaliat
activities in the notorious People's Court, and yesterday's exe-
cution of Brigadier Tabragehali and other participants in the Mosul
uprising, as well as four civilian members of Nurits last government.
This memorandum has been discussed with CCI and DD/P.
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SECRET
2. Predictions as to future developments must remain highly
tentative. Despite Qassin's apparent popularity in the country,
he has not yet developed an organization personally loyal to him.
He probably still hopes to maintain the precarious equilibrium he
thinks he has established between Communist and anti -Corarlunist
forces. He may be able to do so, possibly by counterbalancing the
Tabagchali execution with new moves to cut down Communist power.
However, we believe that there is a better than even chance that
the struggle for control of Iraq is about to enter another critical
phase. The execution of Tabechali could easily serve as a catalyst
for action in the tense situation. Such a crisis would not neces-
sarily prove decisive, but it would probably involve more extensive
disturbances and reprisals than have yet taken place.
3. Reports of coup plots, including the assassination of
Qassim, have increased in recent weeks. Iraqi nationalists' dis-
illusionment with Qassim is at a new peak and the UAR apparently
once again fears increasingly that Qassin cannot be relied upon
to keep Iraq out of Corinunist hands. Nasser has claimed that he
is opposed to any new coup move at this time on the grounds that
it would probably abort, but the UAR nay find itself involved in
a nationalist rising.
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I+. Qaasin and the Communists are both almost certainly aware
that the nationalists may resort to desperate measures, Either
or both may move to forestall a nationalist challenge, though we
believe that the Communists would still hope to act in conjunction
with Qassim. If the nationalists, either alone or with UAR help,
do attempt a coup, the outcome will be uncertain. However, we
believe that at best its chances of success would be no better
than even at this time. Present trends indicate that a further
weakening of anti-Communist ranks in Iraq is likely.
5. If this occurs,, it would probably result in more acute
and more overt hostility between Iraq and the UAR and consequently
in increased turmoil in the Arab World and the Middle East generally.
In such circumstances, both the West and the Communist Bloc would
be likely to find themselves under pressure to play a more active
role in the situation.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SIIERRMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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