THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000200110003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 21, 1959
• Content Type: NIE

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IE 2 2 ?5 9
21 461 1959
25X1
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER 22-59
Supersedes NIE 22-57 and SNIE 71-58
THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, The Joint Staff,
and the Atomic Energy Commission.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 21 April 1959. Concurring were The Director of Intelli-
gence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assist-
ant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, Department
of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF;
the Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff; the Atomic
Energy Commission Representative to the USIB. The Assist-
ant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations, and the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Director of the National Security Agency, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE
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22 June 1953.
4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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within the meaning of the espionage laws,
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
THE PROBLEM
1
CONCLUSIONS
1
DISCUSSION
3
I. INTRODUCTION
3
II. DOMESTIC STABILITY
3
A. The Political Situation
3
The Constitution
4
The First Government of the Fifth Republic
4
The Opposition
5
General Political Outlook
6
B. The Economic Situation
6
III. THE PROBLEM OF ALGERIA
7
Prospects for Algerian Settlement
9
IV. THE FRENCH COMMUNITY
10
V. FRANCE'S POSITION IN THE WEST
10
West Germany
11
The United Kingdom
11
NATO
11
French Nuclear Policy
11
Relations with Morocco and Tunisia
12
VI. PROSPECTS FOR FRANCE
12
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THE OUTLOOK FOR FRANCE
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the impact of de Gaulle's advent to power, over the next year or
two, on, (a) the character, strength and stability of French political institutions;
(b) France's relationship with Algeria, other overseas territories, and Morocco and
Tunisia; and (c) France's position and policies in the Western Alliance.
CONCLUSIONS
1. France under the vigorous leadership
of de Gaulle has begun programs of politi-
cal and economic change that have al-
ready achieved significant results and
that could lead to a national rejuvena-
tion. De Gaulle has gained the broad
support of the French people and has de-
manded recognition of France's claim to
great power status. (Paras. 11, 17-20,
30-34)
2. The most serious problem confronting
de Gaulle is the Algerian War. Its con-
tinuance places serious obstacles in the
way of achieving permanent economic
and political progress. If, however, de
Gaulle should be successful in ending the
war in Algeria, we believe that the pros-
pects for economic growth and political
stability would be bright. (Paras. 12, 13,
35, 61, 62)
3. De Gaulle has been successful in con-
taining the extreme rightists who, along
with the military, emerged as powerful
political forces following the May 13th
coup. He has taken steps to consolidate
loyalty to himself within the military.
However, while the military appears sat-
isfied with de Gaulle as the leader of
France, its responsiveness to the civil
authority of the Fifth Republic on the
crucial question of Algeria has not been
fully tested. (Paras. 12, 13, 16, 17, 37)
4. De Gaulle will probably attempt to
induce the Algerian nationalists to accept
a settlement based on some form of politi-
cal autonomy coupled with economic de-
velopment and social reform. We believe
it unlikely that he can negotiate a cease-
fire on this basis during the next year.
The FLN (Front de Liberation Nationale)
will probably remain unwilling to accept
any plan for ending hostilities unless it
contains at least an implicit French com-
mitment that the Algerians will have the
right after a specified period of time to
opt for independence?a commitment
that we believe de Gaulle is unlikely to
make at least during the next year.
(Paras. 43-44)
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5. Once the FLN is convinced that de
Gaulle is unwilling to so commit himself,
extremist viewpoints within the FLN are
likely to gain the upper hand and the
FLN will almost certainly accept in-
creased assistance from outside sources,
including the Sino-Soviet Bloc countries.
We do not believe that de Gaulle's eco-
nomic development program, even if suc-
cessful, will suffice to counter the appeal
of Algerian nationalism in the long run.
(Paras. 44-45)
6. There remains, however, an outside
chance that the FLN might be persuaded
by Morocco and Tunisia, both of which
are anxious to end the war, to accept a
"North African" solution whereby a semi-
autonomous French Algeria would join a
Maghreb confederation. We believe that
were de Gaulle to favor such a solution
he could secure its acceptance by the
French. (Para. 48)
7. An indefinite continuation of the rebel-
lion would worsen French relations with
Morocco and Tunisia, which will almost
certainly continue actively to support
the nationalist cause. [Furthermore,
continued hostilities without hope for
settlement, would aggravate the policy
dilemma confronting the US. If the US
appeared to give active support to the
French against the rebels, its relations
with the Arab and other ex-colonial states
would deteriorate and the US base posi-
tion in Morocco might be further endan-
gered. US support of the rebels would
severely strain US-French relations and
weaken the NATO structure as a whole.
A new factor would be added if the FLN
commits itself openly to obtaining exten-
sive Communist bloc assistance. (Paras.
46-47)
8. We believe de Gaulle will stay in power
for at least the next two years, even if the
Algerian War is not ended. If, however,
the Algerian War drags on and it be-
comes clear that there are no prospects
for an early settlement, conditions with-
in France would begin to deteriorate.
