THE CHARACTER AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOMOZA REGIME IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030019-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 1999
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 10, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
10 June 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Character and Prospects of the Soraoza Regime
in Nicaragua
1. The Somoza regime has controlled Nicaragua for twenty-
five years through its firm control of the armed forces and
the established political processes. Opposition to the regime
has hitherto been weak, divided, and manageable. Now the
regime is threatened by a variety of revolutionary movements
among Nicaraguan exiles and by a greatly emboldened internal
opposition. The danger to the regime is primarily psychological:
it is less a function of the actual capabilities of any parti-
cular opposition group than of a rapidly spreading conviction
that the Somozas' time has run out. Whatever the outcome of
any particular revolutionary attempt, it has become unlikely
that President Luis Somoza will be able to remain in office to
the expiration of his term in 1963. If moderate opposition
elements prove incapable of bringing about an early change in
government, anti-US and pro-Conaunist elements will probably
gain increasing influence in the revolutionary moverznt and in
the eventual successor regime.
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The Character of the Somoza Re lme
2. From 1933 until his assassination in 1956, Anastasio
(Tacho) Somoza was in firm control if Nicaragua through his per-
sonal control of the National Guard,, the country's only armed
force. He maintained a facade of democratic constitutional
government, occupying the presidency only occasionally himself
and maintaining an elected Congress (including a hand-picked
minority opposition), but he completely controlled all elections
and appointments. During this period the Somoza family amassed
an irxpressive private fortune in ended estates and business
enterprises., as did other closely associated families. Opposition
to the regime consisted mostly of members of the former ruling
elite (landholding and business interests). They resented their
deprivation of political power and concommittant economic oppor-
tunity. These disgruntled elements were allowed considerable
freedom of expression so long as they presented no serious threat
to the regime. On occasion., however, the National Guard was
brutal in its suppression of revolutionary conspiracies. On the
other hand, the regime was acceptable to the generality of the
urban population, to whom it represented stability and a measure
of economic improvement. The rural population was generally
apathetic.
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3. As President of Congress, Luis Somoza was his fatherts
constitutional successor in the Presidency. His position has been
confirmed by election in 1957 for a six-year term. His younger
brother? Anastasio (Tachito) Somoza,, remains in command of the
National Guard.
k. Luis Somoza has recognized the rising sentiment against
dictatorship in Latin America and has endeavored to free himself
of that stigma by exercising less stringent police controls than
did his father. At the same tine, he did not take office in order
to preside over the liquidation of the Somoza political machine
and family fortune. Personal pride and a sense of responsibility
oblige him to maintain the situation which he inherited as best
he can in changing circumstances. In any case, it is impossible
for Luis Somoza to divest himself of the family name and repu-
tation.
Revolutionary Elements
5. The Castro revolution in Cuba has greatly stimulated
revolutionary activity throughout the Caribbean area. The Somoza
regime is high on every list of the dictatorships which must soon
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be swept away. The constant reiteration of this theme has estab-
lished the idea that., however its end may be brought about., the
days of the regime are numbered. This idea creates a bandwagon
psychology which is in itself a powerful stimulus to revolu-
tionary activity.
6. In this atmosphere., an attempt was made to unify the
many Nicaraguan opposition groups in a National Opposition Union
(UNO). This loose coalition includes the major faction of the
traditional Conservative Party., the Independent Liberal Party
(which is the anti-Somoza elenent of the traditional Liberal Party).,
and smaller anti-Somoza groups., both in and out of Nicaragua.
The recognized leader of this opposition grouping is Enrique
Lacayo Farfan. It has the active support of ex.-President Figueres
of Costa Rica and the implicit support of President Detancourt of
Venezuela., the two outstanding liberal., anti-Communist leaders in
the Caribbean area.
7. A separate Nicaraguan revolutionary movement has devel-
oped among exiles who flocked to Cuba in response to Fidel Castro's
call for the overthrow of the Sonoza dictatorship. Castro
apparently commissioned "Che" Guevara to facilitate the organi-
zation and preparation of these exiles for revolutionary action;
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Guevara's partiality for Communists has established Communist
leadership of the group. This group is probably smaller in
numbers than that led by Lacayo Farfan, but its prospects were
greatly enhanced by the active support of the Cuban Goverment-
Castro has recently become more discreet regarding open support
for revolutionary exiles,, but is probably continuing to provide
covert support for this group.
8. Figueres sought Castrors cooperation in an attempt to
overthrow the Somoza regime,, but found that Cuban participation
would involve Communist participation,, which he was unwilling to
accept. The result was a resounding quarrel between the two
leaders. Lacayo Farfan has also solicited Cuban support,, but
could not obtain it on acceptable terns.
9. The present revolutionary invasion of Nicaragua was
made from Costa Rica by followers of Lacayo Farfan. Arlong other
considerations, it was apparently designed to forestall a
revolutionary attempt from Cuba. It was made in conjunction
with an attempted general strike fomented by the Nicaraguan
business community without the cooperation of the small Nicara-
guan labor movement., which is Communist dominated. The strike
was effective only as a lock-out and has collapsed. The
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revolutionary invasion has failed to produce immediate results
for lack of popular response. The invaders are still at large.,
however,, and, if they can maintain themselves as guerrillas,
nay in time be able to sap the prestige and general acceptance
of the regime. Recognizing this President Somoza is seeking
to end the conflict by negotiation.
The Prospects
10. The Somoza regime can probably survive the immediate
crisis. However., its ability to withstand the slow erosion of
its prestige and acceptance which would rem at from a prolonged
guerrilla resistance is doubtful. The willingness of the
business comunity to hazard the attempted general strike is
symptomatic of a conviction that the end of the regime is near.
The leniency of the terms on which the regime settled with the
business community and is seeking to settle with the invaders is
a probable sign of weakness.
11. The regime cannot expect much help from the OAS.,
where it has few friends and where the conspiracies against it are
recognized as genuinely Nicaraguan (as distinguished from the
essentially foreign character of the recent invasion of Panama).
In the OAS., a substantial majority would probably prefer some
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solution which would ease the embarrassing Sonozas out with
minimal disturbance of the peace.
12. If the moderate opposition is not able soon to pro-
duce a convincing prospect for an early change of government
in Nicaragua, its more ardent and impatient followers may turn
to Cuba for leadership in hope of more effective results. The
sentiment would be that only by the united action of all revolu-
tionary elements could the regime be overthrown. The moderate
leadership itself might be moved by this consideration. The end
result would be an increase of anti-US and pro-Communist influence
in the revolutionary movement and in the eventual successor
regime.
13. In these circumstances, the Soraoza regime may become
increasingly disposed to negotiate a political settlement with
its moderate opponents, from whom it might expect more favorable
terms than from the Castro-supported revolutionary movement. Luis
Soraoza has already promised to yield place in 1963 to a duly
elected president not of the Sonoza family. He has so far re-
sisted pressure to shorten his tern of office, but might eventually
yield on this point. Other negotiating; problems would involve
getting rid of Tachito Somoza, provision for disinterested
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supervision of a free election,, and arrange4onts regarding
the extensive Sonoza family properties.
14. Considering the psychological situation primarily,
we believe it unlikely that Luis Somoza will continue in
office to the end of his torras in 1963.
SI3ERMAN KEI'T
Assistant Director
National Eti.:iates
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