THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200080011-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 27, 1999
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 1, 1957
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
1 March 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: The Situation in Indonesin
THE SITUATION
1? President Sukarno, in an effort to overcome a rapidly
deteriorating political and economic situation and to enhance his
own prestige and power, is attempting to make major revisions in
the nature and composition of the Indonesian government. Under
Sukarnots plan,which has so far been formulated in general terms and
remains to be worked out in detail, the role and influence of political
parties and the parliament would be sharply curtailed. Sukarno would
be chairman of a new advisory council, composed of representatives
from non-party groups such as youth, veterans, labor, women, religious,
and the military, which would take over a large share of policy
decisions from the cabinet, A new cabinet would be formed to include
representatives of all political parties holding seats in the
parliament,
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SECRET
The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKt),y Indonesials fourth
largest party, is giving enthusiastic support to Sukarno. It has
thrown the full force of its organizational and propaganda taltnts
into the campaign, staging mass rallies, disrupting opposition meeting
and plastering the capital with posters and handbills. If Sukarmo's
plan is implemented along the lines he now advocates, the Communists
would be represented in the oabinot and stand an excellent chance of
gaining multiple representation in the advisory council through their
leadership or infiltration of non-party.groupso They are exploiting
the advantages of identifying themselves with Sukarno, who continues
to be the leading symbol of Indonesian independence in the eyes of
most Indonesians*
3. The non..Communist political parties have shown little
enthusiasm for Sukarnors plan. All of them are apprehensive about
reducing the power of the cabinet, although they would probably go
along with the formation of a council with purely advisory functions,
The Masjumi, and to a lesser extent the Nahdatul Ularna (NU), oppose
inclusion of Communists in the cabinet. Although the Nationalist
Party (PNI) is sup;)orting Sukarno, important segments of it are doing
so with considerable reluctance.
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Nftlo~
4. The situation is further complicated by the continuing
rebellion in Sumatra and by growing dissatisfaction in other non.
Javanese areas of the country with economic and political domination
by the central ?overnment., As Sukarnots plan now sta,nd.as it gives
no promise of meeting the demands of the non-Javanese areas.
59 The army is divided on the issue of Sukarnots concept.
Although most army leaders. share Sukarnots dissatisfaction with
government drifts inefficiency, and corruption, many are hostile
towards the Conanunists and do not share Sukarnots willingness to
bring them into the ?overnment. However,, recent army reorganization
programs and the transfer of a number of military commanders have
probably increased the number of higher level officers, especially
in Java,, willing to support Sukarno in implementing his plan. Also!
recent reports indicate that the Communists have had some success in
infiltrating a number of military units and some important positions
in the army in Javn
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS
6, The immediate course of events is unclear. Perhaps the most
likely short term outcome is an adjustment and compromise of conflicting
positions. The advisory council might be given a purely ac;.visory functions,
r 3 r
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the role of the Communists might be reduced and limited to the
council, and some means of temporarily accomodating regional interests
may be found. However., unless some early progress is made in coping
with Indonesiats basic economic and politic-1 problems a compromise
solution in the traditional Indonesian manner is not likely to satisfy
for long the growing pressures in Indonesia for a federal structure?
the complaints of the army., nor Sukarnots im'yatience with parliamentary
processes and party politics.
7. It is possible that the opposition leaders may be silenced by
threats of arrest and acts of intimidation and that the plan may be
implemented with a minimum of difficulty, In this event the position
of the Communists would be greatly improved., and their influence in the
government and their hold on Sukarno would bo greatly increased.
$? If the opposition remains firm,, widespread violence may
develop with the Communists and the anti-Communists taking advantage
of the opportunity to settle old scores. If Sukarno should declare..
martial law to enforce his plan., most of the army units on Java would
probably cooperate. However., Sukarno might find it difficult to
control the army? once martial law is declared. Even if the Java
commands were to give Sukarno full support., it is possible that the
military and civil leaders in the outlying islands may take advantage
of the situation to follow the example of Sumatra?
SECRET
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9. The present situation in Indonesia,, though it may for
the time being be resolved by compromise and accommodation,, offers
excellent opportunities for the Communists to improve their position
and has the potential of leading to civil warp an.attempted coup
dletat, or political fragmentation of the Indonesian Republic.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES;
25X1A9a
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
4ECRET
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