Public confidence in the regime would
diminish, and labor would grow more
restive. The General's prestige would de-
cline and his ability to withstand the de-
mands of the extreme right would weaken.
Eventually the government would have
to resort increasingly to the use of au-
thoritarian methods and parliamentary
institutions would be weakened. (Paras.
61, 63, 64)
9. During the period of this estimate we
do not believe any formidable resurgence
of the power of the French left is likely.
However, if the right retains its monopoly
of political power, the Communists will
probably gain increasing support as the
most effective critics of the regime.
Should right-wing forces in the govern-
ment suspend civil liberties and restrict
strike action, a vigorous reaction by the
left would be likely. (Para. 28)
10. De Gaulle apparently believes that
NATO should be reorganized to empha-
size co-operation between national mili-
tary establishments rather than inte-
grated forces. He further believes that
France must play a major role in develop-
ing Western strategy not only for the
NATO area, but elsewhere. De Gaulle
will continue to stress his demand for
parity with the US and the UK in the
councils of the West. In sum, we believe
France under de Gaulle will prove an in-
dependent and stubborn ally. Neverthe-
less, we believe that France will remain
basically committed to the Western
Alliance. (Paras. 56-57)
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DISCUSSION
this problem is resolved, and the unquestioned
obedience of the military to civilian authority
is assured.
I. INTRODUCTION
11. Profound changes have occurred in France
since the grave national crisis of May 1958.
With the advent of the new French regime,
long overdue constitutional and economic re-
forms have been instituted with the result
that there now exists a framework within
which political stability could be achieved and
a more effective utilization made of France's
human and material resources in building up
the strength of the nation. Under the vig-
orous leadership of de Gaulle, a broad consen-
sus of the French public has been achieved
which has, temporarily at least, submerged
many of the traditional divisions of status
and outlook. Relieved of the threat of immi-
nent civil war and chaos, Frenchmen, by-and-
large, are at present agreed to entrust to
de Gaulle the unchallenged leadership of the
State, and to follow him along the path which
he has indicated toward national rejuvenation
and greatness, even though this entails some
personal sacrifice.
12. Serious problems, however, remain. The
events of 13 May not only ended the Fourth
Republic, but showed that groups in France?
most importantly major elements of the armed
forces?were willing to overthrow the estab-
lished but widely discredited institutions of
the Republic. Although now quiescent, these
groups retain a strength which de Gaulle must
take into account in formulating any solution
of France's most pressing problem, the Alge-
rian War.
13. The sharply divergent views of the mili-
tary activists and the politically predominant
right on the one hand, and the Moslem na-
tionalists on the other, regarding the future
status of Algeria will make extremely difficult
any settlement of the Algerian War. More-
over, the Algerian situation has made the ac-
complishment of permanent economic and
political progress much more difficult to at-
tain. Furthermore, the future of the Fifth
Republic cannot be considered as secure until
II. DOMESTIC STABILITY
A. The Political Situation
14. The abrupt breakup of the Fourth Re-
public, precipitated by the military coup in
Algeria in mid-1958, was followed by a radi-
cal rightward shift in the balance of French
political power. This shift was confirmed by
a referendum, which overwhelmingly ap-
proved a new constitution that greatly
strengthens the executive power, and even
more by the subsequent general election. At
the time of the coup the military and colon
extremists assumed effective power in Algeria.
In Paris supporters of de Gaulle, including
veterans of his old political formation, were
appointed to influential posts within the Gen-
eral's provisional government. Many of this
group were extremely nationalistic in outlook
and were violent critics of the Fourth Re-
public.
15. In general the public accepted these events
almost without protest, and appeared re-
lieved to abdicate its responsibilities to de
Gaulle. Some accepted de Gaulle through
fear of civil war. Some are uneasy about the
Bonapartist aspects of the General's coming
to power, and many about the purposes and
loyalties of his most prominent supporters.
Moreover, the traditional divisions and con-
flicts of interest within the French body politic,
though now somewhat submerged, remain
strong.
16. At the moment the military is a latent but
powerful political factor in France. Although
the military appears satisfied with de Gaulle
as the leader of France, its responsiveness
to the civil authority of the Fifth Republic
on the crucial question of Algeria has not
been fully tested. It is possible that the ac-
tivists, who claim to be the spokesmen for
the military, will attempt to reassert their
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power on this question. Moreover we believe
that the military might also again exercise a
decisive role in any crisis of the State, such
as might arise if de Gaulle dies or becomes in-
capacitated. In the meantime the mere exist-
ence of this latent force increases the confi-
dence of the extreme right.
17. Despite de Gaulle's initial debt to right -
wing forces he has consolidated a unique per-
sonal position of great independent strength,
and has obtained broad popular support. In
fact the General has demonstrated consider-
able skill in controlling the elements which
brought him to power. He has made progress
in isolating the extremists and in reshuffling
the top military commanders. He has chosen
many of his ministers from a broad range of
moderate political opinion. He has contained
the power of Jacques Soustelle, the most prom-
inent strategist in the demise of the Fourth
Republic, without publicly alienating him.
