PROSPECTS FOR AN ARMED CLASH IN THE GULF OF AQABA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200080006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 11, 1957
• Content Type: BRIEF

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Intelligence Brief
No, 2083
Office of Intelligence Research
PROSPECTS FOR AN ARID CLASH IN THE GULF OF AQABA
March 11, 1957
I. THE PROBLEM
The government of Israel has announced that it will
test Israel's free access to the Gulf of Aqaba before the end
of March, In effect., this challenge is directed not only at
Egypt and Saudi Arabia., which have previously denied Israel
access to the Gulf through their territorial waters, but also
those leading maritime powers which supported Israel's demand
for free passage, and,, implicitly., its right to protect its
own shipping, in the course of recent UN discussions of the
Middle East crisis. Saudi Arabia is not expected to initiate,
action against Israeli shipping unilaterally,, but Egyptian
intentions have not yet been made clear. If the Egyptians
attempt to interfere with the passage of this test voyage?
Israel will have given prior notice that it will take pro-
tective military action,
II. POSSIBLE CONTINGENCIES
In view of the narrowness of the waters in the Gulf of Aqaba -- 3
to 4 miles at the Strait, of Tiran, between 7 and 14 miles wide inside
the Gulf itself -- it is impossible for an Israeli-bound ship to gain
access to the waterway without going through the territorial waters of
Rgypt or Saudi Arabia, which overlap in the Strait, and unlikely that it
could make its way to the Israeli port of Elath at the far end without
passing through Egyptian, Saudi, or Jordanian territorial waters. Thus,
if Egypt, Saudi Arabia., or Jordan seek cause to enforce the right of visit
and search within territorial waters they will, have no problem in finding
such cause,
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With the UN forces in occupation at Sharm al?Shaykh and Ras Nasrani,
re-establishment of Egyptian control of shipping through the Gulf at its
entrance is temporarily prevented unless Egypt resorts to exercising con-
trol from naval vessels stationed off the entrance to the Gulf, ;Egypt has
the capability to do this, However, Egypt has never thus far attempted to
exercise the right of visit and search outside its ports or checkpoints
within territorial waters,. Should Egypt attempt to exercise control within
territorial waters offshore or on the high seas, it would probably face
international complications with the principal maritime nations as S:Ynll as
Israeli reprisals, Furthermore, it is likely that such Egyptian actions
wou:t.d ^nte.gonize many UN members and might forfeit Egypt its recent advantage
of being the victim rather than perpetrator of an international wrong.
Saudi Arabia, which controls the east coast of the Strait of Tiran,
could conceivably take unilateral action to proven t entry of Israeli or
Israeli-bou d vessels into the Gulf, One possibility open to Saudi Arabia
is to assert its sovereignty over Ti.'an and demand that UNL' forces leave
the island. In the event that Saudi forces were then to occupy the island,
they might attempt to control shipping through the Strait of Tiran from
positions on the island, Similar attempts could be made from the Saudi
mainland, but probably less effectively.
Assuming an Israeli-bound ship made the trip safely through the
mouth and up the Gulf to its head, it is still possible that Jordanian,
Saudi, or Egyptian forces might attempt to bar access to Elath or to en-
force control regulations. While there are no indications that any such
move is planned for the immediate future, maneuverability at the head of
the Cu:Lf is so restricted and tensions so high that the possibility of in-
cidents due to accidental violation of territorial waters cannot be ex-
cluded, Such an incident could conceivably lead to hostilities between
Israeli and Arab forces,
The Saudi Government has been disturbed by the prospect of free
Israeli passage through the Gulf of Aqaba, not only because of general
Arab hostility toward Israel but more specifically because of its fear
that Israel might employ oil shipments through Aqaba and a pipeline to the
Mediterranean for political purposes (i.e., exert pressure by underselling
the Arab states), For the present, however, Saudi Arabia's initiative will
be limited by its military capabilities and probably also by the King's
desire to avoid disturbing friendly relations with the United States.
The presence of the UN force, coupled with the declarations by the
US and other maritime powers that they regard the Strait of T.iran as an
international waterway,.], will probably .-- in the short run, at least ,-
See Section III below, Legal and Geographical Background.
SECRET
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. ''1v SECRET
restrain the Arab states bordering on the Gulf of Aqaba from taking
action against merchant shipping,, particularly non-Israeli.-flag shipping.
