VALIDITY STUDY OF NIE 22-25 PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE, PUBLISHED 29 MARCH 1955

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61-00549R000300010006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: July 11, 1965
• Content Type: STUDY

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I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 22-55:
Probable Developments in France,
published 29 March 1955
The,attached validity study of NIE 22-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in France, " published 29 March 1955, was noted by the IAC
on 10 July 1956 (IAC-M-246, 10 July, item 5 c).
25X1A
Secretary
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11 July 1956
Validity Study of NIE 22-55:
Probable Developments in France,
published 29 March 1955
NIE 22-55 proved invalid in these respects:
a. The estimate failed to appreciate the divisive
forces among the moderate parties that caused them to
split into center-left and center-right alignments in the
1956 elections. This in large measure was responsible
for the 50 percent increase in Communist seats in the
new Assembly, even though the same electoral law applied
in 1956 as in 195.1 and the popular vote for the Communists
was, as estimated, almost the same as in 1951. (See
paras. 2, 25, and 21 with footnote. )
b. The impression given by the estimate was that
the Communists would remain in a greater degree of
political isolation than has in fact proved to be the case.
(Paras. 4, 30)
C. As was also the case in earlier estimates, NIE
22-55 has thus far proved distinctly pessimistic on the
prospects for French economic growth. Thus, it was
estimated in paragraph 38 that ". . . French economic
growth over the next four years is likely to be about equal
to that in 1950-1954. . . GNP is likely to rise by almost
three percent annually, and industrial production may in-
crease by almost four percent. . . . " Actually, GNP
increased in 1955 by 6. 3 percent while industrial production
increased by 10 percent. Although the 1956 rate of increase
is not likely to be as high as the 1955 rate, it will probably
substantially exceed the average annual figures given in
NIE 22-55.
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d. The estimate was overly pessimistic regarding
the outlook for French support of further supranational
European institutions. (Paras. 62- 63)
e. NIE 22-55 overestimated the determination of
the French to remain in Tunisia and Morocco and to use
force in order to retain privileges. (Para. 66)
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