In essence de Gaulle has thus far been able
to remain faithful to the image of the role
he initially cast for himself?that of a na-
tional figure above conflicting political forces.
However, it may be difficult for de Gaulle to
maintain this role.
18. The Constitution. In the effort to breathe
new life into France's troubled body politic,
and to give form to his long-held theories on
presidential government, de Gaulle has in-
cluded in the new constitution formidable
executive powers. Both the president and the
cabinet are greatly strengthened against the
parliament. The government can spell out
the details of general laws passed by the par-
liament; under certain circumstances decrees
having the force of law may be promulgated
without parliamentary approval. Only a vote
of censure by an absolute majority of the
National Assembly can end the life of a gov-
ernment. Furthermore the president is able
to choose his premier without parliamentary
interference. If the president faces strong
opposition from the parliament he can either
dissolve it or submit specific issues to public
referendum. In addition, the president pos-
sesses broad powers in the defense and foreign
policy fields, and under special emergency cir-
cumstances, the existence of which he de-
termines, he may assume full dictatorial au-
thority.
19. Potentially the most troublesome aspect
of the new constitution is the ambiguous posi-
tion of the premier. Because he owes his ap-
pointment to the president, the premier, ini-
tially at least, will probably tend to be a crea-
ture of the president. However, in the con-
duct of day-to-day government business he
may have to seek support from groupings
within the legislature which might be hostile
to some of the president's policies. He might,
therefore on occasion, find himself in the posi-
tion of being allied with the legislature against
the president.
20. De Gaulle will almost certainly try to
establish by precedent and by interpretation
of the constitution that the presidency is the
decisive power in the French Government.
So far there has been no occasion to test the
relative strengths of the presidency and the
legislature, nor to judge the extent to which
the General expects to dominate the premier
and cabinet. It is apparent, however, that
de Gaulle believes that the president, rather
than the premier, should be responsible for
laying down the main lines of national policy.
If the Assembly should challenge the role of
the president, de Gaulle would almost cer-
tainly threaten to use the presidential power
of calling referendums and of dissolving the
legislature, and would use these powers, if
he believed it necessary. Whether or not
these new patterns of power will continue
after de Gaulle will depend largely on the
general French willingness to accept a reduc-
tion in the power of the legislature, and to en-
trust strong executive prerogatives to succes-
sors of less prestige.
21. The First Government of the Fifth Re-
public.' The legislative elections in November
confirmed the fact that popular political in-
terests centered around de Gaulle and his
plans for the new government, rather than
on the Assembly as such. Apart from the
Communists, few candidates dared oppose
him, and most of those who did were soundly
' See attached chart of election statistics and par-
liamentary party strengths.
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defeated, many on the first ballot. Few issues
were aired in the campaign; candidates of ten
disagreed only over the degree of their devo-
tion to de Gaulle's program. De Gaulle had
hoped for an Assembly more evenly divided
between the center-right and the center-left.
But the workings of the electoral law and the
popularity of the UNR (Union de la Nouvelle
Republique), which many voters regarded as
de Gaulle's own, despite the fact that he had
opposed the use of his name, gave the UNR a
disproportionately large number of the As-
sembly seats. Besides, the Independents
(Moderes) also improved their position. The
Communist representation dwindled from 143
to 10 deputies, and the entire left-of-center
was reduced to such a small proportion of
the chamber's total that for the moment no
effective opposition to the overwhelming right-
ist majority exists.
22. The government majority consists of the
UNR, the Independents, the MRP (Movement
Republican Populaire) (the Catholic party) ,
and the bloc of ultra-conservative deputies
from Algeria. The cabinet contains repre-
sentatives of all these groups. In addition
there are technicians, presumably completely
responsive to de Gaulle's wishes, in the posts
of Foreign Affairs and Defense. The more
moderate elements of the government ma-
jority hold important positions, including the
Ministries of the Interior and of Finance--the
latter is held by Antoine Pinay, the only
former premier of the Fourth Republic in the
cabinet. However, the more vocal and unin-
hibited exponents of nationalism within the
UNR exert considerable influence both in the
administration and the Assembly. The pre-
mier, Michel Debr?has long been considered
among those most loyal to de Gaulle, although
his political convictions seem to differ from
those of the General in certain important as-
pects, especially towards Algeria. Soustelle,
an extreme rightist, is vice premier with spe-
cific responsibilities for atomic energy, the
Sahara, and the overseas territories.
23. Numerous opportunities already exist for
splits within the UNR, and between the UNR
and its allies. These will probably increase
as the warm glow of the right's electoral vie-
tory cools off. The UNR contains deputies of
both conservative and progressive economic
views; some UNR leaders belong only because
they consider it the best vehicle to support de
Gaulle's every move, others are openly sus-
picious of the General's policies. However,
its initial electoral success may enable the
party over the next year to develop a nation-
wide organization. This prospect, plus the
obvious advantage of profiting from the
Gaullist label, will work to keep the party
together, at least as long as de Gaulle does
not openly propose a liberal solution for the
Algerian War.
