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December 9, 2016
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March 26, 1999
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PDF icon CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2.pdf675.51 KB
Approved For Releas2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-005491460200030045-2 ATTACH NT B TS #141842-b FOR NESC EXEUCISE 19 i~-19 ~ w~rrr~..-rrrr r ry-.~r ~s ~+.s-~ To provide, for the special-purpose use of the Net Evaluation Sub.. committee, coordinated intelligence assumptions with respect to certain Soviet military capabilities and US warning capabilities in mid-1962, as set forth by the NESC in an "Outline of Specific Coordinated Intelli- gence Required for NESC Exercise, 1953-1959." 1. In preparing these coordinated assumptions, it has been recognized that for its purposes the NESC requires quite specific numerical pro- jections for the mid-1962 period. The views cf individual agencies have in some cases been compromised in an effort to meet this require- ment. Likewise, numerical projections have been made in some areas where the present state of our knowledge might not justify their inclusion as estimates in an NIE for general distribution. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Relea2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549100200030045-2 ATTACH NT B to TS # 14151i2?.b 2. In instances where this has occurred, every effort has been made to provide assumptions which are as realistic as possible. For example, Soviet requirements for Cuided missiles of various categories were derived in accordance with estimated Soviet military thinking and strategy (as outline in NIE ll..L..57), and in the light of available studies of US and Allied targets, data on weapon effects, estimated availability of other Soviet weapon systems, and other pertinent factors. Production of missiles and associated equipment was then scheduled and the schedules were chocked and adjusted in the light of known or estimated Soviet capabilities and programs in the guided missile and other military fields. The final assumptions for mid-1962 were measured against estimated Soviet economic capaliilitics and estimated availability of nuclear materials for warheads, and found to be feasible. * The representative of the Director of Naval Intelligence calls attention to his dissent to the majority estimate of the availability of nuclear materials in the USSit, as registered in NIE 11'2?.53. Jel A ac ordance with this dissent he eliov that ass d n era of~we ns)Mc curac a p 1 ds or .pion w d uir 25X1A 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Relea42000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-0054900200030045-2 ATTACHMENT B .to TS#1L+1842 -b 3 This procedure has been undertaken under the broad assumptions -- there will be no international ac;rcomont on the limitation of control of armaments durin_t; this period; -- the USSR. is not and will not urin; the period of this estimate, ae preparink for eneral war to befLin at any particular date in the future (i.e., that the date 1962 has no special siunificance in Soviet plannin?) ; -- Soviet requirements for weapon s wu,,a:zs will in 1v,eneral be related to the missions to be performed and targets to be attacked and defended in the event of general war; .~. Soviet proz'rams for production aril operational deployment of weapon systems will be affected. by considorations of maximum utilization of proven military hardware, optimum effectiveness vs. cost, minimum loss or wa ta;e due to obsolescence factors, and maximum efficiency in the utilization of available resources. 4. Isum, we believe that the Coordinated Intelligence Assumptions contained in the following; pat,;cs are feasible and reasonable, but it is emphasized that they must be treated as assumptions rather than as estimates of S viet strent -ths in rfdo..-3- 62. Approved For Release 2000/08/2 \-RDP61-00549 R000200030045-2 Approved For Relea`5 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-0054000200030045-2 TOP SECMT TIM ASSUMPTIONS A. SOVIET NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES IN MID-1962 1. Numbers of Delivery Vehicles inOoviet ATTACHMENT B to TS 141842-b erational Units Heavy Borabers/Tankers Nur~ber: 200-300 Composition by type: BISONs, HERS, new heavy bombers (see SNIE 11-7-56). Medium Bombers Tankers Piston: None Jet: 1,350 Composition by role and type: . (a) Long Range Aviation - 725 BADGERS 175 Supersonic "dash" tdium bombers (b) Naval Aviation - 250 DADGERs (c) Tactical Aviation - 200 l3ADGERs -4 - TOP SECPW Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 4 Approved For ReleaW2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549`! 