POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN ALGERIA (U)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200080018-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2001
• Sequence Number: 18
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Rele 2001/08/27: CIA-RDP61-00549R000080018-SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Washington 25,.,D. C.
POSITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN ALGERIA (U)
*ARMY Declass/Release Instructions On File*'
1. Current Security Situation
a. The character of the revolt in Algeria has increased in
intensity since its inception in the Aures Mountain area of eastern
Algeria on 1 November 1954. This is best demonstrated by the marked
increase in the scale of the French effort devoted to its suppression.
"Comparison of French Army Strength
June 1954 to 25 January 1957"
Army
Strength Divisions Regiments Battalions
1 June 1954 64, 000 1 4 6
25 January 1957 340,000* 13 142 64
Gendarmerie, naval and air elements bring the total
French military force in Algeria to approximately
1400,000.
b. During this same period the organization, tactics, strength
and armament of the rebels have continued to improve despite substantial
losses to the French. Army Intelligence currently estimates that there
are between 10,000 to 20,000 armed regular members of the National
Liberation Army cNI,A) in Algeria who can draw upon as many as 30,000
auxiliaries or part time rebels. Behind this group stands the great majority
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of the Moslem population who., either because of ideological identification
or intimidation., are ready to provide supplies., intelligence, and other forms
of support to the rebel bands. The rebel arms inventory, according to a
reasonably reliable French source,, includes 30 machine guns., 200
automatic rifles, 1,800 machine pistols and 9,000 military rifles plus
a sizeable number of hunting weapons. Other reports indicate that the
rebels possess a few mortars and may have acquired light antitank weapons.
The attack of 16 January on French military headquarters in Algiers was
executed with two bazookas.
c.. Despite the magnitude of the French military effort in Algeria
there has been no substantial improvement in the security situation in
recent months. The great influx of French reinforcements, numbering
123,000 men, between May and August 1956 led to French hopes that the
Algerian problem could be resolved by the weight of numbers by late 1956.
Although some progress was made in July and August in limiting large-
scale guerrilla activity French hopes of early termination of the revolt
were dispelled by an upswing in terrorist activity in September. The
pacification program, while limiting the activity of guerrilla bands, 'has not
eradicated armed resistance in the rural areas, particularly in the Aures-
Nementcha area in the east, the Kabylie, the area south of Algiers and
in the western and southwestern areas contiguous to the Moroccan
border. In the towns, and especially in Algiers, terrorist activities
have increased in tempo.
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d. The military problems of the French in combatting the
Algerian nationalists have been compounded by the adverse effects of
the Suez situation, and the Parliamentary difficulties of the Mollet
Government plus a number of other collateral current problems. The use
of Morocco and Tunisia as a sanctuary and as a source of supply to the
rebels is expected to assume even greater importance as a result of the
growing official support in these countries for the Algerian cause.
The growing rigidity in the colon and nationalists positions was not
improved following Premier Mollet?s policy statement of 10 January
which implied the development of Algerian autonomy but insisted that
the French would not leave Algeria. A number of reports have indicated
that the situation in Algeria will come to a head in the next few weeks.
It is fairly well established that the forthcoming discussions in the
United Nations General Assembly will lead to the calling of an eight-
day general strike by the FIN. If the Moslems respond it is likely
that French elements will react violently to such a move. Some
sources have indicated that the French Army will support the "ColonsO
in defiance of constitutional authority and might even stage a
military coup in France.
2. The Position of The French Army
a. In the past month there have been a series of reports
pointing up the growing possibilities of the French military, in
concert Yt th French extremist groups, of effecting a coup to assume
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control of the machinery of Government in Algeria. The United States
Consul General in Algiers reported in early January that the activities
leading to the arrest of Brigadier General Jacques Faure, Assistant
Commander of the Algiers Region,, were symptomatic of the growing
restiveness of the French military over the Algerian situation. Sub-
sequently the Consul General has indicated that he anticipates the
military assuming greater direction and control over events in Algeria.
b.: On 15 January Ambassador Dillon discussed the Algerian
situation with Lieutenant General Jean Ganeval., Secretary General of
the Military Cabinet of ?resident Coty. Ganeval minimized the General
Faure incident buts while affirming the absolute loyalty and discipline of
French officers in the rank of Colonel and above., indicated that ".a
dangerous state of mind" was prevalent among junior and field-grade
officers and particularly noncommissioned officers. Many of these
men are strongly opposed to further French retreats after the losses of
Indochina, Morocco,, Tunisia, and Suez and are in full sympathy with
the colon elements. Ganeval believes this state of mind represents
a matter of concern in case serious trouble should erupt between the
European and Moslem populations. Similar sentiments have been
voiced by senior officers of the French Army in Germany.
3. Estimate of French Army's Reaction to Events in Algeria
a. Considering the current position of the French in Algeria
increased military control of the machinery of Government is probable.
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The military, which have been the prime instrument of Resident General
Robert Lacost?s administration, has become increasingly involved in
administrative, as well as military functions. This has been mani-
fested on several levels of Government. Major General Marie
Gouraud, Commanding General of the 27th Alpine Division in Algeria,
informed Army Intelligence representatives on 16 January that over
300 French officers are now occupying administrative positions in
Algeria. Brigadier General Jacques Massup a paratroop commander most
recently engaged in the Suez operation., was charged in early January with
maintaining order in the Algiers area.
b. It is quite apparent that a clear danger exists that., as
the French military become more involved in the local situation in
Algeria, it ultimately will cease to be an impartial agent of the
Government and will come to identify its interests with those of
the colon extremists. However, Army Intelligence believes that this
danger is not immediate. While many junior officers and noncommis-
sioned officers probably could be influerred to suppTt violence on the
part of the colons it is believed that the tradition of responsibility
to Constitutional authority is sufficiently strong among the senior
commanders to preclude any attempt to stage a coup as long as the
French Government demonstrates itsintention to maintain control
over Algeria. The reaction of the military in event of a drastic
change in Government policy involving an abandonment of Algeria
cannot be estimated at this time.
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