24. The Independents, who represent the
more traditional interests of business and
agriculture, generally support a tough policy
on Algeria, but may develop significant dif-
ferences with the UNR on economic and social
problems. The MRP may be tempted at any
time to leave the government majority, being
on the whole less conservative than its coali-
tion partners, and particularly sensitive to
reckless use of executive power. However, the
loss of MRP support (some 57 votes) would
not by itself threaten the stability of the right-
wing majority.
25. The Opposition. The Socialists (Section
Fran caise de l'Internationale Ouvriere)
(SFIO) , whose popular vote was not signifi-
cantly reduced, but whose strength in the
National Assembly was halved in the recent
legislative elections, are the strongest party
not represented in the government. Their
position, however, is both equivocal and weak.
While Mollet supported de Gaulle and served
in his provisional government, the party had
a leading role in the discredited Fourth Re-
public. Almost all prominent Socialist lead-
ers were defeated?including most of those
who had been maneuvering the party towards
a new Algerian policy. Furthermore, the
SFIO is isolated from the remainder of the
non-Communist left. The Socialists have
promised a constructive opposition, but it is
as yet too early to tell whether the sacrifices
demanded by the economic austerity program
will not drive them into outright hostility.
Even if this should happen, the Socialists do
not appear to have the courage or dynamism
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necessary to conduct an effective opposition in
the Assembly. Nor do they have a program
likely to attract disgruntled deputies from
other parties.
26. The Communist Party not only lost more
than a million popular votes in the November
elections, but suffered a collapse of its rep-
resentation to a point where it can have
nothing more than a nuisance value in the
Assembly. Although its popular vote in the
recent municipal elections increased in the
districts in which it ran candidates, the party
lost control of hundreds of local administra-
tions to various anti-Communist coalitions.
Nevertheless the party's national machinery
remains intact. The Communists will al-
most certainly increase their pleas to other
elements of the left, which are also weakened,
for united front action. However, the Social-
ist leaders are not likely to respond favorably
to such a proposal.
27. As a result of the drastic decrease in leftist
representation in the Assembly, labor will
probably turn more to the trades unions to
protect its interests, particularly in face of
the austerity program. In these circum-
stances, there is likely to be an increase in
strength of the Communist-dominated CGT
(Confederation Generale du Travail), which
will grow in importance as the voice of the
working class, probably at the expense of the
other more moderate labor organizations.
Furthermore the CGT may have some success
in attracting other unions to programs of
joint action on economic issues.
28. During the period of this estimate we do
not believe any formidable resurgence of the
power of the French left is likely. However,
if the right retains its monopoly of political
power, the Communists will probably gain in-
creasing support as the most effective critics
of the regime. Should right-wing forces in
the government suspend civil liberties and re-
strict strike action, a vigorous reaction by the
left would be likely.
29. General Political Outlook. An over-
whelming majority, such as that enjoyed by
the present government, would under normal
circumstances assure stability and continu-
ity of policy probably beyond the period of
this estimate. There is some danger, however,
that the UNR's triumph may cause some of its
leaders to use their power in such a way as
to provoke sharp adverse reactions from allied
parties in the Assembly. More likely, how-
ever, is the outbreak of conflict between the
president and recalcitrant members of the
Assembly's right-wing over a major issue such
as the Algerian question. Although the vot-
ing in the recent local elections showed a
swing away from the UNR and some recoup-
ing of votes by the Communists, this probably
represented more a reaction against the aus-
terity program than a fundamental shift
away from de Gaulle.
B. The Economic Situation
30. De Gaulle's ambitious program for the
rejuvenation of France places heavy burdens
on an economy which has been plagued by
inflation and balance of payment crises.
France has the industrial plant and the
human and natural resources requisite to
carry out the General's program, including
his plans for economic development for Al-
geria and French Africa. Indeed French pro-
duction gains in recent years have been as
impressive as those of any country in postwar
Europe. But France has been unable to profit
fully from its industrial progress because of
chronic financial crises occasioned by the
costs of the Indo-Chinese and Algerian Wars,
expensive welfare programs, and because of
the political unwillingness of insecure govern-
ments to take the unpleasant steps necessary
to curb inflation generated by deficit financ-
ing and ineffective restrictions on credit and
consumption.
31. De Gaulle's accession to power came at
a time when France had decided to enter the
European Economic Community (Common
Market?E.E.C.) which implied that France
must take steps to become an effective com-
petitor in a larger foreign market and gradu-
ally abandon the protection of high cost pro-
ducers. After considerable hesitation the de
Gaulle government took vigorous actions to
insure that the economy would be in a favor-
able position to profit from these new circum-
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stances. The franc was sharply devalued, and
a broad domestic austerity program was un-
dertaken. These measures were aimed at mak-
ing French goods more competitive in foreign
markets, easing balance of payments pres-
sures, and reducing domestic consumption.