Even if Israeli-flag merchant ships test the route,, it is unlikely that
hostile action will occur in the immediate future unless internal political
pressures, particularly in Egypt,, become overwhelming, It is more likely
that Egypt, in concert with the other riparian Arab states,, would reassert
its view that the entrance to the Gulf is not an international waterway
and would attempt to seek a determination of the question short of force,
either in the UN or possibly in the Court of International Justice. There
would also be the possibility of Arab reprisals,, such as refusal on Syria's
part to permit oil from flowing through the pipeline and possibly renewed
difficulties on Canal transit,
The problem of Israeli warships and possibly armed merchantmen is
a more difficult one but even against such ships the use of force is not
very likely unless Eg,t decides to challenge UNEF presence.
Should effective UNEF presence come to an end, there would no doubt
be strong pressures in Egypt for the reestablishment of the status-quo ante
with a very much increased likelihood of an armed clash, .Should Egypt
wish to avoid sucha clash,, it is possible that it would try to achieve a
solution through an international body before the UNEF leaves. Such a
solution might obviate the difficult choice of either acknowledging defeat
by Israel in the question of passage through the Gulf of Aqaba or embark-
ing upon the dangerous course of reestabli.ihing Egyptian shipping controls.
III. LEGAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
The Gulf of Aqaba is a narrow body of water 98 miles long and
varying in width from 7 to l1 miles within the entrance. Access to the
Gulf can be had through two passages, Enterprise Passage and Grafton
Passage, Both passages are located between Ras Nasrani on the Egyptian
mainland (Sinai Peninsula) and the Island of Tiran, the total distance
between Sinai and Tiran being three to four miles, The Egyptian gun em-
placements located at Ras Nasrani were destroyed by the Israelis in the
course of the present hostilities and the Egyptian garrison quartered at
Sharm al-Shaykh south of Ras Nasrani on the mainland was forced to flee.
The Island of Tiran and the smaller island of Sanafir,, located two miles
east of Tiran,, were occupied by Egypt in 1950 "in complete agreement with
the Government of Saudi Arabia." However, the question of sovereignty
over these two islands has never been resolved and recently the Saudi
Government has attempted to establish its claim to both, The mainland on
the east side of the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba is undisputed Saudi
territory, The total distance between the Sinai Peninsula and the Saudi
mainland at the entrance to the Gulf is about eight miles.
Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt claim a six-mile belt of territorial
waters, Thus the territorial waters of the two countries would overlap at
the entrance to the Gulf. Even if only a three-mile limit rather than a
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six-mile limit were recognized$ the entrance to the Gulf would still fall
within territorial waters if the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir were
each given"a, territorial belt of three miles. Furthermore, the only
navigable channels are between the Sinai coast and Tiran and have to be
regarded as being within territorial waters,. Whether the territorial
waters would be wholly Egyptian or divided between Egypt and Saudi Arabia
would depend on the resolution of the question of sovereignty over Tiran.
The coasts along the Gulf are under Egyptian sovereignty in the
West and under Saudi sovereignty in the East up to the head of the Gulf.
At the head of the Gulf short coastal strips of Israel and Jordan separate
the Egyptian and Saudi territories. The Israeli port of Elath is only
about four miles distance from the Jordanian port of Aqaba and the distance
from Elath to the Egyptian border is about five miles, The approach to
Elath thus can hardly avoid the territorial waters of one of the riparian
Arab states, Until now no acute problems have arisen at the head of the
Gulf -y- mainly, no doubt, beca;ase control was exercised by Egypt at the
entrance.
There is no unanimity on the status in international law of the
Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Agaba, The United States has declared
that it regards the Strait as an international waterway because they
offers the only access between two international bodies of water. It is
very likely that many other maritime nations will take the same attitude.
Egypt has held that the Strait is within its "national or territorial
waters." In 1951, Egypt served notice on the maritime nations that it
would permit innocent passage of merchant vessels and warships other than
Israeli subject to its rights of control and visit and search. Israeli
merchantmen would pass "at their own risk" subject to Egyptian prize law.
Israeli warships were barred by Egypt under Article 2, paragraph 2 of the
Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement which bars military forces or vessels
of one party from entering into or passing through the airspace or terri-
torial waters up to three miles., of the other. In 1951 Israel complained
to the Security Council about the restrictions on sbipping in the Gulf
of Aqaba but no action was taken and Egypt exercised its control of Elath-
bound shipping until the ouster of the Egyptian garrison from.. the entrance
of the Gulf by Israeli forces in October 1956.
The International Law Commission of the UN while dealing with other
types of bays has not yet ruled on the status of a bay of the type of the
Gulf of Aqaba. In the last analysis, however, the problem of free and
innocent passage through the Strait may hinge as much ,f not more on the
question of Egyptian belligerancy as on the question of the exact legal
nature of the Strait.
SECRET State - Fl), Wash,, D. C.
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