600200030045-2 ATTACHMENT D to TS 31i18I2-b Jet Light Dotbers Number: 2, 350 Composition by role and type: (a) Tactical Aviation - 1,300 BEAGLES 750 Supersonic tactical boribers (b) Naval Aviation - 100 DEA,GLEs 200 Supersonic tactical bombers Air-to-surface Missiles AS-l, 55 n.m. missiles: AS-2, 100 u.n. missiles: ICBMs Number: Deployment: 450 350 (a) 50 percent static sites hardened to withstand averar;e of 25-50 psi overpressure; 50 percent rail-transpi:artable system with rainiriuz: of two launching, points per missile. (b) launchin;; facilities sufficient to salvo 25C-300 missiles Other Ground-launched ballistic Missiles SS-47700 n.r.m. misoiles: 250-350 SS-5, 1100 n.r.i. missiles: 250-350 Deploinent: road and rail mobile, with four missiles per launcher. Join Sand Air-- orce represe;~tatives reserve their poAitions. Th eliey s tie assut:zed ~ur l~cr off !, D houlc -.mob with .re nce Apprc' 4 s4 1O81~ PA- I 0 549ROGO.200 _4 45-stnn ;e, some o w i c woul. be erjuip ped with nuclear warheads, were excluded upon consultation with NESC Staff representative. Approved For Relea2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-0054900200030045-2 ATTACEMEJT B to TS #141842-b Guided Missile Submarines 7k Number equipped with cruise-type missiles: 47 (a) Current long-range classes., principally "Z" class, converted for topside missile stowage - 20 Missile capacity-- 2 each (b) New design., conventional powered$ constructed for internal missile stowage - 20 Missile capacity " 4 each (c) New design., nuclear powered constructed for internal missile stowage - 7 Missile capacity - 4 each Number equipped with ballistic missiles: 1 or 2 New design., nuclear powered., missile capacity 4-3 each Submarine-launched Guided Missiles SS-7., 200 n.m. cruise-type missiles: 300 SS-81 1000 n.m. ballistic missiles: 10-20 2. Performance Data, Dobbs, and Warheads for Above Vehicles Aircraft characteristics: See SNIE 11-58 and SEC coordinated contribution to NIE 11-4-58 Dodos and warheads: See NIE 11-2-58 and Annex C of NIE 11-5-58. Missile characteristics: See NIE 11-5-58 25X1A Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Relea 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-0054000200030045-2 ATTACIDM B to TS #141842-b Missile reliability: The following assumptions regarding Soviet missile reli- abilities under operational conditions in mid-1962 are proposed for use by the NESC. Bo cause of limited information available on the operational aspects of either the Soviet or US missile programs, there is considerable question as to the validity of these figures. In the table below: Column 1 is the missile designation. Column 2 is the percentage of missiles organic to operational units that will appear "good enough to try" to launch at any given time, i.e., serviceability rate. Column 3 is the percentage of those missiles con- sidered "serviceable" (column 2) that will actually get off the launcher when fired. Column 4 is the percentage of those missiles that get off the launcher (column 3) that will actually reach the vicinity of the target. _7_ Approved For Release 2000[B/2~ti9'EA-RDP61-00549 R000200030045-2 Approved. For Releas2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549800200030045-2 TOP SECRET ATTACIINENT B to TS #141842-b ASSUMED RELIAI3ILITIE$ OF SOVIET MISSILES. MID-1g2 COLUMN 1 COLUMN 2 COLUMN 3 COLUMN 4 AS-1 80 g0 80 AS-2 70 75 6o ICBM 75 85 65 SS-4 85 90 80 SS-5 80 90 75 SS-33 85 60 75 SA-1 00 9o 90 SA-2 80 90 SA 4 L o 8 235 80 - 0 75 75 SA-6 65 85 85 SA-7 85 80 Co AA-2 85 85 00 AA-3 35 Co Co 70 Co 70 NOTES: 1. Out-of-service missiles of sub-launched,, air-to-surface, and air-to-air types would not be landed into submarines or aircraft. 2. The assumptions made for air-to-surface and air-to-air missiles do nQt include losses due to aircraft aborts which are caused by non-missile related items. TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Releas2000/08/26 :CIA-RDP61-0054900200030045-2 ATTACHMENT B to TS #141842-b B. SOVIET ALERT PROCEDURES IN MID-1962 Soviet Bomber Force a. Assuming the continuation of present trends under normal conditions, by mid-1962 some 30-40 percent of LRA medium and heavy bomber and tanker aircraft will be engaged in flight training activities each day except on weekends and at holiday periods, and an additional 30-35 percent of LRA aircraft will be grounded for maintenance purposes each day. The remaining bombers and tankers, some 30 percent of the force, could be constituted as a continuing alert force should Soviet planners so desire. Such a force could be ready at any time to become airborne for its own protection or to take off on assigned missions. During periods of international tension, the size of such a continuing alert force could be increased by reducing the number of aircraft engaged in daily training flights and by intensifying maintenance activity. There is no present indication that the Soviets are concerned with the development of an alert force of this type. b, Should Soviet planners elect to mount surprise air attacks after a preparatory stand-down, they might consider that a relatively X0,.9. Approved For Release 2000/08/26:CI -RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Relea 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549000200030045-2 ATTACI14'P T L3 to TS #141842-b brief stand-down could be concealed from detection if it occured over a weekend, at the time of a Soviet holiday., or during unfavorable weather. About 70 percent of the LRA bomber and tanker force could be serviceable for military operations after a 2-day stand-down, c. Should Soviet planners elect to mount maximum-scale attacks., about 85 percent of the LRA bomber and tanker force could be service- able for military operations after a 5-day stand-down* d. The above factors apply to jet medium bombers of Tactical and Naval Aviation as well as Long Range Aviation. They also apply to jet light bombers, with the exception that about 00 percent of the aire%raft of this type could be serviceable after a 2-day stand.