32. The austerity program involves sharp
price rises in those sectors of the economy
which are largely controlled by government,
and the reduction of subsidies on a number of
commodities of everyday consumption. Al-
though small wage increases will be permit-
ted in some areas to compensate in part for
these rises, the tenor of the program sug-
gests that in general wage demands will be
resisted. The resulting reduction in real in-
come will give substance to the charges that
the de Gaulle program discriminates against
the working classes.
33. There has scarcely been time for the full
impact of the austerity program to be felt
domestically. No organized opposition to de
Gaulle's program has crystallized, although
the Socialists used its adoption to justify their
decision not to join the government majority,
and there has been some grumbling from the
trade unions. Conservative economic inter-
ests, including the farmers, will continue to
be disgruntled at the loss of some traditional
supports and subsidy arrangements. Fur-
thermore strike action, which has been little
used in France in recent years, may soon be-
come an appealing way to register protests
against the regime if the normal political
channels are regarded as being monopolized
by conservatives and right-wing elements. In
general, however, we do not believe that the
much weakened left will be able to reorganize
itself sufficiently over this year to challenge
the economic program in any significant way,
although a continuation of the present minor
recession would strengthen opposition.
34. Despite favorable signs in the current eco-
nomic situation, including an encouraging in-
flow of repatriated capital, progress will de-
pend in the long run on the maintenance of
public confidence in de Gaulle's ability to take
further steps towards resolving France's re-
maining problems, particularly that of Al-
geria. The austerity measures may in time
provoke political opposition sufficiently strong
to force the government to back away from
some of its announced programs, but de
Gaulle will attempt to hold the line wherever
possible. The basic problem of redressing the
imbalance of payments will only be solved if
internal prices are held in check?a task that
may require the imposition of politically un-
popular price controls. Because the French
economy will become more than ever depend-
ent on foreign trade, business confidence
would be strained by a serious slowdown in
world economic activity. However, the over-
all prospects for the French economy seem
bright, barring a long stalemate in Algeria.
III. THE PROBLEM OF ALGERIA
35. The most unsettling element in France's
immediate future is the Algerian War. Con-
tinuation of the conflict will seriously impair
French chances for attaining the national as-
pirations which de Gaulle has aroused. The
orderly processes of the French Government
will continue to be threatened by strident
nationalists, civilian and military, who might
once again attempt extra-legal action to force
their will on the government. The longer the
conflict lasts the more the .Algerian issue will
complicate France's relations with its Western
allies, with Morocco and Tunisia, and with
the nations of the Afro-Asian bloc. At the
same time, the importance of Algeria to
France has been re-emphasized by the initia-
tion of operations to exploit the apparently
large oil deposits in the Sahara, which almost
all French leaders believe will be of great im-
portance to France's future.
36. In certain respects, an early negotiated
settlement of the Algerian issue has become
more difficult. The position of the colons and
of other rightists, who believe that Algeria
must be integrated with metropolitan France
regardless of the cost, was strengthened by
the intervention of the Army on 13 May 1958
and by the overwhelming victory of the right
in the subsequent elections. The evident
power of the right has discouraged many of
those whose opinions had been evolving to-
wards some sort of accommodation with the
rebels.
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37. De Gaulle has been moving cautiously to
gain the initiative on the Algerian problem.
He has taken steps to consolidate within the
military both responsiveness to civil author-
ity and personal loyalty to himself. He has
assured the military that French troops will
remain in Algeria. He has also transferred
some of the extremist officers to other areas,
thus weakening the association between the
military and the colons. Yet, de Gaulle still
has some unresolved problems. General
Massu, one of the principal leaders of the
military intervention of May 13, and in com-
mand of the military and administrative zone
of Algiers, has recently publicly called for the
attainment of the objectives of the movement
of May 13, including integration. The French
Chief of Staff, General Ely, has recently
toured the Algerian front to reassure officers,
especially the junior officers, concerning de
Gaulle's policies.
38. De Gaulle has been attempting to convince
the Moslems in Algeria that they can now
trust France to fulfill its promises. He has
offered them assurances of political freedom
and increased economic opportunities. He is
now implementing the ambitious Constantine
Plan for economic development. He has at-
tempted to improve relations with Morocco
and Tunisia. By these measures he has
gained the confidence of some Algerian Mos-
lems, who while they dislike and fear the
terrorism of the Front de Liberation Nationale
(FLN) , have found no reason in the past to
trust the French.
39. On the other hand, de Gaulle's program
was set back by the results of the November
Assembly elections. The deputies elected
from Algeria for the most part believe that
Algeria must remain an integral part of
France. The General had hoped that the elec-
tions would produce a group of Moslems rep-
resenting a cross section of the Algerian
public, which would include Moslem national-
ists, and with which he could in all correct-
ness negotiate a settlement. Instead, colon
and military pressure on the one hand and
FLN intimidation and boycott on the other
resulted in the absence of Moslem nationalist
candidates. This has been especially harm-
ful to his effort to develop Moslem leadership
other than that represented by the FLN.
