ALGERIAN CRISIS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP61-00549R000200080019-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 27, 1999
Sequence Number:
19
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 28, 1957
Content Type:
PAPER
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
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Body:
Approved For Release 208/26 00020008! 9-6
IAC DISCUSSION TOPIC 28 Ja.nua,ry 1957
I. Threatened rebel "insurrectionary general strike",
planned to coincide with UN debate on Algeria., ha.s
begun ahead of schedule.,
A. In Algiers, press reports state that majority of
Moslem workers stayed out Monday morning. French
security police reportedly were breaking open Moslem
shops which ha.d failed to open for business by 9:00 AM,
and quartermaster troops were maintaining operation
of city bakeries.
1. Early press reports indicated no violence.
B. Early press reports also indicate partial absenteeism
among the 350,000 Algerian workers in Metropolitan
France.
C. Strike is to last 8 days.
II. Strike comes at time when European-Moslem tension in
Algeria. is at a.11-time high. Acts of violence by rebels,
themselves, by 1.2 million indignant "colons", or by
400,000 French military in Algeria, could easily touch
off major explosion.
believes rebels will step up indiscriminate killings
during strike, in hopes of provoking colons into bloody
retaliation. foresees situation "similar to
Budapest", with thousands of Moslems killed.
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B. also expects rebel military groups
(numbering "severa.l thousand") along Moroccan and
Tunisian borders to go into action a.t time.of strike,
attempt capture of Tlemcen (in west) and Tebessa,
(in east).
C. In this connection, a, rebel spokesman in Libya has
stated that strong rebel military offensive will be
timed with strike.
III. Probably most explosive element in s:itua,tion is tough
attitude of colons.
A. Liberals who favor a.ccomodation with rebels--such as
mayor of Algiers--are minority.
B. Vast majority of colons view supression of rebels a.s
fight for own lives, are increasingly fearful that
Paris is ready to compromise.
1. These colon die-ha.rds have established own counter-
terrorist HQ, formed quasi-military reprisal units.
IV. Attitude of Army in showdown is another imponderable.
Paris admits widespread sympathy for colons among junior
officers and non-coms.
A. Recently, three Army generals in Algeria. had to be
"disciplined" by Paris for flirting with colons in
alleged plot to overthrow metropolitan control,
establish "white republic". -
B. Thus, if colons attack Moslems, vigorous Army action
toNrestore order appears unlikely.
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1. Amb. Dillon doubts that Mollet govt would risk
chance of open Army insubordination by ordering
Army to act against colons.
V. In metropole, itself, Amb. Dillon believes that, should
Algerian situation go "very sour", right-wing groups may
attempt overthrow of Mollet govt.
A. We have rumors of plots to assa.ssina.te leading French
politicians, bomb the Ministry of Interior.
B. Dillon believes that, if Mollet govt is unable to con-
trol Army in event of major Algerian explosion, life
of Fourth Republic itself would be endangered.
C. Possible calming note is resounding defeat of both right
extremists and Communists in Sunday's Paris bi-election.
1. Algeria, was paramount campaign issue and winner
(with 54% of votes). supported Mollet program.
D. Meanwhile, Mollet's personal emissary was recently in
contact with rebel representatives in Italy, despite
gov't decla.ra.tion tha.t no negotiations are possible
until cease-fire.
1. Mayor of Algiers believes rebels are likely to
accept Mollet's cease-fire bid, provided French do
not "lose face" in UN discussion.
VI. As to UN airing, French apparently have two-fold plan.
A. Will first deny UN competence to consider "internal""
matter, attack "foreign" (pa.rticula.rly Egyptian, Soviet)
influence behind revolt.
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B. If Assembly nonetheless asserts competence, French
delegation will walk out, boycott further discussion.
C. Should final UN action be official condemnation of
French role in Algeria., French threaten to withdraw
altogether from UN membership.
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