-down. 2.. Soviet Ground Forces a. Past Soviet reactions to civil disturbances in the Satellites provide some indication of the minimum time needed to meet unexpected emergency situations, In June 1953 Soviet units in East Berlin left their barracks and moved into positions along the West Sector boundary within three hours after receiving alert orders. Elements from out- lying areas arrived on the scene within 13 hours. In October 1956 the Soviet response to the Hungarian uprising was even more rapid. Units l0 - Approved For Release 2000/081P# b DP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Relea 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00540000200030045-2 ATTACf3T B to TS #l l842 b began arriving in Budapest from locations 50 miles distant within three and one-half hours, and from locations 160 miles distant within about eight hours. Although exercises have been held regularly in recent years to test alert procedures., it is doubtful that reaction tine could be significantly shortened, b. Circumstances which are most conducive to rapid reaction occur when Soviet units have completed their summer field training and returned to winter quarters. At that time the troops are at peak effectiveness and have access to all their equipment; they probably could move into local assembly areas within two hours. At other times of the year., as many as 50 percent"of Soviet units might be split between home stations and field training areas., requiring 24+ hours or more to assemble with all their equipment. Soviet Submarine Forces Between now and mid-1962 the USSR will continue to improve the readiness and operational capabilities of its naval forces. Alternative assumptions can be made with respect to the precise state of readiness that might exist in mid-1962 (a) that a normal peacetime pattern of TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Relee 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 ATTACI12CM D to TS --141#342-b training, upkeep? overhaul and operations is being maintained; (b) that as a result of increased international tensions or deliberate Soviet decision a sharply increased state of readiness is being maintained. The latter alternative would involve the maintenance of larger numbers of ships at sea.. with ships in port limited for the most part to those in upkeep or overhaul status. Many of the ships in port would have a large percentage of their crews on board and make every effort to be prepared for rapid sortie. The following conditions could apply under each of these alternate assumptions: Assumption Percentage of Naval Forces At Sea Underway in 6 bra. Underway Towable to in 12 brs* dispersal area in 48 hrs. Immovable (a) 25 20 30 15 10 (b) 50 20 5 15 10 The above figures are generally applicable to all types of major Soviet surface vessels and submarines,, and to all Soviet fleet areas. Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-0054900200030045-2 TOP SECRET ATTACI MENT B to TS -#141842..; C. SOVIET AIR DEFENSES IN MID-1962 1. We have reviewed those portions of NIE 11-57 which azze pertinent to the NESC's requirements, and find them generally valid, with the ex- ception of the following points: 2. Fighter Aircraft. For revised performance data on Soviet inter- ceptors, see SEC coordinated contribution to M 11-4-53. With respect to numbers of interceptors, we hold estimated Soviet operational strength con- stant at about 10,000 fighters through mid-1960, at which time a gradual decrease will probably begin. Soviet fighter strength in mid-1962 will probably be about 9,300 aircraft, of which over half nay be all-weather types. The assumed breakdown of Bloc fighter strength by type and area is as follows: - 13 - TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved For Relea 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549 OO200030045-2 ATTACHMENT D to TS# 141342-b Jet Fighter Aircraft O rationaal Units (mid-1962) Area Day All-weather Total Regiments Northwestern USSR 670 720 1390 43 Western USSR 985 1070 2055 63 West Central USSR 600 900 1500 45 Caucasus 555 575 1130 35 East Central USSR 305 315 620 19 Far Eastern USSR 650 020 1670 51 Total Within USSR 3395 4400 5 256 Soviet Forces East Europe 445 490 935 29 (Total Soviet) (4410) (4890) (9300) (285) East European Satellites 2360 740 3600 113 Total Within East Europe 3305 1230 4535 142 Communist China and North Korea 1900 690 2590 76 TOTAL BLOC 9,170 6,320 15,490 474 TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 