Nevertheless, a second effort is being made in
the April municipal elections. These elections
are being conducted under rules which would
permit the election of Moslem majorities to
almost all municipal councils.
40. While de Gaulle has been groping his
way towards a formula f or an Algerian settle-
ment, the army authorities in Algeria have
been achieving progress in both the military
and the psychological fields. Pacification has
been accomplished in some districts hitherto
considered hopeless. The effectiveness of the
Morice line along the Tunisian border has
severely complicated the rebel supply problem.
Furthermore, Army special services officers
are winning the grudging respect of many
villages and towns where they are at work
bringing agricultural and sanitation tech-
niques to an indigent people. These advances
appear to have convinced many officers that
victory is within their grasp, and consequently
they regard rumors of a compromise settle-
ment with utmost concern. Nevertheless, we
believe it unlikely that the French can pacify
Algeria by military means within the year.
41. The FLN appears confident in its own
ability to replace its casualties with fresh re-
cruits and periodically to intensify its terror-
istic and guerrilla operations. It continues to
hope that ultimately the French people will
tire of the war and insist that peace be made
even if it means loss of Algeria. It counts on
the support of most of the Afro-Asian coun-
tries, and on the growing interest of the Bloc.
The supply of arms from Communist coun-
tries is probably on the rise. The FLN also
talks of a slow evolution of world opinion in
its favor, using as an example, the US absten-
tion on the Algerian resolution in the UN
General Assembly debate in 1958. It con-
tinues to count on support from Morocco and
Tunisia, even though the latter shows occa-
sional irritation over the truculence of Al-
gerians to whom it has given sanctuary.
42. Despite this apparent impasse, both de
Gaulle and the FLN are continuing a cautious
exploration of the limits of each other's posi-
tions, and we believe both are seeking some
means for ending the war.
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43. Prospects for an Algerian settlement. De
Gaulle probably has now established certain
guide lines for resolving the Algerian prob-
lem. We believe he has rejected as acceptable
solutions both (a) full integration of Algeria
into metropolitan France (the announced ob-
jective of the extremist military and the
colons) and (b) full independence (the an-
nounced objective of the FLN and the Provi-
sional Algerian Government (PAG). We be-
lieve his primary aim is to change the status
of Algeria, now comprising special Depart-
ments of France, so as to give it a wide degree
of autonomy within the French Community,
but with guarantees for French interests, and
with no provision for secession. It is not yet
clear whether he will eventually offer such a
plan to the FLN in exchange for a cease-fire,
or whether, even while hostilities continue, he
will attempt to arrange a change in the status
of Algeria with other Moslem leaders.
44. We believe it unlikely that de Gaulle can
negotiate a cease-fire in Algeria during the
next year. Although the FLN, especially its
moderate leadership, is anxious to see an end
to the war, it probably does not believe the
French will permit the Algerians, even under
a semi-autonomous status, to evolve towards
independence by political means. Hence we
believe it unlikely that the FLN will accept
any plan unless it contains at least an implicit
French commitment that the Algerians will
have the right after a specified period of time
to opt for independence. We also believe it
unlikely that de Gaulle will make such a com-
mitment at least during the next year.
45. While it is possible that over a period of
time de Gaulle can rally to his program a
considerable number of war-weary Alge-
rians?including perhaps some moderates
from the FLN?we believe that he is unlikely
to gain sufficient support to jeopardize seri-
ously the ability of the FLN to continue the
rebellion. As it becomes increasingly clear
that de Gaulle is unwilling to commit himself
to ultimate independence for Algeria, the FLN
will almost certainly increase its efforts to ob-
tain assistance from outside sources, includ-
ing the Sino-Soviet Bloc. In these circum-
stances extremist viewpoints within the FLN
will gain the ascendancy and use of terrorism
against those Algerians who are willing to co-
operate with the French program will prob-
ably be stepped-up. We do not believe that
de Gaulle's economic development program,
even if successful, will suffice to counter the
appeal of Algerian nationalism in the long
run.
46. The international implications of an in-
definite continuation of hostilities, even on a
diminished scale, would be serious. Morocco
and Tunisia would probably feel themselves
unable to withdraw their support from the
rebels or their recognition of the PAG. They
would continue to provide sanctuary and
would probably openly permit supplies for
the rebels to transit their territories. In these
circumstances, both countries would feel
themselves constantly exposed to the possi-
bility of reprisals or even French military
intervention. Relations bet ween these coun-
tries and France would deteriorate and the
outstanding differences between them would
be increasingly difficult to resolve.
47. A continuation of the rebellion would also
tend to aggravate relations between France
and its NATO allies. Relations would become
especially acute if all hopes for a negotiated
settlement are lost. In these circumstances
the US in particular would be faced with a
serious policy dilemma. If the US appeared
to give active support to the French, its rela-
tions with the Arab and with other ex-colonial
states would deteriorate and the US base po-
sition in Morocco would be further en-
dangered. Any support given the Algerian
Moslem nationalists, on the other hand, would
severely strain US-French relations and
weaken the NATO structure as a whole. A
new factor would be added if the FLN com-
mits itself openly to obtaining exte:nsive Com-
munist bloc assistance. .f
48. Despite our belief that the PAG is un-
likely to negotiate a cease-fire without at least
an implicit commitment for ultimate inde-
pendence, the possibility that it may do so
cannot be excluded. Perhaps because they
are apprehensive of circumstances developing
as described in paragraph 46, President
Bourguiba of Tunisia and the King of Morocco
are taking new initiatives to end the war,
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There are indications that they are trying to
devise a "North African solution" acceptable
to the PAG, whereby an autonomous French
Algeria would become part of a Maghrebian
confederation. We believe that de Gaulle
could obtain support from the military for
such a plan, and that if such support were
forthcoming, the colons could not success-
fully block its implementation. Even under
such circumstances, however, there would be
continuing difficulties over such complex
issues as the future of the Sahara and the re-
tention of French troops in the three North
African countries.
IV. THE FRENCH COMMUNITY
49. The French claim to great power status
is based in part on France's vast territorial
holdings in Africa. In a move to retain some
position in the area in the face of growing
nationalism, the French gambled by scrap-
ping their colonial controls and substituting a
Community concept. Individual territories
are given virtual autonomy in domestic af-
fairs, but France in effect retains control in
certain important Community-wide fields
such as foreign affairs, defense, and finance.
All territories were given the right to opt for
independence?so far only Guinea has exer-
cised this right. The French will have great
problems with the territories that remain in
the Community as the Africans insist that
matters of Community-wide interest should be
controlled by the entire Community, and not
by the French alone. The French will try
to associate the Africans in the procedure of
policy-making and execution without giving
them power to control the course of ac tion
taken, but such an arrangement will probably
not satisfy the Africans for long. Indeed some
leaders are now talking of enjoying French
aid for a few more years, and then exercising
their rights to sever connections with the
Community.
50. It seems unlikely that a great public
clamor in France will be raised if individual
territories or federations of several of them
opt for independence over the next few years.
Important figures in French public life will
10
certainly seek to stem this movement, and
will probably attempt to use the more pliable
African politicians, such as Houphouet-
Boigny, for their purposes, but they can do
little more than make the process more
awkward.
51. The new constitution also provides that
states may "associate themselves" with the
Community. While the form such a relation-
ship might take was left unclear, it probably
was included to attract formerly dependent
states which had already won their independ-
ence from France, and was not meant to
provide another level to which present mem-
bers of the Community might graduate. If
the French exercise self-restraint in dealings
with the African republics of the Community,
they may be able over time to induce those
states which opt for independence to become
"associates," thereby retaining some sort of
special relationship with France.
V. FRANCE'S POSITION IN THE WEST
52. France under de Gaulle has been review-
ing its basic foreign policies in a drive to real-
ize its claim to great power status. The Gen-
eral is insisting aggressively on recognition
of France as the leading continental and
Mediterranean power within the Western
coalition with a special position in Africa. He
demands equality with the UK in relations
with the US.
53. In Western Europe certain aspects of
these policies put France at odds with the
general trend toward unity of action and
integration. Indeed, de Gaulle does not con-
ceal his scepticism concerning supra-national
institutions. Premier Debr?nd many other
prominent Gaullists are openly contemptuous
of European integration theories, and describe
themselves as jealous guardians of an unen-
cumbered national sovereignty. On the other
hand, France has honored all the obligations
to the E.E.C. and EURATOM which had been
entered into by the Fourth Republic. Never-
theless, the present government would be un-
likely to accept any further surrender of na-
tional sovereignty.
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25X6
NATO
56. De Gaulle apparently believes that NATO
should be reorganized to emphasize co-opera-
tion between national military establishments
rather than integrated forces. De Gaulle has
refused to accept installation of IRBM's in
France unless the French have control of the
warheads. He has objected to proposals for
joint financing of such installations in Italy,
and has refused to integrate the existing
French air defense into a NATO command sys-
tem. Most recently France has announced
its decision to remove the Mediterranean fleet
from its NATO commitment. At the same
time he is attempting to secure more com-
mand positions for France in NATO.
57. De Gaulle has continued to stress his de-
mand for equal status for France with the US
and the UK in the councils of the West. He
believes France must play a major role in de-
veloping Western strategy not only for the
NATO area, but elsewhere, such as in the Near
and Far East. He, apparently, also sees the
Algerian War as the test of alliance solidarity,
and is attempting by all means to gain the
support of his NATO partners for French
policies in Algeria. For these purposes he
may seek to have the NATO defense commit-
ment extended as far south as the Sahara, or
he may propose the creation of some sort of
Mediterranean pact through which he would
hope to associate other Western nations, in-
cluding the US, with French interests in North
and West Africa. It is unlikely that the West
has heard the last of de Gaulle's demands, or
that he will scale them down significantly.