Approved, For Relea`2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549000200030045-2 ATTACHMENT B to TS # 141842-b 3. Guided Missiles. For revised data on Soviet missile types and performance, see NIE 11-5-58. With respect to numbers of missiles, we assume that by mid-1962 the USSR will have produced sufficient mis- siles and associated equipment to accomplish an operational, program of the following general order of magnitude: Arbitrary Designation Number of Missiles Operational Units* Deployment SA -1 13,500 56 Moscow sites SA-2 23,000 175 Static and mobile SA -3 15,000 100 Static and mobile SA-4 13,500 100 Static SA -6 500 2 cruisers ----------- 4 destroyers ----------- SA-7 1,300 4 cruisers 12 destroyers AA-1 Fully replaced by improved missiles AA-2 3,000 Day and all- weather fighters AA-3 and AA-4 35,000 All-weather fii titers * M-21 SA-3, and SA-4 units are assumed to be battalions with three or four firing units each. The number of AA-3 and AA-4 missiles within this total is flexible, but df r.F ejopse 20 0IG8126 CI - PSII'l$ 49ROrO0 (3 5-lee Approv 15 - Approved For Relea 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-0054900200030045-2 ATTACIDENT B to TS 3#141342-b 4. Early Warning and Intercept Control. For revised performance data on Soviet aearly warning and GCI radars, see SEC coordinated contri- bution to NIE 11-4-58. At the present time radar coverage extends over the entire Soviet Bloc except for certain inland portions of central and eastern Siberia. This radar coverage is achieved with two general cate- gories of radars, i.e., heavy or prime radars and light auxiliary sets. At the present time some 1700 radar sites are active. Some 1200 - 1500 prime radars and some 3000 of the light radars are used in various com- binations in the Soviet Bloc system. By mid-1962 radar coverage will probably be complete over the Soviet Bloc. New radars of much higher quality are already beginning to appear, and b mid-1962 will be widely deployed. 5. There is evidence that, in addition to the employment of indi- vidual Soviet cruisers and destroyers 25X1 D Soviet minesweepers are now being adapted for use as radar picket ships for for continental early warning. 6. Command and coordination. The limitation imposed by current air-ground communications equipment is probably being overcome by use of on air-ground data-link system for GCI vectoring of interceptors. We believe such equipment is in widespread use in western USSR and will be in use throughout the Bloc by Ali 162. Approved For Release 2000/08 :-CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 TOP SECRET Approved For Relea[ 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-005400200030045-2 7. For several years the Soviets have been developing computers and other components suitable for data handling use. The use of such equip- ment will have a marked effect in increasing traffic-handling capabilities, reducing system reaction time, and improving coordination within the Soviet air defense system. For example, it is expected that data'-handling equip- ment will increase the traffic capacity of each Soviet radar reporting site to at least 20 simultaneous raids. We believe that an air defense system with some semi-automatic features is being widely deployed in western USSR in association with early warning and GCI sites. This system, which is believed to be similar in concept to the US SAGE system, will be in use throughout the Bloc by mid-1962. The Soviets are introducing a new IFF system; such a system will probably be fully operational by 1960. 8. Electronic Warfare. Shipborne, land-based, and airborne equip- ments, suitable for jamming at frequencies in the X-Dand and below, are now in operational use. A trend towards frequency diversification has been noted in Soviet radio and. radar equipment, in contrast to the earlier con- centration of frequencies. This trend includes the addition of L-Band frequencies and probably th6 use of rapidly changeable frequencies in some radars. 9? Air Facilities. It is assumed that, as a minimum, the current- ly-existing airfields with long, permanent-surface runways will remain available for operational employment. They are as follows: Approved For Release 2000/08/26 II,IA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2 TOP SECRET 'Approved For Releae 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-005448000200030045-2 ATTACHMENT B to TS #141842-b General Area Minimum Runway Len;;ths t (ft) 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 USSR 20 62 30 239 51 European Satellites 7 47 38 52 0 Communist China and North Korea 1 11 27 72 31 22' 1217 95 363 92- About 300 of these fields are currently being used for air defense operations. In addition, there are about 400 Bloc airfields with run- ways over 4,000 feet in length which could be utilized for fighter oper- ations under reduced safety margins. D. U.S. WARNING CAPABILITIES IN MID-1962 (Submitted through special channels under separate cover.) - 16- TOP SECRET Approved For Release 2000/08/26 : CIA-RDP61-00549R000200030045-2