Accordingly it is almost certain that France
under de Gaulle will prove an independent and
stubborn ally. Nevertheless we believe that
France will remain basically committed to the
Western Alliance.
58. French Nuclear Policy. The French may
press their claims for equal treatment with
the UK and the US in the Western Alliance
more insistently when they have successfully
tested a nuclear device, which could be as
early as mid-1959. At the moment France un-
doubtedly regards the explosion of at least
one fission weapon as a strong political gam-
bit to justify its claim to great power status.
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We believe that a successful nuclear test will
be only a first step in developing a broader
nuclear program, and France has asked the
US and UK for assistance in this program.
France is unlikely to accede to any agree-
ment limiting nuclear tests at least until after
testing a few French weapons.2
Relations with Morocco and Tunisia
59. Most Moroccans and Tunisians had mis-
givings regarding the role of the French mili-
tary and rightist elements in bringing about
the events of May 13. Nevertheless the King
of Morocco, Mohamed V, and President Bour-
guiba of Tunisia have clung to the hope that
de Gaulle would act to resolve the Algerian
question on terms acceptable to the FLN.
This hope was fortified by the comparatively
restrained French reaction to Moroccan and
Tunisian recognition of the PAG in September
1958. However, the failure of de Gaulle to
present proposals acceptable to the FLN, and
the intensification of the French military
effort have led to renewed pessimism. In
Tunisia, recurrent border incidents and pres-
sure from the FLN has led Bourguiba to re-
iterate his demand that the French evacuate
Bizerte. While protesting his solidarity with
the Algerians, he clearly fears them?perhaps
at times more than he does the French. In
Morocco, the King has publicly sought to de-
velop close relations with France (ostensibly
in order to advocate the Algerian cause) and
France has renewed its financial and military
assistance to the King's forces. However, re-
lations between the French and the Ibrahim
government are not particularly cordial.
60. In both Morocco and Tunisia the principal
obstacle to improved relations with France is
the continuation of the Algerian revolt. The
French will resist evacuation of their troops
from both countries as long as the rebellion
continues. Algerian rebels taking sanctuary
in Tunisia and Morocco will continue to be
a source of friction between France and the
For a discussion of French capabilities and of
possible joint European efforts for nuclear
weapon production see NIE 100-2-58, "Develop-
ment of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Coun-
tries: Likelihood and Consequences," dated 1
July 1958.
Moroccan and Tunisian Governments. At
the same time the Algerians will probably
become more insistent that Morocco and
Tunisia co-operate fully in furthering the
Algerian War effort. In these circumstances
the governments of Morocco and Tunisia will
increasingly be forced to identify themselves
with the popular cause of Algerian independ-
ence, or be overthrown by extreme national-
ists.
VI. PROSPECTS FOR FRANCE
61. We believe de Gaulle will remain in power
for at least the next two years, even if the
Algerian War is not ended. But whether de
Gaulle will be able to make progress toward
fulfillment of his aspirations for France or
whether the country will be faced with po-
litical and economic deterioration depends in
large measure on the course of the Algerian
War.
62. If de Gaulle should be successful in end-
ing the war in Algeria, France would expe-
rience a major psychological lift. De Gaulle
would have demonstrated his authority over
the extremists and the military, and would
be relatively free to deal with France's other
problems within the framework of parlia-
mentary government. The ending of the eco-
nomic drain of the war would assist de
Gaulle's efforts to achieve financial stability
in France. French relations with Morocco
and Tunisia would be greatly improved as
would the prospects for the development of
favorable relations with the African terri-
tories. Furthermore, an end to the war would
remove an irritant from French relations with
the US 25X6
63. If, however, the Algerian War drags on
and it becomes clear that there are no pros-
pects for an early settlement, conditions with-
in France would begin to deteriorate. The
costs of the war would be likely to rise. Public
confidence would decline and the recent inflow
of capital would be reversed, again threaten-
ing the stability of the franc. Labor would
become more restive and serious strikes would
probably occur. The UNR would probably
begin to split and the opposition parlia-
mentary groups would increase their attacks
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on the government. However, we do not be-
lieve that even in these circumstances the
center groups?with or without Socialist sup-
port?would be able to form a coalition with
sufficient strength to challenge successfully
the rightist majority. Nor could the weak-
ened left offer an effective opposition to the
regime, even in the unlikely event of the So-
cialists joining the Communists in a united
front. The General's prestige would decline
and his ability to withstand the demands of
the extreme right would progressively weaken.
64. In such a situation of political deteriora-
tion, there would probably be an increased
use of authoritarian methods by the govern-
ment, and a weakening of parliamentary in-
stitutions. If de Gaulle were still in power,
he would probably be forced to resort to his
decree power in order to withstand pressures
from the extreme right. If de Gaulle passed
from the scene in these circumstances, his
government would probably be succeeded by
an authoritarian regime led by rightists and
supported by the military.
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